overarching principle in Oregon

2021He notes that he assigned error to the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss and, relying on Stull v. Hoke, 326 Or 72 , 948 P2d 722 (1997), contends that, although his basis for establishing prejudice on sentencing grounds is different than the basis he asserted at the trial level, “the overarching error—that the state’s 91-month delay prejudiced defendant—was before the court.” Alternatively, defendant asks that we review the error as plain, because the error appears on the face of the record and because it is obvious that sentencing consequences flowing from a preindictment delay vio

2021He notes that he assigned error to the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss and, relying on Stull v. Hoke, 326 Or 72 , 948 P2d 722 (1997), contends that, although his basis for establishing prejudice on sentencing grounds is different than the basis he asserted at the trial level, “the overarching error—that the state’s 91-month delay prejudiced defendant—was before the court.” Alternatively, defendant asks that we review the error as plain, because the error appears on the face of the record and because it is obvious that sentencing consequences flowing from a preindictment delay vio

2021Id. at 612 .

2017Cite as 22 OTR 442 (2017) 459 To demonstrate a violation of these provisions, tax- payers “must demonstrate an intentional and systematic pattern of discrimination.” Pacificorp Power Marketing v. Dept. of Rev., 340 Or 204, 219 , 131 P3d 725 (2006), citing Freightliner Corp. v. Dept. of Rev., 275 Or 13, 17 , 549 P2d 662 (1976).

2017Cite as 22 OTR 442 (2017) 459 To demonstrate a violation of these provisions, tax- payers “must demonstrate an intentional and systematic pattern of discrimination.” Pacificorp Power Marketing v. Dept. of Rev., 340 Or 204, 219 , 131 P3d 725 (2006), citing Freightliner Corp. v. Dept. of Rev., 275 Or 13, 17 , 549 P2d 662 (1976).

2017Cite as 22 OTR 442 (2017) 459 To demonstrate a violation of these provisions, tax- payers “must demonstrate an intentional and systematic pattern of discrimination.” Pacificorp Power Marketing v. Dept. of Rev., 340 Or 204, 219 , 131 P3d 725 (2006), citing Freightliner Corp. v. Dept. of Rev., 275 Or 13, 17 , 549 P2d 662 (1976).

2017The overarching principle of these provisions rele- vant to this case is that “taxing authorities may not single out one taxpayer for discriminatory, or selective, enforce- ment of a tax law that should apply equally to all similarly situated taxpayers.” Penn Phillips Lands v. Tax Com., 247 Or 380, 385-86 , 430 P2d 349 (1967).

2017The overarching principle of these provisions rele- vant to this case is that “taxing authorities may not single out one taxpayer for discriminatory, or selective, enforce- ment of a tax law that should apply equally to all similarly situated taxpayers.” Penn Phillips Lands v. Tax Com., 247 Or 380, 385-86 , 430 P2d 349 (1967).

2017Cite as 22 OTR 442 (2017) 459 To demonstrate a violation of these provisions, tax- payers “must demonstrate an intentional and systematic pattern of discrimination.” Pacificorp Power Marketing v. Dept. of Rev., 340 Or 204, 219 , 131 P3d 725 (2006), citing Freightliner Corp. v. Dept. of Rev., 275 Or 13, 17 , 549 P2d 662 (1976).

2017Cite as 22 OTR 442 (2017) 459 To demonstrate a violation of these provisions, tax- payers “must demonstrate an intentional and systematic pattern of discrimination.” Pacificorp Power Marketing v. Dept. of Rev., 340 Or 204, 219 , 131 P3d 725 (2006), citing Freightliner Corp. v. Dept. of Rev., 275 Or 13, 17 , 549 P2d 662 (1976).

2016At the outset, we note, and reiterate, the overarching principle that “ORS 132.560(1) is to be broadly construed in favor of initial joinder.” State v. Staley, 142 Or App 583, 589 , 923 P2d 650 (1996), rev den, 324 Or 560 (1997).

2016At the outset, we note, and reiterate, the overarching principle that “ORS 132.560(1) is to be broadly construed in favor of initial joinder.” State v. Staley, 142 Or App 583, 589 , 923 P2d 650 (1996), rev den, 324 Or 560 (1997).

2016L., 272 Or App 216, 223 , 355 P3d 926 (2015) (“Due process requires that interested parties receive ‘notice reasonably calculated, under all circumstances, to apprise [them] of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.’” (Quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 US 306, 314 , 70 S Ct 652 , 94 L Ed 865 (1950).)).

2016L., 272 Or App 216, 223 , 355 P3d 926 (2015) (“Due process requires that interested parties receive ‘notice reasonably calculated, under all circumstances, to apprise [them] of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.’” (Quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 US 306, 314 , 70 S Ct 652 , 94 L Ed 865 (1950).)).

2016L., 272 Or App 216, 223 , 355 P3d 926 (2015) (“Due process requires that interested parties receive ‘notice reasonably calculated, under all circumstances, to apprise [them] of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.’” (Quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 US 306, 314 , 70 S Ct 652 , 94 L Ed 865 (1950).)).

2016L., 272 Or App 216, 223 , 355 P3d 926 (2015) (“Due process requires that interested parties receive ‘notice reasonably calculated, under all circumstances, to apprise [them] of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.’” (Quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 US 306, 314 , 70 S Ct 652 , 94 L Ed 865 (1950).)).

2015First, as the Oregon Supreme Court has explained, “the overarching inquiry” in Unger was “whether the evidence that the state [sought] to introduce must be suppressed because that evidence was obtained in violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights.” Id. at 85 .

2014Backstrand, 354 Or at 416 (officer does not stop a person when the officer takes the person’s identification card and retains it for a reasonable time); Highley, 354 Or at 472 {“Hall should not be understood, as it appears to have been understood by some advocates and by the Court of Appeals, to stand for the proposition that an officer’s request for identification and a check of that identification, either to determine its validity or the status of the person who tenders it, is a per se stop.”). 1 Indeed, with one possible exception described below, the court in Backstrand held that determini

2010As this court noted in Drews v. EBI Companies, 310 Or 134, 139 , 795 P2d 531 (1990), the overarching principle of preclusion “comprises two doctrines: claim preclusion, also known as res judicata, and issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel.” 8 (Footnotes omitted.) Further, the doctrine of claim preclusion can be separated into two concepts: the rule of merger and the rule of bar.

2010As this court noted in Drews v. EBI Companies, 310 Or 134, 139 , 795 P2d 531 (1990), the overarching principle of preclusion “comprises two doctrines: claim preclusion, also known as res judicata, and issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel.” 8 (Footnotes omitted.) Further, the doctrine of claim preclusion can be separated into two concepts: the rule of merger and the rule of bar.

2008In order to frame the issue properly, it is important to be mindful that the overarching rule of law to be applied in this case is that “[i]t is well established that a trial court generally possess broad discretion to control the proceedings before it.” State v. Rogers, 330 Or 282, 300 , 4 P3d 1261 (2000).

2008In order to frame the issue properly, it is important to be mindful that the overarching rule of law to be applied in this case is that “[i]t is well established that a trial court generally possess broad discretion to control the proceedings before it.” State v. Rogers, 330 Or 282, 300 , 4 P3d 1261 (2000).

2003More concretely stated, this so-called “work-connection test” has two parts: first, the injury must “arise out of’ the employment, which means that there must be some causal link “between the worker’s injury and his or her employment,” Robinson, 331 Or at 186 ; and second, the injury must occur “in the course of the employment,” which means “that the time, place, and circumstances of the injury justify connecting the injury to the employment,” id. (citing Krushwitz v. McDonald’s Restaurants, 323 Or 520, 526 , 919 P2d 465 (1996)).

2003More concretely stated, this so-called “work-connection test” has two parts: first, the injury must “arise out of’ the employment, which means that there must be some causal link “between the worker’s injury and his or her employment,” Robinson, 331 Or at 186 ; and second, the injury must occur “in the course of the employment,” which means “that the time, place, and circumstances of the injury justify connecting the injury to the employment,” id. (citing Krushwitz v. McDonald’s Restaurants, 323 Or 520, 526 , 919 P2d 465 (1996)).

2003In determining whether an injury arises out of and in the course of employment, the court takes guidance from the overarching principle expressed as the following inquiry: “Considering all the pertinent circumstances, are the temporal, spatial, circumstantial, and causal connections between the claimant’s injury and employment sufficient to justify compensation, when sufficiency is evaluated in light of the [Workers’ Compensation] Act’s policy of providing financial protection to workers who are injured in the course of employment, regardless of fault?” Andrews v. Tektronix, Inc., 323 Or 154,

2003In determining whether an injury arises out of and in the course of employment, the court takes guidance from the overarching principle expressed as the following inquiry: “Considering all the pertinent circumstances, are the temporal, spatial, circumstantial, and causal connections between the claimant’s injury and employment sufficient to justify compensation, when sufficiency is evaluated in light of the [Workers’ Compensation] Act’s policy of providing financial protection to workers who are injured in the course of employment, regardless of fault?” Andrews v. Tektronix, Inc., 323 Or 154,

2003First, it involved a release agreement, and we emphasized the overarching principle that releases and settlements “are favored by the law.” Id. at 151 (quoting Davis v. Bacon, 280 Or 561, 564 , 571 P2d 912 (1977)).

2003First, it involved a release agreement, and we emphasized the overarching principle that releases and settlements “are favored by the law.” Id. at 151 (quoting Davis v. Bacon, 280 Or 561, 564 , 571 P2d 912 (1977)).

2003First, it involved a release agreement, and we emphasized the overarching principle that releases and settlements “are favored by the law.” Id. at 151 (quoting Davis v. Bacon, 280 Or 561, 564 , 571 P2d 912 (1977)).

2003More concretely stated, this so-called “work-connection test” has two parts: first, the injury must “arise out of’ the employment, which means that there must be some causal link “between the worker’s injury and his or her employment,” Robinson, 331 Or at 186 ; and second, the injury must occur “in the course of the employment,” which means “that the time, place, and circumstances of the injury justify connecting the injury to the employment,” id. (citing Krushwitz v. McDonald’s Restaurants, 323 Or 520, 526 , 919 P2d 465 (1996)).

2003More concretely stated, this so-called “work-connection test” has two parts: first, the injury must “arise out of’ the employment, which means that there must be some causal link “between the worker’s injury and his or her employment,” Robinson, 331 Or at 186 ; and second, the injury must occur “in the course of the employment,” which means “that the time, place, and circumstances of the injury justify connecting the injury to the employment,” id. (citing Krushwitz v. McDonald’s Restaurants, 323 Or 520, 526 , 919 P2d 465 (1996)).