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13 New York opinions name it 5 courts 1959–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Eboligreen1 sentence2020Donnino, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 39, Penal Law § 265.01 at 106 [2017 ed]), that is not the premise of his challenge ( cf. People v Eboli , 34 NY2d 281, 284 [1974]); nor does this case involve a constitutional challenge to the licensing requirements or process upon a denial or revocation of such a license ( cf. Matter of Delgado v Kelly , 127 AD3d 644, 644 [1st Dept 2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 905 [2015]). | 1 | 1 |
Matter of Delgado v. Kellygreen1 sentence2020Donnino, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 39, Penal Law § 265.01 at 106 [2017 ed]), that is not the premise of his challenge ( cf. People v Eboli , 34 NY2d 281, 284 [1974]); nor does this case involve a constitutional challenge to the licensing requirements or process upon a denial or revocation of such a license ( cf. Matter of Delgado v Kelly , 127 AD3d 644, 644 [1st Dept 2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 905 [2015]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Rosariogreen1 sentence2018In fact, defendant's argument is a classic "masked repugnancy" argument (People v Rodriguez, 179 AD2d 554, 554 [1st Dept 1992]), and it suffers from the same premise error that dooms all "masked repugnancy" arguments: it assumes that a jury's verdict on one count can be weaponized to attack the legal or factual sufficiency of its verdict on another count. | 1 | 1 |
Gross v. Cantorgreen2 sentences2016However, where a group is sufficiently small, a defamation claim may be viable because "reference to the individual plaintiff reasonably follows from the statement and the question of reference is left for the jury" (Brady, 84 AD2d at 231 ; see Gross, 270 NY at 96 ). 2016However, where a group is sufficiently small, a defamation claim may be viable because “reference to the individual plaintiff reasonably follows from the statement and the question of reference is left for the jury” (Brady, 84 AD2d at 231 ; see Gross, 270 NY at 96 ). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Holmesgreen1 sentence2008Milanese, 41 AD3d at 1061 ; see also Brennan v RCP Assoc., 257 AD2d 389, 391 [1st Dept 1999], lv dismissed 93 NY2d 889 [1999]). | 1 | 1 |
Brennan v. RCP Associatesgreen1 sentence2008Milanese, 41 AD3d at 1061 ; see also Brennan v RCP Assoc., 257 AD2d 389, 391 [1st Dept 1999], lv dismissed 93 NY2d 889 [1999]). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Brady v. Ottaway Newspapers, Inc.
green
2 sentences2016"The underlying premise of this principle is that the larger the collectivity named in the libel, the less likely it is that a reader would understand it to refer to a particular individual" (Brady, 84 AD2d at 228 ). 2016“The underlying premise of this principle is that the larger the collectivity named in the libel, the less likely it is that a reader would understand it to refer to a particular individual” (Brady, 84 AD2d at 228 ). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Matter of Battin v. Battin
green
1 sentence2016While the premise for this hearing was the father’s request to present the child as a fact witness, as we have recently observed, “calling a child to testify in a Family Ct Act article 6 proceeding is generally neither necessary nor appropriate” (Matter of Battin v Battin, 130 AD3d at 1266 n 2). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Mingo
green
1 sentence2015Here, the premise that the clause does not give rise to a statutory element undermines defendant’s argument that it is possible to commit first-degree contempt without committing second-degree (see People v Mingo, 66 AD3d 1043 [2d Dept 2009], lv denied 14 NY3d 843 [2010]). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Perdomo
green
1 sentence2015Here, the premise that the clause does not give rise to a statutory element undermines defendant’s argument that it is possible to commit first-degree contempt without committing second-degree (see People v Mingo, 66 AD3d 1043 [2d Dept 2009], lv denied 14 NY3d 843 [2010]). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Milanese v. Kellerman
green
1 sentence2008Milanese, 41 AD3d at 1061 ; see also Brennan v RCP Assoc., 257 AD2d 389, 391 [1st Dept 1999], lv dismissed 93 NY2d 889 [1999]). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State
green
1 sentence2001As noted in Campaign for Fiscal Equity v State of New York (supra, 179 Misc 2d, at 913-914 ), there is federal authority that “certain documents generated during the course of legislative activity may be discoverable,” and this authority relies on the premise that the privilege is primarily a “use” privilege designed to protect legislators from being “dragged into court.” The Campaign for Fiscal Equity court rejected this reasoning, based on its conclusion that the privilege “is also designed to provide State legislators and other State officials acting within the legislative sphere with ‘brea | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Corporacion Insular De Seguros v. Garcia
green
1 sentence1999(See, Marylanders for Fair Representation v Schaefer, 144 FRD 292, 302, n 20; Corporación Insular de Seguros v Garcia, 709 F Supp 288, 297 .) These cases rely on the premise that the privilege is primarily a “use” privilege that is designed to protect legislators from being dragged into court. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
People v. Friedgood
green
1 sentence1995(People v Friedgood, 58 NY2d 467 [1983].) Although Dokes (supra) does not require a showing of prejudice, in this case a showing of prejudice is necessary to support the premise that a hearing was held, that the defendant was not in attendance and that his presence would not have been superfluous. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
People v. Dokes
green
1 sentence1995(People v Friedgood, 58 NY2d 467 [1983].) Although Dokes (supra) does not require a showing of prejudice, in this case a showing of prejudice is necessary to support the premise that a hearing was held, that the defendant was not in attendance and that his presence would not have been superfluous. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Claim of Cerami v. Rochester City School District
green
1 sentence1993The Appellate Division reversed, holding specifically that the vital determination was "not simply whether claimant was capable of filing a claim, but whether claimant was able to comprehend the premise for his claim, i.e., that the conditions at work occasioned or contributed to his psychiatric problems” ( 148 AD2d 807 , 808). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Rackley v. County of Rensselaer
green
1 sentence1989The question is not simply whether claimant was capable of filing a claim, but whether claimant was able to comprehend the premise for his claim, i.e., that the conditions at work occasioned or contributed to his psychiatric problems (see, Matter of Rackley v County of Rensselaer, 141 AD2d 232 ). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Becar v. . Flues
green
1 sentence1970The underlying premise for the rule of Becar v. Flues (supra) no longer exists. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
In Re the Accounting of Fitzsimons
green
1 sentence1959Co., 185 N. Y. 520 , supra; Matter of Fitzsimons, 174 N. Y. 15 , supra; Barry v. Whitney, 3 Sandf. 696 .) Since then the premise that rule 4 prohibits contracts which would be enforcible under section 474 of the Judiciary Law is correct, as I have attempted to indicate, it follows that rule 4 in effect fixes contingent fees. | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Morehouse v. . Brooklyn Heights R.R. Co.
green
1 sentence1959Co., 185 N. Y. 520 , supra; Matter of Fitzsimons, 174 N. Y. 15 , supra; Barry v. Whitney, 3 Sandf. 696 .) Since then the premise that rule 4 prohibits contracts which would be enforcible under section 474 of the Judiciary Law is correct, as I have attempted to indicate, it follows that rule 4 in effect fixes contingent fees. | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Barry v. Whitney & Tucker
neutral
1 sentence1959Co., 185 N. Y. 520 , supra; Matter of Fitzsimons, 174 N. Y. 15 , supra; Barry v. Whitney, 3 Sandf. 696 .) Since then the premise that rule 4 prohibits contracts which would be enforcible under section 474 of the Judiciary Law is correct, as I have attempted to indicate, it follows that rule 4 in effect fixes contingent fees. | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.