56 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1969–2026 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Brown v. Cottrell, Inc.green2 sentences2008See Guerine, 198 Ill.2d at 525 , 261 Ill.Dec. 763 , 764 N.E.2d 54 (holding that it "fail[ed] to see how a jury view of the accident site will be necessary" to resolve a products liability claim); see also Hinshaw, 319 Ill.App.3d at 277 , 253 Ill.Dec. 460 , 745 N.E.2d 583 ; Brown, 374 Ill.App.3d at 533-34 , 312 Ill.Dec. 663 , 871 N.E.2d 63 . 2008See Guerine, 198 Ill.2d at 525 , 261 Ill.Dec. 763 , 764 N.E.2d 54 (holding that it "fail[ed] to see how a jury view of the accident site will be necessary" to resolve a products liability claim); see also Hinshaw, 319 Ill.App.3d at 277 , 253 Ill.Dec. 460 , 745 N.E.2d 583 ; Brown, 374 Ill.App.3d at 533-34 , 312 Ill.Dec. 663 , 871 N.E.2d 63 . | 3 | 3 |
First Nat. Bank v. Guerinegreen2 sentences2009Although it is the possibility, rather than the necessity, of a jury view that is important, "the importance of this factor diminishes due to the fact that this case primarily concerns a products liability claim." Dawdy, 207 Ill.2d at 178 , 278 Ill.Dec. 92 , 797 N.E.2d 687 ; Ammerman, 379 Ill.App.3d at 891 , 318 Ill.Dec. 950 , 884 N.E.2d 1221 ; Guerine, 198 Ill.2d at 525 , 261 Ill.Dec. 763 , 764 N.E.2d 54 . 2009Although it is the possibility, rather than the necessity, of a jury view that is important, "the importance of this factor diminishes due to the fact that this case primarily concerns a products liability claim." Dawdy, 207 Ill.2d at 178 , 278 Ill.Dec. 92 , 797 N.E.2d 687 ; Ammerman, 379 Ill.App.3d at 891 , 318 Ill.Dec. 950 , 884 N.E.2d 1221 ; Guerine, 198 Ill.2d at 525 , 261 Ill.Dec. 763 , 764 N.E.2d 54 . | 2 | 4 |
Hinshaw v. Coachmen Industries, Inc.green2 sentences2008See Guerine, 198 Ill.2d at 525 , 261 Ill.Dec. 763 , 764 N.E.2d 54 (holding that it "fail[ed] to see how a jury view of the accident site will be necessary" to resolve a products liability claim); see also Hinshaw, 319 Ill.App.3d at 277 , 253 Ill.Dec. 460 , 745 N.E.2d 583 ; Brown, 374 Ill.App.3d at 533-34 , 312 Ill.Dec. 663 , 871 N.E.2d 63 . 2008See Guerine, 198 Ill.2d at 525 , 261 Ill.Dec. 763 , 764 N.E.2d 54 (holding that it "fail[ed] to see how a jury view of the accident site will be necessary" to resolve a products liability claim); see also Hinshaw, 319 Ill.App.3d at 277 , 253 Ill.Dec. 460 , 745 N.E.2d 583 ; Brown, 374 Ill.App.3d at 533-34 , 312 Ill.Dec. 663 , 871 N.E.2d 63 . | 2 | 4 |
Quaid v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.green2 sentences2025Regarding the possibility of viewing the premises, we find this factor to be neutral as “ ‘the importance of this factor diminishes due to the fact that this case primarily concerns a products liability claim.’ ” Quaid v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 392 Ill. 2024App. 3d at 891 ; see also Quaid v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 392 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
Blake v. Colfax Corp.green2 sentences2023See Blake v. Colfax Corp., 2013 IL App (1st) 122987, ¶¶ 22-23 . 2023See Blake v. Colfax Corp., 2013 IL App (1st) 122987, ¶¶ 22-23 . | 2 | 2 |
Auton v. Logan Landfill, Inc.green2 sentences2005In support of her forfeiture argument, Socha cites Auton v. Logan Landfill, Inc. , 105 Ill. 2d 537, 550 (1984), a products liability action in which, at trial, the plaintiff argued against a comparative negligence instruction but, on appeal, argued that a new trial was required because this court had recently applied comparative fault to a products liability claim. 2005In support of her forfeiture argument, Socha cites Auton v. Logan Landfill, Inc., 105 Ill. 2d 537, 550 (1984), a products liability action in which, at trial, the plaintiff argued against a comparative negligence instruction but, on appeal, argued that a new trial was required because this court had recently applied comparative fault to a products liability claim. | 2 | 2 |
Rozny v. Marnulgreen2 sentences1979See also Rozny v. Marnul (1969), 43 Ill. 2d 54, 72 . 1974See also Rozny v. Marnul (1969), 43 Ill.2d 54, 72 . | 2 | 2 |
Suvada v. White Motor Co.green2 sentences1981In Williams v. Brown Manufacturing Co. (1970), 45 Ill. 2d 418 , where this court applied the discovery rule to a strict tort liability action, it was stated: “ [W] e have held that an action to recover for personal injuries resulting from a sudden traumatic event accrues when plaintiff first knew of his right to sue, i.e. at the time when the injury occurred. [Citations.] Although we have not specifically held this rule applicable to a products liability claim [citation], refusal to do so would emasculate much of the consumer protection afforded by Suvada [v. White Motor Co. (1965), 32 Ill. 2d 1980As a consequence, the majority hold that the third element of a products liability claim under Suvada v. White Motor Co. (1965), 32 Ill. 2d 612 , 210 N.E.2d 182 , was not met. | 1 | 6 |
Scoby v. Vulcan-Hart Corp.green2 sentences2004In Scoby, 211 Ill.App.3d at 108 [ 155 Ill.Dec. 536 ], 569 N.E.2d at 1148-49 , the plaintiff argued that a deep-fat fryer, in which he had accidentally submerged his arm, was unreasonably dangerous in that it lacked a cover, which was merely `optional equipment.' We agreed with the trial court that `the dangerous nature of the open fryer containing hot oil' was `obvious to plaintiff.' Scoby, 211 Ill.App.3d at 109 [ 155 Ill.Dec. 536 ], 569 N.E.2d at 1149 . *1244 In Smith, 215 Ill.App.3d at 953 [ 159 Ill.Dec. 477 ], 576 N.E.2d at 148-49 , the plaintiff argued that a Jeep with detachable side door 2004In Scoby, 211 Ill.App.3d at 108 [ 155 Ill.Dec. 536 ], 569 N.E.2d at 1148-49 , the plaintiff argued that a deep-fat fryer, in which he had accidentally submerged his arm, was unreasonably dangerous in that it lacked a cover, which was merely `optional equipment.' We agreed with the trial court that `the dangerous nature of the open fryer containing hot oil' was `obvious to plaintiff.' Scoby, 211 Ill.App.3d at 109 [ 155 Ill.Dec. 536 ], 569 N.E.2d at 1149 . *1244 In Smith, 215 Ill.App.3d at 953 [ 159 Ill.Dec. 477 ], 576 N.E.2d at 148-49 , the plaintiff argued that a Jeep with detachable side door | 1 | 2 |
Salerno v. Innovative Serveillance Technology, Inc.green1 sentence2026Learned Intermediary Doctrine ¶ 130 “A strict products liability claim may proceed under three different theories of liability: a manufacturing defect, a design defect, or a failure to warn.” Salerno v. Innovative Surveillance Technology, Inc., 402 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
| Smith v. American Motors Sales Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Nowakowski v. Hoppe Tire Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Madison v. Wedron Silica Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ammerman v. Raymond Corp.
green
2 sentences2024However, “the importance of this factor diminishes” in a case involving a products liability claim “because jury views of the accident site are not generally necessary in such cases.” Ammerman, 379 Ill. 2009Although it is the possibility, rather than the necessity, of a jury view that is important, “the importance of this factor diminishes due to the fact that this case primarily concerns a products liability claim.” Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 178 ; Ammerman, 379 Ill. | 4 | 2009–2025 |
Dawdy v. Union Pacific RR Co.
green
2 sentences2009Although it is the possibility, rather than the necessity, of a jury view that is important, “the importance of this factor diminishes due to the fact that this case primarily concerns a products liability claim.” Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 178 ; Ammerman, 379 Ill. 2009Although it is the possibility, rather than the necessity, of a jury view that is important, "the importance of this factor diminishes due to the fact that this case primarily concerns a products liability claim." Dawdy, 207 Ill.2d at 178 , 278 Ill.Dec. 92 , 797 N.E.2d 687 ; Ammerman, 379 Ill.App.3d at 891 , 318 Ill.Dec. 950 , 884 N.E.2d 1221 ; Guerine, 198 Ill.2d at 525 , 261 Ill.Dec. 763 , 764 N.E.2d 54 . | 4 | 2008–2009 |
Williams v. Brown Manufacturing Co.
green
2 sentences1981In Williams v. Brown Manufacturing Co. (1970), 45 Ill. 2d 418 , where this court applied the discovery rule to a strict tort liability action, it was stated: “ [W] e have held that an action to recover for personal injuries resulting from a sudden traumatic event accrues when plaintiff first knew of his right to sue, i.e. at the time when the injury occurred. [Citations.] Although we have not specifically held this rule applicable to a products liability claim [citation], refusal to do so would emasculate much of the consumer protection afforded by Suvada [v. White Motor Co. (1965), 32 Ill. 2d 1981In Williams v. Brown Manufacturing Co. (1970), 45 Ill. 2d 418 , where this court applied the discovery rule to a strict tort liability action, it was stated: “ [W] e have held that an action to recover for personal injuries resulting from a sudden traumatic event accrues when plaintiff first knew of his right to sue, i.e. at the time when the injury occurred. [Citations.] Although we have not specifically held this rule applicable to a products liability claim [citation], refusal to do so would emasculate much of the consumer protection afforded by Suvada [v. White Motor Co. (1965), 32 Ill. 2d | 4 | 1974–1984 |
Mikolajczyk v. Ford Motor Co.
green
2 sentences2012In Mikolajczyk, the Illinois Supreme Court held that, “the existence of a feasible alternative design and the balancing of risks and benefits are relevant considerations in a strict product liability design-defect case, but they are not elements of the claim that the plaintiff is required to plead and prove in every case.” Mikolajczyk, 231 Ill. 2d at 546 . ¶ 65 In 1998, the American Law Institute (ALI) published the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, giving the products liability doctrine its very own Restatement and adopting the requirement that plaintiffs must prove the existe 2010Mikolajczyk, 231 Ill.2d at 548 , 327 Ill.Dec. 1 , 901 N.E.2d 329 . | 3 | 2010–2012 |
Lowrie v. City of Evanston
green
2 sentences1985In Greemnan v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. (1963), 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62 , 377 P.2d 897, 900 , 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 , the case regarded as “the progenitor” (Lowrie v. City of Evanston (1977), 50 Ill. 1977The Illinois Supreme Court has not defined a product under the doctrine of strict products liability, but in the First District case of Lowrie v. City of Evanston (1977), 50 Ill. | 3 | 1977–1985 |
Mitsias v. I-Flow Corporation
green
2 sentences2015Mitsias, 2011 IL App (1st) 101126, ¶ 3 . 2015Mitsias, 2011 IL App (1st) 101126, ¶ 3 . | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc.
green
2 sentences2011Fox, 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 661 , 110 P.3d at 918 . 2011Fox, 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 661 , 110 P.3d at 918 . | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Kotecki v. Cyclops Welding Corp.
green
2 sentences2011Kotecki, 146 Ill.2d at 156 , 166 Ill.Dec. 1 , 585 N.E.2d at 1023 . 2011Kotecki, 146 Ill.2d at 156 , 166 Ill.Dec. 1 , 585 N.E.2d at 1023 . | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Omega Forensic Engineering, Inc. v. RLI Insurance
green
2 sentences2011In Omega Forensic Engineering, Inc. v. RLI Insurance Co., 682 F.Supp.2d 1336 (S.D.Fla. 2010), the insured was sued for spoliation of evidence based on the alleged destruction of a water heater that was evidence in a products liability claim. 2011Id. at 1337 . | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Linton v. Smith & Wesson
green
2 sentences2004Because a products liability claim against one who lawfully manufactures and sells a nondefective product must fail (see Riordan v. International Armament Corp., 132 Ill.App.3d 642 , 87 Ill.Dec. 765 , 477 N.E.2d 1293 (1985); Linton v. Smith & Wesson, 127 Ill.App.3d 676 , 82 Ill.Dec. 805 , 469 N.E.2d 339 (1984)), defendants urge this court to conclude that plaintiffs have failed to state a cause of action in public nuisance and to leave to the legislature the question of whether to impose additional constraints on the marketing and sale of firearms. 2004Because a products liability claim against one who lawfully manufactures and sells a nondefective product must fail (see Riordan v. International Armament Corp., 132 Ill.App.3d 642 , 87 Ill.Dec. 765 , 477 N.E.2d 1293 (1985); Linton v. Smith & Wesson, 127 Ill.App.3d 676 , 82 Ill.Dec. 805 , 469 N.E.2d 339 (1984)), defendants urge this court to conclude that plaintiffs have failed to state a cause of action in public nuisance and to leave to the legislature the question of whether to impose additional constraints on the marketing and sale of firearms. | 2 | 2004–2004 |
Riordan v. International Armament Corp.
green
2 sentences2004Because a products liability claim against one who lawfully manufactures and sells a non-defective product must fail (see Riordan v. International Armament Corp., 132 Ill. 2004Because a products liability claim against one who lawfully manufactures and sells a nondefective product must fail (see Riordan v. International Armament Corp., 132 Ill.App.3d 642 , 87 Ill.Dec. 765 , 477 N.E.2d 1293 (1985); Linton v. Smith & Wesson, 127 Ill.App.3d 676 , 82 Ill.Dec. 805 , 469 N.E.2d 339 (1984)), defendants urge this court to conclude that plaintiffs have failed to state a cause of action in public nuisance and to leave to the legislature the question of whether to impose additional constraints on the marketing and sale of firearms. | 2 | 2004–2004 |
Bass v. Cincinnati, Inc.
green
2 sentences1999Bass v. Cincinnati, Inc., 180 Ill. 1999Bass v. Cincinnati, Inc. , 180 Ill. | 2 | 1999–1999 |
Hunt v. Blasius
green
2 sentences1999Hunt v. Blasius, 74 Ill. 2d 203, 210 , 384 N.E.2d 368 (1978). 1999Hunt v. Blasius, 74 Ill. 2d 203, 210 , 384 N.E.2d 368 (1978). | 2 | 1999–1999 |
Boyd v. Travelers Insurance
green
2 sentences1996Boyd v. Travelers Insurance Co., 166 Ill. 2d 188, 196-97 , 652 N.E.2d 267 (1995). 1996Boyd v. Travelers Insurance Co., 166 Ill. 2d 188, 196-97 , 652 N.E.2d 267 (1995). | 2 | 1996–1996 |
Lipsey v. Michael Reese Hospital
green
2 sentences1979In rejecting plaintiff’s argument as to the time her action for strict libility in tort accrued under section 14 of the Limitations Act, the supreme court stated: # ° In Williams v. Brown Manufacturing Co. (1970), 45 Ill. 2d 418, 432 , it was stated, ‘we have held that an action to recover for personal injuries resulting from a sudden traumatic event accrues when plaintiff first knew of his right to sue, i.e., at the time when the injury occurred. [Citations.] Although we have not specifically held this rule applicable to a products liability claim [citation], refusal to do so would emasculate 1974In Williams v. Brown Manufacturing Co. (1970), 45 Ill.2d 418, 432 , it was stated, “we have held that an action to recover for personal injuries resulting from a sudden traumatic event accrues when plaintiff first knew of his right to sue, i.e., at the time when the injury occurred. [Citations.] Although we have not specifically held this rule applicable to a products liability claim [citation], refusal to do so would emasculate much of the consumer protection afforded by Suvada. ” (Emphasis added.) To avoid the possible unfavorable implication of Williams, plaintiff relies upon Lipsey v. Mich | 2 | 1974–1979 |
Weedon v. Pfizer, Inc.
green
2 sentences2011Acknowledging that the plaintiff had not produced any expert witness to testify "regarding any specific defect in the venous access device," the court reviewed the evidence presented by each party and concluded that summary judgment was precluded because the court could not say that *1246 "no issue of material fact exist[ed]." (Emphasis added.) Weedon, 332 Ill.App.3d at 30 , 265 Ill.Dec. 956 , 773 N.E.2d 720 . ¶ 23 Although the procedural posture of Weedon differed from that of the instant case, we believe it stands for the principle that a plaintiff need not show a malfunction such as an "exp 2011Acknowledging that the plaintiff had not produced any expert witness to testify "regarding any specific defect in the venous access device," the court reviewed the evidence presented by each party and concluded that summary judgment was precluded because the court could not say that *1246 "no issue of material fact exist[ed]." (Emphasis added.) Weedon, 332 Ill.App.3d at 30 , 265 Ill.Dec. 956 , 773 N.E.2d 720 . ¶ 23 Although the procedural posture of Weedon differed from that of the instant case, we believe it stands for the principle that a plaintiff need not show a malfunction such as an "exp | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Ammerman v. Raymond Corp.
green
1 sentence2009Although it is the possibility, rather than the necessity, of a jury view that is important, "the importance of this factor diminishes due to the fact that this case primarily concerns a products liability claim." Dawdy, 207 Ill.2d at 178 , 278 Ill.Dec. 92 , 797 N.E.2d 687 ; Ammerman, 379 Ill.App.3d at 891 , 318 Ill.Dec. 950 , 884 N.E.2d 1221 ; Guerine, 198 Ill.2d at 525 , 261 Ill.Dec. 763 , 764 N.E.2d 54 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Hefner v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.
green
2 sentences2008See, e.g., Brown v. Cottrell, Inc., 374 Ill.App.3d 525, 534 , 312 Ill.Dec. 663 , 871 N.E.2d 63 (2007) (noting that products liability claims "are not inherently local in flavor" and finding that a jury view of the accident site was not warranted); Woodward v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 368 Ill.App.3d 827, 836 , 306 Ill.Dec. 839 , 858 N.E.2d 897 (2006), quoting Hefner v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 276 Ill.App.3d 1099, 1106 , 213 Ill.Dec. 532 , 659 N.E.2d 448 (1995) (recognizing that "while the forum where the injury occurred `generally has a strong interest in the outcome of litigation, t 2008See, e.g., Brown v. Cottrell, Inc., 374 Ill.App.3d 525, 534 , 312 Ill.Dec. 663 , 871 N.E.2d 63 (2007) (noting that products liability claims "are not inherently local in flavor" and finding that a jury view of the accident site was not warranted); Woodward v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 368 Ill.App.3d 827, 836 , 306 Ill.Dec. 839 , 858 N.E.2d 897 (2006), quoting Hefner v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 276 Ill.App.3d 1099, 1106 , 213 Ill.Dec. 532 , 659 N.E.2d 448 (1995) (recognizing that "while the forum where the injury occurred `generally has a strong interest in the outcome of litigation, t | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Woodward v. Bridgestone/ Firestone, Inc.
green
1 sentence2008See, e.g., Brown v. Cottrell, Inc., 374 Ill.App.3d 525, 534 , 312 Ill.Dec. 663 , 871 N.E.2d 63 (2007) (noting that products liability claims "are not inherently local in flavor" and finding that a jury view of the accident site was not warranted); Woodward v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 368 Ill.App.3d 827, 836 , 306 Ill.Dec. 839 , 858 N.E.2d 897 (2006), quoting Hefner v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 276 Ill.App.3d 1099, 1106 , 213 Ill.Dec. 532 , 659 N.E.2d 448 (1995) (recognizing that "while the forum where the injury occurred `generally has a strong interest in the outcome of litigation, t | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Woodward v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Hefner v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.
green
1 sentence2008See, e.g., Brown v. Cottrell, Inc., 374 Ill.App.3d 525, 534 , 312 Ill.Dec. 663 , 871 N.E.2d 63 (2007) (noting that products liability claims "are not inherently local in flavor" and finding that a jury view of the accident site was not warranted); Woodward v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 368 Ill.App.3d 827, 836 , 306 Ill.Dec. 839 , 858 N.E.2d 897 (2006), quoting Hefner v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 276 Ill.App.3d 1099, 1106 , 213 Ill.Dec. 532 , 659 N.E.2d 448 (1995) (recognizing that "while the forum where the injury occurred `generally has a strong interest in the outcome of litigation, t | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement & Power District v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Berwind Corporation, a Pennsylvania Corporation v. Litton Industries, Inc., a Delaware Corporation green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Lamkin v. Towner green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Patton v. T.O.F.C., Inc. green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Kramer v. Weedhopper of Utah, Inc. green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Freeman v. White Way Sign & Maintenance Co. green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| McGrew v. Heinold Commodities, Inc. green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Sweeney v. Matthews green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co. green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Ray v. Alad Corp. green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Leroy v. City of Springfield green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Kirk v. Stineway Drug Store Co. green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.