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9 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1990–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Nissen Corp. v. Millergreen2 sentences2015See Moran, 273 Md. at 543-44 , 332 A.2d at 15 (describing Section 388 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) “as a general principle in the duty to warn area”); see also Nissen Corp. v. Miller, 323 Md. 613, 619 , 594 A.2d 564, 566-67 (1991) (explaining that “[t]he negligence count of a products liability claim comports with longstanding common law tort principles”). 2015See Moran, 273 Md. at 543-44 , 332 A.2d at 15 (describing Section 388 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) “as a general principle in the duty to warn area”); see also Nissen Corp. v. Miller, 323 Md. 613, 619 , 594 A.2d 564, 566-67 (1991) (explaining that “[t]he negligence count of a products liability claim comports with longstanding common law tort principles”). | 2 | 2 |
Moran v. Fabergé, Inc.green2 sentences2015See Moran, 273 Md. at 543-44 , 332 A.2d at 15 (describing Section 388 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) “as a general principle in the duty to warn area”); see also Nissen Corp. v. Miller, 323 Md. 613, 619 , 594 A.2d 564, 566-67 (1991) (explaining that “[t]he negligence count of a products liability claim comports with longstanding common law tort principles”). 2015See Moran, 273 Md. at 543-44 , 332 A.2d at 15 (describing Section 388 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) “as a general principle in the duty to warn area”); see also Nissen Corp. v. Miller, 323 Md. 613, 619 , 594 A.2d 564, 566-67 (1991) (explaining that “[t]he negligence count of a products liability claim comports with longstanding common law tort principles”). | 1 | 2 |
Martin v. Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co.green2 sentences2026Discussing Embs, 528 S.W.2d at 706 , the Sixth Circuit stated that “Kentucky recognizes a bystander claim under a products liability framework” and that in Kentucky the rule “is limited to bystanders whose injury from the defect is reasonably foreseeable.” Martin, 561 F.3d at 446-47 (citation modified). 2026The Sixth Circuit concluded, however, that, as stated in its discussion of the plaintiff’s negligence claim, “there [was] no evidence that the danger from secondary exposure was reasonably foreseeable at the time of [the plaintiff’s father’s] exposure[,]” and, as such, the trial court was correct in ruling that the plaintiff “did not present sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on a bystander liability claim.” Id. at 447 . - 27 - would reasonably be expected to be in the vicinity of the product during its reasonably expected use.” Stegemoller v. ACandS, Inc., 767 N.E.2d 974, 975 (In | 1 | 1 |
Stegemoller v. ACandS, Inc.green1 sentence2026The Sixth Circuit concluded, however, that, as stated in its discussion of the plaintiff’s negligence claim, “there [was] no evidence that the danger from secondary exposure was reasonably foreseeable at the time of [the plaintiff’s father’s] exposure[,]” and, as such, the trial court was correct in ruling that the plaintiff “did not present sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on a bystander liability claim.” Id. at 447 . - 27 - would reasonably be expected to be in the vicinity of the product during its reasonably expected use.” Stegemoller v. ACandS, Inc., 767 N.E.2d 974, 975 (In | 1 | 1 |
Martin v. ACandS, Inc.green1 sentence2026The Sixth Circuit concluded, however, that, as stated in its discussion of the plaintiff’s negligence claim, “there [was] no evidence that the danger from secondary exposure was reasonably foreseeable at the time of [the plaintiff’s father’s] exposure[,]” and, as such, the trial court was correct in ruling that the plaintiff “did not present sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on a bystander liability claim.” Id. at 447 . - 27 - would reasonably be expected to be in the vicinity of the product during its reasonably expected use.” Stegemoller v. ACandS, Inc., 767 N.E.2d 974, 975 (In | 1 | 1 |
Camplin v. ACandS, Inc.green1 sentence2026The Sixth Circuit concluded, however, that, as stated in its discussion of the plaintiff’s negligence claim, “there [was] no evidence that the danger from secondary exposure was reasonably foreseeable at the time of [the plaintiff’s father’s] exposure[,]” and, as such, the trial court was correct in ruling that the plaintiff “did not present sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on a bystander liability claim.” Id. at 447 . - 27 - would reasonably be expected to be in the vicinity of the product during its reasonably expected use.” Stegemoller v. ACandS, Inc., 767 N.E.2d 974, 975 (In | 1 | 1 |
Cornett v. Johnson & Johnsongreen2 sentences2014See Cornett, 211 N.J. at 389 , 48 A.3d 1041 . 2014See Cornett, 211 N.J. at 389 , 48 A.3d 1041 . | 1 | 1 |
Dehn v. Edgecombegreen2 sentences2008A. Failure to Warn Claims—Negligence and Strict Liability In Counts 1 and 2, negligence and strict liability, Ms. Gourdine alleges that Lilly owed a duty to Mr. Gourdine to warn Ms. Crews about the risks of the combination of Humalog and Humulin N. “The negligence count of a products liability claim comports with longstanding common law tort principles,” Nissen Corp. v. Miller, 323 Md. 613, 619 , 594 A.2d 564, 567 (1991), and the injured party must allege “(1) that the defendant was under a duty to protect the plaintiff from injury, (2) that the defendant breached that duty, (3) that the plain 2008A. Failure to Warn Claims—Negligence and Strict Liability In Counts 1 and 2, negligence and strict liability, Ms. Gourdine alleges that Lilly owed a duty to Mr. Gourdine to warn Ms. Crews about the risks of the combination of Humalog and Humulin N. “The negligence count of a products liability claim comports with longstanding common law tort principles,” Nissen Corp. v. Miller, 323 Md. 613, 619 , 594 A.2d 564, 567 (1991), and the injured party must allege “(1) that the defendant was under a duty to protect the plaintiff from injury, (2) that the defendant breached that duty, (3) that the plain | 1 | 1 |
Doe v. Pharmacia & Upjohn Co.green2 sentences2008A. Failure to Warn Claims—Negligence and Strict Liability In Counts 1 and 2, negligence and strict liability, Ms. Gourdine alleges that Lilly owed a duty to Mr. Gourdine to warn Ms. Crews about the risks of the combination of Humalog and Humulin N. “The negligence count of a products liability claim comports with longstanding common law tort principles,” Nissen Corp. v. Miller, 323 Md. 613, 619 , 594 A.2d 564, 567 (1991), and the injured party must allege “(1) that the defendant was under a duty to protect the plaintiff from injury, (2) that the defendant breached that duty, (3) that the plain 2008A. Failure to Warn Claims—Negligence and Strict Liability In Counts 1 and 2, negligence and strict liability, Ms. Gourdine alleges that Lilly owed a duty to Mr. Gourdine to warn Ms. Crews about the risks of the combination of Humalog and Humulin N. “The negligence count of a products liability claim comports with longstanding common law tort principles,” Nissen Corp. v. Miller, 323 Md. 613, 619 , 594 A.2d 564, 567 (1991), and the injured party must allege “(1) that the defendant was under a duty to protect the plaintiff from injury, (2) that the defendant breached that duty, (3) that the plain | 1 | 1 |
Hanes Dye & Finishing Co. v. Caisson Corp.green1 sentence2003See Mosley v. General Motors Corp., 497 F.2d 1330, 1333 (8th Cir.1974) (holding joinder of ten plaintiffs was proper in a case alleging each plaintiff had been injured by General Motors' "same general policy of discrimination”); Jarriel v. General Motors Corp., 835 F.Supp. 639, 641-42 (N.D.Ga.1993) (holding joinder of two defendants was proper where plaintiffs filed a products liability claim against General Motors and a negligent roadway design claim against a local government for injuries caused by an automobile accident); Hanes Dye and Finishing Co. v. Caisson Corp., 309 F.Supp. 237, 243 (M | 1 | 1 |
Jarriel v. General Motors Corp.green1 sentence2003See Mosley v. General Motors Corp., 497 F.2d 1330, 1333 (8th Cir.1974) (holding joinder of ten plaintiffs was proper in a case alleging each plaintiff had been injured by General Motors' "same general policy of discrimination”); Jarriel v. General Motors Corp., 835 F.Supp. 639, 641-42 (N.D.Ga.1993) (holding joinder of two defendants was proper where plaintiffs filed a products liability claim against General Motors and a negligent roadway design claim against a local government for injuries caused by an automobile accident); Hanes Dye and Finishing Co. v. Caisson Corp., 309 F.Supp. 237, 243 (M | 1 | 1 |
Nathaniel MOSLEY Et Al., Appellants, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION Et Al., Appelleesgreen1 sentence2003See Mosley v. General Motors Corp., 497 F.2d 1330, 1333 (8th Cir.1974) (holding joinder of ten plaintiffs was proper in a case alleging each plaintiff had been injured by General Motors' "same general policy of discrimination”); Jarriel v. General Motors Corp., 835 F.Supp. 639, 641-42 (N.D.Ga.1993) (holding joinder of two defendants was proper where plaintiffs filed a products liability claim against General Motors and a negligent roadway design claim against a local government for injuries caused by an automobile accident); Hanes Dye and Finishing Co. v. Caisson Corp., 309 F.Supp. 237, 243 (M | 1 | 1 |
Smith Laboratories, Inc. v. Teuschergreen2 sentences1990Vol., 1986 Cum.Supp.), §§ 3-2A-01 to -08 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (the Act), does not require, as a condition precedent to a civil action in court, arbitration of a products liability claim asserted exclusively against a pharmaceutical manufacturer.” Smith, 310 Md. at 678 , 531 A.2d 300 . 1990Vol., 1986 Cum.Supp.), §§ 3-2A-01 to -08 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (the Act), does not require, as a condition precedent to a civil action in court, arbitration of a products liability claim asserted exclusively against a pharmaceutical manufacturer.” Smith, 310 Md. at 678 , 531 A.2d 300 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Embs v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Lexington
green
1 sentence2026Discussing Embs, 528 S.W.2d at 706 , the Sixth Circuit stated that “Kentucky recognizes a bystander claim under a products liability framework” and that in Kentucky the rule “is limited to bystanders whose injury from the defect is reasonably foreseeable.” Martin, 561 F.3d at 446-47 (citation modified). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Hebel v. Sherman Equipment
green
2 sentences2016Then, observing that the "aim of the ['apparent manufacturer’] doctrine clearly was to provide a remedy for consumers injured by unsafe products,” an "objective [now] achieved by the doctrine of strict products liability,” it went on to declare that the "function of the apparent-manufacturer doctrine has, as it were, been absorbed by the theory of sellers’ strict liability in tort for injuries caused by unreasonably unsafe products.” Id. 65 Ill.Dec. 888 , 442 N.E.2d at 202 . 2016Then, observing that the "aim of the ['apparent manufacturer’] doctrine clearly was to provide a remedy for consumers injured by unsafe products,” an "objective [now] achieved by the doctrine of strict products liability,” it went on to declare that the "function of the apparent-manufacturer doctrine has, as it were, been absorbed by the theory of sellers’ strict liability in tort for injuries caused by unreasonably unsafe products.” Id. 65 Ill.Dec. 888 , 442 N.E.2d at 202 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Gourdine v. Crews
green
2 sentences2012This is wholly different from a products liability claim. “ ‘[I]n the products liability domain a duty to warn is imposed on a manufacturer if the item it produces has an inherent and hidden danger about which the producer knows, or should know, could be a substantial factor in bringing injury to an individual ...’” Gourdine, 405 Md. at 739 , 955 A.2d 769 (quoting Moran, 273 Md. at 552 , 332 A.2d 11 ). 2012This is wholly different from a products liability claim. “ ‘[I]n the products liability domain a duty to warn is imposed on a manufacturer if the item it produces has an inherent and hidden danger about which the producer knows, or should know, could be a substantial factor in bringing injury to an individual ...’” Gourdine, 405 Md. at 739 , 955 A.2d 769 (quoting Moran, 273 Md. at 552 , 332 A.2d 11 ). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Ex Parte Rudolph
green
1 sentence2003See Mosley v. General Motors Corp., 497 F.2d 1330, 1333 (8th Cir.1974) (holding joinder of ten plaintiffs was proper in a case alleging each plaintiff had been injured by General Motors' "same general policy of discrimination”); Jarriel v. General Motors Corp., 835 F.Supp. 639, 641-42 (N.D.Ga.1993) (holding joinder of two defendants was proper where plaintiffs filed a products liability claim against General Motors and a negligent roadway design claim against a local government for injuries caused by an automobile accident); Hanes Dye and Finishing Co. v. Caisson Corp., 309 F.Supp. 237, 243 (M | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Rodriguez v. Abbott Laboratories
green
1 sentence2003See Mosley v. General Motors Corp., 497 F.2d 1330, 1333 (8th Cir.1974) (holding joinder of ten plaintiffs was proper in a case alleging each plaintiff had been injured by General Motors' "same general policy of discrimination”); Jarriel v. General Motors Corp., 835 F.Supp. 639, 641-42 (N.D.Ga.1993) (holding joinder of two defendants was proper where plaintiffs filed a products liability claim against General Motors and a negligent roadway design claim against a local government for injuries caused by an automobile accident); Hanes Dye and Finishing Co. v. Caisson Corp., 309 F.Supp. 237, 243 (M | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Myers v. Montgomery Ward & Co.
green
2 sentences2001Myers, 253 Md. at 285 , 252 A.2d at 857 . 2001Myers, 253 Md. at 285 , 252 A.2d at 857 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.