constitutionality immunity in New Jersey

1977It has long been recognized that it is a proper function of courts to act as a check of improper use of both executive and legislative investigatory powers. [ 356 F. Supp. at 169 ] This authority would extend, of course, to determinations concerning the constitutionality of the immunity statute as applied to a specific case, see, e. g., Brown v. United States, supra, 359 U. S. at 49 , 79 S. Ct. at 545 , 3 L.

1977It has long been recognized that it is a proper function of courts to act as a check of improper use of both executive and legislative investigatory powers. [ 356 F. Supp. at 169 ] This authority would extend, of course, to determinations concerning the constitutionality of the immunity statute as applied to a specific case, see, e. g., Brown v. United States, supra, 359 U. S. at 49 , 79 S. Ct. at 545 , 3 L.

1977It has long been recognized that it is a proper function of courts to act as a check of improper use of both executive and legislative investigatory powers. [ 356 F. Supp. at 169 ] This authority would extend, of course, to determinations concerning the constitutionality of the immunity statute as applied to a specific case, see, e. g., Brown v. United States, supra, 359 U. S. at 49 , 79 S. Ct. at 545 , 3 L.

1977It has long been recognized that it is a proper function of courts to act as a check of improper use of both executive and legislative investigatory powers. [ 356 F. Supp. at 169 ] This authority would extend, of course, to determinations concerning the constitutionality of the immunity statute as applied to a specific case, see, e.g., Brown v. United States, supra, 359 U.S. at 49 , 79 S.Ct. at 545 , 3 L.Ed. 2d at 616 ; Baldinger, supra, 356 F. Supp. at 170 ; Hearings on H.R. 11157 and H.R. 12041 Before Subcomm.

1990In challenging the constitutionality of the immunity provision, plaintiffs rely upon cases such as Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 , 102 S.Ct. 2452 , 73 L.Ed. 2d 28 (1982); Gann v. Schramm 606 F. Supp. 1442 (D.Ct.De. 1985); and Sabo v. O'Bannon, 586 F. Supp. 1132 (E.D.Pa. 1984).

1990In challenging the constitutionality of the immunity provision, plaintiffs rely upon cases such as Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 , 102 S.Ct. 2452 , 73 L.Ed. 2d 28 (1982); Gann v. Schramm 606 F. Supp. 1442 (D.Ct.De. 1985); and Sabo v. O'Bannon, 586 F. Supp. 1132 (E.D.Pa. 1984).

1990In challenging the constitutionality of the immunity provision, plaintiffs rely upon cases such as Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 , 102 S.Ct. 2452 , 73 L.Ed. 2d 28 (1982); Gann v. Schramm 606 F. Supp. 1442 (D.Ct.De. 1985); and Sabo v. O'Bannon, 586 F. Supp. 1132 (E.D.Pa. 1984).

1990In challenging the constitutionality of the immunity provision, plaintiffs rely upon cases such as Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 , 102 S.Ct. 2452 , 73 L.Ed. 2d 28 (1982); Gann v. Schramm 606 F. Supp. 1442 (D.Ct.De. 1985); and Sabo v. O'Bannon, 586 F. Supp. 1132 (E.D.Pa. 1984).

1987In Foraker v. State, 394 A. 2d 208 (Del. 1978), the Delaware Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a rule requiring the exercise of peremptory challenges in capital cases immediately after examination of individual jurors and not after the entire jury has been impaneled.

1987In Foraker v. State, 394 A.2d 208 (Del.1978), the Delaware Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a rule requiring the exercise of peremptory challenges in capital cases immediately after examination of individual jurors and not after the entire jury has been impaneled.

1981The Law Division has recently upheld the constitutionality of this rule, Suchit v. Baxt, 176 N-J.Super. 407 (Law Div.1980). 4 Although the facts of this case concern a physician panelist with a malpractice suit pending against him, we agree with the dissenting judge in the Appellate Division, 173 N.J.Super. at 307 , that the same considerations and conclusions should apply to a doctor who has been party to a malpractice action in the past. 5 We have noted the argument of Judge Morgan in dissent below that in view of the large number of doctors with present or past involvement in malpractice su

1981The Law Division has recently upheld the constitutionality of this rule, Suchit v. Baxt, 176 N-J.Super. 407 (Law Div.1980). 4 Although the facts of this case concern a physician panelist with a malpractice suit pending against him, we agree with the dissenting judge in the Appellate Division, 173 N.J.Super. at 307 , that the same considerations and conclusions should apply to a doctor who has been party to a malpractice action in the past. 5 We have noted the argument of Judge Morgan in dissent below that in view of the large number of doctors with present or past involvement in malpractice su

1981Although we agree with Judge Morgan, we decline to use her conclusion as a basis for our holding today. 6 Such review may be sought in the Appellate Division either pursuant to R. 2:2-4 after the panel has rendered its findings, see, e. g., Vasily v. Cole, 173 N.J.Super. 152 (App.Div.1980), or as an appeal as of right to the Appellate Division after trial, R. 2:2-3(a). 7 This requirement does not violate R. 4:21-5(a), which proscribes the keeping of any verbatim record of panel hearings.

1978Deprivation of physical liberty is not the sole permissible consequence of a criminal conviction. [at 380] The Johnson court similarly gave short shrift to plaintiff's other constitutional arguments, disposing of them with a simple recognition that states can rely on their general power over the institution of marriage to justify bans on the marriage of certain prisoners. *437 The case of In re Goalen, 30 Utah 2d 27 , 512 P. 2d 1028 (Sup. Ct. 1973) cert. den. 414 U.S. 1148 , 94 S.Ct. 905 , 39 L.Ed. 2d 104 (1974), afforded Utah's highest court the opportunity to scrutinize and rule on the const

1978Deprivation of physical liberty is not the sole permissible consequence of a criminal conviction. [at 380] The Johnson court similarly gave short shrift to plaintiff's other constitutional arguments, disposing of them with a simple recognition that states can rely on their general power over the institution of marriage to justify bans on the marriage of certain prisoners. *437 The case of In re Goalen, 30 Utah 2d 27 , 512 P. 2d 1028 (Sup. Ct. 1973) cert. den. 414 U.S. 1148 , 94 S.Ct. 905 , 39 L.Ed. 2d 104 (1974), afforded Utah's highest court the opportunity to scrutinize and rule on the const

1978Deprivation of physical liberty is not the sole permissible consequence of a criminal conviction. [at 380] The Johnson court similarly gave short shrift to plaintiff's other constitutional arguments, disposing of them with a simple recognition that states can rely on their general power over the institution of marriage to justify bans on the marriage of certain prisoners. *437 The case of In re Goalen, 30 Utah 2d 27 , 512 P. 2d 1028 (Sup. Ct. 1973) cert. den. 414 U.S. 1148 , 94 S.Ct. 905 , 39 L.Ed. 2d 104 (1974), afforded Utah's highest court the opportunity to scrutinize and rule on the const

1978Deprivation of physical liberty is not the sole permissible consequence of a criminal conviction. [at 380] The Johnson court similarly gave short shrift to plaintiff's other constitutional arguments, disposing of them with a simple recognition that states can rely on their general power over the institution of marriage to justify bans on the marriage of certain prisoners. *437 The case of In re Goalen, 30 Utah 2d 27 , 512 P. 2d 1028 (Sup. Ct. 1973) cert. den. 414 U.S. 1148 , 94 S.Ct. 905 , 39 L.Ed. 2d 104 (1974), afforded Utah's highest court the opportunity to scrutinize and rule on the const

1977No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., Ser. 14 at 69 (1969), and to allegations that an order to testify would violate some independent constitutional right, see, e.g., Bursey v. United States, supra, 466 F. 2d at 1079-81 (finding that fundamental fairness inherent in due process places some limitations on repetitious questioning, and that due process is violated by requiring a witness to answer questions excepted from grant of immunity); In re Tierney, 465 F. 2d 806, 810 (5 Cir.1972), cert. den. 410 U.S. 914 , 93 S.Ct. 959 , 35 L.Ed. 2d 276 (1973) (alleged violation

1977No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., Ser. 14 at 69 (1969), and to allegations that an order to testify would violate some independent constitutional right, see, e.g., Bursey v. United States, supra, 466 F. 2d at 1079-81 (finding that fundamental fairness inherent in due process places some limitations on repetitious questioning, and that due process is violated by requiring a witness to answer questions excepted from grant of immunity); In re Tierney, 465 F. 2d 806, 810 (5 Cir.1972), cert. den. 410 U.S. 914 , 93 S.Ct. 959 , 35 L.Ed. 2d 276 (1973) (alleged violation

1977No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., Ser. 14 at 69 (1969), and to allegations that an order to testify would violate some independent constitutional right, see, e.g., Bursey v. United States, supra, 466 F. 2d at 1079-81 (finding that fundamental fairness inherent in due process places some limitations on repetitious questioning, and that due process is violated by requiring a witness to answer questions excepted from grant of immunity); In re Tierney, 465 F. 2d 806, 810 (5 Cir.1972), cert. den. 410 U.S. 914 , 93 S.Ct. 959 , 35 L.Ed. 2d 276 (1973) (alleged violation

1976Named as defendants were state universities and various state officials. 56 F.R.D. at 439-440 .

1968State v. Salerno, supra .

1964The constitutionality of this rule was approved in the Federal Courts in Patton v. United States, 281 U. S. 276 , 50 S. Ct. 253 , 74 L.

1964The constitutionality of this rule was approved in the Federal Courts in Patton v. United States, 281 U. S. 276 , 50 S. Ct. 253 , 74 L.