21 Florida opinions name it 4 courts 1961–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Mercy Hospital v. Holmesgreen2 sentences2023Similarly, on appellate review, we do not consider “whether the record contains evidence which could be interpreted to support the arguments rejected by the JCC.” Frederick v. United Airlines, 688 So. 2d 412, 414 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); see Swanigan, 442 So. 2d at 1027 (“We do not review whether there was competent, substantial evidence to support the claim disallowed by the [JCC]; we only review whether the record contains competent, substantial evidence to support the [JCC’s] order.); Mercy Hosp. v. Holmes, 679 So. 2d 860, 860 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (“Once again we remind counsel of the basic prem 2014See Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Manning, 685 So.2d 64, 64 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (“Once again we remind counsel of the basic premise that the standard of review in workers’ compensation cases is whether competent substantial evidence supports the decision below, not whether it is possible to recite contradictory record evidence which supported the arguments rejected below.” (citing Mercy Hosp. v. Holmes, 679 So.2d 860 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996))). | 3 | 4 |
Swanigan v. Dobbs Housegreen2 sentences2023Similarly, on appellate review, we do not consider “whether the record contains evidence which could be interpreted to support the arguments rejected by the JCC.” Frederick v. United Airlines, 688 So. 2d 412, 414 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); see Swanigan, 442 So. 2d at 1027 (“We do not review whether there was competent, substantial evidence to support the claim disallowed by the [JCC]; we only review whether the record contains competent, substantial evidence to support the [JCC’s] order.); Mercy Hosp. v. Holmes, 679 So. 2d 860, 860 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (“Once again we remind counsel of the basic prem 2006See Mercy Hosp. v. Holmes, 679 So.2d 860, 860 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) ("Once again we remind counsel of the basic premise that the standard of review in worker's compensation cases is whether competent substantial evidence supports the decision below, not whether it is possible to recite contradictory record evidence which supported the arguments rejected below."); see also GTE v. Miller, 642 So.2d 1188, 1190 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Holiday Foliage v. Anderson, 642 So.2d 94, 97 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Swanigan v. Dobbs House, 442 So.2d 1026 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). | 2 | 4 |
Singer v. Stategreen2 sentences2011Specifically applicable to this case is “the premise that the presumption of innocence is defeated if ‘a juror is taken upon a trial whose mind is in such condition that the accused must produce evidence of his innocence to avoid a conviction.’ ” Overton, 801 So.2d at 891 (quoting Singer v. State, 109 So.2d 7, 24 (Fla.1959)). 2001(Emphasis supplied.) We begin our analysis with the premise that the presumption of innocence is defeated if "a juror is taken upon a trial whose mind is in such condition that the accused must produce evidence of his innocence to avoid a conviction." Singer v. State, 109 So.2d 7, 24 (Fla.1959) (quoting Powell v. State, 131 Fla. 254 , 175 So. 213, 216 (1937)). | 2 | 2 |
GTE v. Millergreen2 sentences2006See Mercy Hosp. v. Holmes, 679 So.2d 860, 860 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) ("Once again we remind counsel of the basic premise that the standard of review in worker's compensation cases is whether competent substantial evidence supports the decision below, not whether it is possible to recite contradictory record evidence which supported the arguments rejected below."); see also GTE v. Miller, 642 So.2d 1188, 1190 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Holiday Foliage v. Anderson, 642 So.2d 94, 97 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Swanigan v. Dobbs House, 442 So.2d 1026 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). 1996See GTE v. Miller, 642 So.2d 1188, 1190 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Holiday Foliage v. Anderson, 642 So.2d 94, 97 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Swanigan v. Dobbs House, 442 So.2d 1026 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). | 2 | 2 |
Holiday Foliage v. Andersongreen2 sentences2006See Mercy Hosp. v. Holmes, 679 So.2d 860, 860 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) ("Once again we remind counsel of the basic premise that the standard of review in worker's compensation cases is whether competent substantial evidence supports the decision below, not whether it is possible to recite contradictory record evidence which supported the arguments rejected below."); see also GTE v. Miller, 642 So.2d 1188, 1190 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Holiday Foliage v. Anderson, 642 So.2d 94, 97 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Swanigan v. Dobbs House, 442 So.2d 1026 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). 1996See GTE v. Miller, 642 So.2d 1188, 1190 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Holiday Foliage v. Anderson, 642 So.2d 94, 97 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Swanigan v. Dobbs House, 442 So.2d 1026 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). | 2 | 2 |
Frederick v. United Airlinesgreen1 sentence2023Similarly, on appellate review, we do not consider “whether the record contains evidence which could be interpreted to support the arguments rejected by the JCC.” Frederick v. United Airlines, 688 So. 2d 412, 414 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); see Swanigan, 442 So. 2d at 1027 (“We do not review whether there was competent, substantial evidence to support the claim disallowed by the [JCC]; we only review whether the record contains competent, substantial evidence to support the [JCC’s] order.); Mercy Hosp. v. Holmes, 679 So. 2d 860, 860 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (“Once again we remind counsel of the basic prem | 1 | 1 |
Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Manninggreen1 sentence2014See Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Manning, 685 So.2d 64, 64 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (“Once again we remind counsel of the basic premise that the standard of review in workers’ compensation cases is whether competent substantial evidence supports the decision below, not whether it is possible to recite contradictory record evidence which supported the arguments rejected below.” (citing Mercy Hosp. v. Holmes, 679 So.2d 860 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996))). | 1 | 1 |
DEPT. OF HEALTH & REHAB. SERVICES v. Privettegreen1 sentence2011See Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Privette, 617 So.2d 305, 307 (Fla.1993) (“We must start from the premise that the presumption of legitimacy is based on the policy of protecting the welfare of the child, i.e., the policy of advancing the best interests of the child.”). | 1 | 1 |
Mitchell v. Stategreen2 sentences2011In Mitchell v. State, 862 So.2d 908, 911 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003), one potential juror testified that “although she knew that the defendant had a right not to testify, it ‘probably1 would cross her mind if he did not.” A second potential juror testified that “he would ‘wonder why they didn’t get up there and tell their story.’” Id. 2011In Mitchell v. State, 862 So.2d 908, 911 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003), one potential juror testified that “although she knew that the defendant had a right not to testify, it ‘probably1 would cross her mind if he did not.” A second potential juror testified that “he would ‘wonder why they didn’t get up there and tell their story.’” Id. | 1 | 1 |
Humana, Inc. v. Castillogreen2 sentences2010A central premise in the analysis of a fraud claim based upon nondisclosure is that the party advancing the claim must prove the claim as if the culpable party had “represented the nonexistence of the matter he failed to disclose.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 551; see Humana, Inc. v. Castillo, 728 So.2d 261, 265 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (reliance is element of fraud based on nondisclosure). 2010A central premise in the analysis of a fraud claim based upon nondisclosure is that the party advancing the claim must prove the claim as if the culpable party had "represented the nonexistence of the matter he failed to disclose." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 551; see Humana, Inc. v. Castillo, 728 So.2d 261, 265 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (reliance is element of fraud based on nondisclosure). | 1 | 1 |
Powell v. Stategreen2 sentences2001(Emphasis supplied.) We begin our analysis with the premise that the presumption of innocence is defeated if "a juror is taken upon a trial whose mind is in such condition that the accused must produce evidence of his innocence to avoid a conviction." Singer v. State, 109 So.2d 7, 24 (Fla.1959) (quoting Powell v. State, 131 Fla. 254 , 175 So. 213, 216 (1937)). 2001(Emphasis supplied.) We begin our analysis with the premise that the presumption of innocence is defeated if "a juror is taken upon a trial whose mind is in such condition that the accused must produce evidence of his innocence to avoid a conviction." Singer v. State, 109 So.2d 7, 24 (Fla.1959) (quoting Powell v. State, 131 Fla. 254 , 175 So. 213, 216 (1937)). | 1 | 1 |
Birge v. Stategreen1 sentence1985The argument offered by the State was rejected by the Fourth District Court of Appeal which, in its opinion, quoted from the opinion of the Florida Supreme Court in Birge v. State, 92 So. 2d 819, 821, 822 (Fla. 1957), to-wit: We have consistently held that the right guaranteed to an accused by the cited statute is a vested procedural right the denial of which constitutes reversible error. | 1 | 1 |
Department of Transp. v. Neilsongreen1 sentence1983In Department of Transportation v. Neilson, supra, at 1075, Justice Overton succinctly stated the rationale for the Supreme Court's recognition that a certain part of the sovereign immunity doctrine, that part identified at times as "official or governmental immunity," was not waived by Section 768.28: The underlying premise for this immunity is that it cannot be tortious conduct for a government to govern. | 1 | 1 |
Curtis Publishing Company v. Badergreen1 sentence1975See Curtis Publishing Company v. Bader, Fla.App.3d, 1972, 266 So.2d 78 . . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Jacques Blouin
green
1 sentence2026Id. at 798–99. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Overton v. State
green
1 sentence2011Specifically applicable to this case is “the premise that the presumption of innocence is defeated if ‘a juror is taken upon a trial whose mind is in such condition that the accused must produce evidence of his innocence to avoid a conviction.’ ” Overton, 801 So.2d at 891 (quoting Singer v. State, 109 So.2d 7, 24 (Fla.1959)). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Smith v. State
green
2 sentences2011The Third District rejected the premise that an inquiry cannot be made by the trial court unless the objecting party meets the first prong of Melbourne, 4 which requires the objecting party to “make a timely objection, identify the racial or ethnic class or gender of the juror being challenged, and request that the trial court ask the striking party to articulate its reason(s) for the strike.” Smith, 1 So.3d at 353 . 2011The Third District then concluded that “the trial court did not abuse its discretion in requesting the defense to provide a race-neutral reason for its peremptory challenge of prospective juror Buehholz.” Id. at 355 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Windom v. State
green
1 sentence2009We also find that the defendant’s reliance upon Windom, 656 So.2d at 436-38 , is misplaced, as in Windom the issue was whether the trial court erred in failing to make an inquiry, not whether it erred for making one, which is the issue before us. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Sacks v. Sacks
green
1 sentence1993Sacks v. Sacks, 267 So.2d 73 (Fla. 1972). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Johnson v. New Jersey
green
2 sentences1989Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 , 86 S.Ct. 1772 , 16 L.Ed.2d 882 , reh'g denied, 385 U.S. 890 , 87 S.Ct. 12 , 17 L.Ed.2d 121 (1966). 1989Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 , 86 S.Ct. 1772 , 16 L.Ed.2d 882 , reh'g denied, 385 U.S. 890 , 87 S.Ct. 12 , 17 L.Ed.2d 121 (1966). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
California v. Stewart
green
1 sentence1989Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 , 86 S.Ct. 1772 , 16 L.Ed.2d 882 , reh'g denied, 385 U.S. 890 , 87 S.Ct. 12 , 17 L.Ed.2d 121 (1966). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Greer v. Morrison
green
1 sentence1989Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 , 86 S.Ct. 1772 , 16 L.Ed.2d 882 , reh'g denied, 385 U.S. 890 , 87 S.Ct. 12 , 17 L.Ed.2d 121 (1966). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Blount v. State Road Dept.
green
1 sentence1983Blount v. State Road Department, 87 So.2d 507 (Fla. 1956). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Sampaio
green
1 sentence1980State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Sampaio, 374 So.2d 617 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979); Moore v. Caughey, 368 So.2d 109 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979); County of St. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Moore v. Caughey
neutral
1 sentence1980State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Sampaio, 374 So.2d 617 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979); Moore v. Caughey, 368 So.2d 109 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979); County of St. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Bell
green
1 sentence1966In presenting the first point petitioners adopt as a premise the rule that unscheduled injuries are compensated only on the basis of diminution in wage-earning capacity and to emphasize the view direct us to our decision in Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Bell, 116 So.2d 617 (Fla.1959). | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Smith v. Georgia
green
1 sentence1961The same is true upon examination of the opinion by Justice Learned Hand in Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres Societe Anonyme (2nd Cir., 1947), 163 Fed. 2d 246, cert. den. 332 U.S. 772 , involving Nazi confiscation of property of Jews (in that case by execution of property transfer under duress). | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.