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21 Louisiana opinions name it 2 courts 1974–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Louisiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Warrengreen1 sentence2012Exigent circumstances justify a warrantless entry, search, or seizure when “ ‘police officers, acting on probable cause and in good faith, reasonably believe from the totality of the circumstances that (a) evidence or contraband will imminently be destroyed or (b) the nature of the crime or character of the suspect(s) pose a risk of danger to the arresting officers or third persons.’ ” Warren , 05-2248 at 11-12, 949 So.2d at 1225 (quotation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Louisiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Illinois v. McArthur
green
2 sentences2024State v. Warren, supra. In determining whether sufficient exigent circumstances exist to justify the warrantless entry and search or seizure, the court must “consider the totality of the circumstances and the ‘inherent necessities of the situation at the time.’” State v. Warren, supra. The United States Supreme Court has 10 described exigent circumstances as “a plausible claim of specially pressing or urgent law enforcement need.” Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331 , 121 S. Ct. 946, 950 , 148 L. 2024State v. Warren, supra. In determining whether sufficient exigent circumstances exist to justify the warrantless entry and search or seizure, the court must “consider the totality of the circumstances and the ‘inherent necessities of the situation at the time.’” State v. Warren, supra. The United States Supreme Court has 10 described exigent circumstances as “a plausible claim of specially pressing or urgent law enforcement need.” Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331 , 121 S. Ct. 946, 950 , 148 L. | 17 | 2002–2024 |
State v. Brisban
green
2 sentences2011The Supreme Court of Louisiana has further explained that “[ejxigent circumstances may arise from the need to prevent the offender’s escape, minimize the possibility of a violent confrontation which could cause injury to the officers and the public, and preserve evidence from destruction or concealment.” State v. Brisban, 00-3437, p. 5 (La.2/26/02), 809 So.2d 923, 927 , emphasis added. 2008The Supreme Court of Louisiana has further explained that "[e]xigent circumstances may arise from the need to prevent the offender's escape, minimize the possibility of a violent confrontation which could cause injury to the officers and the public, and preserve evidence from destruction or concealment." State v. Brisban, 00-3437, p. 5 (La.2/26/02), 809 So.2d 923, 927 , emphasis added. | 4 | 2005–2011 |
Webb v. Morella
neutral
2 sentences2023The federal court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Webbs' state law claims and dismissed those causes of action without prejudice. 28 U.S. C. § 1367; Webb, 224 So. 3d at 409 . 2023App. 1st Cir. 6121117), 224 So. 3d 406, 409 , applying federal issue preclusion, which mirrors Louisiana' s issue preclusion requirements in all pertinent respects.' In the Webbs' first suit, the federal district court found that the complaint failed to state a plausible claim for relief and dismissed the Webbs' federal law causes of action. | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Nix v. Williams
green
2 sentences2018Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 , 444, 104 S.Ct. 2501 , 2509, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984). 2018Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 , 444, 104 S.Ct. 2501 , 2509, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Lewis
neutral
1 sentence2013Lewis, 878 So.2d at 763 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Shumaker
green
1 sentence2006The United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331 , 121 S.Ct. 946, 950 , 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) has defined *596 exigent circumstances as "a plausible claim of specially pressing or urgent law enforcement need." In State v. Shumaker, 40,275 (La.App. 2nd Cir.10/28/05), 914 So.2d 1156, 1167-68 , the second circuit upheld a warrantless search of a trailer based on exigent circumstances. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
State v. Temple
green
1 sentence2005Exigent circumstances may arise "from the need to prevent the offender's escape, minimize the possibility of a violent confrontation which could cause injury to the officers and the public, and preserve evidence from destruction." State v. Brisban, 00-3437, p. 5 (La.2/26/02), 809 So.2d 923, 927 ; State v. Temple, 01-655, p. 11 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/12/01), 806 So.2d 697, 705 , writ denied, 02-0234 (La.1/31/03), 836 So.2d 58 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
State v. Temple
green
1 sentence2005Exigent circumstances may arise "from the need to prevent the offender's escape, minimize the possibility of a violent confrontation which could cause injury to the officers and the public, and preserve evidence from destruction." State v. Brisban, 00-3437, p. 5 (La.2/26/02), 809 So.2d 923, 927 ; State v. Temple, 01-655, p. 11 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/12/01), 806 So.2d 697, 705 , writ denied, 02-0234 (La.1/31/03), 836 So.2d 58 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
United States v. Ralph Benavidez and Abel Tavarez
green
1 sentence1983ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, The Defense Function § 4-3.5(b) (2d ed. 1980); Code of Professional Responsibility, DR5-105(A), (C). [8] As noted in United States v. Benavidez, 664 F.2d 1255 (5th Cir.1982), an untested theory always looks better than an unsuccessful one. [9] Of course, the client can make an informed choice to forego a plausible defense and to adhere to a common defense with the codefendant, thereby waiving his right to conflict-free counsel. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
William Foxworth v. Louie L. Wainwright, Director, Division of Corrections
green
1 sentence1983Foxworth v. Wainwright, 516 F.2d 1072 (5th Cir.1975). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Succession of Beattie
green
2 sentences1974Proponents' alternate contention on the will's validity (or primary contention depending on the emphasis) is that the will's witnesses cannot legally be heard 12 years after the will's confection, to dispute their own solemn attestation to the contrary, evidenced by their subscription under oath in the notarial act of October 7, 1955. *540 While we subscribe to this plausible principle as first enunciated in Succession of Beattie, 163 La. 831 , 112 So. 802 (1926) and repeated in Talton v. Todd, 233 La. 146 , 96 So.2d 327 (1957) [6] we do not feel that our present holding is contrary, for two r 1974Proponents' alternate contention on the will's validity (or primary contention depending on the emphasis) is that the will's witnesses cannot legally be heard 12 years after the will's confection, to dispute their own solemn attestation to the contrary, evidenced by their subscription under oath in the notarial act of October 7, 1955. *540 While we subscribe to this plausible principle as first enunciated in Succession of Beattie, 163 La. 831 , 112 So. 802 (1926) and repeated in Talton v. Todd, 233 La. 146 , 96 So.2d 327 (1957) [6] we do not feel that our present holding is contrary, for two r | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Talton v. Todd
neutral
2 sentences1974Proponents' alternate contention on the will's validity (or primary contention depending on the emphasis) is that the will's witnesses cannot legally be heard 12 years after the will's confection, to dispute their own solemn attestation to the contrary, evidenced by their subscription under oath in the notarial act of October 7, 1955. *540 While we subscribe to this plausible principle as first enunciated in Succession of Beattie, 163 La. 831 , 112 So. 802 (1926) and repeated in Talton v. Todd, 233 La. 146 , 96 So.2d 327 (1957) [6] we do not feel that our present holding is contrary, for two r 1974Proponents' alternate contention on the will's validity (or primary contention depending on the emphasis) is that the will's witnesses cannot legally be heard 12 years after the will's confection, to dispute their own solemn attestation to the contrary, evidenced by their subscription under oath in the notarial act of October 7, 1955. *540 While we subscribe to this plausible principle as first enunciated in Succession of Beattie, 163 La. 831 , 112 So. 802 (1926) and repeated in Talton v. Todd, 233 La. 146 , 96 So.2d 327 (1957) [6] we do not feel that our present holding is contrary, for two r | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.