formulation standard in Alaska

2022Rather, this formulation is the standard that an appellate court employs when a litigant challenges a trial judge’s denial of a 16 Hunter, 364 P.3d at 448-49 . 17 Howell v. State, 917 P.2d 1202, 1212 (Alaska App. 1996) (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Amidon v. State, 565 P.2d 1248 , 1262 n.44 (Alaska 1977)). 18 White v. State, 298 P.3d 884, 885-86 (Alaska App. 2013). –7– 2718 request for a new trial (on the ground that the jury’s verdict is against the weight of the evidence).[19] However, although we recognized the problem with the “any evidentiary basis” appellate standard in W

2022Rather, this formulation is the standard that an appellate court employs when a litigant challenges a trial judge’s denial of a 16 Hunter, 364 P.3d at 448-49 . 17 Howell v. State, 917 P.2d 1202, 1212 (Alaska App. 1996) (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Amidon v. State, 565 P.2d 1248 , 1262 n.44 (Alaska 1977)). 18 White v. State, 298 P.3d 884, 885-86 (Alaska App. 2013). –7– 2718 request for a new trial (on the ground that the jury’s verdict is against the weight of the evidence).[19] However, although we recognized the problem with the “any evidentiary basis” appellate standard in W

2022Rather, this formulation is the standard that an appellate court employs when a litigant challenges a trial judge’s denial of a 16 Hunter, 364 P.3d at 448-49 . 17 Howell v. State, 917 P.2d 1202, 1212 (Alaska App. 1996) (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Amidon v. State, 565 P.2d 1248 , 1262 n.44 (Alaska 1977)). 18 White v. State, 298 P.3d 884, 885-86 (Alaska App. 2013). –7– 2718 request for a new trial (on the ground that the jury’s verdict is against the weight of the evidence).[19] However, although we recognized the problem with the “any evidentiary basis” appellate standard in W

2022Rather, this formulation is the standard that an appellate court employs when a litigant challenges a trial judge’s denial of a 16 Hunter, 364 P.3d at 448-49 . 17 Howell v. State, 917 P.2d 1202, 1212 (Alaska App. 1996) (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Amidon v. State, 565 P.2d 1248 , 1262 n.44 (Alaska 1977)). 18 White v. State, 298 P.3d 884, 885-86 (Alaska App. 2013). –7– 2718 request for a new trial (on the ground that the jury’s verdict is against the weight of the evidence).[19] However, although we recognized the problem with the “any evidentiary basis” appellate standard in W

2021See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 (emphasizing that judicial review (continued...) – 20 – 2691 Thus, in the current case, we are required to resolve all the conflicts in favor of the verdict and assume that the jury rejected almost all of the eyewitness testimony as unreliable.

1995This formulation of the test traces its origin to Judge Friendly’s opinion in United States v. Burke, 517 F.2d 377, 386-87 (2nd Cir.1975).

1992The formulation of the standard in Texas v. Brown seems particularly compatible with the notion of immediate apparency that this court recently addressed in Brown v. State, 809 P.2d 421, 423-24 (Alaska App.1991), and that the Alaska Supreme Court addressed in Reeves v. State, 599 P.2d 727, 728-40 (Alaska 1979).

1992The formulation of the standard in Texas v. Brown seems particularly compatible with the notion of immediate apparency that this court recently addressed in Brown v. State, 809 P.2d 421, 423-24 (Alaska App. 1991), and that the Alaska Supreme Court addressed in Reeves v. State, 599 P.2d 727, 728-40 (Alaska 1979).

1992The formulation of the standard in Texas v. Brown seems particularly compatible with the notion of immediate apparency that this court recently addressed in Brown v. State, 809 P.2d 421, 423-24 (Alaska App.1991), and that the Alaska Supreme Court addressed in Reeves v. State, 599 P.2d 727, 728-40 (Alaska 1979).

1992The formulation of the standard in Texas v. Brown seems particularly compatible with the notion of immediate apparency that this court recently addressed in Brown v. State, 809 P.2d 421, 423-24 (Alaska App. 1991), and that the Alaska Supreme Court addressed in Reeves v. State, 599 P.2d 727, 728-40 (Alaska 1979).

1982Of the various alternatives, the one that we believe most appropriate for our own jurisdiction is the so-called “discovery rule.” According to the best formulation of that rule, the statute of limitations for legal malpractice does not begin to run until the client discovers, or reasonably should discover, the existence of all the elements of his cause of action. 3 See Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 491 P.2d *830 421, 422 (Cal.1971); Budd v. Nixen, 491 P.2d 433 (Cal.1971); Raymond v. EH Lilly & Co., 117 N.H. 164 , 371 A.2d 170, 174 (1977).

1982Of the various alternatives, the one that we believe most appropriate for our own jurisdiction is the so-called “discovery rule.” According to the best formulation of that rule, the statute of limitations for legal malpractice does not begin to run until the client discovers, or reasonably should discover, the existence of all the elements of his cause of action. 3 See Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 491 P.2d *830 421, 422 (Cal.1971); Budd v. Nixen, 491 P.2d 433 (Cal.1971); Raymond v. EH Lilly & Co., 117 N.H. 164 , 371 A.2d 170, 174 (1977).

1980See Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 , 95 S.Ct. 1191 , 43 L.Ed.2d 530 (1975), and Travis v. Yale & Towne Manufacturing Co., 252 U.S. 60 , 40 S.Ct. 228 , 64 L.Ed. 460 (1920).

1980See Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 , 95 S.Ct. 1191 , 43 L.Ed.2d 530 (1975), and Travis v. Yale & Towne Manufacturing Co., 252 U.S. 60 , 40 S.Ct. 228 , 64 L.Ed. 460 (1920).

1980See Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 , 95 S.Ct. 1191 , 43 L.Ed.2d 530 (1975), and Travis v. Yale & Towne Manufacturing Co., 252 U.S. 60 , 40 S.Ct. 228 , 64 L.Ed. 460 (1920).

1980See Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 , 95 S.Ct. 1191 , 43 L.Ed.2d 530 (1975), and Travis v. Yale & Towne Manufacturing Co., 252 U.S. 60 , 40 S.Ct. 228 , 64 L.Ed. 460 (1920).