premise rule in New Jersey

2009Nelson, supra, 318 N.J.Super. at 250 , 723 A. 2d 627 .

2009Nelson, supra, 318 N.J.Super. at 250 , 723 A. 2d 627 .

1993Others have questioned this thesis, characterizing the traditional rule as “atavistic, generating ... harsh results out of all proportion to the mistake of inadvertent disclosure.” Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 531 F.Supp. 951 , 955 n. 8 (N.D.Ill.1982); see also Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214 (D.C.Cir.1981); Transamerica Computer v. Intern.

1993Others have questioned this thesis, characterizing the traditional rule as "atavistic, generating... harsh results out of all proportion to the mistake of inadvertent disclosure." Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 531 F. Supp. 951 , 955 n. 8 (N.D.Ill. 1982); see also Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F. 2d 1214 (D.C.

1993This approach is based on the premise that the privilege interferes with the search for the truth and therefore must be narrowly applied, see, e.g., F.D.I.C. v. Marine Midland Realty Credit Corp., 138 F.R.D. at 481 , and that the risk of insufficient precautions should rest with the party at fault, see, e.g., United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461, 465 (E.D.Mich.1954).

1993This approach is based on the premise that the privilege interferes with the search for the truth and therefore must be narrowly applied, see, e.g., F.D.I.C. v. Marine Midland Realty Credit Corp., 138 F.R.D. at 481 , and that the risk of insufficient *420 precautions should rest with the party at fault, see, e.g., United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461, 465 (E.D.Mich. 1954).

2019The Buckeye decision was based on the premise that a challenge to the validity of the arbitration agreement is different from a challenge to "the contract as a whole, either on a ground that directly affects the entire agreement (e.g., the agreement was fraudulently induced), or on the ground that the illegality of one of the contract's provisions renders the whole contract invalid." Id. at 444 , 126 S.Ct. 1204 .

2019The Buckeye decision was based on the premise that a challenge to the validity of the arbitration agreement is different from a challenge to "the contract as a whole, either on a ground that directly affects the entire agreement (e.g., the agreement was fraudulently induced), or on the ground that the illegality of one of the contract's provisions renders the whole contract invalid." Id. at 444 , 126 S.Ct. 1204 .

2016The premise of the rule is that "[i]t should not concern the tortfeasor that someone else is obligated to aid his victim because of a duty assumed by contract or imposed by law," ibid. , and that "an injured party may recover fully from a tortfeasor for personal injuries notwithstanding that much of his loss was covered by contractual arrangements, such as for example an accident or life insurance policy." *186 [ Kiss v. Jacob , 138 N.J. 278 , 281, 650 A .2d 336 (1994) (quoting Theobald v. Angelos , 44 N.J. 228 , 239, 208 A .2d 129 (1965) ).] In Kiss , the Court recognized that the Legislature

2014Rather, the statutory language is designed to focus attention on the intensity and duration of the precipitating work effort or strain in evaluating its capacity to cause cardiac dysfunction. [See Hellwig, supra, 110 N.J. at 50 , 538 A.2d 1243 .] The Court went on to reject the premise that a claim is not compensable unless caused during a work effort that exceeds the claimant’s ordinary work effort.

2014Rather, the statutory language is designed to focus attention on the intensity and duration of the precipitating work effort or strain in evaluating its capacity to cause cardiac dysfunction. [See Hellwig, supra, 110 N.J. at 50 , 538 A.2d 1243 .] The Court went on to reject the premise that a claim is not compensable unless caused during a work effort that exceeds the claimant’s ordinary work effort.

1985Suter, supra, 81 N.J. at 169 .

1985Suter, supra, 81 N.J. at 169 .

1981Singling out and assessing the factors which enter into the formulation of policy germane to parent-child immunity was rightly described by Justice Clifford in his dissenting opinion in Small v. Rockfeld, 66 N.J. at 251 as "a most difficult undertaking." Foremost, perhaps, among the vexing considerations to be weighed is the very premise of the immunity doctrine itself — that harm has been wrongfully inflicted by one upon another and that it is the purpose of the doctrine to provide the wrongdoer sanctuary from its consequences.

1940That argument is grounded upon the premise that the violation was committed by prosecutor in face of the decision rendered on April 1st, 1935, in the case of Semler v. Oregon State Board of Dental Examiners, 294 U. S. 608 ; 79 L.

1940That argument is grounded upon the premise that the violation was committed by prosecutor in face of the decision rendered on April 1st, 1935, in the case of Semler v. Oregon State Board of Dental Examiners, 294 U. S. 608 ; 79 L.