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34 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1971–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Sweet v. Mooregreen2 sentences2006See Griffin v. State, 866 So.2d 1, 16 (Fla.2003); Sweet v. Moore, 822 So.2d 1269, 1274 (Fla. 2002); see also Whitton v. State, 649 So.2d 861 , 867 n. 10 (Fla.1994) (concluding that the standard jury instruction for avoid arrest aggravator is not unconstitutionally vague and did not require a limiting instruction to make this aggravator constitutionally sound). 2004See, e.g., Sweet v. Moore, 822 So.2d at 1274-75 ; Whitton v. State, 649 So.2d 861 , 867 n. 10 (Fla.1994) (concluding that standard jury instruction for avoid arrest *17 aggravator was not vague and did not require a limiting instruction in order to make the aggravator constitutionally sound). | 2 | 2 |
Whitton v. Stategreen2 sentences2006See Griffin v. State, 866 So.2d 1, 16 (Fla.2003); Sweet v. Moore, 822 So.2d 1269, 1274 (Fla. 2002); see also Whitton v. State, 649 So.2d 861 , 867 n. 10 (Fla.1994) (concluding that the standard jury instruction for avoid arrest aggravator is not unconstitutionally vague and did not require a limiting instruction to make this aggravator constitutionally sound). 2004See, e.g., Sweet v. Moore, 822 So.2d at 1274-75 ; Whitton v. State, 649 So.2d 861 , 867 n. 10 (Fla.1994) (concluding that standard jury instruction for avoid arrest *17 aggravator was not vague and did not require a limiting instruction in order to make the aggravator constitutionally sound). | 1 | 3 |
James v. Stategreen2 sentences2005See James v. State, 615 So.2d 668, 669 (Fla.1993) (holding that retroactive application of the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079 , 112 S.Ct. 2926 , 120 L.Ed.2d 854 (1992), that Florida's heinous, atrocious and cruel (HAC) jury instruction was unconstitutional, was to be retroactively applied where appellant "objected to the then-standard instruction at trial, asked for an expanded instruction, and argued on appeal against the constitutionality of the instruction his jury received"). 1995The trial court is directed to empanel a new jury, to hold a new sentencing proceeding, and to resentence James. 615 So.2d at 669 . | 1 | 2 |
Malicki v. Doegreen1 sentence2026See Malicki, 814 So. 2d at 347 ; Flynn, 221 So. 3d at 1247 (collecting cases). | 1 | 1 |
Parrish v. Ilinagreen1 sentence2026See Malicki, 814 So. 2d at 347 ; Flynn, 221 So. 3d at 1247 (collecting cases). | 1 | 1 |
Wyatt v. Stategreen1 sentence2019We have rejected related challenges to the constitutionality of rule 3.852, Wyatt v. State, 71 So. 3d 86, 111 (Fla. 2011); Howell v. State, 133 So. 3d 511 , 515- 16 (Fla. 2014), and decline to rule otherwise here. | 1 | 1 |
Troy v. Stategreen2 sentences2017See Deparvine v. State, 146 So. 3d 1071, 1106 (Fla. 2014) (“Deparvine’s claim is both procedurally barred because it was not raised on direct appeal and meritless.”); Troy v. State, 57 So. 3d 828, 841 (Fla. 2011) (“First, this claim is procedurally barred because it should have been raised on direct appeal.”). 2017See Deparvine v. State, 146 So.3d 1071, 1106 (Fla. 2014) (“Deparvine’s claim is both procedurally barred because it was not raised on direct appeal and meritless.”); Troy v. State, 57 So.3d 828, 841 (Fla. 2011) (“First, this claim is procedurally barred because it should have been raised on direct appeal.”). | 1 | 1 |
William James Deparvine v. State of Floridagreen2 sentences2017See Deparvine v. State, 146 So. 3d 1071, 1106 (Fla. 2014) (“Deparvine’s claim is both procedurally barred because it was not raised on direct appeal and meritless.”); Troy v. State, 57 So. 3d 828, 841 (Fla. 2011) (“First, this claim is procedurally barred because it should have been raised on direct appeal.”). 2017See Deparvine v. State, 146 So.3d 1071, 1106 (Fla. 2014) (“Deparvine’s claim is both procedurally barred because it was not raised on direct appeal and meritless.”); Troy v. State, 57 So.3d 828, 841 (Fla. 2011) (“First, this claim is procedurally barred because it should have been raised on direct appeal.”). | 1 | 1 |
Salter v. Stategreen2 sentences2016Id. at 954 (citing Weatherford v. State, 561 So.2d 629 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); Salter v. State, 500 So.2d 184 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)); see also id. (“[T]he reliability requirements of this statute are essential in assuring the constitutionality of this exception.”). 2016Id. at 954 (citing Weatherford v. State, 561 So.2d 629 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); Salter v. State, 500 So.2d 184 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)); see also id. (“[T]he reliability requirements of this statute are essential in assuring the constitutionality of this exception.”). | 1 | 1 |
Walker v. Stategreen1 sentence2014See K.C. v. State, 147' So.3d 552, 553 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014); Walker v. State, 137 So.3d 594, 595 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014). | 1 | 1 |
Kilgore v. Stategreen1 sentence2012See Kilgore v. State, 55 So.3d 487, 511 (Fla.2010) (holding a challenge to the constitutionality of rule 4 — 3.5(d)(4) procedurally barred in postcon-viction proceedings and noting moreover that “this Court has repeatedly rejected claims that Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 4 — 3.5(d)(4) is unconstitutional”). | 1 | 1 |
Barnhill v. Stategreen1 sentence2008See, e.g., Barnhill, 971 So.2d at 116-17 . | 1 | 1 |
In the Matter of the Florida Bargreen1 sentence2007See generally DeBock v. State, 512 So.2d 164, 168 (Fla.1987) (stating that there is a "rational basis" for holding attorneys to different standards than other regulated professionals); In re Fla. Bar Amendment to Code of Prof'l Responsibility (Contingent Fees), 349 So.2d 630, 635 (Fla.1977) (applying rational basis test in analyzing proposed amendment that impinged upon constitutional guarantee of freedom of contract). | 1 | 1 |
DeBock v. Stategreen1 sentence2007See generally DeBock v. State, 512 So.2d 164, 168 (Fla.1987) (stating that there is a "rational basis" for holding attorneys to different standards than other regulated professionals); In re Fla. Bar Amendment to Code of Prof'l Responsibility (Contingent Fees), 349 So.2d 630, 635 (Fla.1977) (applying rational basis test in analyzing proposed amendment that impinged upon constitutional guarantee of freedom of contract). | 1 | 1 |
Griffin v. Stategreen1 sentence2006See Griffin v. State, 866 So.2d 1, 16 (Fla.2003); Sweet v. Moore, 822 So.2d 1269, 1274 (Fla. 2002); see also Whitton v. State, 649 So.2d 861 , 867 n. 10 (Fla.1994) (concluding that the standard jury instruction for avoid arrest aggravator is not unconstitutionally vague and did not require a limiting instruction to make this aggravator constitutionally sound). | 1 | 1 |
Espinosa v. Floridagreen2 sentences2005See James v. State, 615 So.2d 668, 669 (Fla.1993) (holding that retroactive application of the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079 , 112 S.Ct. 2926 , 120 L.Ed.2d 854 (1992), that Florida's heinous, atrocious and cruel (HAC) jury instruction was unconstitutional, was to be retroactively applied where appellant "objected to the then-standard instruction at trial, asked for an expanded instruction, and argued on appeal against the constitutionality of the instruction his jury received"). 2005See James v. State, 615 So.2d 668, 669 (Fla.1993) (holding that retroactive application of the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079 , 112 S.Ct. 2926 , 120 L.Ed.2d 854 (1992), that Florida's heinous, atrocious and cruel (HAC) jury instruction was unconstitutional, was to be retroactively applied where appellant "objected to the then-standard instruction at trial, asked for an expanded instruction, and argued on appeal against the constitutionality of the instruction his jury received"). | 1 | 1 |
Allen v. Stategreen1 sentence2005See, e.g., Arbelaez v. State, 775 So.2d 909, 920 (Fla.2000); see also Allen v. State, 854 So.2d 1255 , 1258 n. 4 (Fla.2003). | 1 | 1 |
Arbelaez v. Stategreen1 sentence2005See, e.g., Arbelaez v. State, 775 So.2d 909, 920 (Fla.2000); see also Allen v. State, 854 So.2d 1255 , 1258 n. 4 (Fla.2003). | 1 | 1 |
Young v. Stategreen1 sentence2003See Young v. State, 739 So.2d 553 , 555 n. 5 (Fla.1999) (concluding that postconviction claim regarding the constitutionality of rule which limits an attorney's right to interview jurors after the conclusion of trial was procedurally barred because not raised on direct appeal). | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Ayalagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Davis v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
Roberts v. Stategreen1 sentence2002See Roberts v. State, 568 So.2d 1255, 1261 (Fla. 1990); Bertolotti v. Dugger, 514 So.2d 1095, 1097 (Fla.1987). | 1 | 1 |
Franqui v. Stategreen1 sentence2002See Franqui, 699 So.2d at 1334 (finding failure to renew objection renders claim procedurally barred). | 1 | 1 |
| Bertolotti v. Duggergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Johnson v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Beckwith v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Baillie v. Dept. of Natural Resourcesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Griffin v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commissiongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Younggreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Lott
green
2 sentences1978The constitutionality of this rule was upheld by this court in State v. Lott, 286 So.2d 565 (Fla. 1973), on the grounds that the enlarged speedy trial time period applicable to prisoners serving sentences in our state correctional institutions was based upon a reasonable classification, and did not deny such prisoners equal protection of the laws. [2] This court, in Lott , noted that Rule 3.191 insures the speedy trial rights of prisoners, and authorizes them to file a demand for speedy trial to shorten the time provided for in the rule. 1974The first paragraph of the motion reads: "Upon reading and examining the NOTICE OF RELIANCE FILED in this cause and received by the undersigned on January 21, 1974, it has been discovered that when the constitutionality of a rule of criminal procedure is challenged, the jurisdiction is apparently in the Supreme Court of Florida, State v. Lott [ 286 So.2d 565 ] (FSC 1973), filed December 5, 1973." The best evidence of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction is the Florida Constitution, Article V, § 3, F.S.A., which reads in part: "The Supreme Court: (1) Shall hear appeals from final judgments of trial | 2 | 1974–1978 |
Sims v. State
green
1 sentence2019The disputed limitations in rule 3.852(h)(3) and rule 3.852(i) are aimed at preventing capital postconviction defendants from engaging in an “eleventh hour attempt to delay the execution rather than a focused investigation into some legitimate inquiry.” Sims, 753 So. 2d at 68 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Paul Augustus Howell v. State of Florida
green
1 sentence2019We have rejected related challenges to the constitutionality of rule 3.852, Wyatt v. State, 71 So. 3d 86, 111 (Fla. 2011); Howell v. State, 133 So. 3d 511 , 515- 16 (Fla. 2014), and decline to rule otherwise here. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Hurst v. Florida
green
2 sentences2017Due to the clear and extensive case law that establishes that claims challenging the constitutionality of the standard jury instructions, as they apply to the jury’s advisory role, are entirely without merit, we conclude that appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise this meritless claim and thus deny Hall relief on this claim. - 55 - Florida’s Unconstitutional Capital Sentencing Scheme During the pendency of Hall’s postconviction appeal, the United States Supreme Court issued Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), in which it held that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme vi 2017Id. at 621 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Weatherford v. State
green
1 sentence2016Id. at 954 (citing Weatherford v. State, 561 So.2d 629 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); Salter v. State, 500 So.2d 184 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)); see also id. (“[T]he reliability requirements of this statute are essential in assuring the constitutionality of this exception.”). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Townsend
green
1 sentence2016Id. at 954 (citing Weatherford v. State, 561 So.2d 629 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); Salter v. State, 500 So.2d 184 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)); see also id. (“[T]he reliability requirements of this statute are essential in assuring the constitutionality of this exception.”). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Ring v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2012As his sixth claim, Johnson argues that Florida’s death sentencing statute, as applied, is unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 , 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). 2012As his sixth claim, Johnson argues that Florida’s death sentencing statute, as applied, is unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 , 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Rose v. State
red
1 sentence2005With regard to Elledge's claim regarding the constitutionality of the rule governing an attorney's ability to interview jurors, we determine that the substantive constitutional challenge to the rule governing juror interviews is procedurally barred as it was not raised on direct appeal. [27] See Rose v. State, 774 So.2d 629 , 637 n. 12 (Fla.2000) (holding that the claim "attacking the constitutionality of the Florida Bar Rule of Professional Conduct governing interviews of jurors [was] procedurally barred because Rose could have raised this issue on direct appeal"). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Smith v. Florida Department of Corrections
neutral
1 sentence2004In Smith v. Florida Department of Corrections, 752 So.2d 59 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), a prisoner filed a petition for writ of mandamus/declaratory judgment challenging through declaratory judgment, as petitioner does here, the constitutionality of the rule under which he was disciplined, as well as the disciplinary action itself. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| People Ex Rel. Hemingway v. Elrod green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Stringer v. Black green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Sochor v. Florida green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| American Civil Liberties Union and Larry Schack v. The Florida Bar and the Florida Judicial Qualifications Commission green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Diamond v. Charles green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Barnes v. United States green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Sanford v. Rubin green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Key Haven Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Internal Improvement Trust Fund green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Picchione v. Asti green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Century Village, Inc. v. WELLINGTON, ETC. green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Granados v. Miller green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Miranda v. Arizona green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Palmer v. State green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Young v. Florida green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Department of Transp. v. Morehouse green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Walsingham v. State green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.