products liability claim in Texas

2025See Timpte Indus., Inc. v. Gish, 286 S.W.3d 306, 311 (Tex. 2009) (“To recover for a products liability claim alleging a design defect, a plaintiff must prove that (1) the product was defectively designed so as to render it unreasonably dangerous; (2) a safer alternative design existed; and (3) the defect was a producing cause of the [alleged] injury . . . .”; “To determine whether a product was defectively designed . . . , Texas courts have long applied a risk-utility analysis that requires consideration of [several factors],” including: “(1) the utility of the product to the user and to the p

2025See Timpte Indus., Inc. v. Gish, 286 S.W.3d 306, 311 (Tex. 2009) (“To recover for a products liability claim alleging a design defect, a plaintiff must prove that (1) the product was defectively designed so as to render it unreasonably dangerous; (2) a safer alternative design existed; and (3) the defect was a producing cause of the [alleged] injury . . . .”; “To determine whether a product was defectively designed . . . , Texas courts have long applied a risk-utility analysis that requires consideration of [several factors],” including: “(1) the utility of the product to the user and to the p

2009“Requiring proof of a deviation from manufacturer specifications or planned output [] comports with our recognition that expert testimony is generally encouraged if not required to establish a products liability claim.” Ledesma, 242 S.W.3d at 42 (emphasis added).

2008Expert testimony "is generally encouraged if not required to establish a products liability claim." Ledesma, 242 S.W.3d at 42 .

2008E.g., Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez, 977 S.W.2d 328, 334-335 (Tex.1998) ("This Court has adopted the products liability standard set forth in section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.

2005App.-Austin 1938, no writ)). [14] "This Court has adopted the products liability standard set forth in section 401A of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS." Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez, 977 S.W.2d 328 , 334-35 (Tex.1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1040 , 119 S.Ct. 1336 (1999). [15] See Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 432 (Tex.1984); Bonniwell v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 663 S.W.2d 816, 819 (Tex. 1984). [16] Because our opinion is limited to a determination that Gladstrong USA is not entitled to summary judgment we make no determination regarding whether Gladstrong USA will be

2000Id. at 463 .

1999See id. at 463 .

2025Tobacco Co. v. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d 420, 437 (Tex. 1997) (“negligent design” claim is likewise “predicated on the existence of a safer alternative design”). 15 “compulsion” theory.

2025Tobacco Co. v. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d 420, 437 (Tex. 1997) (“negligent design” claim is likewise “predicated on the existence of a safer alternative design”). 14 recipient ‘an unconscious and automatic, neurobiological compulsion to engage in texting behavior.’” Id. at 263.

2024But federal preemption does not apply here because even if state tort liability has the practical effect of restricting a manufacturer’s choice of seatbelt design, it “does not ‘[s]tand as an obstacle to the accomplishment . . . of the full purposes and objectives’ of federal law.” Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 562 U.S. 323 , 336 (2011) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)) (holding that a federal safety standard did not preempt a tort claim premised on a manufacturer’s failure to install safer seatbelts); see 49 U.S.C. §§ 30102 (a)(10) (describing a “motor vehicle sa

2024But federal preemption does not apply here because even if state tort liability has the practical effect of restricting a manufacturer’s choice of seatbelt design, it “does not ‘[s]tand as an obstacle to the accomplishment . . . of the full purposes and objectives’ of federal law.” Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 562 U.S. 323 , 336 (2011) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)) (holding that a federal safety standard did not preempt a tort claim premised on a manufacturer’s failure to install safer seatbelts); see 49 U.S.C. §§ 30102 (a)(10) (describing a “motor vehicle sa

2024Baseball Partners LLC, 671 S.W.3d 907 , 918 (Tex. 2023); see BankDirect, 519 S.W.3d at 78 (“[D]ivining what the law is, not what the interpreter wishes it to be” is “the foremost task of legal interpretation.”). 12 To the extent federal law preempts a products-liability claim, the decision would be out of the jury’s hands and for the federal agency.

2024Baseball Partners LLC, 671 S.W.3d 907 , 918 (Tex. 2023); see BankDirect, 519 S.W.3d at 78 (“[D]ivining what the law is, not what the interpreter wishes it to be” is “the foremost task of legal interpretation.”). 12 To the extent federal law preempts a products-liability claim, the decision would be out of the jury’s hands and for the federal agency.

2010See Boatland of Houston, Inc., 609 S.W.2d at 750 (even if the trial court erred in submitting three products liability defenses, these errors would not affect the determination of whether the product was defective, and the jury’s negative answer to this question rendered any error regarding the defenses harmless); McGinnis, 109 S.W.2d at 162-63 (any charge error regarding plaintiffs common-law negligence claim was harmless because judgment was also based on plaintiffs FELA claim and the alleged error did not affect the questions regarding the FELA claim); Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 942 S.W.

2010See Boatland of Houston, Inc. , 609 S.W.2d at 750 (even if the trial court erred in submitting three products liability defenses, these errors would not affect the determination of whether the product was defective, and the jury’s negative answer to this question rendered any error regarding the defenses harmless); McGinnis , 109 S.W.2d at 162–63 (any charge error regarding plaintiff’s common-law negligence claim was harmless because judgment was also based on plaintiff’s FELA claim and the alleged error did not affect the questions regarding the FELA claim); Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 942

2007Houston Lighting & Power Co. v. Reynolds, 765 S.W.2d 784, 785 (Tex.1988).

2006See Houston Lighting & Power Co., 765 S.W.2d at 785 (providing that the first element in a strict products liability claim requires a plaintiff to prove that the defendant placed a product in the stream of commerce).

2023See id.

2014Mian Corp., 237 S.W.3d at 857 ; see also Kia Motors Corp. v. Ruiz, 348 S.W.3d 465, 476 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, pet. granted) (“Here, however, because the only negligence Ruiz alleged related to the design of the product, the negligence theories were subsumed and encompassed in the defective product theory, and Ruiz’s burden at trial was to prove injury resulting from defective design.”). 17 Here, Carpenter asserted a strict products-liability claim against Campbell Hausfeld based on the allegedly defective design of the air compressor packaging.

2015See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) at Comment l (a “user” of a product 43 entitled to the protection of § 402A includes “those who are passively enjoying the benefit of the product, as in the case of passengers in automobiles or airplanes ....”); McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967) (adopting § 402A).

1999Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez, 977 S.W.2d 328 (Tex.1998); McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787, 788-89 (Tex.1967).

2014Timpte Indus., Inc. v. Gish, 286 S.W.3d 306, 311 (Tex. 2009); Hernandez v. Tokai Corp., 2 S.W.3d 251 , 256–57 (Tex. 1999); Zavala, 355 S.W.3d at 369 ; see also TEX.

2009Hernandez v. Tokai Carp., 2 S.W.3d 251, 256-57 (Tex.1999); Tex. Civ.

2010See Boatland of Houston, Inc., 609 S.W.2d at 750 (even if the trial court erred in submitting three products liability defenses, these errors would not affect the determination of whether the product was defective, and the jury’s negative answer to this question rendered any error regarding the defenses harmless); McGinnis, 109 S.W.2d at 162-63 (any charge error regarding plaintiffs common-law negligence claim was harmless because judgment was also based on plaintiffs FELA claim and the alleged error did not affect the questions regarding the FELA claim); Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 942 S.W.

2010See Boatland of Houston, Inc. , 609 S.W.2d at 750 (even if the trial court erred in submitting three products liability defenses, these errors would not affect the determination of whether the product was defective, and the jury’s negative answer to this question rendered any error regarding the defenses harmless); McGinnis , 109 S.W.2d at 162–63 (any charge error regarding plaintiff’s common-law negligence claim was harmless because judgment was also based on plaintiff’s FELA claim and the alleged error did not affect the questions regarding the FELA claim); Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 942

2010See Boatland of Houston, Inc., 609 S.W.2d at 750 (even if the trial court erred in submitting three products liability defenses, these errors would not affect the determination of whether the product was defective, and the jury’s negative answer to this question rendered any error regarding the defenses harmless); McGinnis, 109 S.W.2d at 162-63 (any charge error regarding plaintiffs common-law negligence claim was harmless because judgment was also based on plaintiffs FELA claim and the alleged error did not affect the questions regarding the FELA claim); Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 942 S.W.

2010See Boatland of Houston, Inc. , 609 S.W.2d at 750 (even if the trial court erred in submitting three products liability defenses, these errors would not affect the determination of whether the product was defective, and the jury’s negative answer to this question rendered any error regarding the defenses harmless); McGinnis , 109 S.W.2d at 162–63 (any charge error regarding plaintiff’s common-law negligence claim was harmless because judgment was also based on plaintiff’s FELA claim and the alleged error did not affect the questions regarding the FELA claim); Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 942

2022B.V., 213 F.3d 841, 844, 855 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that although there were minimum contacts with Texas through a Syrian oil company signing a contract for the killed workers’ services, there was no specific jurisdiction when the plaintiff’s claims did not arise out of those contacts but from alleged tortious acts committed in Syria); see also Burton v. Honeywell Int’l Inc., 614 S.W.3d 271 , 283 (Tex. App.— Tyler 2020, no pet.) (holding no substantial connection between defendant’s purposeful contacts with Texas—maintaining offices, employees, and marketing activities in Texas—and plaintiff

2022Ltd. v. Brighouse, 556 S.W.3d 490, 500 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.) (holding plaintiff’s alleged slip and fall accident did not arise out of or relate to the work performed in Texas to refurbish the rig and therefore there was no specific jurisdiction over defendants); Wilco Farmers v. Carter, 558 S.W.3d 197, 206 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2018, no pet.) (holding the operative facts of plaintiff’s claims against defendant, whether defendant exercised reasonable care in unloading trucks, training, and supervising employees in Oregon, had no substantial connection to defendant’s cont

2022Ltd. v. Brighouse, 556 S.W.3d 490, 500 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.) (holding plaintiff’s alleged slip and fall accident did not arise out of or relate to the work performed in Texas to refurbish the rig and therefore there was no specific jurisdiction over defendants); Wilco Farmers v. Carter, 558 S.W.3d 197, 206 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2018, no pet.) (holding the operative facts of plaintiff’s claims against defendant, whether defendant exercised reasonable care in unloading trucks, training, and supervising employees in Oregon, had no substantial connection to defendant’s cont

2021Genie Indus., Inc. v. Matak, 462 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. 2015).

2020Type Culture Collection, 83 S.W.3d at 807; Horizon Shipbuilding, 324 S.W.3d at 847 (holding plaintiff’s allegation that defendants committed torts in Texas was sufficient to bring defendants within long-arm statute). 11 The elements of a products liability claim alleging a design defect are that (1) the product was defectively designed so as to render it unreasonably dangerous; (2) a safer alternative design existed; and (3) the defect was a producing cause of the injury for which the plaintiff seeks recovery.

2019CODE § 82.001 (emphasis added); see JCW Elec. v. Garza, 257 S.W.3d 701, 705 (Tex. 2008) (“[A] claim for implied warranty is one basis for a products liability claim.”); see also id. at 704–05 (“[C]onceptually, the breach of an implied warranty can either be in contract or in tort. . . .

2019CODE § 82.001 (emphasis added); see JCW Elec. v. Garza, 257 S.W.3d 701, 705 (Tex. 2008) (“[A] claim for implied warranty is one basis for a products liability claim.”); see also id. at 704–05 (“[C]onceptually, the breach of an implied warranty can either be in contract or in tort. . . .

2018See Ford Motor Co. v. Ledesma, 242 S.W.3d 32 , 41–43 (Tex. 2007); Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 600 (Tex. 2004).

2018See id. § 82.003(a); In re Atlas Tubular, LP, 296 S.W.3d 363, 365 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2009, orig. proceeding); see also Howard v. Wal-Mart, No. 10-09- 00246-CV, 2010 WL 3784918 , at *3–4 (Tex. App.—Waco Sept. 29, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that the trial court properly granted seller’s no-evidence summary judgment motion where plaintiff presented no evidence regarding the application of a statutory exception); Dennis v. Giles Grp., Inc., No. 04-07-00280-CV, 2008 WL 183062 , at *6 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Jan. 23, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.) (reviewing whether plaintiff 2 Section 82.0

2018See Ranger Conveying & Supply Co. v. Davis, 254 S.W.3d 471, 480 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied).

2015Bartley v. Guillot, 990 S.W.2d 481, 484 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. denied), also disallowed a “one satisfaction” settlement credit because “any set-off [the liable defendant] may be entitled to receive must come from another tortfeasor, not … a party merely involved by contract.” Id.

2015Bartley v. Guillot, 990 S.W.2d 481, 484 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. denied), also disallowed a “one satisfaction” settlement credit because “any set-off [the liable defendant] may be entitled to receive must come from another tortfeasor, not … a party merely involved by contract.” Id.