21 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Torres v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.green2 sentences2007Torres v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 163 Ariz. 88, 91 , 786 P.2d 939, 942 (1990). 2007Torres v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 163 Ariz. 88, 91 , 786 P.2d 939, 942 (1990). | 2 | 2 |
Byrns v. Riddell, Incorporatedgreen2 sentences2024Compare Vineyard, 199 Ariz. 504–05 (assuming Arizona rejected risk/benefit analysis as set forth in Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978)), with Dart, 147 Ariz. at 245 (approving risk/benefit analysis as expressed in Barker as an alternative strict products liability test and noting Barker’s “analysis is a logical refinement of [the Arizona Supreme Court’s] previous reasoning in [Byrns v. Riddell, 113 Ariz. 264 (1976)].”). ¶16 Thus, Toyota’s reliance on Vineyard is misplaced. 1978In Byrns v. Riddell, Inc., 113 Ariz. 264 , 550 P.2d 1065 (1976), our Supreme Court expressly held that proof of an “unreasonably dangerous product” is a necessary element in a products liability claim. | 1 | 2 |
Jimenez v. Sears, Roebuck and Co.green2 sentences2006The court held that the trier of fact, when allocating causal responsibility in a strict products liability claim, must make a factual determination as to the relative degree of fault of the plaintiffs misuse. 183 Ariz. at 405 , 904 P.2d at 867 . 2006The court held that the trier of fact, when allocating causal responsibility in a strict products liability claim, must make a factual determination as to the relative degree of fault of the plaintiffs misuse. 183 Ariz. at 405 , 904 P.2d at 867 . | 1 | 2 |
Vega v. Sullivangreen1 sentence2024Compare Vineyard, 199 Ariz. 504–05 (assuming Arizona rejected risk/benefit analysis as set forth in Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978)), with Dart, 147 Ariz. at 245 (approving risk/benefit analysis as expressed in Barker as an alternative strict products liability test and noting Barker’s “analysis is a logical refinement of [the Arizona Supreme Court’s] previous reasoning in [Byrns v. Riddell, 113 Ariz. 264 (1976)].”). ¶16 Thus, Toyota’s reliance on Vineyard is misplaced. | 1 | 1 |
Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.green1 sentence2024Compare Vineyard, 199 Ariz. 504–05 (assuming Arizona rejected risk/benefit analysis as set forth in Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978)), with Dart, 147 Ariz. at 245 (approving risk/benefit analysis as expressed in Barker as an alternative strict products liability test and noting Barker’s “analysis is a logical refinement of [the Arizona Supreme Court’s] previous reasoning in [Byrns v. Riddell, 113 Ariz. 264 (1976)].”). ¶16 Thus, Toyota’s reliance on Vineyard is misplaced. | 1 | 1 |
Dart v. Wiebe Manufacturing, Inc.green1 sentence2024Compare Vineyard, 199 Ariz. 504–05 (assuming Arizona rejected risk/benefit analysis as set forth in Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978)), with Dart, 147 Ariz. at 245 (approving risk/benefit analysis as expressed in Barker as an alternative strict products liability test and noting Barker’s “analysis is a logical refinement of [the Arizona Supreme Court’s] previous reasoning in [Byrns v. Riddell, 113 Ariz. 264 (1976)].”). ¶16 Thus, Toyota’s reliance on Vineyard is misplaced. | 1 | 1 |
Lowrey v. Montgomery Kone, Inc.green1 sentence2020Lowrey v. Montgomery Kone, Inc., 202 Ariz. 190, 192, ¶ 7 (App. 2002). ¶14 However, Emmons brought a products liability claim for a manufacturing defect. | 1 | 1 |
Gomulka v. Yavapai MacHine & Auto Parts, Inc.green1 sentence2020Such a claim alleges a defective product “flawed as a result of something that went wrong during the manufacturing process.” Gomulka v. Yavapai Mach. & Auto Parts, Inc., 155 Ariz. 239, 241-42 (App. 1987). | 1 | 1 |
Wetzel v. Commercial Chair Companygreen1 sentence2019Corp. v. Founders Title Co., 169 Ariz. 417, 423 (App. 1991) (duty in a negligent misrepresentation claim may exist notwithstanding a lack of privity between the parties); Wetzel v. Commercial Chair Co., 18 Ariz. App. 54, 56 (1972) (privity is not required in order to bring a products liability claim). | 1 | 1 |
Mur-Ray Management Corp. v. Founders Title Co.green1 sentence2019Corp. v. Founders Title Co., 169 Ariz. 417, 423 (App. 1991) (duty in a negligent misrepresentation claim may exist notwithstanding a lack of privity between the parties); Wetzel v. Commercial Chair Co., 18 Ariz. App. 54, 56 (1972) (privity is not required in order to bring a products liability claim). | 1 | 1 |
Caruth v. Marianigreen2 sentences2006Strict Products Liability and Comparative Fault ¶ 7 The doctrine of strict products liability is “a public policy device to spread the risk from one to whom a defective product may be a catastrophe, to those who marketed the product, profit from its sale, and have the know-how to remove its defects before placing it in the chain of distribution.” Tucson Indus., Inc. v. Schwartz, 108 Ariz. 464, 467-68 , 501 P.2d 936, 939-40 (1972). 2 In *422 Caruth v. Mariani, 11 Ariz.App. 188, 192 , 463 P.2d 83, 87 (1970), this court discussed application of the doctrine to those involved in the chain of a def 2006Strict Products Liability and Comparative Fault ¶ 7 The doctrine of strict products liability is “a public policy device to spread the risk from one to whom a defective product may be a catastrophe, to those who marketed the product, profit from its sale, and have the know-how to remove its defects before placing it in the chain of distribution.” Tucson Indus., Inc. v. Schwartz, 108 Ariz. 464, 467-68 , 501 P.2d 936, 939-40 (1972). 2 In *422 Caruth v. Mariani, 11 Ariz.App. 188, 192 , 463 P.2d 83, 87 (1970), this court discussed application of the doctrine to those involved in the chain of a def | 1 | 1 |
Tucson Industries, Incorporated v. Schwartzgreen2 sentences2006Strict Products Liability and Comparative Fault ¶ 7 The doctrine of strict products liability is “a public policy device to spread the risk from one to whom a defective product may be a catastrophe, to those who marketed the product, profit from its sale, and have the know-how to remove its defects before placing it in the chain of distribution.” Tucson Indus., Inc. v. Schwartz, 108 Ariz. 464, 467-68 , 501 P.2d 936, 939-40 (1972). 2 In *422 Caruth v. Mariani, 11 Ariz.App. 188, 192 , 463 P.2d 83, 87 (1970), this court discussed application of the doctrine to those involved in the chain of a def 2006Strict Products Liability and Comparative Fault ¶ 7 The doctrine of strict products liability is “a public policy device to spread the risk from one to whom a defective product may be a catastrophe, to those who marketed the product, profit from its sale, and have the know-how to remove its defects before placing it in the chain of distribution.” Tucson Indus., Inc. v. Schwartz, 108 Ariz. 464, 467-68 , 501 P.2d 936, 939-40 (1972). 2 In *422 Caruth v. Mariani, 11 Ariz.App. 188, 192 , 463 P.2d 83, 87 (1970), this court discussed application of the doctrine to those involved in the chain of a def | 1 | 1 |
Gosewisch v. American Honda Motor Co.green2 sentences1997Three types of defects can result in an unreasonably dangerous product: (1) design defects, (2) manufacturing defects, and (3) informational defects encompassing instructions and warnings. 153 Ariz. 400, 403 , 737 P.2d 376, 379 (1987) (citations omitted). 1997Three types of defects can result in an unreasonably dangerous product: (1) design defects, (2) manufacturing defects, and (3) informational defects encompassing instructions and warnings. 153 Ariz. 400, 403 , 737 P.2d 376, 379 (1987) (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Gibbs v. O'Malley Lumber Co.green2 sentences1995See Gibbs, 177 Ariz. at 348 , 868 P.2d at 363 (Voss, J., dissenting). 1995See Gibbs, 177 Ariz. at 348 , 868 P.2d at 363 (Voss, J., dissenting). | 1 | 1 |
Times Mirror Co. v. Siskgreen2 sentences1993Times Mirror Co. v. Sisk, 122 Ariz. 174, 178 , 593 P.2d 924, 928 (App.1978). 1993Times Mirror Co. v. Sisk, 122 Ariz. 174, 178 , 593 P.2d 924, 928 (App.1978). | 1 | 1 |
Gates v. LaBelle's Distribution of Arizona, Inc.green2 sentences1989All actions which satisfy the three elements delineated in A.R.S. § 12-681 are subject to the two year statute of limitations contained in A.R.S. § 12-542, regardless of whether they are otherwise couched in tort or contract language. 147 Ariz. at 24 , 708 P.2d at 115 (emphasis in original). 1989All actions which satisfy the three elements delineated in A.R.S. § 12-681 are subject to the two year statute of limitations contained in A.R.S. § 12-542, regardless of whether they are otherwise couched in tort or contract language. 147 Ariz. at 24 , 708 P.2d at 115 (emphasis in original). | 1 | 1 |
Bryant v. Continental Conveyor & Equipment Co.red2 sentences1988Article 18, § 6 of our constitution prevents the legislature from abrogating "the right of action to recover damages for injuries." The majority concludes, however, that the "doctrine of strict products liability" is not protected because it "did not exist at common law when our constitution ... was adopted in 1912." 156 Ariz. at 195 , 751 P.2d at 511 . [1] True, the "doctrine" of strict liability for injuries caused by a product was first recognized by this court in the 1960's. 1988Article 18, § 6 of our constitution prevents the legislature from abrogating "the right of action to recover damages for injuries." The majority concludes, however, that the "doctrine of strict products liability" is not protected because it "did not exist at common law when our constitution ... was adopted in 1912." 156 Ariz. at 195 , 751 P.2d at 511 . [1] True, the "doctrine" of strict liability for injuries caused by a product was first recognized by this court in the 1960's. | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.green2 sentences1985Brown v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 136 Ariz. 556, 563 , 667 P.2d 750, 757 (App.1983). 6 . 1985Brown v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 136 Ariz. 556, 563 , 667 P.2d 750, 757 (App.1983). 6 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.
green
2 sentences1983We thus conclude that the doctrine of products liability does not apply as between parties who: (1) deal in a commercial setting; (2) from positions of relatively equal economic strength; (3) bargain the specifications of the product; and (4) negotiate concerning the risk of loss from defects in it. 55 Cal.App.3d at 748 , 127 Cal.Rptr. at 845 . 1983We thus conclude that the doctrine of products liability does not apply as between parties who: (1) deal in a commercial setting; (2) from positions of relatively equal economic strength; (3) bargain the specifications of the product; and (4) negotiate concerning the risk of loss from defects in it. 55 Cal.App.3d at 748 , 127 Cal.Rptr. at 845 . | 2 | 1983–1984 |
Hazine v. Montgomery Elevator Co.
green
2 sentences2023Id. 2023Id. at 342 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Alcombrack v. Ciccarelli
green
1 sentence2019Accordingly, we reject Gavilan Peak’s argument that privity is a necessary prerequisite to imposing liability. ¶36 Gavilan Peak further relies on Alcombrack v. Ciccarelli, 238 Ariz. 538 (App. 2015), for the assertion that a landowner is not liable to a third party injured on the property when the landowner is not in possession of the property. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Kearl v. Lederle Laboratories
green
2 sentences2008The Arizona Supreme Court impliedly recognized this essential distinction in Dart when it refused to extend the hindsight test to warning defect claims, citing Kearl v. Lederle Labs., 172 Cal.App.3d 812 , 218 Cal.Rptr. 453 (1985). ¶ 23 The California Court of Appeal ruled in Kearl that a products liability claim based on a failure to warn about an unavoidably dangerous product could not be brought in strict liability, only negligence, because the adequacy of the manufacturer’s warning must be based on a determination regarding what it knew or should have known. 2008The Arizona Supreme Court impliedly recognized this essential distinction in Dart when it refused to extend the hindsight test to warning defect claims, citing Kearl v. Lederle Labs., 172 Cal.App.3d 812 , 218 Cal.Rptr. 453 (1985). ¶ 23 The California Court of Appeal ruled in Kearl that a products liability claim based on a failure to warn about an unavoidably dangerous product could not be brought in strict liability, only negligence, because the adequacy of the manufacturer’s warning must be based on a determination regarding what it knew or should have known. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Bridgestone/Firestone North America Tire, L.L.C. v. A.P.S. Rent-A-Car & Leasing, Inc.
green
2 sentences2006Id. at 504, ¶ 5 , 88 P.3d at 574 . 2006Id. at 505, ¶ 9 , 88 P.3d at 575 . ¶ 26 Finally, allowing fault to be allocated against the participants in a defective product’s chain of distribution does not place additional legal proof requirements on a strict products liability plaintiff. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Baird v. Bell Helicopter Textron
green
2 sentences1994Id. at 1140-1141 . 1994Id. at 1140-1141 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Byrd Motor Lines, Inc. v. Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp.
green
2 sentences1988Byrd Motor Lines, Inc. v. Dunlop Tire and Rubber Corp., 63 N.C.App. 292 , 304 S.E.2d 773 (1983). 1988Byrd Motor Lines, Inc. v. Dunlop Tire and Rubber Corp., 63 N.C.App. 292 , 304 S.E.2d 773 (1983). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Allen v. Southwest Salt Co.
green
2 sentences1987Allen v. Southwest Salt Co., 149 Ariz. 368 , 718 P.2d 1021 (App.1986); Hills v. Salt River Project Ass’n, 144 Ariz. 421 , 698 P.2d 216 (App.1985). 1987Allen v. Southwest Salt Co., 149 Ariz. 368 , 718 P.2d 1021 (App.1986); Hills v. Salt River Project Ass’n, 144 Ariz. 421 , 698 P.2d 216 (App.1985). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Hills v. Salt River Project Ass'n
green
2 sentences1987Allen v. Southwest Salt Co., 149 Ariz. 368 , 718 P.2d 1021 (App.1986); Hills v. Salt River Project Ass’n, 144 Ariz. 421 , 698 P.2d 216 (App.1985). 1987Allen v. Southwest Salt Co., 149 Ariz. 368 , 718 P.2d 1021 (App.1986); Hills v. Salt River Project Ass’n, 144 Ariz. 421 , 698 P.2d 216 (App.1985). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Southwest Forest Industries, Inc. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.
green
1 sentence1983In Southwest Forest Industries, Inc. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 422 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir.); cert. denied, 400 U.S. 902 , 91 S.Ct. 138 , 27 L.Ed.2d 138 (1970), the district court’s dismissal of a strict liability consequential damages claim was affirmed by the court of appeals because the principles underlying strict liability are not to be extended to cases involving essentially commercial problems in the sale of industrial products between large corporations with equal bargaining power: The circumstances of this case do not bring the plaintiff within that class of consumers, type of transa | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Smith v. Humble Oil & Refining Co.
green
2 sentences1983In Southwest Forest Industries, Inc. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 422 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir.); cert. denied, 400 U.S. 902 , 91 S.Ct. 138 , 27 L.Ed.2d 138 (1970), the district court’s dismissal of a strict liability consequential damages claim was affirmed by the court of appeals because the principles underlying strict liability are not to be extended to cases involving essentially commercial problems in the sale of industrial products between large corporations with equal bargaining power: The circumstances of this case do not bring the plaintiff within that class of consumers, type of transa 1983In Southwest Forest Industries, Inc. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 422 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir.); cert. denied, 400 U.S. 902 , 91 S.Ct. 138 , 27 L.Ed.2d 138 (1970), the district court’s dismissal of a strict liability consequential damages claim was affirmed by the court of appeals because the principles underlying strict liability are not to be extended to cases involving essentially commercial problems in the sale of industrial products between large corporations with equal bargaining power: The circumstances of this case do not bring the plaintiff within that class of consumers, type of transa | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Martin v. Commissioner
green
1 sentence1983In Southwest Forest Industries, Inc. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 422 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir.); cert. denied, 400 U.S. 902 , 91 S.Ct. 138 , 27 L.Ed.2d 138 (1970), the district court’s dismissal of a strict liability consequential damages claim was affirmed by the court of appeals because the principles underlying strict liability are not to be extended to cases involving essentially commercial problems in the sale of industrial products between large corporations with equal bargaining power: The circumstances of this case do not bring the plaintiff within that class of consumers, type of transa | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.