constitutionality principle in California

1974In Hill v. City of Manhattan Beach (1971) 6 Cal.3d 279, 285 [ 98 Cal. Rptr. 785 , 491 P.2d 369 ], the Supreme Court recently said: "`The constitutionality of the principle of zoning is no longer an open question, and a restrictive regulation in this field pursuant to a municipality's comprehensive and systematic plan of community development, when reasonable in object and not arbitrary in operation, will be sustained as within the legitimate exercise of the police power. [Citations.]' [Citation.] Zoning ordinances which nevertheless are unreasonable, arbitrary or discriminatory in their applic

1974In Hill v. City of Manhattan Beach (1971) 6 Cal.3d 279, 285 [ 98 Cal. Rptr. 785 , 491 P.2d 369 ], the Supreme Court recently said: "`The constitutionality of the principle of zoning is no longer an open question, and a restrictive regulation in this field pursuant to a municipality's comprehensive and systematic plan of community development, when reasonable in object and not arbitrary in operation, will be sustained as within the legitimate exercise of the police power. [Citations.]' [Citation.] Zoning ordinances which nevertheless are unreasonable, arbitrary or discriminatory in their applic

1962The first comprehensive zoning ordinance in the United States was enacted in 1916 in the City of New York ( Miller v. Board of Public Works, 195 Cal. 477, 485 [ 234 P. 381 , 38 A.L.R. 1479 ]), and in the space of nine years when *521 this court first sustained the constitutionality of the principle in the Miller case in 1925, a bulletin of the United States Department of Commerce showed that "35 states and the District of Columbia have adopted this form of regulation; 221 municipalities have been zoned and over 22,000,000 inhabitants, aggregating 40 per cent of the urban population of this cou

1962The first comprehensive zoning ordinance in the United States was enacted in 1916 in the City of New York ( Miller v. Board of Public Works, 195 Cal. 477, 485 [ 234 P. 381 , 38 A.L.R. 1479 ]), and in the space of nine years when *521 this court first sustained the constitutionality of the principle in the Miller case in 1925, a bulletin of the United States Department of Commerce showed that "35 states and the District of Columbia have adopted this form of regulation; 221 municipalities have been zoned and over 22,000,000 inhabitants, aggregating 40 per cent of the urban population of this cou

1974In Hill v. City of Manhattan Beach (1971) 6 Cal.3d 279, 285 [ 98 Cal. Rptr. 785 , 491 P.2d 369 ], the Supreme Court recently said: "`The constitutionality of the principle of zoning is no longer an open question, and a restrictive regulation in this field pursuant to a municipality's comprehensive and systematic plan of community development, when reasonable in object and not arbitrary in operation, will be sustained as within the legitimate exercise of the police power. [Citations.]' [Citation.] Zoning ordinances which nevertheless are unreasonable, arbitrary or discriminatory in their applic

1974In Hill v. City of Manhattan Beach (1971) 6 Cal.3d 279, 285 [ 98 Cal. Rptr. 785 , 491 P.2d 369 ], the Supreme Court recently said: "`The constitutionality of the principle of zoning is no longer an open question, and a restrictive regulation in this field pursuant to a municipality's comprehensive and systematic plan of community development, when reasonable in object and not arbitrary in operation, will be sustained as within the legitimate exercise of the police power. [Citations.]' [Citation.] Zoning ordinances which nevertheless are unreasonable, arbitrary or discriminatory in their applic

1980In California’s history it had long been the rule that punitive damages were recoverable only where the defendant entertained “the wrongful personal intention to injure” the plaintiff (Roth v. Shell Oil Co. (1960) 185 Cal.App.2d 676, 682 [ 8 Cal.Rptr. 514 ]; italics added), and that the essential element of malice must be actual malice [denoting] ill will on the part of the defendant, or his desire to do harm for the mere satisfaction of doing it’” (Gombos v. Ashe (1958) 158 Cal.App.2d 517, 527 [ 322 P.2d 933 ], italics added).

1980In California’s history it had long been the rule that punitive damages were recoverable only where the defendant entertained “the wrongful personal intention to injure” the plaintiff (Roth v. Shell Oil Co. (1960) 185 Cal.App.2d 676, 682 [ 8 Cal.Rptr. 514 ]; italics added), and that the essential element of malice must be actual malice [denoting] ill will on the part of the defendant, or his desire to do harm for the mere satisfaction of doing it’” (Gombos v. Ashe (1958) 158 Cal.App.2d 517, 527 [ 322 P.2d 933 ], italics added).

1980In California’s history it had long been the rule that punitive damages were recoverable only where the defendant entertained “the wrongful personal intention to injure” the plaintiff (Roth v. Shell Oil Co. (1960) 185 Cal.App.2d 676, 682 [ 8 Cal.Rptr. 514 ]; italics added), and that the essential element of malice must be actual malice [denoting] ill will on the part of the defendant, or his desire to do harm for the mere satisfaction of doing it’” (Gombos v. Ashe (1958) 158 Cal.App.2d 517, 527 [ 322 P.2d 933 ], italics added).

1980In California’s history it had long been the rule that punitive damages were recoverable only where the defendant entertained “the wrongful personal intention to injure” the plaintiff (Roth v. Shell Oil Co. (1960) 185 Cal.App.2d 676, 682 [ 8 Cal.Rptr. 514 ]; italics added), and that the essential element of malice must be actual malice [denoting] ill will on the part of the defendant, or his desire to do harm for the mere satisfaction of doing it’” (Gombos v. Ashe (1958) 158 Cal.App.2d 517, 527 [ 322 P.2d 933 ], italics added).

1979The Supreme Court pointed out: “California courts, *365 however, have consistently upheld the constitutionality of our rule placing the burden of proof on the defendant,” citing People v. Hickman (1928) 204 Cal. 470, 477-478 [ 268 P. 909 , 270 P. 1117 ]; People v. Miller (1972) 7 Cal.3d 562, 574 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 841 , 498 P.2d 1089 ], Drew lays to rest appellant’s due process challenge to the burden of proof on the sanity issue.

1979The Supreme Court pointed out: “California courts, *365 however, have consistently upheld the constitutionality of our rule placing the burden of proof on the defendant,” citing People v. Hickman (1928) 204 Cal. 470, 477-478 [ 268 P. 909 , 270 P. 1117 ]; People v. Miller (1972) 7 Cal.3d 562, 574 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 841 , 498 P.2d 1089 ], Drew lays to rest appellant’s due process challenge to the burden of proof on the sanity issue.

1974In Hill v. City of Manhattan Beach (1971) 6 Cal.3d 279, 285 [ 98 Cal. Rptr. 785 , 491 P.2d 369 ], the Supreme Court recently said: "`The constitutionality of the principle of zoning is no longer an open question, and a restrictive regulation in this field pursuant to a municipality's comprehensive and systematic plan of community development, when reasonable in object and not arbitrary in operation, will be sustained as within the legitimate exercise of the police power. [Citations.]' [Citation.] Zoning ordinances which nevertheless are unreasonable, arbitrary or discriminatory in their applic

1974In Hill v. City of Manhattan Beach (1971) 6 Cal.3d 279, 285 [ 98 Cal. Rptr. 785 , 491 P.2d 369 ], the Supreme Court recently said: "`The constitutionality of the principle of zoning is no longer an open question, and a restrictive regulation in this field pursuant to a municipality's comprehensive and systematic plan of community development, when reasonable in object and not arbitrary in operation, will be sustained as within the legitimate exercise of the police power. [Citations.]' [Citation.] Zoning ordinances which nevertheless are unreasonable, arbitrary or discriminatory in their applic

1974In Hill v. City of Manhattan Beach (1971) 6 Cal.3d 279, 285 [ 98 Cal. Rptr. 785 , 491 P.2d 369 ], the Supreme Court recently said: "`The constitutionality of the principle of zoning is no longer an open question, and a restrictive regulation in this field pursuant to a municipality's comprehensive and systematic plan of community development, when reasonable in object and not arbitrary in operation, will be sustained as within the legitimate exercise of the police power. [Citations.]' [Citation.] Zoning ordinances which nevertheless are unreasonable, arbitrary or discriminatory in their applic

1974In Hill v. City of Manhattan Beach (1971) 6 Cal.3d 279, 285 [ 98 Cal. Rptr. 785 , 491 P.2d 369 ], the Supreme Court recently said: "`The constitutionality of the principle of zoning is no longer an open question, and a restrictive regulation in this field pursuant to a municipality's comprehensive and systematic plan of community development, when reasonable in object and not arbitrary in operation, will be sustained as within the legitimate exercise of the police power. [Citations.]' [Citation.] Zoning ordinances which nevertheless are unreasonable, arbitrary or discriminatory in their applic

1974In Hill v. City of Manhattan Beach (1971) 6 Cal.3d 279, 285 [ 98 Cal. Rptr. 785 , 491 P.2d 369 ], the Supreme Court recently said: "`The constitutionality of the principle of zoning is no longer an open question, and a restrictive regulation in this field pursuant to a municipality's comprehensive and systematic plan of community development, when reasonable in object and not arbitrary in operation, will be sustained as within the legitimate exercise of the police power. [Citations.]' [Citation.] Zoning ordinances which nevertheless are unreasonable, arbitrary or discriminatory in their applic

1974In Hill v. City of Manhattan Beach (1971) 6 Cal.3d 279, 285 [ 98 Cal. Rptr. 785 , 491 P.2d 369 ], the Supreme Court recently said: "`The constitutionality of the principle of zoning is no longer an open question, and a restrictive regulation in this field pursuant to a municipality's comprehensive and systematic plan of community development, when reasonable in object and not arbitrary in operation, will be sustained as within the legitimate exercise of the police power. [Citations.]' [Citation.] Zoning ordinances which nevertheless are unreasonable, arbitrary or discriminatory in their applic

1974In Hill v. City of Manhattan Beach (1971) 6 Cal.3d 279, 285 [ 98 Cal. Rptr. 785 , 491 P.2d 369 ], the Supreme Court recently said: "`The constitutionality of the principle of zoning is no longer an open question, and a restrictive regulation in this field pursuant to a municipality's comprehensive and systematic plan of community development, when reasonable in object and not arbitrary in operation, will be sustained as within the legitimate exercise of the police power. [Citations.]' [Citation.] Zoning ordinances which nevertheless are unreasonable, arbitrary or discriminatory in their applic

1974In Hill v. City of Manhattan Beach (1971) 6 Cal.3d 279, 285 [ 98 Cal. Rptr. 785 , 491 P.2d 369 ], the Supreme Court recently said: "`The constitutionality of the principle of zoning is no longer an open question, and a restrictive regulation in this field pursuant to a municipality's comprehensive and systematic plan of community development, when reasonable in object and not arbitrary in operation, will be sustained as within the legitimate exercise of the police power. [Citations.]' [Citation.] Zoning ordinances which nevertheless are unreasonable, arbitrary or discriminatory in their applic

1974In Hill v. City of Manhattan Beach (1971) 6 Cal.3d 279, 285 [ 98 Cal. Rptr. 785 , 491 P.2d 369 ], the Supreme Court recently said: “ ‘The constitutionality of the principle of zoning is no longer an open question, and a restrictive regulation in this field pursuant to a municipality’s comprehensive and systematic plan of community development, when reasonable in object and not arbitrary in operation, will- be sustained as within the legitimate exercise of the police power. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] Zoning ordinances which nevertheless are unreasonable, arbitrary or discriminatory in their appl

1974In Hill v. City of Manhattan Beach (1971) 6 Cal.3d 279, 285 [ 98 Cal. Rptr. 785 , 491 P.2d 369 ], the Supreme Court recently said: “ ‘The constitutionality of the principle of zoning is no longer an open question, and a restrictive regulation in this field pursuant to a municipality’s comprehensive and systematic plan of community development, when reasonable in object and not arbitrary in operation, will- be sustained as within the legitimate exercise of the police power. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] Zoning ordinances which nevertheless are unreasonable, arbitrary or discriminatory in their appl

1974In Hill v. City of Manhattan Beach (1971) 6 Cal.3d 279, 285 [ 98 Cal. Rptr. 785 , 491 P.2d 369 ], the Supreme Court recently said: "`The constitutionality of the principle of zoning is no longer an open question, and a restrictive regulation in this field pursuant to a municipality's comprehensive and systematic plan of community development, when reasonable in object and not arbitrary in operation, will be sustained as within the legitimate exercise of the police power. [Citations.]' [Citation.] Zoning ordinances which nevertheless are unreasonable, arbitrary or discriminatory in their applic

1974In Hill v. City of Manhattan Beach (1971) 6 Cal.3d 279, 285 [ 98 Cal. Rptr. 785 , 491 P.2d 369 ], the Supreme Court recently said: "`The constitutionality of the principle of zoning is no longer an open question, and a restrictive regulation in this field pursuant to a municipality's comprehensive and systematic plan of community development, when reasonable in object and not arbitrary in operation, will be sustained as within the legitimate exercise of the police power. [Citations.]' [Citation.] Zoning ordinances which nevertheless are unreasonable, arbitrary or discriminatory in their applic

1974In Hill v. City of Manhattan Beach (1971) 6 Cal.3d 279, 285 [ 98 Cal. Rptr. 785 , 491 P.2d 369 ], the Supreme Court recently said: "`The constitutionality of the principle of zoning is no longer an open question, and a restrictive regulation in this field pursuant to a municipality's comprehensive and systematic plan of community development, when reasonable in object and not arbitrary in operation, will be sustained as within the legitimate exercise of the police power. [Citations.]' [Citation.] Zoning ordinances which nevertheless are unreasonable, arbitrary or discriminatory in their applic

1974In Hill v. City of Manhattan Beach (1971) 6 Cal.3d 279, 285 [ 98 Cal. Rptr. 785 , 491 P.2d 369 ], the Supreme Court recently said: "`The constitutionality of the principle of zoning is no longer an open question, and a restrictive regulation in this field pursuant to a municipality's comprehensive and systematic plan of community development, when reasonable in object and not arbitrary in operation, will be sustained as within the legitimate exercise of the police power. [Citations.]' [Citation.] Zoning ordinances which nevertheless are unreasonable, arbitrary or discriminatory in their applic

1974In Hill v. City of Manhattan Beach (1971) 6 Cal.3d 279, 285 [ 98 Cal. Rptr. 785 , 491 P.2d 369 ], the Supreme Court recently said: "`The constitutionality of the principle of zoning is no longer an open question, and a restrictive regulation in this field pursuant to a municipality's comprehensive and systematic plan of community development, when reasonable in object and not arbitrary in operation, will be sustained as within the legitimate exercise of the police power. [Citations.]' [Citation.] Zoning ordinances which nevertheless are unreasonable, arbitrary or discriminatory in their applic

1974In Hill v. City of Manhattan Beach (1971) 6 Cal.3d 279, 285 [ 98 Cal. Rptr. 785 , 491 P.2d 369 ], the Supreme Court recently said: "`The constitutionality of the principle of zoning is no longer an open question, and a restrictive regulation in this field pursuant to a municipality's comprehensive and systematic plan of community development, when reasonable in object and not arbitrary in operation, will be sustained as within the legitimate exercise of the police power. [Citations.]' [Citation.] Zoning ordinances which nevertheless are unreasonable, arbitrary or discriminatory in their applic

1950Proc., § 963; Pipoly v. Benson, 20 Cal.2d 366, 368 [ 125 P.2d 482 , 147 A.L.R. 515 ]), plaintiff's purported appeal therefrom must be dismissed and only the appeal from the judgment remains for consideration. [1] The constitutionality of the principle of zoning is no longer an open question, and a restrictive regulation in this field pursuant to a municipality's comprehensive and systematic plan of community development, when reasonable in object and not arbitrary in operation, will be sustained as within the legitimate exercise of the police power. ( Miller v. Board of Public Works, 195 Cal.

1950Proc., § 963; Pipoly v. Benson, 20 Cal.2d 366, 368 [ 125 P.2d 482 , 147 A.L.R. 515 ]), plaintiff's purported appeal therefrom must be dismissed and only the appeal from the judgment remains for consideration. [1] The constitutionality of the principle of zoning is no longer an open question, and a restrictive regulation in this field pursuant to a municipality's comprehensive and systematic plan of community development, when reasonable in object and not arbitrary in operation, will be sustained as within the legitimate exercise of the police power. ( Miller v. Board of Public Works, 195 Cal.

1950Proc., § 963; Pipoly v. Benson, 20 Cal.2d 366, 368 [ 125 P.2d 482 , 147 A.L.R. 515 ]), plaintiff's purported appeal therefrom must be dismissed and only the appeal from the judgment remains for consideration. [1] The constitutionality of the principle of zoning is no longer an open question, and a restrictive regulation in this field pursuant to a municipality's comprehensive and systematic plan of community development, when reasonable in object and not arbitrary in operation, will be sustained as within the legitimate exercise of the police power. ( Miller v. Board of Public Works, 195 Cal.

1950Proc., § 963; Pipoly v. Benson, 20 Cal.2d 366, 368 [ 125 P.2d 482 , 147 A.L.R. 515 ]), plaintiff's purported appeal therefrom must be dismissed and only the appeal from the judgment remains for consideration. [1] The constitutionality of the principle of zoning is no longer an open question, and a restrictive regulation in this field pursuant to a municipality's comprehensive and systematic plan of community development, when reasonable in object and not arbitrary in operation, will be sustained as within the legitimate exercise of the police power. ( Miller v. Board of Public Works, 195 Cal.

2018(See People v. Williams (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 922 , 926, 225 Cal.Rptr. 842 [ Leigh merely holds that the constitutionality analysis is not within the sole province of the appellate court, not that it is properly the function of the trier of fact.].) Baker also argues that remand would allow the trial court to "perform its vested role of determining the facts in the first instance" and notes that appellate courts defer to factual findings that are supported by substantial evidence.

2018(See People v. Williams (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 922 , 926, 225 Cal.Rptr. 842 [ Leigh merely holds that the constitutionality analysis is not within the sole province of the appellate court, not that it is properly the function of the trier of fact.].) Baker also argues that remand would allow the trial court to "perform its vested role of determining the facts in the first instance" and notes that appellate courts defer to factual findings that are supported by substantial evidence.

1993(Michelle W. v. Ronald W, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 362, fn. 5 .) 5 See, ante, footnote 4.

1987(See, e.g., Weinberger v. Salfi (1975) 422 U.S. 749 [ 45 L.Ed.2d 522 , 95 S.Ct. 2457 ]; Cleveland Board of Education v. La Fleur (1974) 414 U.S. 632 [ 39 L.Ed.2d 52 , 94 S.Ct. 791 ]; Vlandis v. Kline (1973) 412 U.S. 441 [ 37 L.Ed.2d 63 , 93 S.Ct. 2230 ]; Stanley v. Illinois (1972) 405 U.S. 645 [ 31 L.Ed.2d 551 , 92 S.Ct. 1208 ]; Michelle W. v. Ronald W. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 354 [ 216 Cal.Rptr. 748 , 703 P.2d 88 ]; Estate of Cornelious (1984) 35 Cal.3d 461 [ 198 Cal.Rptr. 543 , 674 P.2d 245 ]; In re Lisa R. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 636 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 475 , 532 P.2d 123 , 90 A.L.R.3d 1017 ];Risinger, “Subs

1979The Supreme Court pointed out: “California courts, *365 however, have consistently upheld the constitutionality of our rule placing the burden of proof on the defendant,” citing People v. Hickman (1928) 204 Cal. 470, 477-478 [ 268 P. 909 , 270 P. 1117 ]; People v. Miller (1972) 7 Cal.3d 562, 574 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 841 , 498 P.2d 1089 ], Drew lays to rest appellant’s due process challenge to the burden of proof on the sanity issue.

1979The Supreme Court pointed out: “California courts, *365 however, have consistently upheld the constitutionality of our rule placing the burden of proof on the defendant,” citing People v. Hickman (1928) 204 Cal. 470, 477-478 [ 268 P. 909 , 270 P. 1117 ]; People v. Miller (1972) 7 Cal.3d 562, 574 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 841 , 498 P.2d 1089 ], Drew lays to rest appellant’s due process challenge to the burden of proof on the sanity issue.

2013(People v. Rodriguez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 437, 441, 447 (Rodriguez).) The constitutionality of this standard of proof “derives from the fact that ‘[r]evocation deprives an individual, not of the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only of the conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special [] restrictions.’ ” (Id. at p. 442, quoting Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471, 480 .) Standard of Review In reviewing an order revoking probation, we give great deference to the trial court’s decision, bearing in mind that “[p]robation is not a matter of right but an ac

2013(People v. Rodriguez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 437, 441, 447 (Rodriguez).) The constitutionality of this standard of proof “derives from the fact that ‘[r]evocation deprives an individual, not of the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only of the conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special [] restrictions.’ ” (Id. at p. 442, quoting Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471, 480 .) Standard of Review In reviewing an order revoking probation, we give great deference to the trial court’s decision, bearing in mind that “[p]robation is not a matter of right but an ac