constitutionality rule (Washington) · Go Syfert
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constitutionality rule in Washington

22 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1972–2024 2 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (9)

CaseFollowedCited
Matter of Personal Restraint of Youngred
wash · 1993 · cited in 2 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
2 sentences

2007See In re Det. of Turay, 139 Wn.2d 379, 407-08 , 986 P.2d 790 (1999) (court rejected a challenge to a jury instruction because the constitutionality of the instruction had been upheld in Young, 122 Wn.2d at 59 ). ¶8 In Young, after considering the same due process challenge that Wright is making, the court concluded “there are no substantive constitutional impediments to the sexually violent predator scheme.” Young, 122 Wn.2d at 26 .

2007See In re Det. of Turay, 139 Wn.2d 379, 407-08 , 986 P.2d 790 (1999) (court rejected a challenge to a jury instruction because the constitutionality of the instruction had been upheld in Young, 122 Wn.2d at 59 ). ¶8 In Young, after considering the same due process challenge that Wright is making, the court concluded “there are no substantive constitutional impediments to the sexually violent predator scheme.” Young, 122 Wn.2d at 26 .

22
In re the Detention of Turaygreen
wash · 1999 · cited in 2 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
2 sentences

2007See In re Turay, 139 Wash.2d 379, 407-408 , 986 P.2d 790 (1999) (court rejected a challenge to a jury instruction because the constitutionality of the instruction had been upheld in Young, 122 Wash.2d at 59 , 857 P.2d 989 ). ¶ 8 In Young , after considering the same due process challenge that Wright is making, the court concluded "there are no substantive constitutional impediments to the sexually *947 violent predator scheme." Young, 122 Wash.2d at 26 , 857 P.2d 989 .

2007See In re Det. of Turay, 139 Wn.2d 379, 407-08 , 986 P.2d 790 (1999) (court rejected a challenge to a jury instruction because the constitutionality of the instruction had been upheld in Young, 122 Wn.2d at 59 ). ¶8 In Young, after considering the same due process challenge that Wright is making, the court concluded “there are no substantive constitutional impediments to the sexually violent predator scheme.” Young, 122 Wn.2d at 26 .

22
In Re Detention of Turaygreen
wash · 1999 · cited in 2 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
2 sentences

2007See In re Turay, 139 Wash.2d 379, 407-408 , 986 P.2d 790 (1999) (court rejected a challenge to a jury instruction because the constitutionality of the instruction had been upheld in Young, 122 Wash.2d at 59 , 857 P.2d 989 ). ¶ 8 In Young , after considering the same due process challenge that Wright is making, the court concluded "there are no substantive constitutional impediments to the sexually *947 violent predator scheme." Young, 122 Wash.2d at 26 , 857 P.2d 989 .

2007See In re Det. of Turay, 139 Wn.2d 379, 407-08 , 986 P.2d 790 (1999) (court rejected a challenge to a jury instruction because the constitutionality of the instruction had been upheld in Young, 122 Wn.2d at 59 ). ¶8 In Young, after considering the same due process challenge that Wright is making, the court concluded “there are no substantive constitutional impediments to the sexually violent predator scheme.” Young, 122 Wn.2d at 26 .

22
City of Bellevue v. Leegreen
wash · 2009 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
2 sentences

2019Under Mathews, courts consider three factors in determining whether the process afforded to an individual was sufficient to satisfy the due process clause: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second,the risk ofan erroneous deprivation ofsuch interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. 424 U.S. at 33

2019Fields had the opportunity to request reconsideration by the licensing supervisor, to appeal her disqualification to the Office of Administrative Hearings, and to challenge her disqualification in superior court as a violation of her substantive due process rights. 3 The fact that she was not able to challenge the constitutionality of this rule within the administrative process itself is not a procedural due process violation. ¶ 49 Under Mathews , courts consider three factors in determining whether the process afforded to an individual was sufficient to satisfy the due process clause: First,

11
City of Bellevue v. Leegreen
wash · 2009 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
2 sentences

2019Under Mathews, courts consider three factors in determining whether the process afforded to an individual was sufficient to satisfy the due process clause: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second,the risk ofan erroneous deprivation ofsuch interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. 424 U.S. at 33

2019Fields had the opportunity to request reconsideration by the licensing supervisor, to appeal her disqualification to the Office of Administrative Hearings, and to challenge her disqualification in superior court as a violation of her substantive due process rights. 3 The fact that she was not able to challenge the constitutionality of this rule within the administrative process itself is not a procedural due process violation. ¶ 49 Under Mathews , courts consider three factors in determining whether the process afforded to an individual was sufficient to satisfy the due process clause: First,

11
Tropiano v. City of Tacomagreen
wash · 1986 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 1994–1994
2 sentences

1994See Tropiano v. Tacoma, 105 Wn.2d 873, 877 , 718 P.2d 801 (1986).

1994See Tropiano v. Tacoma, 105 Wn.2d 873, 877 , 718 P.2d 801 (1986).

11
Corrigal v. Ball & Dodd Funeral Home, Inc.green
wash · 1978 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 1983–1983
2 sentences

1983See also Corrigal v. Ball & Dodd Funeral Home, Inc., 89 Wn.2d 959 , *214 577 P.2d 580 (1978).

1983See also Corrigal v. Ball & Dodd Funeral Home, Inc., 89 Wn.2d 959 , *214 577 P.2d 580 (1978).

11
National Polymer Products, Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corporationgreen
ca6 · 1981 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 1982–1982
2 sentences

1982Corp. v. Koons, 325 F.2d 403 , 407 (2d Cir. 1963), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, speaking through Judge Friendly, said: [W]e entertain no doubt as to the constitutionality of a rule allowing a federal court to forbid the publicizing, in advance of trial, of information obtained by one party from another by use of the court's processes.[ 1 ] In National Polymer Prods., Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 641 F.2d 418, 424 (6th Cir. 1981) (a case in which the parties had consented to a protective order), the Court of Appeals said: An important purpose of a pre-trial protective order is to preserve

1982Corp. v. Koons, 325 F.2d 403 , 407 (2d Cir.1963), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, speaking through Judge Friendly, said: [W]e entertain no doubt as to the constitutionality of a rule allowing a federal court to forbid the publicizing, in advance of trial, of information obtained by one party from another by use of the court's processes.[ [1] ] In National Polymer Prods., Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 641 F.2d 418, 424 (6th Cir.1981) (a case in which the parties had consented to a protective order), the Court of Appeals said: An important purpose of a pre-trial protective order is to preserve

11
Stephen R. Benchwick v. United Statesgreen
ca9 · 1961 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 1972–1972
1 sentence

1972While this contention is not facetiously made, we adopt the language of Benchwick v. United States, 297 F.2d 330, 335 (9th Cir. 1961): *385 This may sometimes present the defendant with a hard choice, but that is true in many situations which may confront litigants in the course of almost every trial, and provides no basis for exempting the defendant from the provisions of the rule [Rule 23(c), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C.A.].

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (18)

CaseCitedYears
Mathews v. Eldridge green
scotus · 1976
2 sentences

2019Fields had the opportunity to request reconsideration by the licensing supervisor, to appeal her disqualification to the Office of Administrative Hearings, and to challenge her disqualification in superior court as a violation of her substantive due process rights. 3 The fact that she was not able to challenge the constitutionality of this rule within the administrative process itself is not a procedural due process violation. ¶ 49 Under Mathews , courts consider three factors in determining whether the process afforded to an individual was sufficient to satisfy the due process clause: First,

2019Fields had the opportunity to request reconsideration by the licensing supervisor, to appeal her disqualification to the Office of Administrative Hearings, and to challenge her disqualification in superior court as a violation of her substantive due process rights. 3 The fact that she was not able to challenge the constitutionality of this rule within the administrative process itself is not a procedural due process violation. ¶ 49 Under Mathews , courts consider three factors in determining whether the process afforded to an individual was sufficient to satisfy the due process clause: First,

22017–2019
Longview Fibre Co. v. Department of Ecology neutral
washctapp · 1998
2 sentences

2010Longview Fibre Co. v. Dep't of Ecology, 89 Wash.App. 627, 632-33 , 949 P.2d 851 (1998). ¶ 15 E-Mail.

2010Longview Fibre Co. v. Dep’t of Ecology, 89 Wn.

22010–2010
State v. Gunwall green
wash · 1986
2 sentences

2005We do not consider the constitutionality of a claim under the Washington Constitution unless a party provides the independent analysis required by State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 61-62 , 720 P.2d 808 (1986).

2005We do not consider the constitutionality of a claim under the Washington Constitution unless a party provides the independent analysis required by State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 61-62 , 720 P.2d 808 (1986).

22005–2005
State v. Ferrier green
wash · 1998
2 sentences

2005State v. Ferrier, 136 Wn.2d 103, 110 , 960 P.2d 927 (1998).

2005State v. Ferrier, 136 Wash.2d 103, 110 , 960 P.2d 927 (1998).

22005–2005
State v. Ferrier green
wash · 1998
2 sentences

2005State v. Ferrier, 136 Wn.2d 103, 110 , 960 P.2d 927 (1998).

2005State v. Ferrier, 136 Wash.2d 103, 110 , 960 P.2d 927 (1998).

22005–2005
State v. Bostrom green
wash · 1995
2 sentences

2002In State v. Bostrom, 127 Wn.2d 580 , 902 P.2d 157 (1995), this court upheld the constitutionality of the warnings given pursuant to RCW 46.20.308 and held that they did not deprive drivers of an opportunity to make knowing and intelligent decisions whether to take a BAC test.

2002In State v. Bostrom, 127 Wn.2d 580 , 902 P.2d 157 (1995), this court upheld the constitutionality of the warnings given pursuant to RCW 46.20.308 and held that they did not deprive drivers of an opportunity to make knowing and intelligent decisions whether to take a BAC test.

22002–2002
State v. Moten green
washctapp · 1999
1 sentence

2024State v. Moten, 95 Wn.

12024–2024
City of Redmond v. Moore green
wash · 2004
1 sentence

2023Evans, 184 Wn.2d at 861-62 . 23 No. 38763-1-III State v. Merritt “An as-applied challenge to the constitutional validity of a statute is characterized by a party’s allegation that application of the statute in the specific context of the party’s actions or intended actions is unconstitutional.” City of Redmond v. Moore, 151 Wn.2d 664, 668-69 , 91 P.3d 875 (2004).

12023–2023
City of Seattle v. Evans green
wash · 2015
1 sentence

2023Evans, 184 Wn.2d at 861-62 . 23 No. 38763-1-III State v. Merritt “An as-applied challenge to the constitutional validity of a statute is characterized by a party’s allegation that application of the statute in the specific context of the party’s actions or intended actions is unconstitutional.” City of Redmond v. Moore, 151 Wn.2d 664, 668-69 , 91 P.3d 875 (2004).

12023–2023
City of Redmond v. Moore green
wash · 2004
1 sentence

2023Evans, 184 Wn.2d at 861-62 . 23 No. 38763-1-III State v. Merritt “An as-applied challenge to the constitutional validity of a statute is characterized by a party’s allegation that application of the statute in the specific context of the party’s actions or intended actions is unconstitutional.” City of Redmond v. Moore, 151 Wn.2d 664, 668-69 , 91 P.3d 875 (2004).

12023–2023
Armstrong v. Manzo green
scotus · 1965
2 sentences

2017Fields's complaint about the lack of an opportunity to present mitigating circumstances about her conviction and her subsequent rehabilitation goes to the substance of DEL's rule, which we have addressed as a substantive due process claim. 54 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 , 85 S. Ct. 1187 , 14 L.

2017Fields's complaint about the lack of an opportunity to present mitigating circumstances about her conviction and her subsequent rehabilitation goes to the substance of DEL's rule, which we have addressed as a substantive due process claim. 54 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 , 85 S. Ct. 1187 , 14 L.

12017–2017
Victor v. Nebraska green
scotus · 1994
1 sentence

1997Victor, 511 U.S. at 16-17 .

11997–1997
State v. Barrington green
washctapp · 1988
1 sentence

1990State v. Barrington, 52 Wn.

11990–1990
State v. Bonds green
wash · 1982
2 sentences

1983We also hold, in light of our recent decision in State v. Bonds, 98 Wn.2d 1 , 653 P.2d 1024 (1982), that in a burglary prosecution the information must specify and the instructions must specify and define the crime or crimes the defendant allegedly intended to commit.

1983We also hold, in light of our recent decision in State v. Bonds, 98 Wn.2d 1 , 653 P.2d 1024 (1982), that in a burglary prosecution the information must specify and the instructions must specify and define the crime or crimes the defendant allegedly intended to commit.

11983–1983
International Products Corporation v. Koons green
ca2 · 1963
2 sentences

1982Corp. v. Koons, 325 F.2d 403 , 407 (2d Cir. 1963), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, speaking through Judge Friendly, said: [W]e entertain no doubt as to the constitutionality of a rule allowing a federal court to forbid the publicizing, in advance of trial, of information obtained by one party from another by use of the court's processes.[ 1 ] In National Polymer Prods., Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 641 F.2d 418, 424 (6th Cir. 1981) (a case in which the parties had consented to a protective order), the Court of Appeals said: An important purpose of a pre-trial protective order is to preserve

1982Corp. v. Koons, 325 F.2d 403 , 407 (2d Cir.1963), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, speaking through Judge Friendly, said: [W]e entertain no doubt as to the constitutionality of a rule allowing a federal court to forbid the publicizing, in advance of trial, of information obtained by one party from another by use of the court's processes.[ [1] ] In National Polymer Prods., Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 641 F.2d 418, 424 (6th Cir.1981) (a case in which the parties had consented to a protective order), the Court of Appeals said: An important purpose of a pre-trial protective order is to preserve

11982–1982
Campbell v. Thunderbird Trucking & Construction, Inc. neutral
washctapp · 1981
1 sentence

1982App. 496 , 636 P.2d 494 (1981), where the court upheld the constitutionality of the claim filing requirement of RCW 36.45.030.

11982–1982
Sandstrom v. Montana green
scotus · 1979
2 sentences

1980Our analysis of the constitutionality of the presumption instruction in this case is governed by the United States Supreme Court's decision in Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 , 61 L.Ed.2d 39 , 99 S.Ct. 2450 (1979), which considered a virtually identical instruction.

1980Our analysis of the constitutionality of the presumption instruction in this case is governed by the United States Supreme Court's decision in Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 , 61 L.Ed.2d 39 , 99 S.Ct. 2450 (1979), which considered a virtually identical instruction.

11980–1980
State v. Roberts green
wash · 1977
2 sentences

1977This court has recently considered the constitutionality of this instruction in State v. Roberts, 88 Wn.2d 337 , 562 P.2d 1259 (1977).

1977This court has recently considered the constitutionality of this instruction in State v. Roberts, 88 Wn.2d 337 , 562 P.2d 1259 (1977).

11977–1977

Statutes the citing opinions construe

WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 34.05.570 (5) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 2.06.040 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

TX 46 (1975–2025) CA 44 (1939–2018) IL 40 (1919–2023) PA 40 (1911–2017) FL 34 (1971–2026) NY 31 (1923–2024) LA 24 (1942–2023) WA 22 (1972–2024) MN 22 (1960–2016) MO 15 (1878–2018) OH 13 (1935–2022) CO 12 (1981–2024) AZ 11 (1966–2019) CT 11 (1984–2017) TN 11 (1979–2022) MA 11 (1975–2008) IN 10 (1895–2012) IA 10 (1974–2025) MS 9 (1975–2010) UT 9 (1981–2022) NJ 9 (1964–1990) MD 9 (1962–2014) OR 8 (1958–2026) MI 8 (1975–2021) NC 8 (1915–2001) VA 7 (1980–2024) GA 7 (1944–2022) OK 7 (1973–2015) NV 6 (1999–2021) ID 6 (1976–1997) AL 5 (1976–2000) WI 4 (1980–2003) WV 4 (1965–1995) AK 4 (1969–2013) ND 4 (1984–2008) KS 4 (1975–2018) KY 3 (2004–2021) DC 3 (1981–2021) HI 3 (1930–1993) MT 3 (1973–2006) AR 2 (2001–2014) SC 2 (1952–1952) NE 2 (2002–2016) ME 2 (1980–2002)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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