10 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1975–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Merritt v. Dardengreen2 sentences2018See Merritt v. Darden , 227 Md. 589 , 596-97, 176 A.2d 205 (1962). 2018See Merritt v. Darden , 227 Md. 589 , 596-97, 176 A.2d 205 (1962). | 1 | 1 |
Lowery v. Smithsburg Emergency Medical Servicegreen2 sentences2014See Lowery v. Smithsburg Emergency Medical Service, 173 Md.App. 662, 683 , 920 A.2d 546 (2007) (In reviewing the grant of a motion for judgment, "[t]he Court assumes the truth of all credible evidence on the issue and any inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to ... the nonmoving parties. 2014See Lowery v. Smithsburg Emergency Medical Service, 173 Md.App. 662, 683 , 920 A.2d 546 (2007) (In reviewing the grant of a motion for judgment, "[t]he Court assumes the truth of all credible evidence on the issue and any inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to ... the nonmoving parties. | 1 | 1 |
Matter of Evansgreen2 sentences2010The proper distinction is between a judicial determination derived from evidence and lengthy proceedings before the court, and a determination not so founded upon facts brought forth in court, but based on attitudes and conceptions that have their origins in sources beyond the four corners of the courtroom.” Id. at 355-56 , 558 A.2d 733 (quoting In re Evans, 411 A.2d 984, 995 (D.C.App.1980)) Applying this principle to the circumstances in Doering , the Court remarked that it saw “nothing in th[e] record to suggest that Judge Fader [had] received any information other than that which was proper 2010The proper distinction is between a judicial determination derived from evidence and lengthy proceedings before the court, and a determination not so founded upon facts brought forth in court, but based on attitudes and conceptions that have their origins in sources beyond the four corners of the courtroom.” Id. at 355-56 , 558 A.2d 733 (quoting In re Evans, 411 A.2d 984, 995 (D.C.App.1980)) Applying this principle to the circumstances in Doering , the Court remarked that it saw “nothing in th[e] record to suggest that Judge Fader [had] received any information other than that which was proper | 1 | 1 |
Cooper v. Saccogreen2 sentences2008See Cooper v. Sacco, 357 Md. 622 , 638 n. 4, 745 A.2d 1074 , 1082 n. 4 (explaining that the earlier formulation of the rule did not mean a lack of appellate jurisdiction, but “inferred” that obtaining an appellate reversal of such a ruling was “difficult”). 2008See Cooper v. Sacco, 357 Md. 622 , 638 n. 4, 745 A.2d 1074 , 1082 n. 4 (explaining that the earlier formulation of the rule did not mean a lack of appellate jurisdiction, but “inferred” that obtaining an appellate reversal of such a ruling was “difficult”). | 1 | 1 |
Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobiagreen2 sentences1996See Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 478-86 , 601 A.2d 633, 661-65 (1992) (Bell, J. concurring and dissenting). 1996See Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 478-86 , 601 A.2d 633, 661-65 (1992) (Bell, J. concurring and dissenting). | 1 | 1 |
Creaser v. Owensgreen2 sentences1991See Creaser v. Owens, 267 Md. 238, 239-40 , 297 A.2d 235 (1972). 1991See Creaser v. Owens, 267 Md. 238, 239-40 , 297 A.2d 235 (1972). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Federal Facilities Realty Trustgreen2 sentences1989The proper distinction is "between a judicial determination derived from evidence and lengthy proceedings before the court, and a determination not so founded upon facts brought forth in court, but based on attitudes and conceptions that have their origins in sources beyond the four corners of the courtroom." In re Federal Facilities Realty Trust Co., 140 F. Supp. 522, 526 (N.D.Ill. 1956). 1989The proper distinction is “between a judicial determination derived from evidence and lengthy proceedings before the court, and a determination not so founded upon facts brought forth in court, but based on attitudes and conceptions that have their origins in sources beyond the four corners of the courtroom.” In re Federal Facilities Realty Trust Co., 140 F.Supp. 522, 526 (N.D.Ill.1956). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Birreuta
green
2 sentences2011Finally, the defendant urges this court to follow People v. Birreuta, 162 Cal.App.3d 454 , 208 Cal.Rptr. 635 (1984), in which the California Appellate Court for the fifth district held that if a defendant kills both an intended and an unintended victim, the doctrine of transferred intent may not be applied to make the unintended killing a murder. 2011Finally, the defendant urges this court to follow People v. Birreuta, 162 Cal.App.3d 454 , 208 Cal.Rptr. 635 (1984), in which the California Appellate Court for the fifth district held that if a defendant kills both an intended and an unintended victim, the doctrine of transferred intent may not be applied to make the unintended killing a murder. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Doering v. Fader
green
2 sentences2010The proper distinction is between a judicial determination derived from evidence and lengthy proceedings before the court, and a determination not so founded upon facts brought forth in court, but based on attitudes and conceptions that have their origins in sources beyond the four corners of the courtroom.” Id. at 355-56 , 558 A.2d 733 (quoting In re Evans, 411 A.2d 984, 995 (D.C.App.1980)) Applying this principle to the circumstances in Doering , the Court remarked that it saw “nothing in th[e] record to suggest that Judge Fader [had] received any information other than that which was proper 2010The proper distinction is between a judicial determination derived from evidence and lengthy proceedings before the court, and a determination not so founded upon facts brought forth in court, but based on attitudes and conceptions that have their origins in sources beyond the four corners of the courtroom.” Id. at 355-56 , 558 A.2d 733 (quoting In re Evans, 411 A.2d 984, 995 (D.C.App.1980)) Applying this principle to the circumstances in Doering , the Court remarked that it saw “nothing in th[e] record to suggest that Judge Fader [had] received any information other than that which was proper | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Sinn v. Burd
green
1 sentence1980As to the formulation of a rule recognizing an independent cause of action for the negligent infliction of emotional distress even absent physical injury, see Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Haw. 398 , 520 P.2d 758 (1974); Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc., 269 A.2d 117 (Me. 1970); Sinn v. Burd, Pa., 404 A.2d 672 (1979). 5 . | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc.
green
1 sentence1980As to the formulation of a rule recognizing an independent cause of action for the negligent infliction of emotional distress even absent physical injury, see Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Haw. 398 , 520 P.2d 758 (1974); Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc., 269 A.2d 117 (Me. 1970); Sinn v. Burd, Pa., 404 A.2d 672 (1979). 5 . | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Leong Ex Rel. Petagno v. Takasaki
green
2 sentences1980As to the formulation of a rule recognizing an independent cause of action for the negligent infliction of emotional distress even absent physical injury, see Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Haw. 398 , 520 P.2d 758 (1974); Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc., 269 A.2d 117 (Me. 1970); Sinn v. Burd, Pa., 404 A.2d 672 (1979). 5 . 1980As to the formulation of a rule recognizing an independent cause of action for the negligent infliction of emotional distress even absent physical injury, see Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Haw. 398 , 520 P.2d 758 (1974); Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc., 269 A.2d 117 (Me. 1970); Sinn v. Burd, Pa., 404 A.2d 672 (1979). 5 . | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Raitt v. Johns Hopkins Hospital
green
2 sentences1975Recently, in Raitt v. Johns Hopkins Hospital, 274 Md. 489, 499-500 , 336 A. 2d 90 (1975), where we held that an expert medical witness need not necessarily reside or practice in the defendant’s community to testify as to the applicable standard of care in a medical malpractice case, we intimated that despite the plethora of reported medical malpractice decisions in Maryland, this Court actually had never been confronted with the need to adopt a standard of care from among the three we have mentioned. 1975Recently, in Raitt v. Johns Hopkins Hospital, 274 Md. 489, 499-500 , 336 A. 2d 90 (1975), where we held that an expert medical witness need not necessarily reside or practice in the defendant’s community to testify as to the applicable standard of care in a medical malpractice case, we intimated that despite the plethora of reported medical malpractice decisions in Maryland, this Court actually had never been confronted with the need to adopt a standard of care from among the three we have mentioned. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.