overarching principle in California

2026Our Supreme Court has “frequently used ‘res judicata’ as an umbrella term encompassing both claim preclusion and issue preclusion, which [it] described as two separate ‘aspects’ of an overarching doctrine.” (DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813, 823 .) The primary aspect is now referred to as “claim preclusion” rather than “res judicata.” (Id. at p. 824; Samara v. Matar (2018) 5 Cal.5th 322, 326 .) The secondary aspect is now referred to as “issue preclusion” rather than “collateral estoppel.” (DKN Holdings, supra, at p. 824 ; Samara, 26 supra, at p. 326 .) Appellants’ briefing fa

2026Our Supreme Court has “frequently used ‘res judicata’ as an umbrella term encompassing both claim preclusion and issue preclusion, which [it] described as two separate ‘aspects’ of an overarching doctrine.” (DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813, 823 .) The primary aspect is now referred to as “claim preclusion” rather than “res judicata.” (Id. at p. 824; Samara v. Matar (2018) 5 Cal.5th 322, 326 .) The secondary aspect is now referred to as “issue preclusion” rather than “collateral estoppel.” (DKN Holdings, supra, at p. 824 ; Samara, 26 supra, at p. 326 .) Appellants’ briefing fa

2025(Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 122 .) “[T]he doctrine of severance attempts to conserve a contractual relationship if to do so would not be condoning an illegal scheme. [Citations.] The overarching inquiry is whether ‘ “the interests of justice . . . would be furthered” ’ by severance.” (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 124 .) We agree with Weisfeiler that the lack of mutuality pervades the entire agreement.

2025(Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 122 .) “[T]he doctrine of severance attempts to conserve a contractual relationship if to do so would not be condoning an illegal scheme. [Citations.] The overarching inquiry is whether ‘ “the interests of justice . . . would be furthered” ’ by severance.” (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 124 .) We agree with Weisfeiler that the lack of mutuality pervades the entire agreement.

2026Our Supreme Court has “frequently used ‘res judicata’ as an umbrella term encompassing both claim preclusion and issue preclusion, which [it] described as two separate ‘aspects’ of an overarching doctrine.” (DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813, 823 .) The primary aspect is now referred to as “claim preclusion” rather than “res judicata.” (Id. at p. 824; Samara v. Matar (2018) 5 Cal.5th 322, 326 .) The secondary aspect is now referred to as “issue preclusion” rather than “collateral estoppel.” (DKN Holdings, supra, at p. 824 ; Samara, 26 supra, at p. 326 .) Appellants’ briefing fa

2026Our Supreme Court has “frequently used ‘res judicata’ as an umbrella term encompassing both claim preclusion and issue preclusion, which [it] described as two separate ‘aspects’ of an overarching doctrine.” (DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813, 823 .) The primary aspect is now referred to as “claim preclusion” rather than “res judicata.” (Id. at p. 824; Samara v. Matar (2018) 5 Cal.5th 322, 326 .) The secondary aspect is now referred to as “issue preclusion” rather than “collateral estoppel.” (DKN Holdings, supra, at p. 824 ; Samara, 26 supra, at p. 326 .) Appellants’ briefing fa

2026(Doe v. SoftwareONE Inc. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 98 , 103 [collecting cases]; but see Pipitone v. Williams (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1437, 1451 [applying de novo review to evidentiary rulings “determined on the papers and based on questions of law such as hearsay”].) “The party challenging an evidentiary ruling bears the burden of establishing the court exceeded the bounds of reason.” (Mackey v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 640, 657 (Mackey).) Nevertheless, evidentiary questions at summary judgment “‘are subject to the overarching principle that the propone

2023(Mackey v. Trustees of California State University (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 640, 657 (Mackey) [explaining the “ ‘weight of authority’ ” supports an abuse of discretion standard].) An abuse of discretion occurs if a ruling was “ ‘so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.’ ” (Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747 , 3 The Garskes do not challenge the trial court’s order sustaining CAIC’s objections to Pedroza’s declaration. 9 773 (Sargon).) “The party challenging an evidentiary ruling bears the burden of establishing the c

2006In Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. [(2000)] 24 Cal.4th [83] at page 123 [ 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 745 , 6 P.3d 669 ], the California Supreme Court set forth two reasons for severing illegal terms rather than voiding an entire contract: `The first is to prevent parties from gaining undeserved benefit or suffering undeserved detriment as a result of voiding the entire agreement—particularly when there has been full or partial performance of the contract. [Citations.] Second, more generally, the doctrine of severance attempts to conserve a contractual relationship if to do so woul

2006In Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. [(2000)] 24 Cal.4th [83] at page 123 [ 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 745 , 6 P.3d 669 ], the California Supreme Court set forth two reasons for severing illegal terms rather than voiding an entire contract: `The first is to prevent parties from gaining undeserved benefit or suffering undeserved detriment as a result of voiding the entire agreement—particularly when there has been full or partial performance of the contract. [Citations.] Second, more generally, the doctrine of severance attempts to conserve a contractual relationship if to do so woul

2021(See In re Kobe A. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1122 .) II Claim/Issue Preclusion Do Not Apply The term “ ‘res judicata’ ” is often used “as an umbrella term encompassing both claim preclusion and issue preclusion, which [is] described as two separate ‘aspects’ of an overarching doctrine. [Citations.] Claim preclusion, the ‘ “ ‘primary aspect’ ” ’ of res judicata, acts to bar claims that were, or should have been, advanced in a previous suit involving the same parties. [Citation.] Issue preclusion, the ‘ “ ‘secondary aspect’ ” ’ historically called collateral estoppel, describes the bar on rel

2021The term “ ‘res judicata’ ” is often used “as an umbrella term encompassing both claim preclusion and issue preclusion, which [is] described as two separate ‘aspects’ of an overarching doctrine. [Citations.] Claim preclusion, the ‘ “ ‘primary aspect’ ” ’ of res judicata, acts to bar claims that were, or should have been, advanced in a previous suit involving the same parties. [Citation.] Issue preclusion, the ‘ “ ‘secondary aspect’ ” ’ historically called collateral estoppel, describes the bar on relitigating issues that were argued and decided in the first suit.” (DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber

2026VI The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Declining to Sever Provisions Civil Code section 1670.5, subdivision (a) provides that “[i]f the court as a matter of law finds [a] contract or any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made[,] the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enfo rce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.” “ ‘ “In deciding whether to sever terms rather than to preclude enforcement of the provis

2026VI The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Declining to Sever Provisions Civil Code section 1670.5, subdivision (a) provides that “[i]f the court as a matter of law finds [a] contract or any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made[,] the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enfo rce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.” “ ‘ “In deciding whether to sever terms rather than to preclude enforcement of the provis

2021(See Reid [v. Google, Inc. (2010)] 50 Cal.4th 512, 534 ; . . . [Code Civ. Proc.,] § 437c, subds. (b)(5), (c), (d).) Such evidentiary questions, however, are subject to the overarching principle that the proponent’s submissions are scrutinized strictly, while the opponent’s are viewed liberally.’ (McCaskey v. California State Automobile Assn. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 947, 957 .)” (Serri v. Santa Clara University (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 830, 852 (Serri).) Exclusion of Evidence Zamora contends the trial court erred by excluding the statement in her declaration that she was unaware of her right to ob

2014Proc., § 437c, subds. (b)(5), (c), (d).) Such evidentiary questions, however, are subject to the overarching principle that the proponent’s submissions are scrutinized strictly, while the opponent’s are viewed liberally.’ ” (McCaskey v. California State Automobile Assn. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 947, 956-957 [ 118 Cal.Rptr.3d 34 ].) *742 II.

2011The first is to prevent parties from gaining undeserved benefit or suffering undeserved detriment as a result of voiding the entire agreement—particularly when there has been full or partial performance of the contract. [Citations.] Second, more generally, the doctrine of severance attempts to conserve a contractual relationship if to do so would not be condoning an illegal scheme. [Citations.] The overarching inquiry is whether ‘ “the interests of justice . . . would be furthered” ’ by severance. [Citation.]” (Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 123-

2010The first is to prevent parties from gaining undeserved benefit or suffering undeserved detriment as a result of voiding the entire agreement— particularly when there has been full or partial performance of the contract. [Citations.] Second, more generally, the doctrine of severance attempts to conserve a contractual relationship if to do so would not be condoning an illegal scheme. [Citations.] The overarching inquiry is whether ‘ “the interests of justice . . . would be furthered” ’ by severance.” (Armendariz, at pp. 123-124; accord, Marathon , at p. 996.) Applying these principles, the Mara

2026(See Alvarez, supra, 567 U.S. at p. 723 , plur. opn. of Kennedy, J.; id. at p. 736, conc. opn. of Breyer, J.; Free Speech Coalition, supra, 606 U.S. 461 .) Similarly, we do not read R.

2026(See Alvarez, supra, 567 U.S. at p. 723 , plur. opn. of Kennedy, J.; id. at p. 736, conc. opn. of Breyer, J.; Free Speech Coalition, supra, 606 U.S. 461 .) Similarly, we do not read R.

2025That is, by offering to stipulate around unenforceable warranty provisions when a “savvy” consumer asserts its unwaivable rights, Thor preserves the unenforceable warranty provisions as to less sophisticated California consumers who comply with the forum selection clause either by filing suit in Indiana (where the state’s lemon law does not apply to motorhomes) or by being “deterred from pursuing their claims at all.” (Id. at p. 821.) Relatedly, the Lathrop court concluded that enforcing Thor’s proposed stipulation would incentivize Thor “to continue to include admittedly unenforceable provisi

2025(See EpicentRx, supra, 18 Cal.5th at pp. 82, 84 & 84, fn. 7.) 16 unconscionability should be cured through severance or restriction because the interests of justice would be furthered by such actions.” (Id. at p. 516; see Armendariz, at p. 124 [“The overarching inquiry is whether ‘ “the interests of justice . . . would be furthered” ’ by severance.”].) Applying this framework, the Lathrop court assumed that Thor’s warranty documents could be cured by severance but concluded they should not be because doing so “would not further the interests of justice.” (Lathrop, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p.

2023Such multiple defects indicate a systematic effort to impose arbitration . . . not simply as an alternative to litigation, but as an inferior forum that works to the [stronger party’s] advantage.’ ” ( Lhotka, supra, at p. 826 , quoting Armendariz, supra, at p. 124 .) “ ‘The overarching inquiry is whether “ ‘the interests of justice . . . would be furthered’ ” by severance.’ ” ( Lhotka, supra, at 20 p. 826, quoting Armendariz, supra, at p. 124 .) The “strong preference is to sever unless the agreement is ‘permeated’ by unconscionability.” (Ajamian v. CantorCO2e, L.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 771,

2012(Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 122 ; Ontiveros, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 502.) In deciding whether to sever terms rather than to preclude enforcement of the provision altogether, the overarching inquiry is whether the interests of justice would be furthered by severance; the strong preference is to sever unless the agreement is “permeated” by unconscionability. ( Dotson, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at pp. 985-986 [where only one provision of agreement is unconscionable and it can be easily severed without affecting the remainder, the proper course is to do so]; see Armendariz, supra, 24 C

2026VI The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Declining to Sever Provisions Civil Code section 1670.5, subdivision (a) provides that “[i]f the court as a matter of law finds [a] contract or any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made[,] the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.” “ ‘ “In deciding whether to sever terms rather than to preclude enforcement of the provisi

2026VI The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Declining to Sever Provisions Civil Code section 1670.5, subdivision (a) provides that “[i]f the court as a matter of law finds [a] contract or any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made[,] the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enfo rce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.” “ ‘ “In deciding whether to sever terms rather than to preclude enforcement of the provis

2026(Doe v. SoftwareONE Inc. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 98 , 103 [collecting cases]; but see Pipitone v. Williams (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1437, 1451 [applying de novo review to evidentiary rulings “determined on the papers and based on questions of law such as hearsay”].) “The party challenging an evidentiary ruling bears the burden of establishing the court exceeded the bounds of reason.” (Mackey v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 640, 657 (Mackey).) Nevertheless, evidentiary questions at summary judgment “‘are subject to the overarching principle that the propone

2021(See Reid [v. Google, Inc. (2010)] 50 Cal.4th 512, 534 ; . . . [Code Civ. Proc.,] § 437c, subds. (b)(5), (c), (d).) Such evidentiary questions, however, are subject to the overarching principle that the proponent’s submissions are scrutinized strictly, while the opponent’s are viewed liberally.’ (McCaskey v. California State Automobile Assn. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 947, 957 .)” (Serri v. Santa Clara University (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 830, 852 (Serri).) Exclusion of Evidence Zamora contends the trial court erred by excluding the statement in her declaration that she was unaware of her right to ob

2024If an employee had the resources to bring suit in court and challenge enforcement of the arbitration agreement, the employer could still compel arbitration if the trial court was willing to sever the offending provisions.” (Mills v. Facility Solutions Group, Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 1035 , 1067– 1068.) “The overarching inquiry is whether ‘“the interests of justice . . . would be furthered”’ by severance.” (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 124.) The trial court acted within its discretion in impliedly determining that the interests of justice would not be furthered by severing the substant

2024If an employee had the resources to bring suit in court and challenge enforcement of the arbitration agreement, the employer could still compel arbitration if the trial court was willing to sever the offending provisions.” (Mills v. Facility Solutions Group, Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 1035 , 1067– 1068.) “The overarching inquiry is whether ‘“the interests of justice . . . would be furthered”’ by severance.” (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 124.) The trial court acted within its discretion in impliedly determining that the interests of justice would not be furthered by severing the substant

2023Such multiple defects indicate a systematic effort to impose arbitration . . . not simply as an alternative to litigation, but as an inferior forum that works to the [stronger party’s] advantage.’ ” ( Lhotka, supra, at p. 826 , quoting Armendariz, supra, at p. 124 .) “ ‘The overarching inquiry is whether “ ‘the interests of justice . . . would be furthered’ ” by severance.’ ” ( Lhotka, supra, at 20 p. 826, quoting Armendariz, supra, at p. 124 .) The “strong preference is to sever unless the agreement is ‘permeated’ by unconscionability.” (Ajamian v. CantorCO2e, L.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 771,

2016(Serafin, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at p. 184 ; Serpa, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 710 [offending attorney fee provision severed as “plainly collateral to the main purpose of the contract” and enforcing remainder of arbitration agreement]; Gutierrez v. Autowest, Inc. (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 77, 92 [severing arbitration costs provision and enforcing the balance of the agreement; the central purpose of the arbitration agreement “was not to regulate costs, but to provide a mechanism to resolve disputes [and] [b]ecause the costs provision is collateral to that purpose, severance was available”].) Her

2023(See Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 535 [recognizing question but declining to address it].) But under either standard, “evidentiary questions at summary judgment ‘ “are subject to the overarching principle that the proponent’s submissions are scrutinized strictly, while the opponent’s are viewed liberally.” ’ ” (Mackey, at p. 657.) As discussed post, we find that even under a de novo standard, the trial court correctly overruled plaintiffs’ evidentiary objections to the declarations of Andrade and Zuniga.

2021(See Reid [v. Google, Inc. (2010)] 50 Cal.4th 512, 534 ; . . . [Code Civ. Proc.,] § 437c, subds. (b)(5), (c), (d).) Such evidentiary questions, however, are subject to the overarching principle that the proponent’s submissions are scrutinized strictly, while the opponent’s are viewed liberally.’ (McCaskey v. California State Automobile Assn. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 947, 957 .)” (Serri v. Santa Clara University (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 830, 852 (Serri).) Exclusion of Evidence Zamora contends the trial court erred by excluding the statement in her declaration that she was unaware of her right to ob

2024SEVERABILITY Civil Code section 1670.5, subdivision (a), provides, “If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.” “An unconscionable contractual term may be severed and the resulting agreement enforced, unless the agreement is permeated by an unlawful purpose, or severance would

2016Such multiple defects indicate a systematic effort to impose arbitration on an employee not simply as an alternative to litigation, but as an inferior forum that works to the employer’s advantage.” ’ ” (Ajamian, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 803 ; see Carlson, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at p. 639 .) “ ‘ “The overarching inquiry is whether ‘ “the interests of justice . . . would be furthered” ’ by severance.” ’ ” (Carlson, at p. 639; see Carmona, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 90.) Here, the Agreement contains three substantively unconscionable terms: the injunctive relief carve-out, the waiver of the