products liability claim in Washington

2013Falk v. Keene Corp., 113 Wn.2d 645 , 782 P.2d 974 (1989), involved a products liability claim against an asbestos manufacturer.

2013Falk v. Keene Corp., 113 Wn.2d 645 , 782 P.2d 974 (1989), involved a products liability claim against an asbestos manufacturer.

1996Savina, 247 Kan. at 121-22 , 795 P.2d 915 (quoting Johnson v. American Cyanamid Co., 239 Kan. 279, 286-87 , 718 P.2d 1318 (1986)).

1996Savina, 247 Kan. at 121-22 , 795 P.2d 915 (quoting Johnson v. American Cyanamid Co., 239 Kan. 279, 286-87 , 718 P.2d 1318 (1986)).

1996Savina, 247 Kan. at 121-22 , 795 P.2d 915 (quoting Johnson v. American Cyanamid Co., 239 Kan. 279, 286-87 , 718 P.2d 1318 (1986)).

1996Savina, 247 Kan. at 121-22 , 795 P.2d 915 (quoting Johnson v. American Cyanamid Co., 239 Kan. 279, 286-87 , 718 P.2d 1318 (1986)).

2025Id.

2024In Washington State Physicians Insurance Exchange & Association v. Fisons Corp., 122 Wn.2d 299 (1993), the Washington Supreme Court approved a jury instruction requiring proof of a defendant’s unfair or deceptive act proximately causing injury to a plaintiff’s business or property.

2022Le Manufacture Francaise Des Pneumatiques Michelin v. District Court, 620 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Colo. 1980); Bush v. BASF Wyandotte Corp., 64 N.C.

2020Generally, in a traditional products liability case, “the plaintiff must establish a reasonable connection between the injury, the product causing the injury, and the manufacturer of that product.”11 In the complaint, James and Era alleged he “suffers from a condition related to exposure to asbestos and asbestos-containing products.”12 In the opening statement, Era strongly emphasized evidence of mesothelioma13 but also referred to lung cancer: 10DeKoning v. Williams, 47 Wn.2d 139, 141-42 , 286 P.2d 694 (1955) (“We therefore hold that the giving of a single general instruction on the emergency

2020Generally, in a traditional products liability case, “the plaintiff must establish a reasonable connection between the injury, the product causing the injury, and the manufacturer of that product.”11 In the complaint, James and Era alleged he “suffers from a condition related to exposure to asbestos and asbestos-containing products.”12 In the opening statement, Era strongly emphasized evidence of mesothelioma13 but also referred to lung cancer: 10DeKoning v. Williams, 47 Wn.2d 139, 141-42 , 286 P.2d 694 (1955) (“We therefore hold that the giving of a single general instruction on the emergency

2015App. 126, 132 , 639 P.2d 240 (1982) (plaintiff improperly tried to amend a complaint to include a products liability claim not recognized by Washington). 36 137 Wn.

2015App. 872, 889-90 , 155 P.3d 952 (2007) aff'd sub nom.

2015App. 126, 132 , 639 P.2d 240 (1982) (plaintiff improperly tried to amend a complaint to include a products liability claim not recognized by Washington). 36 137 Wn.

2014In Hall, a negligence and negligence per se suit, the trial court instructed the jury that the breach of a statute was negligence, and instructed it that negligence per se " ha[ d] the same effect as any other act of negligence." 80 Wn.2d at 803 .

1994In support of this argument, Plaintiff cites to North Coast Air Servs., Ltd. v. Grumman Corp., 111 Wn.2d 315 , 759 P.2d 405 (1988), involving the question of when a products liability claim *215 accrues for the purposes of the statute of limitations.

1994In support of this argument, Plaintiff cites to North Coast Air Servs., Ltd. v. Grumman Corp., 111 Wn.2d 315 , 759 P.2d 405 (1988), involving the question of when a products liability claim *215 accrues for the purposes of the statute of limitations.

1993The charterer sued in federal court, alleging tortious conduct based on the products liability doctrine, and asked for damages for the cost of repairing the ships and for income lost while they were out of service. *70 East River, 476 U.S. at 861 .

1993East River, 476 U.S. at 861 .

1992The court held that plaintiff's claim against the hospital "did not accrue until she discovered or reasonably should have discovered all of the essential elements of her possible cause of action, i.e., duty, breach, causation, damages." 30 In reversing a dismissal on summary judgment, the court determined that there was a genuine issue of material fact whether plaintiff knew her blindness was the result of a breach of the hospital's duty. 31 The court concluded that the discovery rule was reasonably extended in the products liability claim in the case because the challenged product was a "medi

1992The court held that plaintiff's claim against the hospital "did not accrue until she discovered or reasonably should have discovered all of the essential elements of her possible cause of action, i.e., duty, breach, causation, damages." 30 In reversing a dismissal on summary judgment, the court determined that there was a genuine issue of material fact whether plaintiff knew her blindness was the result of a breach of the hospital's duty. 31 The court concluded that the discovery rule was reasonably extended in the products liability claim in the case because the challenged product was a "medi

1992In Sahlie v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 99 Wn.2d 550 , 663 P.2d 473 (1983), this court, upon certification of two alternative formulations of the Ohler rule by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington, rephrased the certified issue to accurately express the rule and concluded that "[i]n a products liability action, the statute of limitation does not begin to ran until the plaintiff has discovered or should reasonably have discovered all the essential elements of the action." The rule "requires actual or imputed discovery of all three of these elements [unreasona

1992In Sahlie v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 99 Wn.2d 550 , 663 P.2d 473 (1983), this court, upon certification of two alternative formulations of the Ohler rule by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington, rephrased the certified issue to accurately express the rule and concluded that "[i]n a products liability action, the statute of limitation does not begin to ran until the plaintiff has discovered or should reasonably have discovered all the essential elements of the action." The rule "requires actual or imputed discovery of all three of these elements [unreasona

1992In Sahlie v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 99 Wn.2d 550 , 663 P.2d 473 (1983), this court, upon certification of two alternative formulations of the Ohler rule by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington, rephrased the certified issue to accurately express the rule and concluded that "[i]n a products liability action, the statute of limitation does not begin to ran until the plaintiff has discovered or should reasonably have discovered all the essential elements of the action." The rule "requires actual or imputed discovery of all three of these elements [unreasona

1992In Sahlie v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 99 Wn.2d 550 , 663 P.2d 473 (1983), this court, upon certification of two alternative formulations of the Ohler rule by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington, rephrased the certified issue to accurately express the rule and concluded that "[i]n a products liability action, the statute of limitation does not begin to ran until the plaintiff has discovered or should reasonably have discovered all the essential elements of the action." The rule "requires actual or imputed discovery of all three of these elements [unreasona

1987A somewhat similar situation was presented in Shaffer v. Victoria Station, Inc., 18 Wn.