premise privilege in California

2017All other claims of ineffective assistance are more appropriately resolved in a habeas corpus proceeding. [Citations.]" ( Hung Thanh Mai , supra , 57 Cal.4th at p. 1009 , 161 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 305 P.3d 1175 .) Bona's claim of ineffective assistance is based on the premise that the standard of review would have been more favorable to him-i.e., no showing of prejudice would have been necessary-had counsel sought pretrial writ relief from the challenged continuances.

2017All other claims of ineffective assistance are more appropriately resolved in a habeas corpus proceeding. [Citations.]" ( Hung Thanh Mai , supra , 57 Cal.4th at p. 1009 , 161 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 305 P.3d 1175 .) Bona's claim of ineffective assistance is based on the premise that the standard of review would have been more favorable to him-i.e., no showing of prejudice would have been necessary-had counsel sought pretrial writ relief from the challenged continuances.

2024This factor is “strongly related to the question of foreseeability itself.” (Cabral, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 779 .) The premise of our analysis is that some patients will suffer the warned-of side effects associated with the existing drug and the manufacturer knows that the alternative drug would allow some of those patients to avoid them.

2024This factor is “strongly related to the question of foreseeability itself.” (Cabral, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 779 .) The premise of our analysis is that some patients will suffer the warned-of side effects associated with the existing drug and the manufacturer knows that the alternative drug would allow some of those patients to avoid them.

2020Legally, Sieg frames his Disclaimer argument on the premise that the error here is erroneous application of the unconscionability standard enunciated in Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83 .

2020Legally, Sieg frames his Disclaimer argument on the premise that the error here is erroneous application of the unconscionability standard enunciated in Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83 .

2014(People v. Valles, 7 supra, 24 Cal.3d at pp. 131-132 (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.).)” The court referred to People v. Oliver (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 423 in which a court reporter was improperly in the jury room during deliberations and in which the court “noted that Valles had implicitly accepted the premise that such error was not reversible per se, . . . and . . . applied a harmless error standard of review.” (Brassfield, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 72 .) The court in Brassfield then said that it “reject[ed] Brassfield’s contention that the simple presence of an alternate in the jury room during de

2014(People v. Valles, 7 supra, 24 Cal.3d at pp. 131-132 (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.).)” The court referred to People v. Oliver (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 423 in which a court reporter was improperly in the jury room during deliberations and in which the court “noted that Valles had implicitly accepted the premise that such error was not reversible per se, . . . and . . . applied a harmless error standard of review.” (Brassfield, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 72 .) The court in Brassfield then said that it “reject[ed] Brassfield’s contention that the simple presence of an alternate in the jury room during de

2006(See People v. Disbrow (1976) 16 Cal.3d 101 , 127 Cal.Rptr. 360 , 545 P.2d 272 ; cf. Harris, supra, 401 U.S. 222 , 91 S.Ct. 643 , 28 L.Ed.2d 1 .) As the Macias plurality opinion explained, we concluded after Proposition 8 that the Truth-in-Evidence provisions of that initiative measure had abrogated the Disbrow ruling and required California's adherence to Harris. ( People v. May (1988) 44 Cal.3d 309 , 243 Cal.Rptr. 369 , 748 P.2d 307 .) In this regard, the Macias plurality opinion stressed May's observation that "the `federal rule announced in Harris . . ., allowing impeachment by the defenda

2006(See People v. Disbrow (1976) 16 Cal.3d 101 , 127 Cal.Rptr. 360 , 545 P.2d 272 ; cf. Harris, supra, 401 U.S. 222 , 91 S.Ct. 643 , 28 L.Ed.2d 1 .) As the Macias plurality opinion explained, we concluded after Proposition 8 that the Truth-in-Evidence provisions of that initiative measure had abrogated the Disbrow ruling and required California's adherence to Harris. ( People v. May (1988) 44 Cal.3d 309 , 243 Cal.Rptr. 369 , 748 P.2d 307 .) In this regard, the Macias plurality opinion stressed May's observation that "the `federal rule announced in Harris . . ., allowing impeachment by the defenda

2025Defendant’s reliance on Simmons v. United States (1968) 390 U.S. 377 fails for the same reason.

2024Indeed, a basic premise of his claim is that the trial court could have corrected the prosecutor’s alleged misstatement by “inform[ing] the jury that replacement cost is not fair market value.” To the extent Gippson argues the trial court committed instructional error based on its responses to the jury’s notes, we conclude that he also forfeited this aspect of the claim by failing to object below. “ ‘When the trial court responds to a question from a deliberating jury with a generally correct and pertinent statement of the law, a party who believes the court’s response should be modified or cl

2023(Id. at p. 546; id. at pp. 544–546 & fn. 2; see Wiley, supra, 18 Cal.3rd at p. 168 [torture designated as first degree murder in part because “the calculated nature of the acts causing death” make torture particularly reprehensible]; People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1227 [same].) In People v. Tuthill (1947) 31 Cal.2d 92 , we addressed the mental state question in the context of first degree murder by lying in wait.

2023He acknowledges he did not raise this argument below, but relies on authority that “standing can be raised at any time in the litigation, even for the first time on appeal.” (Applera Corp. v. MP Biomedicals, LLC (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 769, 785 .) This general principle does not aid Schindler for several reasons, but first we briefly set out the premise for his claim.

2023(Id. at p. 546; id. at pp. 544–546 & fn. 2; see Wiley, supra, 18 Cal.3rd at p. 168 [torture designated as first degree murder in part because “the calculated nature of the acts causing death” make torture particularly reprehensible]; People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1227 [same].) In People v. Tuthill (1947) 31 Cal.2d 92 , we addressed the mental state question in the context of first degree murder by lying in wait.

2023In sum, we conclude the trial court correctly concluded that plaintiff failed to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action against CHP for 9 dangerous condition of public property under section 835.7 When a demurrer is sustained without leave to amend, we must decide “ ‘whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment: if it can be, the trial court has abused its discretion and we reverse; if not, there has been no abuse of discretion and we affirm. [Citations.] The burden of proving such reasonable possibility is squarely on the plaintiff.’ ” (Z

2022The trial court acted correctly in refusing to remove the trustees.” (Estate of Gilliland (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 515, 528 .)” ( Copley, supra, 126 Cal.App.3d at pp. 286–287.) The premise of the rule stated in Copley is that the settlor’s choice of trustee despite awareness of a conflict should prevail absent extreme circumstances.

2022A “waiver of appeal rights does not apply to ‘ “possible future error” [that] is outside the defendant’s contemplation and knowledge at the time the waiver is made.’ ” (People v. Mumm (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 812, 815 ; People v. Espinoza (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 794, 801 .) The Attorney General appears to accept the premise that the waiver is “general” in that it does not explicitly reference the Marsden motion or ruling thereon.

2022The trial court acted correctly in refusing to remove the trustees.” (Estate of Gilliland (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 515, 528 .)” ( Copley, supra, 126 Cal.App.3d at pp. 286–287.) The premise of the rule stated in Copley is that the settlor’s choice of trustee despite awareness of a conflict should prevail absent extreme circumstances.

2022A “waiver of appeal rights does not apply to ‘ “possible future error” [that] is outside the defendant’s contemplation and knowledge at the time the waiver is made.’ ” (People v. Mumm (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 812, 815 ; People v. Espinoza (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 794, 801 .) The Attorney General appears to accept the premise that the waiver is “general” in that it does not explicitly reference the Marsden motion or ruling thereon.

2020(Marvin, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 665 .) Since the premise of his claim fails, Bugbee’s elder abuse appellate claim must fail, as well.

2019The premise of this claim is one version of Chamagua's testimony, which the trial court rejected and which we disregard. *930 Gorski's subjective suspicion of Chamagua is irrelevant, as is Chamagua's subjective belief he could not leave. ( People v. Zamudio , supra , 43 Cal.4th at p. 341 , 75 Cal.Rptr.3d 289 , 181 P.3d 105 .) The pertinent point is that a reasonable and innocent person in Chamagua's position would have felt free to go. ( Florida v. Bostick , supra , 501 U.S. at p. 434 , 111 S.Ct. 2382 .) Once Chamagua admitted he possessed illegal contraband, Gorski had reasonable suspicion to

2019The premise of this claim is one version of Chamagua's testimony, which the trial court rejected and which we disregard. *930 Gorski's subjective suspicion of Chamagua is irrelevant, as is Chamagua's subjective belief he could not leave. ( People v. Zamudio , supra , 43 Cal.4th at p. 341 , 75 Cal.Rptr.3d 289 , 181 P.3d 105 .) The pertinent point is that a reasonable and innocent person in Chamagua's position would have felt free to go. ( Florida v. Bostick , supra , 501 U.S. at p. 434 , 111 S.Ct. 2382 .) Once Chamagua admitted he possessed illegal contraband, Gorski had reasonable suspicion to

2019The premise of this claim is one version of Chamagua's testimony, which the trial court rejected and which we disregard. *930 Gorski's subjective suspicion of Chamagua is irrelevant, as is Chamagua's subjective belief he could not leave. ( People v. Zamudio , supra , 43 Cal.4th at p. 341 , 75 Cal.Rptr.3d 289 , 181 P.3d 105 .) The pertinent point is that a reasonable and innocent person in Chamagua's position would have felt free to go. ( Florida v. Bostick , supra , 501 U.S. at p. 434 , 111 S.Ct. 2382 .) Once Chamagua admitted he possessed illegal contraband, Gorski had reasonable suspicion to

2019The premise of this claim is one version of Chamagua's testimony, which the trial court rejected and which we disregard. *930 Gorski's subjective suspicion of Chamagua is irrelevant, as is Chamagua's subjective belief he could not leave. ( People v. Zamudio , supra , 43 Cal.4th at p. 341 , 75 Cal.Rptr.3d 289 , 181 P.3d 105 .) The pertinent point is that a reasonable and innocent person in Chamagua's position would have felt free to go. ( Florida v. Bostick , supra , 501 U.S. at p. 434 , 111 S.Ct. 2382 .) Once Chamagua admitted he possessed illegal contraband, Gorski had reasonable suspicion to

2017The case he offers as support for this premise analogizes the "speedy trial" rights of a minor who is the subject of a wardship petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 601 or 602 with a criminal defendant's statutory right to a speedy trial under section 1382. ( In re Chuong D. (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1303 , 1309-1310, 38 Cal.Rptr.3d 351 ( Chuong D. )) 5 An analogy to section 1382 is inapt here.

2017The case he offers as support for this premise analogizes the "speedy trial" rights of a minor who is the subject of a wardship petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 601 or 602 with a criminal defendant's statutory right to a speedy trial under section 1382. ( In re Chuong D. (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1303 , 1309-1310, 38 Cal.Rptr.3d 351 ( Chuong D. )) 5 An analogy to section 1382 is inapt here.

2015In sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend, the trial court reasoned, “Although Plaintiff titles this claim as a refund of taxes, the underlying premise of this claim is that Plaintiff is entitled to a refund because the taxes assessed on Plaintiff’s real property pursuant to [the Measures], violated Government Code section 50079, pursuant to the recent holding of [ Borikas, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th 135 ].

2014(People v. Valles, 7 supra, 24 Cal.3d at pp. 131-132 (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.).)” The court referred to People v. Oliver (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 423 in which a court reporter was improperly in the jury room during deliberations and in which the court “noted that Valles had implicitly accepted the premise that such error was not reversible per se, . . . and . . . applied a harmless error standard of review.” (Brassfield, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 72 .) The court in Brassfield then said that it “reject[ed] Brassfield’s contention that the simple presence of an alternate in the jury room during de

2014(People v. Valles, 7 supra, 24 Cal.3d at pp. 131-132 (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.).)” The court referred to People v. Oliver (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 423 in which a court reporter was improperly in the jury room during deliberations and in which the court “noted that Valles had implicitly accepted the premise that such error was not reversible per se, . . . and . . . applied a harmless error standard of review.” (Brassfield, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 72 .) The court in Brassfield then said that it “reject[ed] Brassfield’s contention that the simple presence of an alternate in the jury room during de

2014(People v. Valles, 7 supra, 24 Cal.3d at pp. 131-132 (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.).)” The court referred to People v. Oliver (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 423 in which a court reporter was improperly in the jury room during deliberations and in which the court “noted that Valles had implicitly accepted the premise that such error was not reversible per se, . . . and . . . applied a harmless error standard of review.” (Brassfield, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 72 .) The court in Brassfield then said that it “reject[ed] Brassfield’s contention that the simple presence of an alternate in the jury room during de

2014(People v. Valles, 7 supra, 24 Cal.3d at pp. 131-132 (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.).)” The court referred to People v. Oliver (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 423 in which a court reporter was improperly in the jury room during deliberations and in which the court “noted that Valles had implicitly accepted the premise that such error was not reversible per se, . . . and . . . applied a harmless error standard of review.” (Brassfield, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 72 .) The court in Brassfield then said that it “reject[ed] Brassfield’s contention that the simple presence of an alternate in the jury room during de

2014(People v. Ross, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 1054 .) Like the Ross court, we conclude the instructional error before us did not implicate Gunning’s federal constitutional rights because “the trial court here did not ‘fail[ ] to instruct’ on a defense theory but gave an unwarranted and [arguably] incomplete instruction on a prosecution theory in rebuttal of the defense.” (Ibid.) A mere “failure to clarify the applicable law upon inquiry by the jury is ordinary error the effect of which is tested under the relatively lenient standard of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 . [Citation.] U