10 Maine opinions name it 2 courts 1999–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maine courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
New Orleans Tanker Corp. v. Department of Transportationgreen2 sentences2020Whether immunity is lost pursuant to 14 M.R.S. § 8104-A(l) " .. begins with the premise that immunity is the rule and exceptions to immunity are to be strictly construed." New Orleans Tanker Corp. v. DOT, 1999 ME 67 , ,rs. 2015Knowlton v. Attorney General, 2009 ME 79 , ~15, 976 A.2d 973 ; see also New Orleans Tanker Corp. v. Dep't ofTransp., 1999 ME 67 , ~ 5, 728 A.2d 673,675 (recognizing that the courts "start from the premise that immunity is the rule and exceptions to immunity are to be strictly construed"). | 2 | 4 |
Young v. Greater Portland Transit Districtgreen2 sentences2002We have recognized that the MTCA employs an “ ‘exception-to-immunity’ approach rather than an ‘exception-to-liability’ approach.” Id. (quoting Young v. Greater Portland Transit Dist., 535 A.2d 417, 419 (Me.1987)). [¶ 6] Thompson argues that the State’s failure to sufficiently fuel the helicopter and to maintain adequate communication and navigation equipment squarely falls within the plain meaning of “ownership, maintenance or use” of vehicles. 1999In Young v. Greater Portland Transit Dist., 535 A.2d 417, 419 (Me.1987), we stated that the MTCA “employed an ‘exception-to-immunity 1 approach rather than an ‘exception-to-liability’ approach.” We have consistently required the strict construction of the exceptions to immunity since the enactment of the MTCA. | 2 | 2 |
Estate of Fortier v. City of Lewistongreen2 sentences2016Because “the MTCA employs an exeeption-to-im-munity approach rather than an exception-to-liability approach,” when we consider the exceptions to immunity for governmental entities, “we - start from the premise that immunity is the rule and exceptions to immunity are to be strictly construed.” Thompson v. Dep’t of Inland Fisheries & Wildlife, 2002 ME 78, ¶5 , 796 A.2d 674 (quotation marks omitted); see Estate of Fortier v. City of Lewiston, 2010 ME 50 , ¶ 14 n. 7, 997 A.2d 84 ; Carroll v. City of Portland, 1999 ME 131 , ¶ 6 n. 3, 736 A.2d 279 . [¶ 9] Day’s Auto argues that the summary judgment 2016Because “the MTCA employs an exeeption-to-im-munity approach rather than an exception-to-liability approach,” when we consider the exceptions to immunity for governmental entities, “we - start from the premise that immunity is the rule and exceptions to immunity are to be strictly construed.” Thompson v. Dep’t of Inland Fisheries & Wildlife, 2002 ME 78, ¶5 , 796 A.2d 674 (quotation marks omitted); see Estate of Fortier v. City of Lewiston, 2010 ME 50 , ¶ 14 n. 7, 997 A.2d 84 ; Carroll v. City of Portland, 1999 ME 131 , ¶ 6 n. 3, 736 A.2d 279 . [¶ 9] Day’s Auto argues that the summary judgment | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maine. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Thompson v. Department of Inland Fisheries & Wildlife
green
2 sentences2016Because “the MTCA employs an exeeption-to-im-munity approach rather than an exception-to-liability approach,” when we consider the exceptions to immunity for governmental entities, “we - start from the premise that immunity is the rule and exceptions to immunity are to be strictly construed.” Thompson v. Dep’t of Inland Fisheries & Wildlife, 2002 ME 78, ¶5 , 796 A.2d 674 (quotation marks omitted); see Estate of Fortier v. City of Lewiston, 2010 ME 50 , ¶ 14 n. 7, 997 A.2d 84 ; Carroll v. City of Portland, 1999 ME 131 , ¶ 6 n. 3, 736 A.2d 279 . [¶ 9] Day’s Auto argues that the summary judgment 2016Because “the MTCA employs an exeeption-to-im-munity approach rather than an exception-to-liability approach,” when we consider the exceptions to immunity for governmental entities, “we - start from the premise that immunity is the rule and exceptions to immunity are to be strictly construed.” Thompson v. Dep’t of Inland Fisheries & Wildlife, 2002 ME 78, ¶5 , 796 A.2d 674 (quotation marks omitted); see Estate of Fortier v. City of Lewiston, 2010 ME 50 , ¶ 14 n. 7, 997 A.2d 84 ; Carroll v. City of Portland, 1999 ME 131 , ¶ 6 n. 3, 736 A.2d 279 . [¶ 9] Day’s Auto argues that the summary judgment | 2 | 2010–2016 |
Sanford v. Town of Shapleigh
green
2 sentences2025Accordingly, our analysis starts from the premise that immunity is the rule and exceptions to immunity are to be strictly construed.” (alteration, citation, and quotation marks omitted)); Sanford v. Town of Shapleigh, 2004 ME 73, ¶ 10 , 850 A.2d 325 (“Sovereign immunity is the rule, and liability for 8 governmental entities is the statutorily created narrowly construed exception.” (alterations and quotation marks omitted)). 2025Accordingly, our analysis starts from the premise that immunity is the rule and exceptions to immunity are to be strictly construed.” (alteration, citation, and quotation marks omitted)); Sanford v. Town of Shapleigh, 2004 ME 73, ¶ 10 , 850 A.2d 325 (“Sovereign immunity is the rule, and liability for 8 governmental entities is the statutorily created narrowly construed exception.” (alterations and quotation marks omitted)). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Day's Auto Body, Inc. v. Town of Medway
green
2 sentences2022Because "'the MTCA employs an exception-to-immunity approach rather than an exception-to-liability approach,' when [a court] consider[s] the exceptions to immunity for governmental entities, '[it] start[s] from the premise that immunity is the rule and exceptions to immunity are to be strictly construed."' Day's Auto Body, Inc. v. Town of lYiedway, 2016 ME 121 , i[ 8, 145 A.3d 1030 . 2022Because "'the MTCA employs an exception-to-immunity approach rather than an exception-to-liability approach,' when [a court] consider[s] the exceptions to immunity for governmental entities, '[it] start[s] from the premise that immunity is the rule and exceptions to immunity are to be strictly construed."' Day's Auto Body, Inc. v. Town of lYiedway, 2016 ME 121 , i[ 8, 145 A.3d 1030 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Carroll v. City of Portland
green
2 sentences2016Because “the MTCA employs an exeeption-to-im-munity approach rather than an exception-to-liability approach,” when we consider the exceptions to immunity for governmental entities, “we - start from the premise that immunity is the rule and exceptions to immunity are to be strictly construed.” Thompson v. Dep’t of Inland Fisheries & Wildlife, 2002 ME 78, ¶5 , 796 A.2d 674 (quotation marks omitted); see Estate of Fortier v. City of Lewiston, 2010 ME 50 , ¶ 14 n. 7, 997 A.2d 84 ; Carroll v. City of Portland, 1999 ME 131 , ¶ 6 n. 3, 736 A.2d 279 . [¶ 9] Day’s Auto argues that the summary judgment 2016Because “the MTCA employs an exeeption-to-im-munity approach rather than an exception-to-liability approach,” when we consider the exceptions to immunity for governmental entities, “we - start from the premise that immunity is the rule and exceptions to immunity are to be strictly construed.” Thompson v. Dep’t of Inland Fisheries & Wildlife, 2002 ME 78, ¶5 , 796 A.2d 674 (quotation marks omitted); see Estate of Fortier v. City of Lewiston, 2010 ME 50 , ¶ 14 n. 7, 997 A.2d 84 ; Carroll v. City of Portland, 1999 ME 131 , ¶ 6 n. 3, 736 A.2d 279 . [¶ 9] Day’s Auto argues that the summary judgment | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Knowlton v. Attorney General
green
2 sentences2015Knowlton v. Attorney General, 2009 ME 79 , ~15, 976 A.2d 973 ; see also New Orleans Tanker Corp. v. Dep't ofTransp., 1999 ME 67 , ~ 5, 728 A.2d 673,675 (recognizing that the courts "start from the premise that immunity is the rule and exceptions to immunity are to be strictly construed"). 2015Knowlton v. Attorney General, 2009 ME 79 , ~15, 976 A.2d 973 ; see also New Orleans Tanker Corp. v. Dep't ofTransp., 1999 ME 67 , ~ 5, 728 A.2d 673,675 (recognizing that the courts "start from the premise that immunity is the rule and exceptions to immunity are to be strictly construed"). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Jorgensen v. Department of Transportation
green
2 sentences2010Jorgensen v. Dep’t of Transp., 2009 ME 42, ¶ 12 , 969 A.2d 912, 916 . [¶ 10] The threshold and ultimately dispositive question of statutory interpretation before us is whether the City was “using” the Twin Cities aircraft within the meaning of the MTCA when it crashed. 2010Jorgensen v. Dep’t of Transp., 2009 ME 42, ¶ 12 , 969 A.2d 912, 916 . [¶ 10] The threshold and ultimately dispositive question of statutory interpretation before us is whether the City was “using” the Twin Cities aircraft within the meaning of the MTCA when it crashed. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Coombs
green
2 sentences2006However, in State v. Coombs, 1998 ME 1, ¶ 9 , 704 A.2d 387, 390 , which was decided after Walls, we *713 adopted for the review of the voluntariness of confessions and waivers of Miranda rights the bifurcated standard enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104 , 106 S.Ct. 445 , 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985), whereby the trial court's findings of fact are reviewed for clear error and the legal conclusion to be drawn from those facts is reviewed de novo. 2006However, in State v. Coombs, 1998 ME 1, ¶ 9 , 704 A.2d 387, 390 , which was decided after Walls, we *713 adopted for the review of the voluntariness of confessions and waivers of Miranda rights the bifurcated standard enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104 , 106 S.Ct. 445 , 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985), whereby the trial court's findings of fact are reviewed for clear error and the legal conclusion to be drawn from those facts is reviewed de novo. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Miller v. Fenton
green
2 sentences2006However, in State v. Coombs, 1998 ME 1, ¶ 9 , 704 A.2d 387, 390 , which was decided after Walls, we *713 adopted for the review of the voluntariness of confessions and waivers of Miranda rights the bifurcated standard enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104 , 106 S.Ct. 445 , 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985), whereby the trial court's findings of fact are reviewed for clear error and the legal conclusion to be drawn from those facts is reviewed de novo. 2006However, in State v. Coombs, 1998 ME 1, ¶ 9 , 704 A.2d 387, 390 , which was decided after Walls, we *713 adopted for the review of the voluntariness of confessions and waivers of Miranda rights the bifurcated standard enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104 , 106 S.Ct. 445 , 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985), whereby the trial court's findings of fact are reviewed for clear error and the legal conclusion to be drawn from those facts is reviewed de novo. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.