products liability claim in Florida

2012Our supreme court stated with regard to tobacco in Carter, 778 So.2d at 936-37: Lung cancer caused by smoking is a latent or “creeping disease.” See Copeland v. Armstrong Cork Co., 447 So.2d [922, 926 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) ] (stating that a latent or “creeping” disease is a disease acquired over a period of years as a result of long-term exposure to injurious substances); see also Brown Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Young, 690 So.2d 1377, 1379 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (a latent disease is “difficult to pinpoint when and where it began”). “ ‘[M]anifestation’ of a latent injury in a products liability cla

2012Our supreme court stated with regard to tobacco in Carter, 778 So.2d at 936 -37: Lung cancer caused by smoking is a latent or “creeping disease.” See Copeland v. Armstrong Cork Co., 447 So.2d [922, 926 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) ] (stating that a latent or “creeping” disease is a disease acquired over a period of years as a result of long-term exposure to injurious substances); see also Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Young, 690 So.2d 1377, 1379 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (a latent disease is “difficult to pinpoint when and where it began”). “[Mjanifestation’ of a latent injury in a products liability cl

2018While Count II is labeled “Negligence,” it is clearly a products liability claim against “each Defendant who was in the business of manufacturing, selling and/or distributing products” because “Defendant’s products contained latent characteristics and/or design defects.” Nor can Batchelor’s argument in this regard be reconciled with the jury instruction that, as a “preliminary issue,” required the jury to decide whether “the premises was in the possession or control of Bechtel.” A general negligence claim would not require a tortfeasor to be in possession of the premises as a preliminary issue

2017Under a premises liability theory, “the fact that more than one person is under a duty and one fails to perform is no defense to one who has assumed control.” Worth v. Eugene Gentile Builders, 697 So. 2d 945, 947 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997).

2016As the Florida Supreme Court recognized in Easterday v. Masiello, 518 So.2d 260, 261 (Fla.1988), “it has long been recognized that the doctrine of strict products liability does not apply to structural improvements to real estate.” See also Bernard Schoninger Shopping Centers, Ltd. v. J.P.S.

2007The Second District, noting that the sewage treatment tank was "an integral part of the sewage facility," declined "to extend the strict liability principle of West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So.2d 80 (Fla. 1976), to structural improvements to real estate." Neumann, 433 So.2d at 561 ; see Easterday v. Masiello, 518 So.2d 260, 261 (Fla.1988) ("[I]t has long been recognized that the doctrine of strict products liability does not apply to structural improvements to real estate."); Jackson v. L.A.W.

2012Our supreme court stated with regard to tobacco in Carter, 778 So.2d at 936-37: Lung cancer caused by smoking is a latent or “creeping disease.” See Copeland v. Armstrong Cork Co., 447 So.2d [922, 926 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) ] (stating that a latent or “creeping” disease is a disease acquired over a period of years as a result of long-term exposure to injurious substances); see also Brown Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Young, 690 So.2d 1377, 1379 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (a latent disease is “difficult to pinpoint when and where it began”). “ ‘[M]anifestation’ of a latent injury in a products liability cla

2012Our supreme court stated with regard to tobacco in Carter, 778 So.2d at 936 -37: Lung cancer caused by smoking is a latent or “creeping disease.” See Copeland v. Armstrong Cork Co., 447 So.2d [922, 926 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) ] (stating that a latent or “creeping” disease is a disease acquired over a period of years as a result of long-term exposure to injurious substances); see also Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Young, 690 So.2d 1377, 1379 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (a latent disease is “difficult to pinpoint when and where it began”). “[Mjanifestation’ of a latent injury in a products liability cl

2005Co., 650 So.2d 671 , 673-74 *694 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 659 So.2d 1087 (Fla.1995).

2000The person who lost the evidence has created problems of proof for the plaintiff, but the entire liability should not shift from the manufacturer to the person who lost the evidence unless the loss of evidence has so fatally impaired the products liability claim that to bring a products liability action would be frivolous. 650 So.2d at 674 .

2022Williams v. Davis, 974 So. 2d 1052, 1056 (Fla. 2007).

2016Elastomerics, Corp., 102 F.3d 1173, 1177 (11th Cir.1997) (applying Florida law to define “improvement to real property” term in statute of limitations as a “valuable addition -made to property (usually real estate) or an amelioration in its condition, amounting to -more than mere repairs or replacement of waste, costing labor or capital, and intended to enhance its value, beauty or utility or to adapt it for new or further purposes.” (quoting Hillsboro Island House Condo.

2016We affirm on all issues pursuant to Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Douglas, 110 So.3d 419, 424 (Fla.2013), Engle v. Liggett *831 Group, Inc., 945 So.2d 1246 (Fla.2006), and R.J.

2007Contracting *921 Corp., 481 So.2d 1290, 1291 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986).

2005See Royal & Sunalliance v. Lauderdale Marine Ctr., 877 So.2d 843, 845 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004).

2004Owners Ass'n v. Peachtree Doors, Inc. , 659 A.2d 267 , 270 (Me. 1995) (applying the rule to bar "recovery for a defective product's damage to itself"); Maryland , see Morris v. Osmose Wood Preserving , 340 Md. 519 , 667 A.2d 624 , 632-33 (1995) (characterizing the rule as a products liability rule); Massachusetts , see Berish v. Bornstein , 437 Mass. 252 , 770 N.E.2d 961 , 975 (2002) (holding that the rule applies "to the purchase and sale of products [and] also to claims of negligent design and installation in a newly constructed home"); Michigan , see Neibarger v. Universal Coops., Inc. , 43

2004Owners Ass'n v. Peachtree Doors, Inc. , 659 A.2d 267 , 270 (Me. 1995) (applying the rule to bar "recovery for a defective product's damage to itself"); Maryland , see Morris v. Osmose Wood Preserving , 340 Md. 519 , 667 A.2d 624 , 632-33 (1995) (characterizing the rule as a products liability rule); Massachusetts , see Berish v. Bornstein , 437 Mass. 252 , 770 N.E.2d 961 , 975 (2002) (holding that the rule applies "to the purchase and sale of products [and] also to claims of negligent design and installation in a newly constructed home"); Michigan , see Neibarger v. Universal Coops., Inc. , 43

2004Owners Ass'n v. Peachtree Doors, Inc. , 659 A.2d 267 , 270 (Me. 1995) (applying the rule to bar "recovery for a defective product's damage to itself"); Maryland , see Morris v. Osmose Wood Preserving , 340 Md. 519 , 667 A.2d 624 , 632-33 (1995) (characterizing the rule as a products liability rule); Massachusetts , see Berish v. Bornstein , 437 Mass. 252 , 770 N.E.2d 961 , 975 (2002) (holding that the rule applies "to the purchase and sale of products [and] also to claims of negligent design and installation in a newly constructed home"); Michigan , see Neibarger v. Universal Coops., Inc. , 43

2004Owners Ass'n v. Peachtree Doors, Inc. , 659 A.2d 267 , 270 (Me. 1995) (applying the rule to bar "recovery for a defective product's damage to itself"); Maryland , see Morris v. Osmose Wood Preserving , 340 Md. 519 , 667 A.2d 624 , 632-33 (1995) (characterizing the rule as a products liability rule); Massachusetts , see Berish v. Bornstein , 437 Mass. 252 , 770 N.E.2d 961 , 975 (2002) (holding that the rule applies "to the purchase and sale of products [and] also to claims of negligent design and installation in a newly constructed home"); Michigan , see Neibarger v. Universal Coops., Inc. , 43

2004Owners Ass'n v. Peachtree Doors, Inc., 659 A.2d 267, 270 (Me.1995) (applying the rule to bar "recovery for a defective product's damage to itself"); Maryland, see Morris v. Osmose Wood Preserving, 340 Md. 519 , 667 A.2d 624, 632-33 (1995) (characterizing the rule as a products liability rule); Massachusetts, see Berish v. Bornstein, 437 Mass. 252 , 770 N.E.2d 961 , 975 (2002) (holding that the rule applies "to the purchase and sale of products [and] also to claims of negligent design and installation in a newly constructed home"); Michigan, see Neibarger v. Universal Coops., Inc., 439 Mich. 51

2004Owners Ass'n v. Peachtree Doors, Inc. , 659 A.2d 267 , 270 (Me. 1995) (applying the rule to bar "recovery for a defective product's damage to itself"); Maryland , see Morris v. Osmose Wood Preserving , 340 Md. 519 , 667 A.2d 624 , 632-33 (1995) (characterizing the rule as a products liability rule); Massachusetts , see Berish v. Bornstein , 437 Mass. 252 , 770 N.E.2d 961 , 975 (2002) (holding that the rule applies "to the purchase and sale of products [and] also to claims of negligent design and installation in a newly constructed home"); Michigan , see Neibarger v. Universal Coops., Inc. , 43

2002Because the injured plaintiff is so obviously seeking, albeit on a distinct theory, only a recovery for the injury itself, and because the contention is so obviously contrary to the law of both insurance and spoliation, which is that "only for purposes of section 768.041, the spoliation claim is the same tort for the same damages as the underlying products liability claim," Builder's Square, Inc. v. Shaw, 755 So.2d 721, 725 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), review denied, 751 So.2d 1250 (Fla.2000); see Miller v. Allstate Ins.