negligence per se claim in Georgia

1989Central Anesthesia Assoc. v. Worthy, 254 Ga. 728, 730 (1) ( 333 SE2d 829 ) (1985), discusses the negligence per se principle.

1989Central Anesthesia Assoc. v. Worthy, 254 Ga. 728, 730 (1) ( 333 SE2d 829 ) (1985), discusses the negligence per se principle.

2017Membership Corp., 330 Ga. App. 161, 164 (2) ( 767 SE2d 807 ) (2014) (holding that the plaintiff failed describe the alleged statutory duties with enough specificity to support a negligence per se claim brought under OCGA § 51-1-6); Hubbard v. Dep’t of Transp., 256 Ga. App. 342, 351 (3) ( 568 SE2d 559 ) (2002) (affirming partial summary judgment in favor of the defendant as to the plaintiff’s negligence claim asserted under OCGA § 51-1-6 because the statutory duties identified by the plaintiff were not mandatory). 22 See Jenkins, 293 Ga. at 164 . 11 recover under OCGA § 51-1-6 unless the duty s

2017Membership Corp., 330 Ga. App. 161, 164 (2) ( 767 SE2d 807 ) (2014) (holding that the plaintiff failed describe the alleged statutory duties with enough specificity to support a negligence per se claim brought under OCGA § 51-1-6); Hubbard v. Dep’t of Transp., 256 Ga. App. 342, 351 (3) ( 568 SE2d 559 ) (2002) (affirming partial summary judgment in favor of the defendant as to the plaintiff’s negligence claim asserted under OCGA § 51-1-6 because the statutory duties identified by the plaintiff were not mandatory). 22 See Jenkins, 293 Ga. at 164 . 11 recover under OCGA § 51-1-6 unless the duty s

2012Griswold also set forth a claim for negligence per se premised on his assertion that Collins “issued corporal punishment not within the guidelines of OCGA §§ 20-2-730, 20-2-731, and 20-2-732.” “Negligence per se arises when a statute is violated, the person injured by the violation is within the class of persons the statute was intended to protect, and the harm complained of was the harm the statute was intended to guard against.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Chancey v. Peachtree Pest Control Co., 288 Ga. App. 767, 770 (2) (b) ( 655 SE2d 228 ) (2007); see OCGA § 51-1-6 (“When the law re

2012Griswold also set forth a claim for negligence per se premised on his assertion that Collins “issued corporal punishment not within the guidelines of OCGA §§ 20-2-730, 20-2-731, and 20-2-732.” “Negligence per se arises when a statute is violated, the person injured by the violation is within the class of persons the statute was intended to protect, and the harm complained of was the harm the statute was intended to guard against.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Chancey v. Peachtree Pest Control Co., 288 Ga. App. 767, 770 (2) (b) ( 655 SE2d 228 ) (2007); see OCGA § 51-1-6 (“When the law re

1999"To prevail on a negligence per se claim, a causal relation between the violation of the statutory duty and the injuries sustained thereby must be shown. [Cit.]" Walter v. Orkin Exterminating Co., supra at 624, 385 S.E.2d 725 .

1995“To prevail on a negligence per se claim, a causal relation between the violation of the statutory duty and the injuries sustained thereby must be shown. [Cit.] ” (Emphasis supplied.) Walter v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 192 Ga. App. 621, 624 (3) ( 385 SE2d 725 ) (1989).

1993See Florida Star, 491 U. S. at 539 .

1993Id. at 539-540 .

2025We, however, are not authorized to do so.31 And under the “no set of 30 McLain v. Mariner Health Care, Inc., 279 Ga. App. 410, 411 (2) ( 631 SE2d 435 ) (2006); see also OCGA § 51-1-6 (“When the law requires a person to perform an act for the benefit of another or to refrain from doing an act which may injure another, although no cause of action is given in express terms, the injured party may recover for the breach of such legal duty if he suffers damage thereby.”). 31 See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art.

2025We, however, are not authorized to do so.31 And under the “no set of 30 McLain v. Mariner Health Care, Inc., 279 Ga. App. 410, 411 (2) ( 631 SE2d 435 ) (2006); see also OCGA § 51-1-6 (“When the law requires a person to perform an act for the benefit of another or to refrain from doing an act which may injure another, although no cause of action is given in express terms, the injured party may recover for the breach of such legal duty if he suffers damage thereby.”). 31 See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art.

2023“A plaintiff asserting a negligence per se claim must (1) fall within the class of persons the statute was intended to protect and (2) show the harm complained of was the harm the statute was intended to guard against.”13 12 See Wilson v. Mountain Valley Community Bank, 328 Ga. App. 650, 653 (2) ( 759 SE2d 921 ) (2014). 13 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Eastside Recovery, LLC v. Calhoun, 368 Ga. App. 385 , 388 (1) ( 890 SE2d 135 ) (2023). 10 Knight alleges that the Raceway violated OCGA §§ 43-25-7 through 43-25-10.

2023“A plaintiff asserting a negligence per se claim must (1) fall within the class of persons the statute was intended to protect and (2) show the harm complained of was the harm the statute was intended to guard against.”13 12 See Wilson v. Mountain Valley Community Bank, 328 Ga. App. 650, 653 (2) ( 759 SE2d 921 ) (2014). 13 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Eastside Recovery, LLC v. Calhoun, 368 Ga. App. 385 , 388 (1) ( 890 SE2d 135 ) (2023). 10 Knight alleges that the Raceway violated OCGA §§ 43-25-7 through 43-25-10.

2023Eastside’s negligence per se cause of action states that Calhoun “committ[ed] the offenses of reckless driving, speeding, failure to maintain a lane, passing on the shoulder, and following too close.” OCGA § 51-1-6 provides, “When the law requires a person to perform an act for the benefit of another or to refrain from doing an act which may injure another, although no cause of action is given in express terms, the injured party may recover for the breach of such legal duty if he suffers damage thereby.” A plaintiff asserting a negligence per se claim must (1) “fall[] within the class of perso

2023Eastside’s negligence per se cause of action states that Calhoun “committ[ed] the offenses of reckless driving, speeding, failure to maintain a lane, passing on the shoulder, and following too close.” OCGA § 51-1-6 provides, “When the law requires a person to perform an act for the benefit of another or to refrain from doing an act which may injure another, although no cause of action is given in express terms, the injured party may recover for the breach of such legal duty if he suffers damage thereby.” A plaintiff asserting a negligence per se claim must (1) “fall[] within the class of perso

2023Eastside’s negligence per se cause of action states that Calhoun “committ[ed] the offenses of reckless driving, speeding, failure to maintain a lane, passing on the shoulder, and following too close.” OCGA § 51-1-6 provides, “When the law requires a person to perform an act for the benefit of another or to refrain from doing an act which may injure another, although no cause of action is given in express terms, the injured party may recover for the breach of such legal duty if he suffers damage thereby.” A plaintiff asserting a negligence per se claim must (1) “fall[] within the class of perso

2023Eastside’s negligence per se cause of action states that Calhoun “committ[ed] the offenses of reckless driving, speeding, failure to maintain a lane, passing on the shoulder, and following too close.” OCGA § 51-1-6 provides, “When the law requires a person to perform an act for the benefit of another or to refrain from doing an act which may injure another, although no cause of action is given in express terms, the injured party may recover for the breach of such legal duty if he suffers damage thereby.” A plaintiff asserting a negligence per se claim must (1) “fall[] within the class of perso

2020Code § 5-21. 25 Additionally, several documents transmitted in the appellate record, including the lease, emails between Lemontree and Wyatt, and pictures of Jax and the fence, are difficult or impossible to read. 26 Griffiths v. Rowe Properties, 271 Ga. App. 344, 345 (1) ( 609 SE2d 690 ) (2005) (emphasis supplied); see also Martin v. Johnson-Lemon, 271 Ga. 120, 121 ( 516 SE2d 66 ) (1999) (“[B]ecause an out-of-possession landlord’s tort liability to 9 legislature has opted to expressly limit the potential liability of out-of-possession landlords by enacting OCGA § 44-7-14.”27 To allow a neglig

2020Code § 5-21. 25 Additionally, several documents transmitted in the appellate record, including the lease, emails between Lemontree and Wyatt, and pictures of Jax and the fence, are difficult or impossible to read. 26 Griffiths v. Rowe Properties, 271 Ga. App. 344, 345 (1) ( 609 SE2d 690 ) (2005) (emphasis supplied); see also Martin v. Johnson-Lemon, 271 Ga. 120, 121 ( 516 SE2d 66 ) (1999) (“[B]ecause an out-of-possession landlord’s tort liability to 9 legislature has opted to expressly limit the potential liability of out-of-possession landlords by enacting OCGA § 44-7-14.”27 To allow a neglig

2020Code § 5-21. 25 Additionally, several documents transmitted in the appellate record, including the lease, emails between Lemontree and Wyatt, and pictures of Jax and the fence, are difficult or impossible to read. 26 Griffiths v. Rowe Properties, 271 Ga. App. 344, 345 (1) ( 609 SE2d 690 ) (2005) (emphasis supplied); see also Martin v. Johnson-Lemon, 271 Ga. 120, 121 ( 516 SE2d 66 ) (1999) (“[B]ecause an out-of-possession landlord’s tort liability to 9 legislature has opted to expressly limit the potential liability of out-of-possession landlords by enacting OCGA § 44-7-14.”27 To allow a neglig

2020Code § 5-21. 25 Additionally, several documents transmitted in the appellate record, including the lease, emails between Lemontree and Wyatt, and pictures of Jax and the fence, are difficult or impossible to read. 26 Griffiths v. Rowe Properties, 271 Ga. App. 344, 345 (1) ( 609 SE2d 690 ) (2005) (emphasis supplied); see also Martin v. Johnson-Lemon, 271 Ga. 120, 121 ( 516 SE2d 66 ) (1999) (“[B]ecause an out-of-possession landlord’s tort liability to 9 legislature has opted to expressly limit the potential liability of out-of-possession landlords by enacting OCGA § 44-7-14.”27 To allow a neglig

2017Membership Corp., 330 Ga. App. 161, 164 (2) ( 767 SE2d 807 ) (2014) (holding that the plaintiff failed describe the alleged statutory duties with enough specificity to support a negligence per se claim brought under OCGA § 51-1-6); Hubbard v. Dep’t of Transp., 256 Ga. App. 342, 351 (3) ( 568 SE2d 559 ) (2002) (affirming partial summary judgment in favor of the defendant as to the plaintiff’s negligence claim asserted under OCGA § 51-1-6 because the statutory duties identified by the plaintiff were not mandatory). 22 See Jenkins, 293 Ga. at 164 . 11 recover under OCGA § 51-1-6 unless the duty s

2017Membership Corp., 330 Ga. App. 161, 164 (2) ( 767 SE2d 807 ) (2014) (holding that the plaintiff failed describe the alleged statutory duties with enough specificity to support a negligence per se claim brought under OCGA § 51-1-6); Hubbard v. Dep’t of Transp., 256 Ga. App. 342, 351 (3) ( 568 SE2d 559 ) (2002) (affirming partial summary judgment in favor of the defendant as to the plaintiff’s negligence claim asserted under OCGA § 51-1-6 because the statutory duties identified by the plaintiff were not mandatory). 22 See Jenkins, 293 Ga. at 164 . 11 recover under OCGA § 51-1-6 unless the duty s

2017See, e.g., Simerly, 322 Ga. App. at 705-06 (3) (holdingthat the plaintiffs’ claims regarding the defendant’s noncompliance with various federal and state statutes relating to environmental protection “[fell] within the ambit of OCGA § 51-1-6”); Combs v. Atlanta Auto Auction, Inc., 287 Ga. App. 9, 12 (2) ( 650 SE2d 709 ) (2007) (holding that a plaintiff could pursue a negligence claim under OCGA § 51-1-6 based on the defendant’s alleged violation of certain zoning ordinances); Ford v. Saint Francis Hosp., Inc., 227 Ga. App. 823, 827 (2) ( 490 SE2d 415 ) (1997) (affirming the trial court’s denia

2017Membership Corp., 330 Ga. App. 161, 164 (2) ( 767 SE2d 807 ) (2014) (holding that the plaintiff failed describe the alleged statutory duties with enough specificity to support a negligence per se claim brought under OCGA § 51-1-6); Hubbard v. Dep’t of Transp., 256 Ga. App. 342, 351 (3) ( 568 SE2d 559 ) (2002) (affirming partial summary judgment in favor of the defendant as to the plaintiff’s negligence claim asserted under OCGA § 51-1-6 because the statutory duties identified by the plaintiff were not mandatory). 22 See Jenkins, 293 Ga. at 164 . 11 recover under OCGA § 51-1-6 unless the duty s

2017Membership Corp., 330 Ga. App. 161, 164 (2) ( 767 SE2d 807 ) (2014) (holding that the plaintiff failed describe the alleged statutory duties with enough specificity to support a negligence per se claim brought under OCGA § 51-1-6); Hubbard v. Dep’t of Transp., 256 Ga. App. 342, 351 (3) ( 568 SE2d 559 ) (2002) (affirming partial summary judgment in favor of the defendant as to the plaintiff’s negligence claim asserted under OCGA § 51-1-6 because the statutory duties identified by the plaintiff were not mandatory). 22 See Jenkins, 293 Ga. at 164 . 11 recover under OCGA § 51-1-6 unless the duty s

2017Membership Corp., 330 Ga. App. 161, 164 (2) ( 767 SE2d 807 ) (2014) (holding that the plaintiff failed describe the alleged statutory duties with enough specificity to support a negligence per se claim brought under OCGA § 51-1-6); Hubbard v. Dep’t of Transp., 256 Ga. App. 342, 351 (3) ( 568 SE2d 559 ) (2002) (affirming partial summary judgment in favor of the defendant as to the plaintiff’s negligence claim asserted under OCGA § 51-1-6 because the statutory duties identified by the plaintiff were not mandatory). 22 See Jenkins, 293 Ga. at 164 . 11 recover under OCGA § 51-1-6 unless the duty s

2017Membership Corp., 330 Ga. App. 161, 164 (2) ( 767 SE2d 807 ) (2014) (holding that the plaintiff failed describe the alleged statutory duties with enough specificity to support a negligence per se claim brought under OCGA § 51-1-6); Hubbard v. Dep’t of Transp., 256 Ga. App. 342, 351 (3) ( 568 SE2d 559 ) (2002) (affirming partial summary judgment in favor of the defendant as to the plaintiff’s negligence claim asserted under OCGA § 51-1-6 because the statutory duties identified by the plaintiff were not mandatory). 22 See Jenkins, 293 Ga. at 164 . 11 recover under OCGA § 51-1-6 unless the duty s

2017Ass’n, 309 Ga. App. 562, 566 (2) ( 711 SE2d 80 ) (2011) (holding that a plaintiff could not sue to enforce a check, which was allegedly paid by a bank “over a forged endorsement” when the bank’s alleged wrongful actions were not violations of any legal right of or duty owed to the plaintiff); R & R Insulation Servs., Inc. v. Royal Indem.

2017Ass’n, 309 Ga. App. 562, 566 (2) ( 711 SE2d 80 ) (2011) (holding that a plaintiff could not sue to enforce a check, which was allegedly paid by a bank “over a forged endorsement” when the bank’s alleged wrongful actions were not violations of any legal right of or duty owed to the plaintiff); R & R Insulation Servs., Inc. v. Royal Indem.

2017See, e.g., Simerly, 322 Ga. App. at 705-06 (3) (holdingthat the plaintiffs’ claims regarding the defendant’s noncompliance with various federal and state statutes relating to environmental protection “[fell] within the ambit of OCGA § 51-1-6”); Combs v. Atlanta Auto Auction, Inc., 287 Ga. App. 9, 12 (2) ( 650 SE2d 709 ) (2007) (holding that a plaintiff could pursue a negligence claim under OCGA § 51-1-6 based on the defendant’s alleged violation of certain zoning ordinances); Ford v. Saint Francis Hosp., Inc., 227 Ga. App. 823, 827 (2) ( 490 SE2d 415 ) (1997) (affirming the trial court’s denia

2017See, e.g., Simerly, 322 Ga. App. at 705-06 (3) (holdingthat the plaintiffs’ claims regarding the defendant’s noncompliance with various federal and state statutes relating to environmental protection “[fell] within the ambit of OCGA § 51-1-6”); Combs v. Atlanta Auto Auction, Inc., 287 Ga. App. 9, 12 (2) ( 650 SE2d 709 ) (2007) (holding that a plaintiff could pursue a negligence claim under OCGA § 51-1-6 based on the defendant’s alleged violation of certain zoning ordinances); Ford v. Saint Francis Hosp., Inc., 227 Ga. App. 823, 827 (2) ( 490 SE2d 415 ) (1997) (affirming the trial court’s denia

2017See, e.g., Simerly, 322 Ga. App. at 705-06 (3) (holdingthat the plaintiffs’ claims regarding the defendant’s noncompliance with various federal and state statutes relating to environmental protection “[fell] within the ambit of OCGA § 51-1-6”); Combs v. Atlanta Auto Auction, Inc., 287 Ga. App. 9, 12 (2) ( 650 SE2d 709 ) (2007) (holding that a plaintiff could pursue a negligence claim under OCGA § 51-1-6 based on the defendant’s alleged violation of certain zoning ordinances); Ford v. Saint Francis Hosp., Inc., 227 Ga. App. 823, 827 (2) ( 490 SE2d 415 ) (1997) (affirming the trial court’s denia

2017See, e.g., Simerly, 322 Ga. App. at 705-06 (3) (holdingthat the plaintiffs’ claims regarding the defendant’s noncompliance with various federal and state statutes relating to environmental protection “[fell] within the ambit of OCGA § 51-1-6”); Combs v. Atlanta Auto Auction, Inc., 287 Ga. App. 9, 12 (2) ( 650 SE2d 709 ) (2007) (holding that a plaintiff could pursue a negligence claim under OCGA § 51-1-6 based on the defendant’s alleged violation of certain zoning ordinances); Ford v. Saint Francis Hosp., Inc., 227 Ga. App. 823, 827 (2) ( 490 SE2d 415 ) (1997) (affirming the trial court’s denia

2007See Vito v. Dhillon, 269 Ga. App. 899 ( 605 SE2d 602 ) (2004). 2 See Sherwood v. Boshears, 157 Ga. App. 542, 543 ( 278 SE2d 124 ) (1981) (a charge made against a person regarding his trade, calculated to injure him, is actionable per se unless made under circumstances which constitute a privileged communication; privilege requires good faith, an interest to be upheld, a statement properly limited in scope, a proper occasion, and publication to proper persons). 3 Id. at 543-544 . 4 OCGA § 51-5-7 (7). 5 See generally Sherwood, supra. 6 Jaillett v. Ga. Television Co., 238 Ga. App. 885, 888 ( 520

2007See Vito v. Dhillon, 269 Ga. App. 899 ( 605 SE2d 602 ) (2004). 2 See Sherwood v. Boshears, 157 Ga. App. 542, 543 ( 278 SE2d 124 ) (1981) (a charge made against a person regarding his trade, calculated to injure him, is actionable per se unless made under circumstances which constitute a privileged communication; privilege requires good faith, an interest to be upheld, a statement properly limited in scope, a proper occasion, and publication to proper persons). 3 Id. at 543-544 . 4 OCGA § 51-5-7 (7). 5 See generally Sherwood, supra. 6 Jaillett v. Ga. Television Co., 238 Ga. App. 885, 888 ( 520

2007See Vito v. Dhillon, 269 Ga. App. 899 ( 605 SE2d 602 ) (2004). 2 See Sherwood v. Boshears, 157 Ga. App. 542, 543 ( 278 SE2d 124 ) (1981) (a charge made against a person regarding his trade, calculated to injure him, is actionable per se unless made under circumstances which constitute a privileged communication; privilege requires good faith, an interest to be upheld, a statement properly limited in scope, a proper occasion, and publication to proper persons). 3 Id. at 543-544 . 4 OCGA § 51-5-7 (7). 5 See generally Sherwood, supra. 6 Jaillett v. Ga. Television Co., 238 Ga. App. 885, 888 ( 520

2007See Vito v. Dhillon, 269 Ga. App. 899 ( 605 SE2d 602 ) (2004). 2 See Sherwood v. Boshears, 157 Ga. App. 542, 543 ( 278 SE2d 124 ) (1981) (a charge made against a person regarding his trade, calculated to injure him, is actionable per se unless made under circumstances which constitute a privileged communication; privilege requires good faith, an interest to be upheld, a statement properly limited in scope, a proper occasion, and publication to proper persons). 3 Id. at 543-544 . 4 OCGA § 51-5-7 (7). 5 See generally Sherwood, supra. 6 Jaillett v. Ga. Television Co., 238 Ga. App. 885, 888 ( 520

2007See Vito v. Dhillon, 269 Ga. App. 899 ( 605 SE2d 602 ) (2004). 2 See Sherwood v. Boshears, 157 Ga. App. 542, 543 ( 278 SE2d 124 ) (1981) (a charge made against a person regarding his trade, calculated to injure him, is actionable per se unless made under circumstances which constitute a privileged communication; privilege requires good faith, an interest to be upheld, a statement properly limited in scope, a proper occasion, and publication to proper persons). 3 Id. at 543-544 . 4 OCGA § 51-5-7 (7). 5 See generally Sherwood, supra. 6 Jaillett v. Ga. Television Co., 238 Ga. App. 885, 888 ( 520

2007See Vito v. Dhillon, 269 Ga. App. 899 ( 605 SE2d 602 ) (2004). 2 See Sherwood v. Boshears, 157 Ga. App. 542, 543 ( 278 SE2d 124 ) (1981) (a charge made against a person regarding his trade, calculated to injure him, is actionable per se unless made under circumstances which constitute a privileged communication; privilege requires good faith, an interest to be upheld, a statement properly limited in scope, a proper occasion, and publication to proper persons). 3 Id. at 543-544 . 4 OCGA § 51-5-7 (7). 5 See generally Sherwood, supra. 6 Jaillett v. Ga. Television Co., 238 Ga. App. 885, 888 ( 520

2007See Vito v. Dhillon, 269 Ga. App. 899 ( 605 SE2d 602 ) (2004). 2 See Sherwood v. Boshears, 157 Ga. App. 542, 543 ( 278 SE2d 124 ) (1981) (a charge made against a person regarding his trade, calculated to injure him, is actionable per se unless made under circumstances which constitute a privileged communication; privilege requires good faith, an interest to be upheld, a statement properly limited in scope, a proper occasion, and publication to proper persons). 3 Id. at 543-544 . 4 OCGA § 51-5-7 (7). 5 See generally Sherwood, supra. 6 Jaillett v. Ga. Television Co., 238 Ga. App. 885, 888 ( 520

2007See Vito v. Dhillon, 269 Ga. App. 899 ( 605 SE2d 602 ) (2004). 2 See Sherwood v. Boshears, 157 Ga. App. 542, 543 ( 278 SE2d 124 ) (1981) (a charge made against a person regarding his trade, calculated to injure him, is actionable per se unless made under circumstances which constitute a privileged communication; privilege requires good faith, an interest to be upheld, a statement properly limited in scope, a proper occasion, and publication to proper persons). 3 Id. at 543-544 . 4 OCGA § 51-5-7 (7). 5 See generally Sherwood, supra. 6 Jaillett v. Ga. Television Co., 238 Ga. App. 885, 888 ( 520

2007See Vito v. Dhillon, 269 Ga. App. 899 ( 605 SE2d 602 ) (2004). 2 See Sherwood v. Boshears, 157 Ga. App. 542, 543 ( 278 SE2d 124 ) (1981) (a charge made against a person regarding his trade, calculated to injure him, is actionable per se unless made under circumstances which constitute a privileged communication; privilege requires good faith, an interest to be upheld, a statement properly limited in scope, a proper occasion, and publication to proper persons). 3 Id. at 543-544 . 4 OCGA § 51-5-7 (7). 5 See generally Sherwood, supra. 6 Jaillett v. Ga. Television Co., 238 Ga. App. 885, 888 ( 520

2007See Vito v. Dhillon, 269 Ga. App. 899 ( 605 SE2d 602 ) (2004). 2 See Sherwood v. Boshears, 157 Ga. App. 542, 543 ( 278 SE2d 124 ) (1981) (a charge made against a person regarding his trade, calculated to injure him, is actionable per se unless made under circumstances which constitute a privileged communication; privilege requires good faith, an interest to be upheld, a statement properly limited in scope, a proper occasion, and publication to proper persons). 3 Id. at 543-544 . 4 OCGA § 51-5-7 (7). 5 See generally Sherwood, supra. 6 Jaillett v. Ga. Television Co., 238 Ga. App. 885, 888 ( 520

2007See Vito v. Dhillon, 269 Ga. App. 899 ( 605 SE2d 602 ) (2004). 2 See Sherwood v. Boshears, 157 Ga. App. 542, 543 ( 278 SE2d 124 ) (1981) (a charge made against a person regarding his trade, calculated to injure him, is actionable per se unless made under circumstances which constitute a privileged communication; privilege requires good faith, an interest to be upheld, a statement properly limited in scope, a proper occasion, and publication to proper persons). 3 Id. at 543-544 . 4 OCGA § 51-5-7 (7). 5 See generally Sherwood, supra. 6 Jaillett v. Ga. Television Co., 238 Ga. App. 885, 888 ( 520

2007See Vito v. Dhillon, 269 Ga. App. 899 ( 605 SE2d 602 ) (2004). 2 See Sherwood v. Boshears, 157 Ga. App. 542, 543 ( 278 SE2d 124 ) (1981) (a charge made against a person regarding his trade, calculated to injure him, is actionable per se unless made under circumstances which constitute a privileged communication; privilege requires good faith, an interest to be upheld, a statement properly limited in scope, a proper occasion, and publication to proper persons). 3 Id. at 543-544 . 4 OCGA § 51-5-7 (7). 5 See generally Sherwood, supra. 6 Jaillett v. Ga. Television Co., 238 Ga. App. 885, 888 ( 520

1997Although the trial court denied the Fords' motion for directed verdict with regard to this claim, the trial court's ruling excluding recovery based on negligence per se was the same as if the trial court had directed a verdict for the Hospital on the Fords' negligence per se claim. "`A *422 directed verdict is proper only where there is no conflict in the evidence as to any material issue and the evidence introduced together with all reasonable deductions or inferences therefrom demands a particular verdict.' Carver v. Jones, 166 Ga.App. 197, 199 (3), 303 S.E.2d 529 (1983).

1997Although the trial court denied the Fords' motion for directed verdict with regard to this claim, the trial court's ruling excluding recovery based on negligence per se was the same as if the trial court had directed a verdict for the Hospital on the Fords' negligence per se claim. "`A *422 directed verdict is proper only where there is no conflict in the evidence as to any material issue and the evidence introduced together with all reasonable deductions or inferences therefrom demands a particular verdict.' Carver v. Jones, 166 Ga.App. 197, 199 (3), 303 S.E.2d 529 (1983).

1976"It is not error to refuse a request to charge, or to fail to give it in the exact language thereof, when it is adequately covered in the general charge. [Cits.]” Maloy v. Dixon, 127 Ga. App. 151, 163 ( 193 SE2d 19 ). (6) We have examined the portion of the charge attacked by the twelfth enumeration with reference to the manner in which the jury is to treat opinion testimony from non-experts and experts.

1976"It is not error to refuse a request to charge, or to fail to give it in the exact language thereof, when it is adequately covered in the general charge. [Cits.]” Maloy v. Dixon, 127 Ga. App. 151, 163 ( 193 SE2d 19 ). (6) We have examined the portion of the charge attacked by the twelfth enumeration with reference to the manner in which the jury is to treat opinion testimony from non-experts and experts.