premise rule in Illinois

2004Additionally, “[t]he very fact the jury asked the question shows at least some jurors did not find the instructions clear as applied to the facts of the case.” People v. Comage , 303 Ill.

2004Additionally, “[t]he very fact the jury asked the question shows at least some jurors did not find the instructions clear as applied to the facts of the case.” People v. Comage, 303 Ill.

2022People v. Henderson, 2013 IL 114040, ¶ 11 . ¶ 35 The defendant’s argument is based on the premise that defense counsel conceded the defendant’s guilt in closing argument and that defense counsel argued that surface-to-surface contact was insufficient to prove predatory criminal sexual assault, demonstrating a misapprehension of the law.

2020We have no basis to dispute that point, either. ¶ 172 “Where legal advice of any kind is sought from a lawyer in his or her capacity as a lawyer, the communications relating to that purpose, made in confidence by the client, are protected from disclosure by the client or lawyer, unless the protection is waived.” Center Partners, Ltd. - 23 - v. Growth Head GP, LLC, 2012 IL 113107, ¶ 30 .

1995Vernon Hospital, Inc. (1989), 131 Ill. 2d 145 , 545 N.E.2d 672 .) The premise of that doctrine is that "[a] person who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required to make restitution to the other.” (Restatement of Restitution § 1, at 12 (1937).) To state a cause of action based on a theory of unjust enrichment, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant has unjustly retained a benefit to the plaintiff’s detriment and that defendant’s retention of the benefit violates fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience.

1995Vernon Hospital, Inc. (1989), 131 Ill. 2d 145 , 545 N.E.2d 672 .) The premise of that doctrine is that "[a] person who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required to make restitution to the other.” (Restatement of Restitution § 1, at 12 (1937).) To state a cause of action based on a theory of unjust enrichment, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant has unjustly retained a benefit to the plaintiff’s detriment and that defendant’s retention of the benefit violates fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience.

1994(Stine, 419 Mich, at 99-100 , 349 N.W.2d at 131 .) The court further stated that "the provision of the insuring agreement which is critical to establishing liability in such policies is the time at which the injured third person’s claim is made against the insured.” (Stine, 419 Mich, at 105 , 349 N.W.2d at 134 .) In Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Superior Court (1990), 221 Cal. App. 3d 1348, 1359-60 , 270 Cal. Rptr. 779, 785 , the court addressed the advantages of claims made policies: "The social utility of claims made policies has been well documented.

1994(Stine, 419 Mich, at 99-100 , 349 N.W.2d at 131 .) The court further stated that "the provision of the insuring agreement which is critical to establishing liability in such policies is the time at which the injured third person’s claim is made against the insured.” (Stine, 419 Mich, at 105 , 349 N.W.2d at 134 .) In Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Superior Court (1990), 221 Cal. App. 3d 1348, 1359-60 , 270 Cal. Rptr. 779, 785 , the court addressed the advantages of claims made policies: "The social utility of claims made policies has been well documented.

1994App. 3d 352 , 452 N.E.2d 73 .) In Stine v. Continental Casualty Co. (1984), 419 Mich. 89 , 349 N.W.2d 127 , the Michigan Supreme Court noted that parties to a claims made insurance policy base their agreement on the premise that a claim is an easily identifiable risk that will allow the insurer to know the extent of its exposure in terms of the number of claims made.

1994App. 3d 352 , 452 N.E.2d 73 .) In Stine v. Continental Casualty Co. (1984), 419 Mich. 89 , 349 N.W.2d 127 , the Michigan Supreme Court noted that parties to a claims made insurance policy base their agreement on the premise that a claim is an easily identifiable risk that will allow the insurer to know the extent of its exposure in terms of the number of claims made.

1994App. 3d 352 , 452 N.E.2d 73 .) In Stine v. Continental Casualty Co. (1984), 419 Mich. 89 , 349 N.W.2d 127 , the Michigan Supreme Court noted that parties to a claims made insurance policy base their agreement on the premise that a claim is an easily identifiable risk that will allow the insurer to know the extent of its exposure in terms of the number of claims made.

1986While we recognize the importance and "central role of arbitration in our `system of industrial self-government'" *14 ( Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck (1985), 471 U.S. 202, 219 , 85 L.Ed.2d 206, 220 , 105 S.Ct. 1904, 1915 , quoting United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co. (1960), 363 U.S. 574, 581 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1409, 1416 , 80 S.Ct. 1347, 1352 ), the fact that an arbitrator is traditionally confined by the labor contract to interpretation and application of its terms evidences that the jurisdiction of the arbitral forum is not without limit.

1986While we recognize the importance and "central role of arbitration in our `system of industrial self-government'" *14 ( Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck (1985), 471 U.S. 202, 219 , 85 L.Ed.2d 206, 220 , 105 S.Ct. 1904, 1915 , quoting United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co. (1960), 363 U.S. 574, 581 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1409, 1416 , 80 S.Ct. 1347, 1352 ), the fact that an arbitrator is traditionally confined by the labor contract to interpretation and application of its terms evidences that the jurisdiction of the arbitral forum is not without limit.

1986Clearly Allis-Chalmers does not supply such a rule for, unlike this case, it did not involve a nonderivative State tort action firmly rooted in an important public policy which "proscribe[s] conduct, [and establishes] rights and obligations, independent of a labor contract." ( Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck (1985), 471 U.S. 202, 212 , 85 L.Ed.2d 206, 216 , 105 S.Ct. 1904, 1912 .) Nor will this court premise such a rule on a legal fiction that would purport to hold that unionized employees, in exchange for the rights they derive from a labor contract, accept a requirement that contract remedies

1986Ed. 2d 206, 216 , 105 S. Ct. 1904, 1912 .) Nor will this court premise such a rule on a legal fiction that would purport to hold that unionized employees, in exchange for the rights they derive from a labor contract, accept a requirement that contract remedies be exhausted before bringing a suit to vindicate a right established by important public policy, independent of the labor contract.

1981(People v. Lain (1980), 80 Ill.

1980(People v. Long (1968), 39 Ill. 2d 40 , 233 N.E.2d 389 .) In a bench trial, as was involved in the present case, the filing of a post-trial motion is not necessary to preserve the error, but that does not remove the requirement that the alleged error must, somehow, have been brought to the attention of the trial court.

1980(People v. Long (1968), 39 Ill. 2d 40 , 233 N.E.2d 389 .) In a bench trial, as was involved in the present case, the filing of a post-trial motion is not necessary to preserve the error, but that does not remove the requirement that the alleged error must, somehow, have been brought to the attention of the trial court.

1968In support of the premise that the rule of foreseeability should be applied here, plaintiff cites Kahn v. James Burton Co., 5 Ill2d 614, 622, 126 NE2d 836 (1955): “All men are presumed to know those things which are matters of common knowledge and must be held, in the absence of actual knowledge or notice, to have reasonably anticipated such occurrences as in the ordinary nature of things reasonable men should know will probably occur.

1943App. 469 , to support the premise that the instruction was not error, as well as Reivitz v. Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 327 Ill. 207, 213 , and Bobalek v. Atlass, 315 Ill.