plausible claim in Texas

2015Nor, absent the sorts of unlawful means or ends we have described, would any characterization of these threats as “coercive” suffice to displace them from the First Amendment’s protections, as the State would have us conclude; on the contrary, the Supreme Court has instructed in Claiborne Hardware and Keefe that “‘offensive’ and ‘coercive’ speech [is] nevertheless protected by the First Amendment.”269 These threats remain protected instead—indeed, as Perry urges, “[s]tatements 268 Cf. Jackson, 180 F.3d at 70-71 (distinguishing “wrongful” threats under federal extortion statute as those made wi

2015Nor, absent the sorts of unlawful means or ends we have described, would any characterization of these threats as “coercive” suffice to displace them from the First Amendment’s protections, as the State would have us conclude; on the contrary, the Supreme Court has instructed in Claiborne Hardware and Keefe that “‘offensive’ and ‘coercive’ speech [is] nevertheless protected by the First Amendment.”269 These threats remain protected instead—indeed, as Perry urges, “[s]tatements 268 Cf. Jackson, 180 F.3d at 70-71 (distinguishing “wrongful” threats under federal extortion statute as those made wi

2016See McDaniel, 98 S.W.3d at 712–13; Kostura v. State, 292 S.W.3d 744 , 747–48 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.).

2009See Ryan v. State, 937 S.W.2d 93, 106 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1996, pet. ref'd) (holding that appellant’s trial testimony is a “good barometer” of competence); see also McDaniel, 98 S.W.3d at 712 (noting, in reviewing whether evidence raised bona fide doubt requiring competency inquiry, that lucid testimony on the part of a defendant has often been viewed as important in determining that defendant is competent to stand trial).

2017Under rule 45, the ultimate test of a sufficient pleading is not whether it offers a plausible claim to the reviewing court, but whether it provides "fair notice” to the "opponent.” Id.

2015Second, he must allege that the person who deprived him of that right acted under color of state or territorial law." and now in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct 1937 (2009) §1983 complaints now must contain factual allegations constituting a plausible claim. 23.

2009See Ryan v. State, 937 S.W.2d 93, 106 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1996, pet. ref'd) (holding that appellant’s trial testimony is a “good barometer” of competence); see also McDaniel, 98 S.W.3d at 712 (noting, in reviewing whether evidence raised bona fide doubt requiring competency inquiry, that lucid testimony on the part of a defendant has often been viewed as important in determining that defendant is competent to stand trial).

2009See Ryan v. State, 937 S.W.2d 93, 106 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1996, pet. refd) (holding that appellant's trial testimony is a "good barometer" of competence); see also McDaniel, 98 S.W.3d at 712 (noting, in reviewing whether evidence raised bona fide doubt requiring competency inquiry, that lucid testimony on the part of a defendant has often been viewed as important in *748 determining that defendant is competent to stand trial).

2024See Preston Hollow, 2021 WL 812114 , at *4-6; see also 23 F.4th at 552-54 . 7 About one month after Cottonwood filed its federal-court counterclaims, Cottonwood’s Board passed a resolution stating that its arrangement with Preston Hollow was based on “a legally defective transaction.” 11 exchange for its funds, including a Promissory Note obligating Cottonwood to repay the debt.

2016See Rylander, 101 S.W.3d at 110-11 .

2015The United States Supreme Court has established that pro se complaints are subject to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers" and should be liberally construed in the plaintiffs favor, see Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007). 24.

2015The United States Supreme Court has established that pro se complaints are subject to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers" and should be liberally construed in the plaintiffs favor, see Erickson v. Pardus, 111 S. Ct. 2197,2200 (2007). 24.

2012App. 1993); Wylie v. State, 908 S.W.2d 307, 308 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1995, pet. ref’d); Jenkins v. State, 870 S.W.2d 626, 631 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref’d).

2012Strategic choices made after a thorough investigation of the law and facts relevant to a defendant’s plausible defense options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after a less than complete investigation are reasonable “precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690–91; see Ex parte Kunckle, 852 S.W.2d 499, 505 (Tex. Crim.

2012App. 1993); Wylie v. State, 908 S.W.2d 307, 308 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1995, pet. ref’d); Jenkins v. State, 870 S.W.2d 626, 631 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref’d).

2011See Gaston v. State , 136 S.W.3d 315, 318 (Tex. App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. struck); Ramirez v. State , 13 S.W.3d 482, 487 (Tex. App. — Corpus Christi 2000, pet. dism’d) (citing Perillo v. Johnson , 79 F.3d 411, 449 (5th Cir. 1996)) .

2011See Gaston v. State , 136 S.W.3d 315, 318 (Tex. App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. struck); Ramirez v. State , 13 S.W.3d 482, 487 (Tex. App. — Corpus Christi 2000, pet. dism’d) (citing Perillo v. Johnson , 79 F.3d 411, 449 (5th Cir. 1996)) .

1981Q: What I mean when I say have you ever been in trouble, this is the first time you’ve ever been charged.” In this connection see Ex parte Ewing, 570 S.W.2d 941, 947 (Tex.Cr.App.1978), holding that an accused is not denied effective assistance of counsel where the trial lawyer was pursuing a plausible defense strategy but was surprised by revelations of prior police encounters which his client had said did not exist.