negligence per se claim in Texas

2016See Gore v. Gore, 233 S.W.3d 911, 913 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2007, pet. denied). “[A] statute that requires a driver proceed safely imposes on the driver a duty of reasonable care, thus precluding a negligence per se instruction.” Louisiana–Pacific Corp. v. Knighten, 976 S.W.2d 674, 675 (Tex. 1998); see also Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 632 (Tex. 1986) (court of appeals erred in holding negligence per se applied to speeding (under former TEX.

2013See Carnation Co. v. Wong, 516 S.W.2d 116, 117 (Tex.1974); Kerby v. Abilene Christian College, 503 S.W.2d 526, 528 (Tex.1974); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 633 (Tex.1986); see also Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Glyn-Jones, 878 S.W.2d 132, 134 (Tex.1994)(“[T]he legislature could have overruled our decision in Kerby and Carnation and established a basis for a negligence per se defense whenever a plaintiff failed to wear a seat belt.

2016See Gore v. Gore, 233 S.W.3d 911, 913 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2007, pet. denied). “[A] statute that requires a driver proceed safely imposes on the driver a duty of reasonable care, thus precluding a negligence per se instruction.” Louisiana–Pacific Corp. v. Knighten, 976 S.W.2d 674, 675 (Tex. 1998); see also Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 632 (Tex. 1986) (court of appeals erred in holding negligence per se applied to speeding (under former TEX.

2007The supreme court held that “a statute that requires a driver [to] proceed safely imposes on the driver a duty of reasonable care, thus precluding a negligence per se instruction.” Knighten, 976 S.W.2d at 675 .

2025In many cases, the penal statute that provides the basis for a negligence per se claim does not clearly abrogate the grade of negligence that applies under the common law;8 it functions “merely to define more precisely what conduct breaches” the “common law duty.” Perry, 973 S.W.2d at 306 .9 In other words, negligence per se is generally “a species of negligence, in which the breach of duty element is established by showing the violation of a statute or regulation.” Tenaris Bay City Inc. v. Ellisor, No. 23-0808, ___ S.W.3d ___, slip op. at 10 (Tex. May 23, 2025) (citing Mo. Pac.

2010BP relies on Perry v. S.N., 973 S.W.2d 301, 304 (Tex. 1998), to support the proposition that determining whether a particular statute will support a negligence per se claim is a matter within the discretion of the court.

2004In response, Maker contends that the negligence per-se instruction “was redundant because it merely restated the standard of ordinary care and did not alter the common law duty which was included in the broad form submission of the negligence question.” Maker relies on Smith v. Central Freight Lines, Inc. , 774 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ denied), which involved a suit for personal injuries arising out of a rear-end collision.

2003Freight Lines, Inc. , 774 S.W.2d 411, 413-15 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ denied)).

2013See Carnation Co. v. Wong, 516 S.W.2d 116, 117 (Tex.1974); Kerby v. Abilene Christian College, 503 S.W.2d 526, 528 (Tex.1974); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 633 (Tex.1986); see also Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Glyn-Jones, 878 S.W.2d 132, 134 (Tex.1994)(“[T]he legislature could have overruled our decision in Kerby and Carnation and established a basis for a negligence per se defense whenever a plaintiff failed to wear a seat belt.

2013See Carnation Co. v. Wong, 516 S.W.2d 116, 117 (Tex.1974); Kerby v. Abilene Christian College, 503 S.W.2d 526, 528 (Tex.1974); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 633 (Tex.1986); see also Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Glyn-Jones, 878 S.W.2d 132, 134 (Tex. 1994)(“[T]he legislature could have overruled our decision in Kerby and Carnation and established a basis for a negligence per se defense whenever a plaintiff failed to wear a seat belt.

2013See Carnation Co. v. Wong, 516 S.W.2d 116, 117 (Tex.1974); Kerby v. Abilene Christian College, 503 S.W.2d 526, 528 (Tex.1974); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 633 (Tex.1986); see also Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Glyn-Jones, 878 S.W.2d 132, 134 (Tex.1994)(“[T]he legislature could have overruled our decision in Kerby and Carnation and established a basis for a negligence per se defense whenever a plaintiff failed to wear a seat belt.

2013See Carnation Co. v. Wong, 516 S.W.2d 116, 117 (Tex.1974); Kerby v. Abilene Christian College, 503 S.W.2d 526, 528 (Tex.1974); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 633 (Tex.1986); see also Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Glyn-Jones, 878 S.W.2d 132, 134 (Tex. 1994)(“[T]he legislature could have overruled our decision in Kerby and Carnation and established a basis for a negligence per se defense whenever a plaintiff failed to wear a seat belt.

2013See Carnation Co. v. Wong, 516 S.W.2d 116, 117 (Tex.1974); Kerby v. Abilene Christian College, 503 S.W.2d 526, 528 (Tex.1974); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 633 (Tex.1986); see also Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Glyn-Jones, 878 S.W.2d 132, 134 (Tex.1994)(“[T]he legislature could have overruled our decision in Kerby and Carnation and established a basis for a negligence per se defense whenever a plaintiff failed to wear a seat belt.

2013See Carnation Co. v. Wong, 516 S.W.2d 116, 117 (Tex.1974); Kerby v. Abilene Christian College, 503 S.W.2d 526, 528 (Tex.1974); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 633 (Tex.1986); see also Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Glyn-Jones, 878 S.W.2d 132, 134 (Tex. 1994)(“[T]he legislature could have overruled our decision in Kerby and Carnation and established a basis for a negligence per se defense whenever a plaintiff failed to wear a seat belt.

2007Code Ann. § 545.351 (a) ("An operator may not drive at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the circumstances then existing.") (emphasis added). "[A] statute that requires a driver proceed safely imposes on the driver a duty of reasonable care, thus precluding a negligence per se instruction." Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Knighten, 976 S.W.2d 674, 675 (Tex. 1998); see also Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 631-32 (Tex. 1986)(court of appeals erred in holding negligence per se applied to speeding under former Article 6701d, § 166); Borden, Inc. v. Price, 939 S.W.2d 247, 251

2007Code Ann. § 545.351 (a) (“An operator may not drive at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the circumstances then existing.”) (emphasis added). “[A] statute that requires a driver proceed safely imposes on the driver a duty of reasonable care, thus precluding a negligence per se instruction.” Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Knighten, 976 S.W.2d 674, 675 (Tex.1998); see also Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 631-32 (Tex.1986)(court of appeals erred in holding negligence per se applied to speeding under former Article 6701d, § 166); Borden, Inc. v. Price, 939 S.W.2d 247, 251 (T

2024Co., 267 F.3d 439, 443 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding Section 10501(b) preempted a negligence per se claim based on alleged violations of a state anti-blocking statute because “regulation of KCS 13 nuisance, and even inverse condemnation.

2024Co., 267 F.3d 439, 443 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding Section 10501(b) preempted a negligence per se claim based on alleged violations of a state anti-blocking statute because “regulation of KCS 13 nuisance, and even inverse condemnation.

2024Co. v. City of West Palm Beach, 266 F.3d 1324, 1329, 1331 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding Section 10501(b) did not preempt a city zoning and licensing ordinance as applied to an aggregate company leasing land from a rail carrier because application “does not constitute ‘regulation of rail transportation’”). 7 Courts have employed a different analysis when addressing negligence per se claims based on a rail carrier’s alleged violation of a statute, regulation, or ordinance, usually holding Section 10501(b) preempts such claims when they are “based solely on [a] preempted state statute.” Elam, 635 F.3

2024Co. v. City of West Palm Beach, 266 F.3d 1324, 1329, 1331 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding Section 10501(b) did not preempt a city zoning and licensing ordinance as applied to an aggregate company leasing land from a rail carrier because application “does not constitute ‘regulation of rail transportation’”). 7 Courts have employed a different analysis when addressing negligence per se claims based on a rail carrier’s alleged violation of a statute, regulation, or ordinance, usually holding Section 10501(b) preempts such claims when they are “based solely on [a] preempted state statute.” Elam, 635 F.3

2024Co. v. City of West Palm Beach, 266 F.3d 1324, 1329, 1331 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding Section 10501(b) did not preempt a city zoning and licensing ordinance as applied to an aggregate company leasing land from a rail carrier because application “does not constitute ‘regulation of rail transportation’”). 7 Courts have employed a different analysis when addressing negligence per se claims based on a rail carrier’s alleged violation of a statute, regulation, or ordinance, usually holding Section 10501(b) preempts such claims when they are “based solely on [a] preempted state statute.” Elam, 635 F.3

2024Co. v. City of West Palm Beach, 266 F.3d 1324, 1329, 1331 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding Section 10501(b) did not preempt a city zoning and licensing ordinance as applied to an aggregate company leasing land from a rail carrier because application “does not constitute ‘regulation of rail transportation’”). 7 Courts have employed a different analysis when addressing negligence per se claims based on a rail carrier’s alleged violation of a statute, regulation, or ordinance, usually holding Section 10501(b) preempts such claims when they are “based solely on [a] preempted state statute.” Elam, 635 F.3

2010Ambrosio v. Carter’s Shooting Ctr., Inc., 20 S.W.3d 262, 265 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied).

2010Negligence Per Se As part of establishing a negligence per se claim, a plaintiff must prove that the “defendant’s act or omission is in violation of a statute or ordinance.” Ambrosio v. Carter’s Shooting Ctr., Inc., 20 S.W.3d 262, 265 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied).

2008In support of his argument that OSHA regulations may be used to establish negligence per se when the plaintiff is an employee of the defendant, Maddox relies on two cases, Dixon v. Int'l Harvester Co. , 754 F.2d 573 , 581 (5th Cir. 1985), and Melerine v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc ., 659 F.2d 706, 710-12 (5th Cir. 1981).

2008Because the plaintiff was not such a class member, the defendant was not negligent in law. 659 F.2d at 712 .

2004For example, in Pack v. Crossroads, Inc. , 53 S.W.3d 492 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, pet. denied), the negligence per-se claim involved alleged breaches of title 40, chapter 19 of the Texas Administrative Code, which applies to a nursing home’s licensure and participation in the Medicaid program.

2004For example, in Pack v. Crossroads, Inc., 53 S.W.3d 492 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. denied), the negligence per-se claim involved alleged breaches of title 40, chapter 19 of the Texas Administrative Code, which applies to a nursing home’s licensure and participation in the Medicaid program. 2 Id. at *763 509.

2003Further, in accord with Gomez , 940 S.W.2d at 251 and Weaver , Inc., 886 S.W.2d at 490 , in Klein v. Brown-Griffin Texaco Distributors, 562 S.W.2d 910, 912 (Tex.Civ.App.-- Amarillo 1978, writ ref’d n.r.e.), we held that the fact that a rear-end collision occurred did not establish negligence on the part of the driver of the following vehicle.

2003Further, in accord with Gomez, 940 S.W.2d at 251 and Weaver, Inc., 886 S.W.2d at 490 , in Klein v. Brown-Griffin Texaco Distributors, 562 S.W.2d 910, 912 (Tex.Civ.App.-- Amarillo 1978, writ ref’d n.r.e.), we held that the fact that a rear-end collision occurred did not establish negligence on the part of the driver of the following vehicle.

2003Cont'l Oil Co. v. Simpson , 604 S.W.2d 530, 534 (Tex. Civ.

2003Cont'l Oil Co. v. *297 Simpson, 604 S.W.2d 530, 534 (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarillo 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 288B (1965)).

2021See, e.g., Brinker v. Evans, 370 S.W.3d 416, 420 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2012, pet. denied) (finding that the trial court was not required to submit a negligence-per-se claim where the plaintiff’s injury resulted from a premises defect).

2019See Brinker v. Evans, 370 S.W.3d 416, 420 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2012, pet. denied) 5 Moreover, the summary-judgment evidence established that the acting principal remained in the classroom after the event, and there was no evidence suggesting that the homeroom teacher had left her classroom. 13 (finding that the trial court was not required to submit a negligence-per-se claim where the plaintiff’s injury resulted from a premises defect).

2020“Negligence per se is a tort concept whereby the civil courts adopt a legislatively imposed standard of conduct as defining the conduct of a reasonably 7 Miranda-Lara’s proposed charge to the court incorporated this language in the “sudden emergency” instruction. 8 prudent person.” Moughon v. Wolf, 576 S.W.2d 603, 604 (Tex. 1978).

2015In the context of a negligence per se claim arising from an alleged violation of a traffic statute, the Texas Supreme Court stated in 1978 that “[t]he typical submission of such a case includes an issue inquiring whether the party charged is actually guilty of legislatively proscribed conduct along with an issue inquiring whether the violative conduct was the proximate cause of the accident.” Moughon v. Wolf, 576 S.W.2d 603, 604 (Tex. 1978).

2020The court of appeals rejected that statute as a basis for a negligence per se claim against T&D, holding that the statute is designed to protect employees and that Arredondo thus “failed to present any evidence T&D violated a statute that was designed to prevent an injury to the class of persons to which Arredondo belongs.” 567 S.W.3d at 395 ; see El Chico Corp. v. Poole, 732 S.W.2d 306, 312 (Tex. 1987) (explaining that a threshold question in determining whether to adopt a statute as a standard for negligence is whether “the statute is designed to prevent an injury to that class of persons to

1996The doctrine of negligence per se may be stated as follows: "The unexcused violation of a statute setting an applicable standard of care constitutes negligence as a matter of law if the statute is designed to prevent an injury to that class of persons to which the injured party belongs." El Chico Corp. v. Poole , 732 S.W.2d 306, 312 (Tex. 1987).

2020See Carter v. William Sommerville & Son, Inc., 584 S.W.2d 274, 278 (Tex. 1979) (“Negligence per se is a tort concept whereby a legislatively 12 imposed standard of conduct is adopted by the civil courts as defining the conduct of a reasonably prudent person.”).

2016See generally Johnson v. Enriquez, 460 S.W.3d 669, 673 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2015, no pet.) (negligence per se requires a plaintiff to prove that a statute or ordinance was violated, and if so, that the violation was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs damages, and that the statute was designed to prevent an injury to the class of persons to which the plaintiff belongs); see also Carter v. William Sommerville & Son, Inc., 584 S.W.2d 274, 278 (Tex.1979) (in a negligence per se case, the only inquiry for the jury is whether or not the defendant violated the statute and, if so, whether this was a p

2016See Gore v. Gore, 233 S.W.3d 911, 913 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2007, pet. denied). “[A] statute that requires a driver proceed safely imposes on the driver a duty of reasonable care, thus precluding a negligence per se instruction.” Louisiana–Pacific Corp. v. Knighten, 976 S.W.2d 674, 675 (Tex. 1998); see also Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 632 (Tex. 1986) (court of appeals erred in holding negligence per se applied to speeding (under former TEX.

2014If we assume, without deciding, that Wright had a duty under Section 545.413(b) in addition to a common-law duty of reasonable care 3 and if we further assume, without deciding, that Wright breached either one of those duties, then the question that remains for consideration is the following: Did Appellants present competent summary judgment evidence to raise an issue of material fact as 3 Because Section 545.351 outlines a reasonable-person standard, it does not support a negligence per se cause of action. “[A] statute that requires a driver proceed safely imposes on the driver a duty of reas

2009See Phillips , 186 S.W.3d at 131-32 ; see also Dyall , 152 S.W.3d at 710 (recognizing that Chapter 95 encompasses all common-law negligence claims); Kelly v. LIN Television , 27 S.W.3d 564, 569-70 (Tex. App.--Eastland 2000, pet. denied) (holding that Chapter 95 encompassed assertions of negligence, negligence per se, res ipsa loquitor, and negligent misrepresentation).

2009See Phillips, 186 S.W.3d at 131-32 ; see also Dyall, 152 S.W.3d at 710 (recognizing that Chapter 95 encompasses all common-law negligence claims); Kelly v. LIN Television, 27 S.W.3d 564, 569-70 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2000, pet. denied) (holding that Chapter 95 encompassed assertions of negligence, negligence per se, res ipsa loquitur, and negligent misrepresentation).

2009See Shupe, 192 S.W.3d at 580 .

2009See Shupe v. Lingafelter, 192 S.W.3d 577, 579 (Tex.2006).

2009See Phillips , 186 S.W.3d at 131-32 ; see also Dyall , 152 S.W.3d at 710 (recognizing that Chapter 95 encompasses all common-law negligence claims); Kelly v. LIN Television , 27 S.W.3d 564, 569-70 (Tex. App.--Eastland 2000, pet. denied) (holding that Chapter 95 encompassed assertions of negligence, negligence per se, res ipsa loquitor, and negligent misrepresentation).

2009See Phillips, 186 S.W.3d at 131-32 ; see also Dyall, 152 S.W.3d at 710 (recognizing that Chapter 95 encompasses all common-law negligence claims); Kelly v. LIN Television, 27 S.W.3d 564, 569-70 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2000, pet. denied) (holding that Chapter 95 encompassed assertions of negligence, negligence per se, res ipsa loquitur, and negligent misrepresentation).