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9 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1996–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Autumn Jackson, Boris Sabas, Also Known as Boris Shmulevich, and Jose Medina, Also Known as Yosi Medinagreen2 sentences2012We conclude that where a threat of harm to a person’s reputation seeks money or property to which the threatener does not have, and cannot reasonably believe she has, a claim of right, or where the threat has no nexus to a plausible claim of right, the threat is inherently wrongful and its transmission in interstate commerce is prohibited by § 875(d). 180 F.3d at 71 . ¶31 Ms. Strong acknowledges Pauling but mistakenly argues that its limiting construction of extortion in the second degree does not solve the constitutional infirmity. 2003The court held, “where a threat of harm to a person’s reputation seeks money or property to which the threatener does not have, and cannot reasonably believe she has, a claim of right, or where the threat has no nexus to a plausible claim of right, the threat is inherently wrongful. . . .” Id. at 71 (emphasis added). | 2 | 3 |
Ashcroft v. Iqbalgreen2 sentences2010P. 12(b)(6) standard effectively reads “plausible” into the rule, as follows: “failure to state a [plausible] claim upon which relief can be granted.” This adds a determination of the likelihood of success on the merits, so that a trial judge can dismiss a claim, even where the law does provide a remedy for the conduct alleged by the plaintiff, if that judge does not believe it is plausible the claim will ultimately succeed. 3 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 ; Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (“only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss” and this determination 2010The new Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) standard effectively reads "plausible" into the rule, as follows: "failure to state a [plausible] claim upon which relief can be granted." This adds a determination of the likelihood of success on the merits, so that a trial judge can dismiss a claim, even where the law does provide a remedy for the conduct alleged by the plaintiff, if that judge does not believe it is plausible the claim will ultimately succeed. [3] See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 , 127 S.Ct. 1955 ; Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950 , 129 S.Ct. 1937 ("only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
green
2 sentences2010P. 12(b)(6) standard effectively reads “plausible” into the rule, as follows: “failure to state a [plausible] claim upon which relief can be granted.” This adds a determination of the likelihood of success on the merits, so that a trial judge can dismiss a claim, even where the law does provide a remedy for the conduct alleged by the plaintiff, if that judge does not believe it is plausible the claim will ultimately succeed. 3 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 ; Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (“only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss” and this determination 2010The new Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) standard effectively reads "plausible" into the rule, as follows: "failure to state a [plausible] claim upon which relief can be granted." This adds a determination of the likelihood of success on the merits, so that a trial judge can dismiss a claim, even where the law does provide a remedy for the conduct alleged by the plaintiff, if that judge does not believe it is plausible the claim will ultimately succeed. [3] See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 , 127 S.Ct. 1955 ; Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950 , 129 S.Ct. 1937 ("only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief | 2 | 2010–2010 |
Weyerhaeuser Real Estate Co. v. Stoneway Concrete, Inc.
green
2 sentences1996McCarthy cannot be excused from his obligations under the promissory note based upon the frustration of the first contract. "[E]ven a plausible claim of frustration asserted with respect to a contract that has been fully performed is almost certain to fail." Andrew Kull, Mistake, Frustration, and the Windfall Principle of Contract Remedies, 43 Hastings L.J. 1 , 18 (1991). [1] Frustration Other than the fully executed nature of this purchase transaction, this case is remarkably similar to Weyerhaeuser Real Estate Co. v. Stoneway Concrete, Inc., 96 Wash.2d 558 , 637 P.2d 647 (1981). 1996McCarthy cannot be excused from his obligations under the promissory note based upon the frustration of the first contract. "[E]ven a plausible claim of frustration asserted with respect to a contract that has been fully performed is almost certain to fail." Andrew Kull, Mistake, Frustration, and the Windfall Principle of Contract Remedies, 43 Hastings L.J. 1 , 18 (1991). [1] Frustration Other than the fully executed nature of this purchase transaction, this case is remarkably similar to Weyerhaeuser Real Estate Co. v. Stoneway Concrete, Inc., 96 Wash.2d 558 , 637 P.2d 647 (1981). | 2 | 1996–1996 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences2020We have reviewed the record and find no deficient performance by counsel under the standards in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L. 2020We have reviewed the record and find no deficient performance by counsel under the standards in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Warren
green
1 sentence2015Given the absence of any evidence that the prosecutor "manifestly intended" to comment on Phasay's right to counsel or suggested, even indirectly, that he had been coached by unethical counsel to feign a mental illness, we reject Phasay's claim of misconduct.20'21 20 Phasay also contends that the prosecutor "impugned defense counsel." Phasay cites three cases addressing this type of misconduct: State v. Warren, 165 Wn.2d 17, 29-30 , 195 P.3d 940 (2008) (prosecutor told jury "mischaracterizations" in defense counsel's argument are "an example of... deal[ing] with defense attorneys," and describ | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Negrete
green
1 sentence2015Given the absence of any evidence that the prosecutor "manifestly intended" to comment on Phasay's right to counsel or suggested, even indirectly, that he had been coached by unethical counsel to feign a mental illness, we reject Phasay's claim of misconduct.20'21 20 Phasay also contends that the prosecutor "impugned defense counsel." Phasay cites three cases addressing this type of misconduct: State v. Warren, 165 Wn.2d 17, 29-30 , 195 P.3d 940 (2008) (prosecutor told jury "mischaracterizations" in defense counsel's argument are "an example of... deal[ing] with defense attorneys," and describ | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Warren
green
1 sentence2015Given the absence of any evidence that the prosecutor "manifestly intended" to comment on Phasay's right to counsel or suggested, even indirectly, that he had been coached by unethical counsel to feign a mental illness, we reject Phasay's claim of misconduct.20'21 20 Phasay also contends that the prosecutor "impugned defense counsel." Phasay cites three cases addressing this type of misconduct: State v. Warren, 165 Wn.2d 17, 29-30 , 195 P.3d 940 (2008) (prosecutor told jury "mischaracterizations" in defense counsel's argument are "an example of... deal[ing] with defense attorneys," and describ | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Morgan v. Nevada Board of Prison Commissioners
green
1 sentence2012It relied upon the limiting construction of a federal extortion statute, 18 U.S.C. § 875 (d), arrived at by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Jackson, 180 F.3d 55 , superseded on reh’g, 196 F.3d 383 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1267 (2000). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
United States v. Autumn Jackson, Boris Sabas, Also Known as Boris Shmulevich, and Jose Medina, Also Known as Yosi Medina
green
1 sentence2012It relied upon the limiting construction of a federal extortion statute, 18 U.S.C. § 875 (d), arrived at by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Jackson, 180 F.3d 55 , superseded on reh’g, 196 F.3d 383 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1267 (2000). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.