formulation rule in Michigan

2025And we continue to reject plaintiff’s reliance on the MBTFA for the creation of a legal obligation in the context of conversion because this argument was not raised in the trial court. 9 This formulation of the test for piercing the corporate veil was initially established by the Michigan Supreme Court in Gledhill v Fisher & Co, 272 Mich 353 ; 262 NW2d 371 (1935).

2015Id.

2025Every reasonable presumption or intendment must be -3- indulged in favor of the validity of the act, and it is only when invalidity appears so clearly as to leave no room for reasonable doubt that it violates some provision of the Constitution that a court will refuse to sustain its validity. [Bonner v City of Brighton, 495 Mich 209, 221 ; 848 NW2d 380 (2014) (cleaned up).] “This Court also reviews de novo whether the trial court properly selected, interpreted, and applied the relevant statutes.” Makowski v Governor, 317 Mich App 434, 441 ; 894 NW2d 753 (2016).

2025Every reasonable presumption or intendment must be -3- indulged in favor of the validity of the act, and it is only when invalidity appears so clearly as to leave no room for reasonable doubt that it violates some provision of the Constitution that a court will refuse to sustain its validity. [Bonner v City of Brighton, 495 Mich 209, 221 ; 848 NW2d 380 (2014) (cleaned up).] “This Court also reviews de novo whether the trial court properly selected, interpreted, and applied the relevant statutes.” Makowski v Governor, 317 Mich App 434, 441 ; 894 NW2d 753 (2016).

2025Every reasonable presumption or intendment must be -3- indulged in favor of the validity of the act, and it is only when invalidity appears so clearly as to leave no room for reasonable doubt that it violates some provision of the Constitution that a court will refuse to sustain its validity. [Bonner v City of Brighton, 495 Mich 209, 221 ; 848 NW2d 380 (2014) (cleaned up).] “This Court also reviews de novo whether the trial court properly selected, interpreted, and applied the relevant statutes.” Makowski v Governor, 317 Mich App 434, 441 ; 894 NW2d 753 (2016).

2025Every reasonable presumption or intendment must be -3- indulged in favor of the validity of the act, and it is only when invalidity appears so clearly as to leave no room for reasonable doubt that it violates some provision of the Constitution that a court will refuse to sustain its validity. [Bonner v City of Brighton, 495 Mich 209, 221 ; 848 NW2d 380 (2014) (cleaned up).] “This Court also reviews de novo whether the trial court properly selected, interpreted, and applied the relevant statutes.” Makowski v Governor, 317 Mich App 434, 441 ; 894 NW2d 753 (2016).

2025Green, 310 Mich App at 454 .

2010The majority opinion also cites favorably the formulation of the rule the Romska partial dissent would have adopted: [I]n order to determine the intentions of the parties about the scope of a general release, extrinsic evidence should be allowed to determine whether a stranger may rely on the omnibus language “all other parties, firms, or corporations” that is contained within a release. [Id. at 533 (emphasis added).] If this is the purpose behind its new rule, the problem is that the “very provision in controversy, and agreed to by the parties to the contract, explicitly relates to the intere

2008Yet the VMI majority disclaimed doing so, id. at 532 , 116 S.Ct. 2264 and, in concurring in the result, Chief Justice Rehnquist explicitly counseled: While terms like "important governmental objective" and "substantially related" are hardly models of precision, they have more content and specificity than does the phrase "exceedingly persuasive justification." That phrase is best confined, as it was first used, as an observation on the difficulty of meeting the applicable test, not as a formulation of the test itself. [ Id. at 559 , 116 S.Ct. 2264 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in result).] Accor

2008Yet the VMI majority disclaimed doing so, id. at 532 , 116 S.Ct. 2264 and, in concurring in the result, Chief Justice Rehnquist explicitly counseled: While terms like "important governmental objective" and "substantially related" are hardly models of precision, they have more content and specificity than does the phrase "exceedingly persuasive justification." That phrase is best confined, as it was first used, as an observation on the difficulty of meeting the applicable test, not as a formulation of the test itself. [ Id. at 559 , 116 S.Ct. 2264 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in result).] Accor

2008Yet the VMI majority disclaimed doing so, id. at 532 , 116 S.Ct. 2264 and, in concurring in the result, Chief Justice Rehnquist explicitly counseled: While terms like "important governmental objective" and "substantially related" are hardly models of precision, they have more content and specificity than does the phrase "exceedingly persuasive justification." That phrase is best confined, as it was first used, as an observation on the difficulty of meeting the applicable test, not as a formulation of the test itself. [ Id. at 559 , 116 S.Ct. 2264 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in result).] Accor

2007Specifically, I believe that Scarsella v Pollak, 461 Mich 547 ; 607 NW2d 711 (2000), was incorrectly decided, so I cannot agree with the majority’s statement, ante at 585, that under the statutes at issue, “the period of limitations is tolled when a complaint and affidavit of merit are filed and served on the defendant.” Rather, I would hold that under the plain language of MCL 600.5856(a), the period of limitations is tolled when a complaint is filed, regardless of whether an affidavit of merit is filed with the complaint.

2007Specifically, I believe that Scarsella v Pollak, 461 Mich 547 ; 607 NW2d 711 (2000), was incorrectly decided, so I cannot agree with the majority’s statement, ante at 585, that under the statutes at issue, “the period of limitations is tolled when a complaint and affidavit of merit are filed and served on the defendant.” Rather, I would hold that under the plain language of MCL 600.5856(a), the period of limitations is tolled when a complaint is filed, regardless of whether an affidavit of merit is filed with the complaint.

2002In short, there is no basis in our case law for supposing that Michigan ever recognized an extension of the doctrine beyond the inhabited “dwelling” itself at the time the common-law rules were codified. *140 Instead, we adhere to this Court’s formulation of the doctrine in Pond, supra at 176 , that “[a] man is not . . . obliged to retreat if assaulted in his dwelling” (emphasis supplied).

2002Pelky v Palmer, 109 Mich 561, 563 ; 67 NW 561 (1896).

2002Pelky v Palmer, 109 Mich 561, 563 ; 67 NW 561 (1896).

2002Thus, the castle doctrine is relevant only to acts of self-defense that take place in the dwelling; the doctrine has no application to “a conflict outside the home.” People v Stallworth, 364 Mich 528, 535 ; 111 NW2d 742 (1961). 29 C.

2002Thus, the castle doctrine is relevant only to acts of self-defense that take place in the dwelling; the doctrine has no application to “a conflict outside the home.” People v Stallworth, 364 Mich 528, 535 ; 111 NW2d 742 (1961). 29 C.

1999An alternative formulation of this test for OUIL is whether “ ‘the person is substantially deprived of [his/her] normal control or clarity of mind at the time [he/she] is operating the motor vehicle.’ ” People v Walters, 160 Mich App 396, 400 ; 407 NW2d 662 (1987), quoting CJI 15:1:01(8).

1999An alternative formulation of this test for OUIL is whether “ ‘the person is substantially deprived of [his/her] normal control or clarity of mind at the time [he/she] is operating the motor vehicle.’ ” People v Walters, 160 Mich App 396, 400 ; 407 NW2d 662 (1987), quoting CJI 15:1:01(8).

1994The classic formulation of the test to be applied in determining whether retrial is permissible was articulated by Justice Story in United States v Perez, 22 US (9 Wheat) 579, 580; 6 L Ed 165 (1824): We think, that in all cases of this nature, the law has invested Courts of justice with the authority to discharge a jury from giving any verdict, whenever, in their opinion, taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated.

1994The classic formulation of the test to be applied in determining whether retrial is permissible was articulated by Justice Story in United States v Perez, 22 US (9 Wheat) 579, 580; 6 L Ed 165 (1824): We think, that in all cases of this nature, the law has invested Courts of justice with the authority to discharge a jury from giving any verdict, whenever, in their opinion, taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated.

1977See Chadwick v Detroit & T S L R Co, 364 Mich 545 ; 111 NW2d 877 (1961), Swanson v Marquette, 357 Mich 424 ; 98 NW2d 574 (1959), Lyshak v Detroit, 351 Mich 230 ; 88 NW2d 596 (1958), Melton v The Urban American Land Development Co, 48 Mich App 272 ; 210 NW2d 262 (1973). 2 The statement in Royston relied upon by the Court in Williams, supra, is contained in a quotation from Smith v Iowa City, 213 Iowa 391 ; 239 NW 29 (1931).

1977See Chadwick v Detroit & T S L R Co, 364 Mich 545 ; 111 NW2d 877 (1961), Swanson v Marquette, 357 Mich 424 ; 98 NW2d 574 (1959), Lyshak v Detroit, 351 Mich 230 ; 88 NW2d 596 (1958), Melton v The Urban American Land Development Co, 48 Mich App 272 ; 210 NW2d 262 (1973). 2 The statement in Royston relied upon by the Court in Williams, supra, is contained in a quotation from Smith v Iowa City, 213 Iowa 391 ; 239 NW 29 (1931).

1977See Chadwick v Detroit & T S L R Co, 364 Mich 545 ; 111 NW2d 877 (1961), Swanson v Marquette, 357 Mich 424 ; 98 NW2d 574 (1959), Lyshak v Detroit, 351 Mich 230 ; 88 NW2d 596 (1958), Melton v The Urban American Land Development Co, 48 Mich App 272 ; 210 NW2d 262 (1973). 2 The statement in Royston relied upon by the Court in Williams, supra, is contained in a quotation from Smith v Iowa City, 213 Iowa 391 ; 239 NW 29 (1931).

1977See Chadwick v Detroit & T S L R Co, 364 Mich 545 ; 111 NW2d 877 (1961), Swanson v Marquette, 357 Mich 424 ; 98 NW2d 574 (1959), Lyshak v Detroit, 351 Mich 230 ; 88 NW2d 596 (1958), Melton v The Urban American Land Development Co, 48 Mich App 272 ; 210 NW2d 262 (1973). 2 The statement in Royston relied upon by the Court in Williams, supra, is contained in a quotation from Smith v Iowa City, 213 Iowa 391 ; 239 NW 29 (1931).

1977See Chadwick v Detroit & T S L R Co, 364 Mich 545 ; 111 NW2d 877 (1961), Swanson v Marquette, 357 Mich 424 ; 98 NW2d 574 (1959), Lyshak v Detroit, 351 Mich 230 ; 88 NW2d 596 (1958), Melton v The Urban American Land Development Co, 48 Mich App 272 ; 210 NW2d 262 (1973). 2 The statement in Royston relied upon by the Court in Williams, supra, is contained in a quotation from Smith v Iowa City, 213 Iowa 391 ; 239 NW 29 (1931).

1977See Chadwick v Detroit & T S L R Co, 364 Mich 545 ; 111 NW2d 877 (1961), Swanson v Marquette, 357 Mich 424 ; 98 NW2d 574 (1959), Lyshak v Detroit, 351 Mich 230 ; 88 NW2d 596 (1958), Melton v The Urban American Land Development Co, 48 Mich App 272 ; 210 NW2d 262 (1973). 2 The statement in Royston relied upon by the Court in Williams, supra, is contained in a quotation from Smith v Iowa City, 213 Iowa 391 ; 239 NW 29 (1931).

1977See Chadwick v Detroit & T S L R Co, 364 Mich 545 ; 111 NW2d 877 (1961), Swanson v Marquette, 357 Mich 424 ; 98 NW2d 574 (1959), Lyshak v Detroit, 351 Mich 230 ; 88 NW2d 596 (1958), Melton v The Urban American Land Development Co, 48 Mich App 272 ; 210 NW2d 262 (1973). 2 The statement in Royston relied upon by the Court in Williams, supra, is contained in a quotation from Smith v Iowa City, 213 Iowa 391 ; 239 NW 29 (1931).

1977See Chadwick v Detroit & T S L R Co, 364 Mich 545 ; 111 NW2d 877 (1961), Swanson v Marquette, 357 Mich 424 ; 98 NW2d 574 (1959), Lyshak v Detroit, 351 Mich 230 ; 88 NW2d 596 (1958), Melton v The Urban American Land Development Co, 48 Mich App 272 ; 210 NW2d 262 (1973). 2 The statement in Royston relied upon by the Court in Williams, supra, is contained in a quotation from Smith v Iowa City, 213 Iowa 391 ; 239 NW 29 (1931).

1977See Chadwick v Detroit & T S L R Co, 364 Mich 545 ; 111 NW2d 877 (1961), Swanson v Marquette, 357 Mich 424 ; 98 NW2d 574 (1959), Lyshak v Detroit, 351 Mich 230 ; 88 NW2d 596 (1958), Melton v The Urban American Land Development Co, 48 Mich App 272 ; 210 NW2d 262 (1973). 2 The statement in Royston relied upon by the Court in Williams, supra, is contained in a quotation from Smith v Iowa City, 213 Iowa 391 ; 239 NW 29 (1931).