plausible claim in Colorado

2026To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff’s complaint must state “a plausible claim for relief.” Warne v. Hall, 2016 CO 50, ¶ 9 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)).

2026In our view, these efforts, which largely paralleled those found sufficient by the court in Teva , 671 F.Supp.3d at 192-93, satisfied 25 C.R.C.P. 11(a)'s reasonable inquiry requirement, even if counsel did not personally speak with the witnesses whose allegations counsel copied. ¶49 Such a conclusion is fully consistent with the above-described purposes of both C.R.C.P. 8 and 11, which are to provide a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, C.R.C.P. 8(a), and to set forth a plausible claim for relief after conducting a reasonable investigation of the facts an

2026To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff’s complaint must state “a plausible claim for relief.” Warne v. Hall, 2016 CO 50, ¶ 9 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)).

2025Thus, a plausible claim for relief must “contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory.” Id. (citation omitted). ¶ 28 Whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is context dependent and “requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 2.

2025Co., 2018 COA 56, ¶ 12 . ¶ 16 “[T]o survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff must allege a plausible claim for relief.” N.M. v. Trujillo, 2017 CO 79, ¶ 20 .

2021The Petition’s Claims ¶ 31 “[T]o survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff must allege a plausible claim for relief.” N.M. v. Trujillo, 2017 CO 79, ¶ 20 ; see also Warne, ¶ 24 (adopting federal pleading standard from Bell Atl.

2021Corp. v. Twom bly , 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “[O]nly a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)). ¶ 20 “We review a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) m otion to dismiss de novo and apply the same standards as the t rial court.” Norton , 2018 CO 3, ¶ 7. “[W]e accept all factual allegat ions in the complaint as true, viewing them in a light most favora ble to the plaintiff.” Bewley , ¶ 14.

2021Corp. v. Twom bly , 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “[O]nly a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)). ¶ 20 “We review a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) m otion to dismiss de novo and apply the same standards as the t rial court.” Norton , 2018 CO 3, ¶ 7. “[W]e accept all factual allegat ions in the complaint as true, viewing them in a light most favora ble to the plaintiff.” Bewley , ¶ 14.

2024Sonit rol Corp. , 187 P.3d at 1158 (a claim may be dismissed und er Rule 12(b)(5) if the substantive law does not support it). 15 ¶ 27 “ The law does not supply a remedy for every wrong, and t he courts may redress a right abridged or a duty breached only if the plaintiff has standing — the right to raise a legal argument or claim. ” City of Arvada ex rel.

2024Sonit rol Corp. , 187 P.3d at 1158 (a claim may be dismissed und er Rule 12(b)(5) if the substantive law does not support it). 15 ¶ 27 “ The law does not supply a remedy for every wrong, and t he courts may redress a right abridged or a duty breached only if the plaintiff has standing — the right to raise a legal argument or claim. ” City of Arvada ex rel.

2016See, e.g., Emmons v. City Univ. of N.Y., 715 F. Supp. 2d 394, 425 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (allegation that 19 defendant acted out of “bad faith, self-interest, malice, and personal animosity” deemed conclusory and insufficient to support a claim for tortious interference with contract); cf. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 686 (bald allegation of discriminatory intent held insufficient to support unlawful discrimination claim).

2016The broad allegations that Warne's actions were motivated by malice or animosity toward Hall were unchallengeably conclusory allegations of a kind elsewhere held to be incapable of supporting a plausible claim for relief, See, eg., Emmons v. City Univ. of N.Y., 715 F.Supp.2d 394, 425 (E.D.N.Y.2010) (allegation that defendant acted out of "bad faith, self-interest, malice, and personal animosity" deemed conclusory and insufficient to support a claim for tortious interference with contract); cf. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 686 , 129 S.Ct. 1937 (bald allegation of discriminatory intent held insufficient t

2016See, e.g., Arista Records, LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 2010); see also 5 Wright & Miller, supra, § 1224 & n.7 (“Pleading on information and belief is a desirable and essential expedient when matters that are necessary to complete the statement of a claim are not within the knowledge of the plaintiff but he has sufficient data to justify interposing an allegation on the subject.”). ¶22 With regard to C.R.C.P. 8(e)(1)’s reference to “ultimate facts” and “conclusions of law,” although this reference might on first glance appear to bear on the requirement of 16 Twombly/Iqbal to allege

2016See, e.g., Arista Records, LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir.2010); see also 5 Wright & Miller, supra, § 1224 & n.7 ("Pleading on information and belief is a desirable and essential expedient when matters that are necessary to complete the statement of a claim are not within the knowledge of the plaintiff but he has suffi-client data to justify interposing an allegation on the subject."). 122 With regard to C.R.C.P. 8(e)(1)'s reference to "ultimate facts" and "conclusions of law," although this reference might on first glance appear to bear on the requirement of Twombly/Iqbal to allege p

2026In our view, these efforts, which largely paralleled those found sufficient by the court in Teva , 671 F.Supp.3d at 192-93, satisfied 25 C.R.C.P. 11(a)'s reasonable inquiry requirement, even if counsel did not personally speak with the witnesses whose allegations counsel copied. ¶49 Such a conclusion is fully consistent with the above-described purposes of both C.R.C.P. 8 and 11, which are to provide a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, C.R.C.P. 8(a), and to set forth a plausible claim for relief after conducting a reasonable investigation of the facts an

2021They argued that the petition’s “conclusory allegations fail[ed] to state a plausible claim against the [personal representative] for undue influence or as to a lack of testamentary capacity as required under Warne v. Hall, [ 2016 CO 50 ,] 373 P.3d 588 .” ¶7 The court granted the motion to dismiss, concluding that the petition “fail[ed] to set forth specific factual allegations regarding the 1We refer to Christopher Everhart as “Christopher” to avoid any confusion, as he, the Objectors, and the Decedent all share the same last name. 2 alleged undue influence or lack of testamentary capacity” a

2025Id. ¶ 41 A plaintiff must allege a plausible claim for relief to survive a Rule 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss.

2025Id. ¶ 20 A plaintiff must allege a plausible claim for relief to survive a Rule 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss.

2026Reznik v. inContact, Inc., 18 F.4th 1257, 1260 (10th Cir. 2021). ¶ 29 As with a discrimination claim, the complainant has the burden of establishing “a prima facie case” of retaliation to merit a hearing.

2026See Burgaz, 30 F.4th at 1188 . ¶ 61 Brooks also asserted that she stated a plausible claim that the arresting officers violated Tweed’s right to due process by directing the intake officer to charge Tweed with multiple felonies based on Tweed’s alleged assault, and that the intake officer similarly violated Tweed’s right by complying with their request.

2026See King, 16 P.3d at 809 . ¶ 45 Under these circumstances, we conclude that Brooks’ amended complaint failed to state a plausible claim for a violation of Tweed’s right to be free from unreasonable seizures. 3.

2026May 2, 2012) (unpublished order); cf. Colbruno v. Kessler, 928 F.3d 1155, 1164 (10th Cir. 2019) (holding pretrial detainee stated a viable due process claim when he alleged that prison officials walked naked detainee through public areas of hospital). 13 ¶ 29 Therefore, even construing Williams’s complaint to raise a constitutional claim, the allegations are insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief under § 1983. ¶ 30 In sum, whether Williams’s complaint is analyzed under C.R.C.P. 106 or 106.5, or under § 1983, it fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted.

2026In order to survive a motion to dismiss under this standard, a plaintiff must allege a plausible claim for relief.” Id. at ¶ 22, 549 P.3d at 234 (citation omitted).

2025The improper use at the heart of an abuse of process claim “is the use of a legal proceeding primarily to accomplish a purpose that the proceeding was not designed to achieve.” Id. ¶ 21 A plausible claim for relief in an abuse of process action must allege “not only proof of an ulterior motive but proof of willful actions by the defendant in the use of process which are not proper in the regular conduct of a proceeding.” Id.; Trujillo, ¶ 20. “[I]f the action is confined to its regular and legitimate function in relation to the cause of action stated in the complaint[,] there is no abuse, even

2025Compare Walker, 148 P.3d at 394-96 (Even with an alleged ulterior motive, defendants’ filing of complaints under an animal control ordinance was “a proper use of the process mandated by the Ordinance” as the filing of complaints was 11 envisioned by the proceedings and “[a]ny advantages that they may have obtained as a result of [plaintiff’s] convictions for violating the Ordinance were regular and legitimate goals which the proceedings were designed to achieve.”), and James H.

2025Cf. Vigil, 725 P.2d at 1157 (plaintiff sufficiently stated claim for negligence in complaint alleging that landlords took care of tenant’s dogs for two weeks before entering into the lease, during which time the dogs showed vicious propensities and, despite this actual knowledge, landlords entered into lease agreement with tenant dog owner). ¶ 21 Joseph contends that the bare factual allegations regarding Katco’s knowledge should not have been disregarded as conclusory because he pled that Katco knew about the dogs’ dangerous propensities “at all times relevant . . . before” the incident.

2025The improper use at the heart of an abuse of process claim “is the use of a legal proceeding primarily to accomplish a purpose that the proceeding was not designed to achieve.” Id. ¶ 21 A plausible claim for relief in an abuse of process action must allege “not only proof of an ulterior motive but proof of willful actions by the defendant in the use of process which are not proper in the regular conduct of a proceeding.” Id.; Trujillo, ¶ 20. “[I]f the action is confined to its regular and legitimate function in relation to the cause of action stated in the complaint[,] there is no abuse, even

2022See Patterson v. James, 2018 COA 173, ¶ 23 .

2021Bewley v. Semler , 2018 CO 79, ¶ 14.

2021See Pueblo Bancorporation, 37 P.3d at 496 (holding that the “drastic remedy” of judicial dissolution is not justified absent allegations of self-dealing, conflicts of interest, misapplication or diminishing of corporate assets, or illegal behavior). ¶ 58 Accordingly, we hold that Walker and Cervi did not plead a plausible claim for judicial dissolution.

2019People v. Martinez, 70 P.3d 474, 477 (Colo. 2003).