overarching principle in Pennsylvania

2025Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 413 (1973) (quoting Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 202-03 (1952)). 51 Germane and to similar effect to the overarching presumption against preemptive effect is the above-mentioned bias in favor of the uninterrupted completion of state administrative proceedings before federal court intervention. 52 B.

2025Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 413 (1973) (quoting Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 202-03 (1952)).51 Germane and to similar effect to the overarching presumption against preemptive effect is the above-mentioned bias in favor of the uninterrupted completion of state administrative proceedings before federal court intervention.52 B.

2025Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 413 (1973) (quoting Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 202-03 (1952)). 51 Germane and to similar effect to the overarching presumption against preemptive effect is the above-mentioned bias in favor of the uninterrupted completion of state administrative proceedings before federal court intervention. 52 B.

2025Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 413 (1973) (quoting Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 202-03 (1952)).51 Germane and to similar effect to the overarching presumption against preemptive effect is the above-mentioned bias in favor of the uninterrupted completion of state administrative proceedings before federal court intervention.52 B.

2003"The overarching principle governing `importance' is that, for the purposes of the Cohen test, an issue is important if the interests that would potentially go unprotected without immediate appellate review of that issue are significant relative to the efficiency interests sought to be advanced by adherence to the final judgment rule." Ben , at 484, 729 A.2d at 552 (quoting Ford, 110 F.3d at 959 (footnote omitted)).

2003“The overarching principle governing ‘importance’ is that, for the purposes of the Cohen test, an issue is important if the interests that would potentially go unprotected without immediate appellate review of that issue are significant relative to the efficiency interests sought to be advanced by adherence to the final judgment rule.” Ben , at 484, 729 A.2d at 552 (quoting Ford, 110 F.3d at 959 (footnote omitted)).

2026Acknowledging that “[t]here is less clarity as to whether attorneys for both parties must be involved in the exchange,” but with the absence of clear guidance from Pennsylvania appellate courts, the Sandoz court “default[ed] to the overarching principle emanating from the Supreme Court, that exceptions to disclosure are to be construed narrowly” and therefore found the privilege waived “where both parties were not represented by counsel in an exchange of information[.]” Id. at 270-71; see also Serrano v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, 298 F.R.D. 271, 284 (W.D.

2024Election, 241 A.3d 1058 , 1062 (Pa. 2020) (“Ballots of Nov. 3, 2020”); see also Appeal of James, 105 A.2d 64, 65 (Pa. 1954) (stating that while our election statutes are to be “strictly enforced to prevent fraud,” they are “ordinarily … construed liberally in [J-59-2024] [MO: Mundy, J.] - 4 favor of the right to vote”).

2024In reviewing claims pertaining to evidence, we are cognizant of the overarching principle that questions concerning the admissibility of evidence are “within the sound discretion of the trial court . . . [and] we will not reverse a trial court’s decision concerning admissibility of evidence absent an abuse of the trial court’s discretion.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 52 A.3d 1139, 1197 (Pa. 2012) (citation omitted).

2022See Coretsky v. Bd. of Commissioners, 520 Pa. 513, 518 , 555 A.2d 72, 74 (1989) (opining that “by definition, ‘shall’ is mandatory”).

2022See Coretsky v. Bd. of Commissioners, 520 Pa. 513, 518 , 555 A.2d 72, 74 (1989) (opining that “by definition, ‘shall’ is mandatory”).

2022“No number of failed claims may collectively warrant relief if they fail to do so individually.” Tedford, 960 A.2d at 56 (citations omitted).

2018"Where it is clear that a petitioner has failed to ,· meet any of the three, distinct prongs of the Pierce test, the claim may be disposed of on that basis alone, without a determination of whether the other two prongs have been met." CQrnmonwealth v Steele, 961 A.2d 786, 797 (Pa. 2008) (citations omitted).

2014Thus, the overarching inquiry on whether a defendant acted improperly is whether the defendant’s conduct is “sanctioned by the rules of the game which society has adopted.” Glenn, 272 A.2d at 899 ; see, e.g., Triffin v. Janssen, 626 A.2d 571, 575 (Pa. Super. 1993) (Refusal to consent to withdrawal of opposing party’s attorney was not improper because conduct was consistent with the rules of court); Small v. Juniata College, 682 A.2d 350, 354 (Pa. Super. 1996) (Players on football team did not act improperly by voicing negative opinions of coach to college administration, which, upon investigat

2014See Commonwealth v. Carson, 590 Pa. 501 , 913 A.2d 220, 235 (2006); Wright v. City of Scranton, 128 Pa.Super. 185 , 194 A. 10, 12 (1937).

2014See Commonwealth v. Carson, 590 Pa. 501 , 913 A.2d 220, 235 (2006); Wright v. City of Scranton, 128 Pa.Super. 185 , 194 A. 10, 12 (1937).

2014Thus, the overarching inquiry on whether a defendant acted improperly is whether the defendant’s conduct is “sanctioned by the rules of the game which society has adopted.” Glenn, 272 A.2d at 899 ; see, e.g., Triffin v. Janssen, 626 A.2d 571, 575 (Pa. Super. 1993) (Refusal to consent to withdrawal of opposing party’s attorney was not improper because conduct was consistent with the rules of court); Small v. Juniata College, 682 A.2d 350, 354 (Pa. Super. 1996) (Players on football team did not act improperly by voicing negative opinions of coach to college administration, which, upon investigat

2014See Commonwealth v. Carson, 590 Pa. 501 , 913 A.2d 220, 235 (2006); Wright v. City of Scranton, 128 Pa.Super. 185 , 194 A. 10, 12 (1937).

2014See Commonwealth v. Carson, 590 Pa. 501 , 913 A.2d 220, 235 (2006); Wright v. City of Scranton, 128 Pa.Super. 185 , 194 A. 10, 12 (1937).

2013The overarching principle of statutory construction is that the “intent of the Legislature is always our polestar when considering the interpretation and construction of statutes.” In re Paulmier, 594 Pa. 433 , 937 A.2d 364, 372 (2007), citing 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a).

2013The overarching principle of statutory construction is that the “intent of the Legislature is always our polestar when considering the interpretation and construction of statutes.” In re Paulmier, 594 Pa. 433 , 937 A.2d 364, 372 (2007), citing 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a).

2010Tannenbaum, 919 A.2d at 271 (emphasis added).

2010Tannenbaum, 919 A.2d at 271 (emphasis added).

2003"The overarching principle governing `importance' is that, for the purposes of the Cohen test, an issue is important if the interests that would potentially go unprotected without immediate appellate review of that issue are significant relative to the efficiency interests sought to be advanced by adherence to the final judgment rule." Ben , at 484, 729 A.2d at 552 (quoting Ford, 110 F.3d at 959 (footnote omitted)).

2003“The overarching principle governing ‘importance’ is that, for the purposes of the Cohen test, an issue is important if the interests that would potentially go unprotected without immediate appellate review of that issue are significant relative to the efficiency interests sought to be advanced by adherence to the final judgment rule.” Ben , at 484, 729 A.2d at 552 (quoting Ford, 110 F.3d at 959 (footnote omitted)).