plausible claim in Massachusetts

2024Defense Fund, Inc. v. Planning Bd. of Cambridge, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 491, 492-493 (1989) (plaintiff can acquire standing by "asserting a plausible claim of a definite violation of a private right, a private property interest, or a private legal interest").

2023Defense Fund, Inc., 27 Mass. App. Ct. at 493 ("[M]atters, essentially involving the expression of aesthetic views and speculative opinions, do not establish a plausible claim of a definite violation of a private right, property interest, or legal interest sufficient to bring . . . plaintiffs within the zone of standing"), and while we acknowledge that the town bylaws call for the board to consider the "[c]ompatibility of the proposed use with surrounding land uses, so as to minimize harmful impact or conflict with existing desirable neighborhood character, including . . . aesthetic values" whe

2024L. c. 40A must assert a plausible claim of a definite violation of a private right" (quotation omitted), Kenner v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Chatham, 459 Mass. 115, 120 (2011), not a public right.

2021Kenner v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Chatham, 459 Mass. 115 , 117 (2011); Marshalian v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Newburyport, 421 Mass. 719 , 721 (1996). [Note 1] Courts have interpreted the term "person aggrieved" as one who can assert "a plausible claim of a definite violation of a private right, a private property interest, or a private legal interest that is separate and distinct from the concerns of the general community." Harvard Square Defense Fund, Inc. v. Planning Bd. of Cambridge, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 491 , 493 (1989).

2021"To qualify for that limited class, a plaintiff must establish -- by direct facts and not by speculative personal opinion - - that his injury is special and different from the concerns of the rest of the community." Barvenik, 33 Mass. App. Ct. at 132 .

2007Harvard Square Defense Fund, Inc. v. Planning Bd. of Cambridge, 27 Mass.App.Ct. 491, 493 (1989); See Barvenik v. Board of Aldermen, 33 Mass.App.Ct. 129, 132-33 (1992). “[M]atters essentially involving the expression of aesthetic views and speculative opinions, do not establish a plausible claim of a definite violation of a private right, properly interest, or legal interest sufficient to bring any of the plaintiffs within the zone of standing.” Harvard Square Defense Fund, Inc v. Planning Bd. of Cambridge, 27 Mass.App.Ct. at 493 .

2001In the context of G.L.c. 40A, standing is defined as “a plausible claim of a definite violation of a private right, a private property interest, or private legal interest.” Bell v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Gloucester, 429 Mass. 551, 554 (1999), quoting Harvard Square Defense Fund, Inc. v. Planning Bd. of Cambridge, 27 Mass.App.Ct. 491, 493 (1989).

2001But the plaintiff must offer “evidence of ‘a plausible claim of a definite violation of a private right, a private property interest, or a private legal interest,’ ” Bell v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Gloucester, 429 Mass. at 554 , quoting from Harvard Square Defense Fund, Inc. v. Planning Bd. of Cambridge, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 491, 493 (1989), that is different from that suffered by the community generally.

2021Courts have described a person aggrieved as one who "suffers some infringement of his legal rights," [Note 3] who has "a plausible claim of a definite violation of a private right, a private property interest, or a private legal interest" which right or interest is "one that the statute under which a plaintiff claims aggrievement intends to protect." Standerwick v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Andover, 447 Mass. 20 , 27-28 (2006) (citations omitted).

2021To be a "party aggrieved" (and as noted earlier, "parties in interest" are presumed to have such aggrievement), the individual must "assert 'a plausible claim of a definite violation of a private right, a private property interest, or a private legal interest."" Standerwick v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Andover, 447 Mass. 20 , 27 (2006), quoting Harvard Sq.

1998In zoning litigation, the statutory phrase ‘person aggrieved’ which appears in §§8 and 17 of G.L.c. 40A, has meant someone who can assert a plausible claim of private right, private property interest, or private legal interest as opposed to a general public concern about a zoning question.” Commonwealth v. Dowd, 37 Mass.App.Ct. 164, 166-67 (1994), citing Waltham Motor Inn, Inc. v. LaCava, 3 Mass.App.Ct. 210, 213-15 (1975).

1994Waltham Motor Inn, Inc. v. LaCava, 3 Mass. App. Ct. 210, 213-215 (1975), and cases cited.

2021Kenner v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Chatham, 459 Mass. 115 , 117 (2011); Marshalian v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Newburyport, 421 Mass. 719 , 721 (1996). [Note 1] Courts have interpreted the term "person aggrieved" as one who can assert "a plausible claim of a definite violation of a private right, a private property interest, or a private legal interest that is separate and distinct from the concerns of the general community." Harvard Square Defense Fund, Inc. v. Planning Bd. of Cambridge, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 491 , 493 (1989).

2009See Marshalian v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Newburyport, 421 Mass. 719, 921-22 (1996); see also Harvard Square Def. v. Planning Bd. of Cambridge, 27 Mass.App.Ct. 491, 492 (1989) (holding that the “[i]ndividual of corporate property owners acquire standing by asserting a plausible claim of a definite violation of a private right, a private property interest, or a private legal interest”).

2006See Com. v. Dowd, 37 Mass.App.Ct. 164, 166-67 (1994).

1998In zoning litigation, the statutory phrase ‘person aggrieved’ which appears in §§8 and 17 of G.L.c. 40A, has meant someone who can assert a plausible claim of private right, private property interest, or private legal interest as opposed to a general public concern about a zoning question.” Commonwealth v. Dowd, 37 Mass.App.Ct. 164, 166-67 (1994), citing Waltham Motor Inn, Inc. v. LaCava, 3 Mass.App.Ct. 210, 213-15 (1975).

2001The requirement of injury to a personal legal-right compels a showing of “injury [which] is special and different from the concerns of the rest of the community.” Id., quoting Barvenik v. Board of Aldermen of Newton, 33 Mass.App.Ct. 129, 132 (1992); see Circle Lounge & Grille, Inc. v. Board of Appeal of Boston, 324 Mass. 427, 432 (1949) (“violation of law commonly gives rise to no private right of action unless there is also violation of some private right or duty”); see also Marashlian v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Newburyport, 421 Mass. 719, 721-23 (1996).

1993See also Circle Lounge & Grille, Inc. v. Board of Appeal of Boston, 324 Mass. 427, 430 (1949); Waltham Motor Inn, Inc. v. LaCava, 3 Mass. App. Ct. 210, 214 (1975); Prudential Ins.

2016See Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008).

2015When the Supreme Judicial Court adopted a more stringent pleading standard in 2008, it did so for the veiy reason that “a wholly conclusoiy statement of claim would survive a motion to dismiss whenever the pleadings left open the possibility that a plaintiff might later establish some ‘set of [undisclosed] facts’ to support recovery.” Iannacchino, 451 Mass. at 636 , citing Bell Atl.

2005See also Harvard Square Defense Fund, Inc. v. Planning Bd. of Cambridge, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 491, 493 (1989) (to establish standing plaintiff must make “a plausible claim of a definite violation of a private right, a private property interest, or a private legal interest”); Jaffe v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Newton, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 929, 930 (1993).

1994See Jaffe v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 34 Mass.App.Ct. 929, 931 (1993) (neighbor’s unsupported “expression of belief’ that his property value would diminish, combined with his statement of existing “facts” based on “personal knowledge,” including increase in pedestrian traffic, sufficient to defeat motion for summary judgment based on challenge of “aggrieved” standing).

2005“Individual or corporate property owners acquire standing [as a person aggrieved] by asserting a plausible claim of a definite violation of a private right, a private property interest, or a private legal interest.” Harvard Square Defense Fund, Inc., 27 Mass.App.Ct. at 492-93 ; see also Green v. Board of Appeals of Provincetown, 404 Mass. 571, 573 (1989) (noting that the word “aggrieved” has the same meaning throughout the Zoning Act).

1989However, “only a limited class of individuals — those whose property interests will be affected — is given the standing to challenge the board’s exercise of its discretion.” Green v. Board of Appeals of Provincetown, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 469, 479 (1988), S.C., 404 Mass. 571 (1989). 4 Individual or corporate property owners acquire stand *493 ing by asserting a plausible claim of a definite violation of a private right, a private property interest, or a private legal interest.

2026See, e.g., Polay v. McMahon, 468 Mass. 379, 385 (2014) (holding that plaintiffs "made out a plausible claim" against their neighbor for invasion of privacy under G.

2026Compare Najas Realty, LLC v. Seekonk Water Dist., 821 F.3d 134, 146 (1st Cir. 2016) (Najas Realty II) (concluding "complaint failed to state a plausible claim that bad faith or malice, as opposed to a concern for the Town's residents' general welfare, motivated [water district superintendent's] behavior").

2025Under Massachusetts law, a plaintiff generally must either have actual possession of the converted property, Shaw v. Kaler, 106 Mass. 448, 449-450 (1871), or be entitled to its immediate possession, Robinson v. Bird, 158 Mass. 357, 360 (1893) (Holmes, J.), at the time of the defendant's wrongful act.

2025Under Massachusetts law, a plaintiff generally must either have actual possession of the converted property, Shaw v. Kaler, 106 Mass. 448, 449-450 (1871), or be entitled to its immediate possession, Robinson v. Bird, 158 Mass. 357, 360 (1893) (Holmes, J.), at the time of the defendant's wrongful act.

2025First, there must be a plausible claim that the defendants violated a legal duty that they owed to the plaintiff. “[I]t is not enough that the plaintiff be injured by some act or omission of the defendant; the defendant must additionally have violated some duty owed to the plaintiff.” School Comm. of Hudson, 448 Mass. at 579 (cleaned up) (school committees lacked standing to challenge charter school approval), quoting Penal Institutions Comm’r for Suffolk County v. Comm’r of Correction, 382 Mass. 527, 532 (1981) (county penal commissioner lacked standing to seek order compelling transfer of pr

2025First, there must be a plausible claim that the defendants violated a legal duty that they owed to the plaintiff. “[I]t is not enough that the plaintiff be injured by some act or omission of the defendant; the defendant must additionally have violated some duty owed to the plaintiff.” School Comm. of Hudson, 448 Mass. at 579 (cleaned up) (school committees lacked standing to challenge charter school approval), quoting Penal Institutions Comm’r for Suffolk County v. Comm’r of Correction, 382 Mass. 527, 532 (1981) (county penal commissioner lacked standing to seek order compelling transfer of pr

2025The judge's findings confirmed that Pendse "is an individual residing at [the property] with her children." 6 Further, Pendse was the sole manager of BoylstonD3 LLC "at the time the [zoning board decision] was issued, and when this case was initiated." See Denneny v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Seekonk, 59 Mass. App. Ct. 208, 215 (2003) ("Individual or corporate property owners acquire standing by asserting a plausible claim of a definitive violation of a . . . private property interest" [citation omitted]).

2025"To state a plausible claim of conversion, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant wrongfully exercised dominion or control over the personal property of the plaintiff." Hornibrook v. Richard, 488 Mass. 74 , 83 (2021), citing Weiler v. PortfolioScope, Inc., 469 Mass. 75, 87 (2014).

2024A plaintiff is entitled to relief under § 1983 if he can establish "(1) that the defendants acted 'under color of state law' and (2) that the defendants deprived [him] of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Appleton v. Hudson, 397 Mass. 812, 818 (1986), quoting Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981).

2024A plaintiff is entitled to relief under § 1983 if he can establish "(1) that the defendants acted 'under color of state law' and (2) that the defendants deprived [him] of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Appleton v. Hudson, 397 Mass. 812, 818 (1986), quoting Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981).

2019Id. at 583 , quoting Commonwealth v. Grant, 426 Mass. 667, 673 (1998).

2019See Mole v. University of Mass. , 442 Mass. 582 , 592 (2004) ("That an employer knows of a discrimination claim and thereafter takes some adverse action against the complaining employee does not, by itself, establish causation").

2014Comm’n, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 571, 574 (1981), and characterized the Act as being “concerned with the visual appearance of things.” And when a zoning ordinance demands consideration of the visual impact of a proposed structure on a neighborhood, “in order for a[n] [allegedly aggrieved person] to establish standing based on the impairment of an interest protected by [the] zoning bylaw, [that person] would need to show a particularized harm to [her] own property and a detrimental impact on the neighborhood’s visual character.” Kenner v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Chatham, 459 Mass. 115, 121 (2011).