constitutionality instruction in Connecticut

2001State v. Taylor, 239 Conn. 481, 504-505 , 687 A.2d 489 (1996), cert, denied, 521 U.S. 1121 , 117 S. Ct. 2515 , 138 L.

2000We also repeatedly have upheld the constitutionality of an instruction characterizing reasonable doubt as “a real doubt, an honest doubt, a doubt which has its foundation in the evidence or lack of evidence”; (internal quotation marks omitted) State v. Taylor, 239 Conn. 481, 504-505 , 687 A.2d 489 (1996), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1121 , 117 S. Ct. 2515 , 138 L.

2000We also repeatedly have upheld the constitutionality of an instruction characterizing reasonable doubt as “a real doubt, an honest doubt, a doubt which has its foundation in the evidence or lack of evidence”; (internal quotation marks omitted) State v. Taylor, 239 Conn. 481, 504-505 , 687 A.2d 489 (1996), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1121 , 117 S. Ct. 2515 , 138 L.

2000We also repeatedly have upheld the constitutionality of an instruction characterizing reasonable doubt as “a real doubt, an honest doubt, a doubt which has its foundation in the evidence or lack of evidence”; (internal quotation marks omitted) State v. Taylor, 239 Conn. 481, 504-505 , 687 A.2d 489 (1996), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1121 , 117 S. Ct. 2515 , 138 L.

2000We also repeatedly have upheld the constitutionality of an instruction characterizing reasonable doubt as “a real doubt, an honest doubt, a doubt which has its foundation in the evidence or lack of evidence”; (internal quotation marks omitted) State v. Taylor, 239 Conn. 481, 504-505 , 687 A.2d 489 (1996), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1121 , 117 S. Ct. 2515 , 138 L.

2000We also repeatedly have upheld the constitutionality of an instruction characterizing reasonable doubt as “a real doubt, an honest doubt, a doubt which has its foundation in the evidence or lack of evidence”; (internal quotation marks omitted) State v. Taylor, 239 Conn. 481, 504-505 , 687 A.2d 489 (1996), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1121 , 117 S. Ct. 2515 , 138 L.

2007Second, “[w]e are not at liberty to overrule or discard the decisions of our Supreme Court but are bound by them.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mazzuca v. Sullivan, 94 Conn. App. 97, 102 , 891 A.2d 83 , cert. denied, 278 Conn. 905 , 896 A.2d 107 (2006).

2007Second, “[w]e are not at liberty to overrule or discard the decisions of our Supreme Court but are bound by them.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mazzuca v. Sullivan, 94 Conn. App. 97, 102 , 891 A.2d 83 , cert. denied, 278 Conn. 905 , 896 A.2d 107 (2006).

2007Second, “[w]e are not at liberty to overrule or discard the decisions of our Supreme Court but are bound by them.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mazzuca v. Sullivan, 94 Conn. App. 97, 102 , 891 A.2d 83 , cert. denied, 278 Conn. 905 , 896 A.2d 107 (2006).

2007Second, “[w]e are not at liberty to overrule or discard the decisions of our Supreme Court but are bound by them.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mazzuca v. Sullivan, 94 Conn. App. 97, 102 , 891 A.2d 83 , cert. denied, 278 Conn. 905 , 896 A.2d 107 (2006).

2004See Elliott v. Larson, 81 Conn. App. 468, 472 , 840 A.2d 59 (2004) ("[a]lthough we have questioned the continuing viability of the waiver rule in the criminal context ... we have never questioned its applicability in the civil context" [internal quotation marks omitted]); State v. Rodriguez, 69 Conn.App. 779, 786 , 796 A.2d 611 ("[d]espite its criticism of the waiver rule, our Supreme Court has not expressly abandoned it"), cert. denied, 260 Conn. 938 , 802 A.2d 91 (2002); State v. Wright, 62 Conn.App. 743 , 749 n. 5, 774 A.2d 1015 ("[w]e are mindful that the application of the waiver rule in

2004See Elliott v. Larson, 81 Conn. App. 468, 472 , 840 A.2d 59 (2004) ("[a]lthough we have questioned the continuing viability of the waiver rule in the criminal context ... we have never questioned its applicability in the civil context" [internal quotation marks omitted]); State v. Rodriguez, 69 Conn.App. 779, 786 , 796 A.2d 611 ("[d]espite its criticism of the waiver rule, our Supreme Court has not expressly abandoned it"), cert. denied, 260 Conn. 938 , 802 A.2d 91 (2002); State v. Wright, 62 Conn.App. 743 , 749 n. 5, 774 A.2d 1015 ("[w]e are mindful that the application of the waiver rule in

2004See Elliott v. Larson, 81 Conn. App. 468, 472 , 840 A.2d 59 (2004) ("[a]lthough we have questioned the continuing viability of the waiver rule in the criminal context ... we have never questioned its applicability in the civil context" [internal quotation marks omitted]); State v. Rodriguez, 69 Conn.App. 779, 786 , 796 A.2d 611 ("[d]espite its criticism of the waiver rule, our Supreme Court has not expressly abandoned it"), cert. denied, 260 Conn. 938 , 802 A.2d 91 (2002); State v. Wright, 62 Conn.App. 743 , 749 n. 5, 774 A.2d 1015 ("[w]e are mindful that the application of the waiver rule in

2004See Elliott v. Larson, 81 Conn. App. 468, 472 , 840 A.2d 59 (2004) ("[a]lthough we have questioned the continuing viability of the waiver rule in the criminal context ... we have never questioned its applicability in the civil context" [internal quotation marks omitted]); State v. Rodriguez, 69 Conn.App. 779, 786 , 796 A.2d 611 ("[d]espite its criticism of the waiver rule, our Supreme Court has not expressly abandoned it"), cert. denied, 260 Conn. 938 , 802 A.2d 91 (2002); State v. Wright, 62 Conn.App. 743 , 749 n. 5, 774 A.2d 1015 ("[w]e are mindful that the application of the waiver rule in

2004See Elliott v. Larson, 81 Conn. App. 468, 472 , 840 A.2d 59 (2004) ("[a]lthough we have questioned the continuing viability of the waiver rule in the criminal context ... we have never questioned its applicability in the civil context" [internal quotation marks omitted]); State v. Rodriguez, 69 Conn.App. 779, 786 , 796 A.2d 611 ("[d]espite its criticism of the waiver rule, our Supreme Court has not expressly abandoned it"), cert. denied, 260 Conn. 938 , 802 A.2d 91 (2002); State v. Wright, 62 Conn.App. 743 , 749 n. 5, 774 A.2d 1015 ("[w]e are mindful that the application of the waiver rule in

2004See Elliott v. Larson, 81 Conn. App. 468, 472 , 840 A.2d 59 (2004) ("[a]lthough we have questioned the continuing viability of the waiver rule in the criminal context ... we have never questioned its applicability in the civil context" [internal quotation marks omitted]); State v. Rodriguez, 69 Conn.App. 779, 786 , 796 A.2d 611 ("[d]espite its criticism of the waiver rule, our Supreme Court has not expressly abandoned it"), cert. denied, 260 Conn. 938 , 802 A.2d 91 (2002); State v. Wright, 62 Conn.App. 743 , 749 n. 5, 774 A.2d 1015 ("[w]e are mindful that the application of the waiver rule in

2004See Elliott v. Larson, 81 Conn. App. 468, 472 , 840 A.2d 59 (2004) ("[a]lthough we have questioned the continuing viability of the waiver rule in the criminal context ... we have never questioned its applicability in the civil context" [internal quotation marks omitted]); State v. Rodriguez, 69 Conn.App. 779, 786 , 796 A.2d 611 ("[d]espite its criticism of the waiver rule, our Supreme Court has not expressly abandoned it"), cert. denied, 260 Conn. 938 , 802 A.2d 91 (2002); State v. Wright, 62 Conn.App. 743 , 749 n. 5, 774 A.2d 1015 ("[w]e are mindful that the application of the waiver rule in

2004See Elliott v. Larson, 81 Conn. App. 468, 472 , 840 A.2d 59 (2004) ("[a]lthough we have questioned the continuing viability of the waiver rule in the criminal context ... we have never questioned its applicability in the civil context" [internal quotation marks omitted]); State v. Rodriguez, 69 Conn.App. 779, 786 , 796 A.2d 611 ("[d]espite its criticism of the waiver rule, our Supreme Court has not expressly abandoned it"), cert. denied, 260 Conn. 938 , 802 A.2d 91 (2002); State v. Wright, 62 Conn.App. 743 , 749 n. 5, 774 A.2d 1015 ("[w]e are mindful that the application of the waiver rule in

2002The defendant made no objection to the constitutional ity of the admissibihty of this evidence at trial. 22 He now asks this court to review the constitutionality of his claim pursuant to the standard we have articulated in State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989). 23 We conclude that the defendant’s claim does not prevail under Golding and, therefore, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

2002The defendant made no objection to the constitutional ity of the admissibihty of this evidence at trial. 22 He now asks this court to review the constitutionality of his claim pursuant to the standard we have articulated in State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989). 23 We conclude that the defendant’s claim does not prevail under Golding and, therefore, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

2001We first address the trial court’s attempts to define “reasonable doubt.” In State v. Griffin, 253 Conn. 195, 205-206 , 749 A.2d 1192 (2000), we concluded that the instructions “that reasonable doubt is: (1) not a surmise, a guess or mere conjecture; [and] (2) [is] a real doubt, an honest doubt, a doubt that has its foundation in the evidence or lack of evidence ... in the context of the court’s entire charge on reasonable doubt . . . did not dilute the state’s burden of proof.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Additionally, we noted that we previously had “approved a rea

2001We first address the trial court’s attempts to define “reasonable doubt.” In State v. Griffin, 253 Conn. 195, 205-206 , 749 A.2d 1192 (2000), we concluded that the instructions “that reasonable doubt is: (1) not a surmise, a guess or mere conjecture; [and] (2) [is] a real doubt, an honest doubt, a doubt that has its foundation in the evidence or lack of evidence ... in the context of the court’s entire charge on reasonable doubt . . . did not dilute the state’s burden of proof.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Additionally, we noted that we previously had “approved a rea

1996The defendant, however, failed to file a motion for review pursuant to Practice Book § 4054. 11 Similar to the defendant in Dime Savings Bank of Wallingford v. Cornaglia, 33 Conn. App. 549, 554-55 , 636 A.2d 1370 , cert. granted, 229 Conn. 907 , 640 A.2d 120 (1994), the defendant in the present case “did nothing to perfect the record. ‘[He] could have sought review by this court of the adequacy of the trial court’s response pursuant to Practice Book § 4054.’ . . . [He] elected not to do so.” (Citation omitted.) “When a party is ‘dissatisfied with the trial court’s response to a motion for arti

1996The defendant, however, failed to file a motion for review pursuant to Practice Book § 4054. 11 Similar to the defendant in Dime Savings Bank of Wallingford v. Cornaglia, 33 Conn. App. 549, 554-55 , 636 A.2d 1370 , cert. granted, 229 Conn. 907 , 640 A.2d 120 (1994), the defendant in the present case “did nothing to perfect the record. ‘[He] could have sought review by this court of the adequacy of the trial court’s response pursuant to Practice Book § 4054.’ . . . [He] elected not to do so.” (Citation omitted.) “When a party is ‘dissatisfied with the trial court’s response to a motion for arti

1996The defendant, however, failed to file a motion for review pursuant to Practice Book § 4054. 11 Similar to the defendant in Dime Savings Bank of Wallingford v. Cornaglia, 33 Conn. App. 549, 554-55 , 636 A.2d 1370 , cert. granted, 229 Conn. 907 , 640 A.2d 120 (1994), the defendant in the present case “did nothing to perfect the record. ‘[He] could have sought review by this court of the adequacy of the trial court’s response pursuant to Practice Book § 4054.’ . . . [He] elected not to do so.” (Citation omitted.) “When a party is ‘dissatisfied with the trial court’s response to a motion for arti

1996The defendant, however, failed to file a motion for review pursuant to Practice Book § 4054. 11 Similar to the defendant in Dime Savings Bank of Wallingford v. Cornaglia, 33 Conn. App. 549, 554-55 , 636 A.2d 1370 , cert. granted, 229 Conn. 907 , 640 A.2d 120 (1994), the defendant in the present case “did nothing to perfect the record. ‘[He] could have sought review by this court of the adequacy of the trial court’s response pursuant to Practice Book § 4054.’ . . . [He] elected not to do so.” (Citation omitted.) “When a party is ‘dissatisfied with the trial court’s response to a motion for arti

1996The defendant, however, failed to file a motion for review pursuant to Practice Book § 4054. 11 Similar to the defendant in Dime Savings Bank of Wallingford v. Cornaglia, 33 Conn. App. 549, 554-55 , 636 A.2d 1370 , cert. granted, 229 Conn. 907 , 640 A.2d 120 (1994), the defendant in the present case “did nothing to perfect the record. ‘[He] could have sought review by this court of the adequacy of the trial court’s response pursuant to Practice Book § 4054.’ . . . [He] elected not to do so.” (Citation omitted.) “When a party is ‘dissatisfied with the trial court’s response to a motion for arti

1996The defendant, however, failed to file a motion for review pursuant to Practice Book § 4054. 11 Similar to the defendant in Dime Savings Bank of Wallingford v. Cornaglia, 33 Conn. App. 549, 554-55 , 636 A.2d 1370 , cert. granted, 229 Conn. 907 , 640 A.2d 120 (1994), the defendant in the present case “did nothing to perfect the record. ‘[He] could have sought review by this court of the adequacy of the trial court’s response pursuant to Practice Book § 4054.’ . . . [He] elected not to do so.” (Citation omitted.) “When a party is ‘dissatisfied with the trial court’s response to a motion for arti

1996The defendant, however, failed to file a motion for review pursuant to Practice Book § 4054. 11 Similar to the defendant in Dime Savings Bank of Wallingford v. Cornaglia, 33 Conn. App. 549, 554-55 , 636 A.2d 1370 , cert. granted, 229 Conn. 907 , 640 A.2d 120 (1994), the defendant in the present case “did nothing to perfect the record. ‘[He] could have sought review by this court of the adequacy of the trial court’s response pursuant to Practice Book § 4054.’ . . . [He] elected not to do so.” (Citation omitted.) “When a party is ‘dissatisfied with the trial court’s response to a motion for arti

1996The defendant, however, failed to file a motion for review pursuant to Practice Book § 4054. 11 Similar to the defendant in Dime Savings Bank of Wallingford v. Cornaglia, 33 Conn. App. 549, 554-55 , 636 A.2d 1370 , cert. granted, 229 Conn. 907 , 640 A.2d 120 (1994), the defendant in the present case “did nothing to perfect the record. ‘[He] could have sought review by this court of the adequacy of the trial court’s response pursuant to Practice Book § 4054.’ . . . [He] elected not to do so.” (Citation omitted.) “When a party is ‘dissatisfied with the trial court’s response to a motion for arti

1992The court emphasized that by concluding that a defendant’s bail could be revoked for violating a condition of release, it was “not adopting the principle of preventive detention of one charged with a criminal offense for the protection of the public” and declined to discuss “the wisdom or the constitutionality of that principle.” Id., 80 ; see also Rendel v. Mummert, supra, 237-38 ; Gardner v. Murphy, 402 So. 2d 525, 526 (Fla. App. 1981); State v. Albert, 312 N.C. 567, 575 , 324 S.E.2d 233 (1985); State v. Brown, 136 Vt. 561, 565-66 , 396 A.2d 134 (1978); but see Reeves v. State, 261 Ark. 384

1984This court subsequently reversed that judgment, ruling that the trial court erred when it concluded that, on the basis of Florentine v. Darien, 142 Conn. 415, 428 , 115 A.2d 328 (1955), the plaintiff could not challenge the rule.

1984This court subsequently reversed that judgment, ruling that the trial court erred when it concluded that, on the basis of Florentine v. Darien, 142 Conn. 415, 428 , 115 A.2d 328 (1955), the plaintiff could not challenge the rule.