premise defense in Louisiana

2002Id.; Haskins v. Clary, 346 So.2d 193 (La.1977).

2001Id.; Haskins v. Clary, 346 So.2d 193 (La.1977).

2018App. 2 Cir. 8/7/13), 121 So.3d 1246 , 1250.

2018App. 2 Cir. 8/7/13), 121 So.3d 1246 , 1250.

2014Berry v. Insurance Co. of North America, 28,580 (La.App.2d Cir.10/30/96), 683 So.2d 310, 311 , writ denied, 97 -0091 (La.3/7/97), 689 So.2d 1374 .

2014Berry v. Insurance Co. of North America, 28,580 (La.App.2d Cir.10/30/96), 683 So.2d 310, 311 , writ denied, 97 -0091 (La.3/7/97), 689 So.2d 1374 .

2008American Deposit, 00-2457 at pp. 10-11, 783 So.2d at 1289 .

2004Western Development Group, supra ; Succession of Fragala, 28,663 (La.App.2d Cir.9/27/96), 680 So.2d 1345 .

2001Donaghey, 600 So.2d at 831 (quoting Guilbeau v. Shelter Mut.

2000The Louisiana Supreme Court did not expressly reference the doctrine of credit for time at liberty when it accorded the defendants relief in State v. Roberts, 568 So.2d 1017 (La.1990); however, the basic premise of that doctrine was unquestionably applied.

1988Darville v. Texaco, supra. The petition clearly states a claim for declaratory relief with respect to the personal liability of the plaintiffs on FMH's note.

1984In State v. Monroe, 345 So.2d 1185 (La.1977), this court reaffirmed its original formulation of the business records exception to the hearsay rule: Before the exception may be invoked by the State against the defendant, allowing introduction of a permanent record made in the ordinary course of business from personal knowledge of the facts recorded, or from information furnished to one having business duty to observe and report the facts, it must be shown that the person who made the record is genuinely unavailable for testimony, that he had no strong motive to misrepresent, and that in all pro

1979On this premise the defense asserts that the holding in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975), requires that defendant's oral and written confessions, and his clothing surrendered to the detectives at his house were tainted by the prior illegality and were therefore inadmissible as evidence at trial.

1979On this premise the defense asserts that the holding in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975), requires that defendant's oral and written confessions, and his clothing surrendered to the detectives at his house were tainted by the prior illegality and were therefore inadmissible as evidence at trial.

1978In Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 , 93 S.Ct. 2607 , 37 L.Ed.2d 419 (1973), the phrase "ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated" were approved as properly constituting the hard-core sexual conduct which states may regulate.

1978In Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 , 93 S.Ct. 2607 , 37 L.Ed.2d 419 (1973), the phrase "ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated" were approved as properly constituting the hard-core sexual conduct which states may regulate.

1978From this premise defense counsel reasons that the State introduced evidence of other crimes, impermissible under the rule of State v. Prieur, 277 So.2d 126 (La.1973).

1977Noting the State's reliance on the rules of "stop and frisk" and "plain view", the brief quotes from Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) to the effect that ". . . whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has `seized' that person . . ." On this premise the defense argues that Schouest had the right to be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.

1977Noting the State's reliance on the rules of "stop and frisk" and "plain view", the brief quotes from Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) to the effect that ". . . whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has `seized' that person . . ." On this premise the defense argues that Schouest had the right to be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.

1962Appellants contend that the District Court is in error in discharging Canal Insurance *91 Company on the premise that the rule stated by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Williams v. Marionneaux, 240 La. 713 , 124 So.2d 919 (December 12, 1960), could conceivably be applied by analogy to this case, so as to expose appellants (claimants in the death and personal injury actions) to a plea of res judicata or some comparative exception, which if sustained would bar appellants from further action against the other defendants in the death and personal injury suits.

1962Appellants contend that the District Court is in error in discharging Canal Insurance *91 Company on the premise that the rule stated by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Williams v. Marionneaux, 240 La. 713 , 124 So.2d 919 (December 12, 1960), could conceivably be applied by analogy to this case, so as to expose appellants (claimants in the death and personal injury actions) to a plea of res judicata or some comparative exception, which if sustained would bar appellants from further action against the other defendants in the death and personal injury suits.