121 California opinions name it 4 courts 1945–2026 14 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn.green2 sentences2021The line between rules that “apply generally, rather than in a specific case” (Tidewater, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 571 ) reflects the distinction between the “adjudicatory determinations of an administrative agency [and the] . . . actions undertaken by such an agency in its legislative capacity.” (Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28, 34, fn. 2 ; see Tidewater, at pp. 571, 573–575.) 8 “Generally speaking, a legislative action is the formulation of a rule to be applied in all future cases, while an adjudicatory act involves the actual application of such a 2014Challenge of an agency’s action or decision via proceeding for a writ of administrative mandamus is available if the decision was “made as a result of a proceeding in which by law a hearing is required to be given . . . .” (§ 1094.5, subd. (a); accord, Keeler v. Superior Court (1956) 46 Cal.2d 596, 599 [ 297 P.2d 967 ].) In general, “quasi-legislative acts are reviewed by ordinary mandate and quasi-judicial acts are reviewed by administrative mandate.” (Bunnett, supra, at p. 848 ; see Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28, 34, fn. 2 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 805 , 5 | 18 | 24 |
Wulzen v. Bd. of Supervisors of City & Cty of San Franciscogreen2 sentences1988(Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28, 34, fn. 2 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 805 , 520 P.2d 29 ]; Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 140-144 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 234 , 481 P.2d 242 ].) “Generally speaking, a legislative action is the formulation of a rule to be applied to all future cases, while an adjudicatory act involves the actual application of such a rule to a specific set of existing facts.” (Strum- *737 sky, supra, at p. 35, fn. 2 , citing Wulzen v. Board of Supervisors (1894) 101 Cal. 15, 24 [ 35 P. 353 ], and Smith v. Strother (1885) 68 Cal. 194, 196-198 [ 8 P. 1988(Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28, 34, fn. 2 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 805 , 520 P.2d 29 ]; Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 140-144 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 234 , 481 P.2d 242 ].) “Generally speaking, a legislative action is the formulation of a rule to be applied to all future cases, while an adjudicatory act involves the actual application of such a rule to a specific set of existing facts.” (Strum- *737 sky, supra, at p. 35, fn. 2 , citing Wulzen v. Board of Supervisors (1894) 101 Cal. 15, 24 [ 35 P. 353 ], and Smith v. Strother (1885) 68 Cal. 194, 196-198 [ 8 P. | 4 | 5 |
Ramirez v. Plough, Inc.green2 sentences2023While the formulation of the standard of care is a question of law for the court, the question of breach is a question of fact for the jury “if reasonable minds might differ as to whether the defendant’s conduct has conformed to the standard.” (Ramirez v. Plough, Inc., supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 546 .) On the issue of compliance with the relevant standards, Avrit’s conclusions differed from Iler’s, and summary judgment cannot be granted if it involves “choosing between competing expert opinions.” (Garrett v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 173, 186 .) Avrit stated without objectio 2022A “The formulation of the standard of care is a question of law for the court. [Citations.] Once the court has formulated the standard, its application to the facts of the case is a task for the trier of fact if reasonable minds might differ as to whether the defendant’s conduct has conformed to the standard. [Citations.] [¶] In most cases, courts have fixed no standard of care for tort liability more precise than that of a reasonably prudent person under like circumstances. [Citations.] ‘But the proper conduct of a reasonable person under particular situations may become settled by judicial d | 3 | 7 |
McGill v. Regents of University of Californiagreen2 sentences2022Proc.,] § 1094.5).” (Id. at p. 1400.) Typically, “[t]he applicable type of mandate is determined by the nature of the administrative action or decision. [Citation.] Usually, quasi-legislative acts are reviewed by ordinary mandate and quasi-judicial acts are reviewed by administrative mandate. [Citation.] [¶] ‘Generally speaking a legislative action is the formulation of a rule to be applied to all future cases, while an adjudicatory act involves the actual application of such a rule to a specific set of existing facts.’ ” (McGill v. Regents of University of California (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 177 2020Quasi-legislative acts involve the adoption of rules of general application on the basis of broad public policy, while quasi-judicial acts involve the determination and application of facts peculiar to an individual case.” (Beck Development Co. v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1188 .) “‘Generally speaking, a legislative action is the formulation of a rule to be applied to all future cases, while an adjudicatory act involves the actual application of such a rule to a specific set of existing facts.’” (Major v. Memorial Hospitals Assn. (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1380 | 3 | 5 |
Silberg v. Andersongreen2 sentences2018The litigation privilege The litigation privilege "precludes liability arising from a publication or broadcast made in a judicial proceeding or other official proceeding." ( Fremont Reorganizing Corp. v. Faigin (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1153 , 1172, 131 Cal.Rptr.3d 478 .) Under the usual formulation of the privilege, it applies "to any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that have some connection or logical relation to the action." ( Silberg v. Anderson (19 2018The litigation privilege The litigation privilege "precludes liability arising from a publication or broadcast made in a judicial proceeding or other official proceeding." ( Fremont Reorganizing Corp. v. Faigin (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1153 , 1172, 131 Cal.Rptr.3d 478 .) Under the usual formulation of the privilege, it applies "to any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that have some connection or logical relation to the action." ( Silberg v. Anderson (19 | 3 | 5 |
Dominey v. Department of Personnel Administrationgreen2 sentences2020Proc., § 1085) under the arbitrary and capricious standard . . . .” (Dominey, supra, 205 Cal.App.3d at p. 736 .) “Whether an administrative action is quasi-legislative or quasi-adjudicative is a question of law.” (Dominey, supra, 205 Cal.App.3d at p. 737, fn. 4 .) “ ‘Generally speaking, a legislative action is the formulation of a rule to be applied to all future cases, while an adjudicatory act involves the actual application of such a rule to a specific set of existing facts.’ [Citations.]” (Id. at pp. 736-737.) In determining the matter, we must consider “only the function performed” by the 2020Proc., § 1085) under the arbitrary and capricious standard . . . .” (Dominey, supra, 205 Cal.App.3d at p. 736 .) “Whether an administrative action is quasi-legislative or quasi-adjudicative is a question of law.” (Dominey, supra, 205 Cal.App.3d at p. 737, fn. 4 .) “ ‘Generally speaking, a legislative action is the formulation of a rule to be applied to all future cases, while an adjudicatory act involves the actual application of such a rule to a specific set of existing facts.’ [Citations.]” (Id. at pp. 736-737.) In determining the matter, we must consider “only the function performed” by the | 3 | 3 |
Sinking-Fund Casesgreen2 sentences1983“Generally speaking, a legislative [act] is the formulation of a rule to be applied to all future cases, while an adjudicatory act involves the actual application of such a rule to a specific set of existing facts. [Citations.]” (Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28, 35, fn. 2 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 805 , 520 P.2d 29 ]; see also Quinchard v. Board of Trustees (1896) 113 Cal. 664, 670 [ 45 P. 856 ]; Santa Ana Tustin Community Hospital v. Board of Supervisors (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 644, 650 [ 179 Cal.Rptr. 620 ].) The distinction between legislative and adjudicator 1983“Generally speaking, a legislative [act] is the formulation of a rule to be applied to all future cases, while an adjudicatory act involves the actual application of such a rule to a specific set of existing facts. [Citations.]” (Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28, 35, fn. 2 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 805 , 520 P.2d 29 ]; see also Quinchard v. Board of Trustees (1896) 113 Cal. 664, 670 [ 45 P. 856 ]; Santa Ana Tustin Community Hospital v. Board of Supervisors (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 644, 650 [ 179 Cal.Rptr. 620 ].) The distinction between legislative and adjudicator | 3 | 3 |
Quinchard v. Board of Trusteesgreen2 sentences1983“Generally speaking, a legislative [act] is the formulation of a rule to be applied to all future cases, while an adjudicatory act involves the actual application of such a rule to a specific set of existing facts. [Citations.]” (Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28, 35, fn. 2 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 805 , 520 P.2d 29 ]; see also Quinchard v. Board of Trustees (1896) 113 Cal. 664, 670 [ 45 P. 856 ]; Santa Ana Tustin Community Hospital v. Board of Supervisors (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 644, 650 [ 179 Cal.Rptr. 620 ].) The distinction between legislative and adjudicator 1983“Generally speaking, a legislative [act] is the formulation of a rule to be applied to all future cases, while an adjudicatory act involves the actual application of such a rule to a specific set of existing facts. [Citations.]” (Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28, 35, fn. 2 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 805 , 520 P.2d 29 ]; see also Quinchard v. Board of Trustees (1896) 113 Cal. 664, 670 [ 45 P. 856 ]; Santa Ana Tustin Community Hospital v. Board of Supervisors (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 644, 650 [ 179 Cal.Rptr. 620 ].) The distinction between legislative and adjudicator | 3 | 3 |
Lewin v. St. Joseph Hospital of Orangegreen2 sentences2020Quasi-legislative acts involve the adoption of rules of general application on the basis of broad public policy, while quasi-judicial acts involve the determination and application of facts peculiar to an individual case.” (Beck Development Co. v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1188 .) “‘Generally speaking, a legislative action is the formulation of a rule to be applied to all future cases, while an adjudicatory act involves the actual application of such a rule to a specific set of existing facts.’” (Major v. Memorial Hospitals Assn. (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1380 2020Quasi-legislative acts involve the adoption of rules of general application on the basis of broad public policy, while quasi-judicial acts involve the determination and application of facts peculiar to an individual case.” (Beck Development Co. v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1188 .) “‘Generally speaking, a legislative action is the formulation of a rule to be applied to all future cases, while an adjudicatory act involves the actual application of such a rule to a specific set of existing facts.’” (Major v. Memorial Hospitals Assn. (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1380 | 2 | 6 |
Patterson v. Central Coast Regional Commissiongreen2 sentences2026Typical land-use project approvals—separate from a general plan adoption or amendment—are not legislative, but are instead adjudicatory or quasi-adjudicatory: “The well-settled functional distinction between [legislative and adjudicatory decisions] is set out in Patterson v. Central Coast Regional Com. (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 833 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 169 ]. ‘ “Generally speaking, a legislative action is the formulation of a rule to be applied to all future cases, while an adjudicatory act involves the actual application of such a rule to a specific set of existing facts.” . . . 2026Typical land-use project approvals—separate from a general plan adoption or amendment—are not legislative, but are instead adjudicatory or quasi-adjudicatory: “The well-settled functional distinction between [legislative and adjudicatory decisions] is set out in Patterson v. Central Coast Regional Com. (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 833 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 169 ]. ‘ “Generally speaking, a legislative action is the formulation of a rule to be applied to all future cases, while an adjudicatory act involves the actual application of such a rule to a specific set of existing facts.” . . . | 2 | 5 |
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.green2 sentences1993The policy considerations underlying this suggestion were that the manufacturer, unlike the public, can anticipate or guard against the recurrence of hazards, that the cost of injury may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured whereas the manufacturer can insure against the risk and distribute the costs among the consuming public, and that it is in the public interest to discourage the marketing of defective products. [The California Supreme Court] unanimously adopted Justice Traynor’s concept in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 57, 62 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 697 , 377 1993The policy considerations underlying this suggestion were that the manufacturer, unlike the public, can anticipate or guard against the recurrence of hazards, that the cost of injury may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured whereas the manufacturer can insure against the risk and distribute the costs among the consuming public, and that it is in the public interest to discourage the marketing of defective products. [The California Supreme Court] unanimously adopted Justice Traynor’s concept in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 57, 62 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 697 , 377 | 2 | 4 |
Pitts v. Perlussgreen2 sentences1983“Generally speaking, a legislative [act] is the formulation of a rule to be applied to all future cases, while an adjudicatory act involves the actual application of such a rule to a specific set of existing facts. [Citations.]” (Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28, 35, fn. 2 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 805 , 520 P.2d 29 ]; see also Quinchard v. Board of Trustees (1896) 113 Cal. 664, 670 [ 45 P. 856 ]; Santa Ana Tustin Community Hospital v. Board of Supervisors (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 644, 650 [ 179 Cal.Rptr. 620 ].) The distinction between legislative and adjudicator 1983“Generally speaking, a legislative [act] is the formulation of a rule to be applied to all future cases, while an adjudicatory act involves the actual application of such a rule to a specific set of existing facts. [Citations.]” (Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28, 35, fn. 2 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 805 , 520 P.2d 29 ]; see also Quinchard v. Board of Trustees (1896) 113 Cal. 664, 670 [ 45 P. 856 ]; Santa Ana Tustin Community Hospital v. Board of Supervisors (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 644, 650 [ 179 Cal.Rptr. 620 ].) The distinction between legislative and adjudicator | 2 | 3 |
Action Apartment Ass'n v. City of Santa Monicagreen2 sentences2018The litigation privilege The litigation privilege "precludes liability arising from a publication or broadcast made in a judicial proceeding or other official proceeding." ( Fremont Reorganizing Corp. v. Faigin (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1153 , 1172, 131 Cal.Rptr.3d 478 .) Under the usual formulation of the privilege, it applies "to any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that have some connection or logical relation to the action." ( Silberg v. Anderson (19 2018The litigation privilege The litigation privilege "precludes liability arising from a publication or broadcast made in a judicial proceeding or other official proceeding." ( Fremont Reorganizing Corp. v. Faigin (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1153 , 1172, 131 Cal.Rptr.3d 478 .) Under the usual formulation of the privilege, it applies "to any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that have some connection or logical relation to the action." ( Silberg v. Anderson (19 | 2 | 3 |
Bunnett v. Regents of University of Californiagreen2 sentences2009(Id. at p. 849.) But in traditional mandamus under section 1085, which is the appropriate method of obtaining judicial review of an agency decision when these conditions are absent, the judicial inquiry is limited to whether the decision was arbitrary, capricious, or entirely lacking in evidentiary support. ( 35 Cal.App.4th at p. 849 .) Quasi-legislative acts, which are the formulation of a rule to be applied to future cases, are generally reviewed by ordinary mandamus while quasi-judicial acts, which involve the application of a rule to a specific set of facts, are generally reviewed by admin 2007“Judicial review of most public agency decisions is obtained by a proceeding for a writ of ordinary or administrative mandate. [Citation.] The applicable type of mandate is determined by the nature of the administrative action or decision. [Citation.] Usually, quasiTlegislative acts are reviewed by ordinary mandate and quasi-judicial acts are reviewed by administrative mandate. [Citation.] [][] ‘Generally speaking, a legislative ■ action is the formulation of a rule to be applied to all future cases, while an adjudicatory act involves the actual application of such a rule to a specific set of | 2 | 3 |
Pacific Legal Foundation v. California Coastal Commissiongreen2 sentences2025(Pacific Legal Foundation v. California Coastal Com. (1982) 33 Cal.3d 158, 168-169 [adoption of guidelines interpreting coastal access provisions constituted quasi-legislative agency action because guidelines governed future permit decisions rather than the application of the rules to a particular case . . . ]; Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. City of Turlock (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 273, 299-300 [traditional mandate [is] the proper vehicle to challenge constitutionality of city’s zoning ordinance][, disapproved on another ground in Hernandez v. City of Hanford (2007) 41 Cal.4th 279, 297 ].) A petition 2008(Pacific Legal Foundation v. California Coastal Com. (1982) 33 Cal.3d 158, 168-169 [ 188 Cal.Rptr. 104 , 655 P.2d 306 ] [adoption of guidelines interpreting coastal access provisions constituted quasi-legislative agency action because guidelines governed future permit decisions rather than the application of the rules to a particular case and thus were reviewed under Code Civ. | 2 | 2 |
T-Mobile West LLC v. City and County of S.F.green2 sentences2023It is also the subject of some uncertainty.” (Today’s Fresh Start, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Office of Education (2013) 57 Cal.4th 197, 218 .) In the stricter formulation of the standard, “legislation is invalid only if it presents a total and fatal conflict with applicable constitutional prohibitions.” (T-Mobile West LLC v. City and County of San Francisco (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1107, 1117, fn. 6 .) This standard requires a challenger to “ ‘ “ ‘establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the [law] would be valid.’ ” ’ ” (American Civil Rights Foundation v. Berkeley Unified School Dis 2023It is also the subject of some uncertainty.” (Today’s Fresh Start, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Office of Education (2013) 57 Cal.4th 197, 218 .) In the stricter formulation of the standard, “legislation is invalid only if it presents a total and fatal conflict with applicable constitutional prohibitions.” (T-Mobile West LLC v. City and County of San Francisco (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1107, 1117, fn. 6 .) This standard requires a challenger to “ ‘ “ ‘establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the [law] would be valid.’ ” ’ ” (American Civil Rights Foundation v. Berkeley Unified School Dis | 2 | 2 |
Olsen v. Harbisongreen2 sentences2018The litigation privilege The litigation privilege "precludes liability arising from a publication or broadcast made in a judicial proceeding or other official proceeding." ( Fremont Reorganizing Corp. v. Faigin (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1153 , 1172, 131 Cal.Rptr.3d 478 .) Under the usual formulation of the privilege, it applies "to any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that have some connection or logical relation to the action." ( Silberg v. Anderson (19 2018The litigation privilege The litigation privilege "precludes liability arising from a publication or broadcast made in a judicial proceeding or other official proceeding." ( Fremont Reorganizing Corp. v. Faigin (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1153 , 1172, 131 Cal.Rptr.3d 478 .) Under the usual formulation of the privilege, it applies "to any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that have some connection or logical relation to the action." ( Silberg v. Anderson (19 | 2 | 2 |
| Rusheen v. Cohengreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Martinezgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Starr v. Mooslingreen | 2 | 2 |
| Wilson v. Hidden Valley Municipal Water Districtgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Anton v. San Antonio Community Hospitalgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Rivera v. Division of Industrial Welfaregreen | 2 | 2 |
| Connally v. General Construction Co.green | 2 | 2 |
| City Council v. Superior Courtgreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Welchgreen | 2 | 2 |
Hagberg v. California Federal Bank FSBgreen2 sentences2018The litigation privilege The litigation privilege "precludes liability arising from a publication or broadcast made in a judicial proceeding or other official proceeding." ( Fremont Reorganizing Corp. v. Faigin (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1153 , 1172, 131 Cal.Rptr.3d 478 .) Under the usual formulation of the privilege, it applies "to any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that have some connection or logical relation to the action." ( Silberg v. Anderson (19 2018The litigation privilege The litigation privilege "precludes liability arising from a publication or broadcast made in a judicial proceeding or other official proceeding." ( Fremont Reorganizing Corp. v. Faigin (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1153 , 1172, 131 Cal.Rptr.3d 478 .) Under the usual formulation of the privilege, it applies "to any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that have some connection or logical relation to the action." ( Silberg v. Anderson (19 | 1 | 4 |
Landi v. County of Montereygreen2 sentences1990(Landi v. County of Monterey (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 934 [ 189 Cal.Rptr. 55 ].) An adjudicatory act involves the actual application of already existing rules to a specific set of existing facts whereas a quasi-legislative action is the formulation of a rule to be applied to all future cases. 1990(Landi v. County of Monterey (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 934 [ 189 Cal.Rptr. 55 ].) An adjudicatory act involves the actual application of already existing rules to a specific set of existing facts whereas a quasi-legislative action is the formulation of a rule to be applied to all future cases. | 1 | 2 |
| Mike Moore's 24-Hour Towing v. City of San Diegogreen | 1 | 2 |
| Laurel Heights Improvement Ass'n of San Francisco, Inc. v. Regents of University of Californiagreen | 1 | 2 |
| Arnel Development Co. v. City of Costa Mesagreen | 1 | 2 |
| Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. City of Turlockgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Thanh Thuy Vo v. City of Garden Grovegreen | 1 | 1 |
| California Water Impact Network v. Newhall County Water Districtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hostetter v. Aldersongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Selby Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventuragreen | 1 | 1 |
| Alvarado v. Dart Container Corp. of Californiagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Tidewater Marine Western, Inc. v. Bradshawgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. R.V.green | 1 | 1 |
| Major v. Memorial Hospitals Assn.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Fremont Reorganizing Corp. v. Faigin
green
2 sentences2018The litigation privilege The litigation privilege "precludes liability arising from a publication or broadcast made in a judicial proceeding or other official proceeding." ( Fremont Reorganizing Corp. v. Faigin (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1153 , 1172, 131 Cal.Rptr.3d 478 .) Under the usual formulation of the privilege, it applies "to any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that have some connection or logical relation to the action." ( Silberg v. Anderson (19 2018The litigation privilege The litigation privilege "precludes liability arising from a publication or broadcast made in a judicial proceeding or other official proceeding." ( Fremont Reorganizing Corp. v. Faigin (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1153 , 1172, 131 Cal.Rptr.3d 478 .) Under the usual formulation of the privilege, it applies "to any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that have some connection or logical relation to the action." ( Silberg v. Anderson (19 | 4 | 2015–2018 |
The Regents of the University of California v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2018(See Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 634 , 230 Cal.Rptr.3d 415 , 413 P.3d 656 .) " 'Once the existence of a legal duty is found, it is the further function of the court to determine and formulate the standard of conduct to *903 which the duty requires the defendant to conform.' [Citation.] ¶ The formulation of the standard of care is a question of law for the court. [Citations.] Once the court has formulated the standard, its application to the facts of the case is a task for the trier of fact if reasonable minds might differ as to whether the defendant's conduct has conformed to the standard. 2018(See Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 634 , 230 Cal.Rptr.3d 415 , 413 P.3d 656 .) " 'Once the existence of a legal duty is found, it is the further function of the court to determine and formulate the standard of conduct to *903 which the duty requires the defendant to conform.' [Citation.] ¶ The formulation of the standard of care is a question of law for the court. [Citations.] Once the court has formulated the standard, its application to the facts of the case is a task for the trier of fact if reasonable minds might differ as to whether the defendant's conduct has conformed to the standard. | 3 | 2018–2018 |
American Civil Rights Foundation v. Berkeley Unified School District
green
2 sentences2023It is also the subject of some uncertainty.” (Today’s Fresh Start, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Office of Education (2013) 57 Cal.4th 197, 218 .) In the stricter formulation of the standard, “legislation is invalid only if it presents a total and fatal conflict with applicable constitutional prohibitions.” (T-Mobile West LLC v. City and County of San Francisco (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1107, 1117, fn. 6 .) This standard requires a challenger to “ ‘ “ ‘establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the [law] would be valid.’ ” ’ ” (American Civil Rights Foundation v. Berkeley Unified School Dis 2023It is also the subject of some uncertainty.” (Today’s Fresh Start, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Office of Education (2013) 57 Cal.4th 197, 218 .) In the stricter formulation of the standard, “legislation is invalid only if it presents a total and fatal conflict with applicable constitutional prohibitions.” (T-Mobile West LLC v. City and County of San Francisco (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1107, 1117, fn. 6 .) This standard requires a challenger to “ ‘ “ ‘establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the [law] would be valid.’ ” ’ ” (American Civil Rights Foundation v. Berkeley Unified School Dis | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Today's Fresh Start, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Office of Education
green
2 sentences2023It is also the subject of some uncertainty.” (Today’s Fresh Start, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Office of Education (2013) 57 Cal.4th 197, 218 .) In the stricter formulation of the standard, “legislation is invalid only if it presents a total and fatal conflict with applicable constitutional prohibitions.” (T-Mobile West LLC v. City and County of San Francisco (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1107, 1117, fn. 6 .) This standard requires a challenger to “ ‘ “ ‘establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the [law] would be valid.’ ” ’ ” (American Civil Rights Foundation v. Berkeley Unified School Dis 2023It is also the subject of some uncertainty.” (Today’s Fresh Start, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Office of Education (2013) 57 Cal.4th 197, 218 .) In the stricter formulation of the standard, “legislation is invalid only if it presents a total and fatal conflict with applicable constitutional prohibitions.” (T-Mobile West LLC v. City and County of San Francisco (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1107, 1117, fn. 6 .) This standard requires a challenger to “ ‘ “ ‘establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the [law] would be valid.’ ” ’ ” (American Civil Rights Foundation v. Berkeley Unified School Dis | 2 | 2023–2023 |
20th Century Insurance v. Garamendi
green
2 sentences2020Co. v. Garamendi (1994) 8 Cal.4th 216, 275 .) 19 Here, the Board adopted emergency regulations and then issued curtailment orders contemplated by those regulations. 2020Co. v. Garamendi (1994) 8 Cal.4th 216, 275 .) 19 Here, the Board adopted emergency regulations and then issued curtailment orders contemplated by those regulations. | 2 | 2020–2020 |
San Bernardino County Children & Family Services v. C.K.
green
2 sentences2018We agree. " ' "The disentitlement doctrine is based on the equitable notion that a party to an action cannot seek the assistance of a court while the party 'stands in an attitude of contempt to legal orders and processes of the courts of this state. [Citations.]' [Citation.] A formal judgment of contempt, however, is not a prerequisite to exercising [an appellate court's] power to dismiss; rather, we may dismiss an appeal where there has been willful disobedience or obstructive tactics . [Citation.]" (Italics added.) [¶] This broader formulation of the doctrine suggests that it is not limited 2018We agree. " ' "The disentitlement doctrine is based on the equitable notion that a party to an action cannot seek the assistance of a court while the party 'stands in an attitude of contempt to legal orders and processes of the courts of this state. [Citations.]' [Citation.] A formal judgment of contempt, however, is not a prerequisite to exercising [an appellate court's] power to dismiss; rather, we may dismiss an appeal where there has been willful disobedience or obstructive tactics . [Citation.]" (Italics added.) [¶] This broader formulation of the doctrine suggests that it is not limited | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Wainwright v. Witt
green
2 sentences2017We have repeatedly explained that such an inquiry is a proper formulation of the standard set forth in Wainwright v. Witt , supra , 469 U.S. 412 , 105 S.Ct. 844 "].) " Witt has long been the law and it is clear the court was aware of the appropriate standard to apply. 2017We have repeatedly explained that such an inquiry is a proper formulation of the standard set forth in Wainwright v. Witt , supra , 469 U.S. 412 , 105 S.Ct. 844 "].) " Witt has long been the law and it is clear the court was aware of the appropriate standard to apply. | 2 | 2014–2017 |
Felix v. Asai
green
2 sentences2016(Felix, supra, 192 Cal.App.3d at p. 929 .) The parties did not dispute this formulation of the exception. 2016(Felix, supra, 192 Cal.App.3d at p. 929 .) The parties did not dispute this formulation of the exception. | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Getz v. Boeing Co.
green
2 sentences2016(Ibid.) 15 In short, Hawaii failed to acknowledge that the Supreme Court in Boyle (a) expressly rejected a formulation of the defense that would have excluded any contractor that participated in the design of the procured item and (b) made clear that a “design ultimately selected” by the government, including one conceived by the contractor, “may well reflect a significant policy judgment by Government officials whether or not the contractor rather than those officials developed the design.” (Boyle, supra, 487 U.S. at p. 513 , italics added.) In a more recent decision, moreover, Getz v. Boeing 2016(Ibid.) In short, Hawaii failed to acknowledge that the Supreme Court in Boyle (a) expressly rejected a formulation of the defense that would have excluded any contractor that participated in the design of the procured item and (b) made clear that a ‘“design ultimately selected!' by the government, including one conceived by the contractor, ‘“may well reflect a significant policy judgment by Government officials whether or not the contractor rather than those officials developed the design.” (Boyle, supra, 487 U.S. at p. 513 , italics added.) In a more recent decision, moreover, Getz v. Boeing | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.
green
2 sentences2016(Ibid.) 15 In short, Hawaii failed to acknowledge that the Supreme Court in Boyle (a) expressly rejected a formulation of the defense that would have excluded any contractor that participated in the design of the procured item and (b) made clear that a “design ultimately selected” by the government, including one conceived by the contractor, “may well reflect a significant policy judgment by Government officials whether or not the contractor rather than those officials developed the design.” (Boyle, supra, 487 U.S. at p. 513 , italics added.) In a more recent decision, moreover, Getz v. Boeing 2016(Ibid.) In short, Hawaii failed to acknowledge that the Supreme Court in Boyle (a) expressly rejected a formulation of the defense that would have excluded any contractor that participated in the design of the procured item and (b) made clear that a ‘“design ultimately selected!' by the government, including one conceived by the contractor, ‘“may well reflect a significant policy judgment by Government officials whether or not the contractor rather than those officials developed the design.” (Boyle, supra, 487 U.S. at p. 513 , italics added.) In a more recent decision, moreover, Getz v. Boeing | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Tielsch v. City of Anaheim
green
2 sentences2015“Whether a petitioner must proceed under section 1094.5 to obtain judicial review of a local agency’s action, or is entitled to petition under section 1085 depends on the type of action undertaken by the local agency: ‘Generally speaking, a legislative action is the formulation of a rule to be applied to all future cases, while an adjudicatory act involves the actual application of such a rule to a specific set of existing facts. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] The former may be reviewed by ordinary mandate (§ 1085), but ‘[t]he adjudicatory nature of the [local agency’s] action requires that judicia 2014Thus, Tielsch was required to petition for relief under section 1094.5, not section 1085. [Citation.]" (Tielsch v. City of Anaheim, supra, 160 Cal.App.3d at p. 574 ; see also Masters v. San Bernardino County Employees Retirement Assn. (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 30, 45 [citing Tielsch, court concluded that retirement board's determination "whether a member is permanently incapacitated for duty [citation] and whether the disability is service-connected [citation] . . . is an adjudicatory function"].) 7 Appellant does not mention Tielsch. | 2 | 2014–2015 |
| Garcia v. Soogian green | 2 | 1966–1988 |
| People ex rel. Cochran v. Bd. of Educ. of Oakland green | 2 | 1976–1976 |
| Hernandez v. City of Hanford green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| Garrett v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp. green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| State of California v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Lien Huynh v. Chase Manhattan Bank green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Tejon Real Estate, LLC v. City of Los Angeles green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| People v. Shipman green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Juen v. Alain Pinel Realtors, Inc. green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| People v. Huggins green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Beck Development Co. v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| People v. Williams green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| People v. Smith green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Hartt v. County of Los Angeles green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| People v. Lawley green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| People v. Duarte green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| McKelvey v. Boeing North American, Inc. red | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Boynton v. McKales green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Hanh Nguyen v. Western Digital Corp. green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| SUSAN S. v. Israels green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Kimmel v. Goland green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Southern California Cement Masons Joint Apprenticeship Committee v. California Apprenticeship Council green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Friends of Sierra Madre v. City of Sierra Madre green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.