15 Wisconsin opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wisconsin courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Dippel v. Scianogreen2 sentences1991We first address the question whether a products liability claim, first sanctioned by this court in Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443 , 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967), applies to a used product which otherwise meets the criteria for strict liability set forth in sec. 402A, Restatement (Second) of Torts. 1991We first address the question whether a products liability claim, first sanctioned by this court in Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443 , 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967), applies to a used product which otherwise meets the criteria for strict liability set forth in sec. 402A, Restatement (Second) of Torts. | 1 | 4 |
Sumnicht v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.green2 sentences2008The Horsts dispute that Vincer is a bystander case emphasizing that "access to an above-ground swimming pool. . . involved a risk of harm to all children using the pool — not bystanders making no use of the pool." We appreciate the distinction; nonetheless, Vincer teaches that unreasonable danger, a distinct element in a strict products liability claim, is based on consumer expectations. 2 See also Sumnicht v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A, Inc., 121 Wis. 2d 338, 367-70 , 360 *432 N.W.2d 2 (1984). 2001In Sumnicht, 121 Wis. 2d at 346, 348-49 , we reviewed a strict products liability claim in which the plaintiff, Sumnicht, alleged that a design defect in the defendants' automobiles exacerbated the injuries that he sustained during a traffic accident. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Dunngreen2 sentences2021See State v. Dunn, 213 Wis. 2d 363, 368 , 570 N.W.2d 614 (Ct. App. 1997). 2021See State v. Dunn, 213 Wis. 2d 363, 368 , 570 N.W.2d 614 (Ct. App. 1997). | 1 | 1 |
Raymond Leannais and Catherine Leannais v. Cincinnati, Incorporated and Cincinnati-Forte Company and Liberty Mutual Insurance Companygreen1 sentence2018The majority disagreed with a dissenting judge, who opined that Wisconsin courts would not limit the exceptions to the four, and would extend "strict liability to successor companies that carry on the product line of their predecessors and that trade on the good name and good will of their predecessors [so as to give] the policy underlying the strict products liability rule ... full effect." See id. at 443 (Fairchild, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). | 1 | 1 |
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.green2 sentences2009Because the child was an injured bystander (i.e., not a user or consumer), the main issue in the case was whether an injured bystander can maintain a strict products liability claim against a manufacturer, or whether strict products liability claims may only be advanced by injured users and consumers. ¶ 40 After acknowledging that our prior decision in Dippel only allowed users and consumers to recover, the court chose to extend coverage to bystanders, holding that a manufacturer is strictly liable "when he places a defective article on the market `that causes injury to a human being.'" Id. at 2009Because the child was an injured bystander (i.e., not a user or consumer), the main issue in the case was whether an injured bystander can maintain a strict products liability claim against a manufacturer, or whether strict products liability claims may only be advanced by injured users and consumers. ¶ 40 After acknowledging that our prior decision in Dippel only allowed users and consumers to recover, the court chose to extend coverage to bystanders, holding that a manufacturer is strictly liable "when he places a defective article on the market `that causes injury to a human being.'" Id. at | 1 | 1 |
Howes v. Hansengreen2 sentences2009Because the child was an injured bystander (i.e., not a user or consumer), the main issue in the case was whether an injured bystander can maintain a strict products liability claim against a manufacturer, or whether strict products liability claims may only be advanced by injured users and consumers. ¶ 40 After acknowledging that our prior decision in Dippel only allowed users and consumers to recover, the court chose to extend coverage to bystanders, holding that a manufacturer is strictly liable "when he places a defective article on the market `that causes injury to a human being.'" Id. at 2009Id. at 258, 201 N.W.2d 825 . ¶ 42 The Horsts claim that Howes I is dispositive, and suggest that we cannot legitimately reconcile a rejection of their proposed bystander contemplation test with this case. ¶ 43 Deere, on the other hand, concedes that Howes I allows an injured bystander to pursue a strict products liability claim, but disputes that it creates or adopts a bystander contemplation test. | 1 | 1 |
Ahnapee & Western Railway Co. v. Challonergreen2 sentences2003Co. v. Challoner, 34 Wis. 2d 134, 145 , 148 N.W.2d 646 (1967)("[T]he basis of promissory estoppel is akin to the contractual basis for reformation."). [2] See Wis JICivil 2400-03 for the elements of misrepresentation. [3] I suppose we could say that one branch of the family tree of strict products liability lies in contract law (i.e., breach of implied warranty), but that would not transform a strict products liability claim, derived from section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, into a contract action. 2003Co. v. Challoner, 34 Wis. 2d 134, 145 , 148 N.W.2d 646 (1967)("[T]he basis of promissory estoppel is akin to the contractual basis for reformation."). [2] See Wis JICivil 2400-03 for the elements of misrepresentation. [3] I suppose we could say that one branch of the family tree of strict products liability lies in contract law (i.e., breach of implied warranty), but that would not transform a strict products liability claim, derived from section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, into a contract action. | 1 | 1 |
Berry v. Gibsongreen1 sentence1993Berry v. Gibson, 491 N.E.2d 33, 35 (Ill. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wisconsin. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Michael Bohm v. Michael Leiber
green
2 sentences2023Bohm v. Leiber, 2020 WI App 52, ¶8 , 393 Wis. 2d 757 , 948 N.W.2d 370 . ¶11 American Family’s complaint advanced a single strict products liability claim against Sunvest, but it had two components. 2023Bohm v. Leiber, 2020 WI App 52, ¶8 , 393 Wis. 2d 757 , 948 N.W.2d 370 . ¶11 American Family’s complaint advanced a single strict products liability claim against Sunvest, but it had two components. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
United Cooperative v. Frontier FS Cooperative
green
2 sentences2021United Coop. v. Frontier FS Coop., 2007 WI App 197, ¶39 , 304 Wis. 2d 750 , 738 N.W.2d 578 (holding that an argument asserted by a respondent on appeal and not disputed by the appellant in the reply brief may be taken as admitted). ¶20 In sum, we reject Ryant’s strict products liability argument because Ryant’s brief-in-chief contains inadequate references to the record and his reply brief fails to respond to Summit’s argument disposing of the products liability claim. ¶21 We next consider Ryant’s negligence claim. 6 The party moving for summary judgment, here, Summit, bears the burden of esta 2021United Coop. v. Frontier FS Coop., 2007 WI App 197, ¶39 , 304 Wis. 2d 750 , 738 N.W.2d 578 (holding that an argument asserted by a respondent on appeal and not disputed by the appellant in the reply brief may be taken as admitted). ¶20 In sum, we reject Ryant’s strict products liability argument because Ryant’s brief-in-chief contains inadequate references to the record and his reply brief fails to respond to Summit’s argument disposing of the products liability claim. ¶21 We next consider Ryant’s negligence claim. 6 The party moving for summary judgment, here, Summit, bears the burden of esta | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Penny L. Springer v. Nohl Electric Products Corporation
green
2 sentences2020Corp., 2018 WI 48 , 381 Wis. 2d 438 , 912 N.W.2d 1 , in the context of a products liability claim that alleged successor corporation liability. 2020Corp., 2018 WI 48 , 381 Wis. 2d 438 , 912 N.W.2d 1 , in the context of a products liability claim that alleged successor corporation liability. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Komanekin Ex Rel. Hausmann v. Inland Truck Parts
green
2 sentences2009Id. at 811 . ¶ 58 In its opinion, the Eastern District of Wisconsin described the injured child as a bystander, and rightly stated that he may assert a strict products liability claim just like a user or consumer under Howes I. 2009Id. at 809 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc.
green
2 sentences2008Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 2001 WI 109, ¶ 72 , 245 Wis. 2d 772 , 629 N.W.2d 727 . 2 Our supreme court cited with approval Restatement (Second) of ToRTS § 402A comment g, which provides that a product is defective "where the product is, at the time it leaves the seller's hands, in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate *432 consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to him [or her]." Vincer v. Esther William s All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 69 Wis. 2d 326, 330 , 230 N.W.2d 794 (1975). 2008Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 2001 WI 109, ¶ 72 , 245 Wis. 2d 772 , 629 N.W.2d 727 . 2 Our supreme court cited with approval Restatement (Second) of ToRTS § 402A comment g, which provides that a product is defective "where the product is, at the time it leaves the seller's hands, in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate *432 consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to him [or her]." Vincer v. Esther William s All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 69 Wis. 2d 326, 330 , 230 N.W.2d 794 (1975). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co.
green
2 sentences2008Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 2001 WI 109, ¶ 72 , 245 Wis. 2d 772 , 629 N.W.2d 727 . 2 Our supreme court cited with approval Restatement (Second) of ToRTS § 402A comment g, which provides that a product is defective "where the product is, at the time it leaves the seller's hands, in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate *432 consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to him [or her]." Vincer v. Esther William s All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 69 Wis. 2d 326, 330 , 230 N.W.2d 794 (1975). 2008Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 2001 WI 109, ¶ 72 , 245 Wis. 2d 772 , 629 N.W.2d 727 . 2 Our supreme court cited with approval Restatement (Second) of ToRTS § 402A comment g, which provides that a product is defective "where the product is, at the time it leaves the seller's hands, in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate *432 consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to him [or her]." Vincer v. Esther William s All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 69 Wis. 2d 326, 330 , 230 N.W.2d 794 (1975). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Roger J. Bergfeld, Sr. Denise I. Bergfeld v. Unimin Corporation, Martin Marietta Corporation, Also Known as Lockheed Martin Corporation
green
1 sentence2003Id. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Sharp Ex Rel. Gordon v. Case Corp.
green
2 sentences2001Id. ś 63. 2001Id. at 20 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co.
green
2 sentences1994Recognizing the "insurmountable obstacle" faced by DES plaintiffs in proving that a particular drug company produced or marketed the specific DES taken by the plaintiffs' mothers, see id. at 182 , 342 N.W.2d at 45 , the supreme court relaxed the plaintiffs burden of proof, concluding that for causal identification, DES plaintiffs need only prove "by a preponderance of the evidence that an allegedly negligent defendant drug company produced or marketed the type of DES taken by the plaintiffs mother" for a negligence claim, and "by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant drug company pr 1994Recognizing the "insurmountable obstacle" faced by DES plaintiffs in proving that a particular drug company produced or marketed the specific DES taken by the plaintiffs' mothers, see id. at 182 , 342 N.W.2d at 45 , the supreme court relaxed the plaintiffs burden of proof, concluding that for causal identification, DES plaintiffs need only prove "by a preponderance of the evidence that an allegedly negligent defendant drug company produced or marketed the type of DES taken by the plaintiffs mother" for a negligence claim, and "by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant drug company pr | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Ransome v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co.
green
2 sentences1990Id. at 622 , 275 N.W.2d at 649 . 1990Id. at 622 , 275 N.W.2d at 649 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.