negligence per se doctrine in Alabama

1998Jones v. Kappa Alpha Order, Inc., supra. The Court of Civil Appeals stated that no Alabama case had recognized the tort of hazing, but then recognized that tort, based on the doctrine of negligence per se and Ala.Code 1975, § 16-1-23, which makes hazing a criminal misdemeanor, and based on a new interpretation of common-law negligence principles.

1998Jones v. Kappa Alpha Order, Inc., supra. The Court of Civil Appeals stated that no Alabama case had recognized the tort of hazing, but then recognized that tort, based on the doctrine of negligence per se and Ala.Code 1975, § 16-1-23, which makes hazing a criminal misdemeanor, and based on a new interpretation of common-law negligence principles.

2024In support of that argument, Griggs relies on Allen v. Delchamps, Inc., 624 So. 2d 1065 (Ala. 1993), in which this Court allowed a negligence per se claim to proceed under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("the FDCA"), 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq., even though the FDCA did not provide for a private cause of action for civil damages.

2024In support of that argument, Griggs relies on Allen v. Delchamps, Inc., 624 So. 2d 1065 (Ala. 1993), in which this Court allowed a negligence per se claim to proceed under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("the FDCA"), 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq., even though the FDCA did not provide for a private cause of action for civil damages.

2007In Parker Building Services Co. v. Lightsey, 925 So.2d 927 (Ala.2005), we stated that, under the negligence per se doctrine, the enactment of a statute, ordinance, or building code can replace the common-law standard of the reasonably prudent man with an absolute standard of care. 925 So.2d at 931 . [9] Here, the jury was not charged on *365 that doctrine, and negligence per se was not pleaded, argued, or otherwise asserted in the trial court.

2007In Parker Building Services Co. v. Lightsey, 925 So.2d 927 (Ala.2005), we stated that, under the negligence per se doctrine, the enactment of a statute, ordinance, or building code can replace the common-law standard of the reasonably prudent man with an absolute standard of care. 925 So.2d at 931 . [9] Here, the jury was not charged on *365 that doctrine, and negligence per se was not pleaded, argued, or otherwise asserted in the trial court.

2005See Keeton v. Fayette County , 558 So.2d 884 , 887 (Ala. 1989) (stating that violation of a statute or an ordinance may be negligence per se); Simpson v. Glenn , 264 Ala. 519 , 521 , 88 So.2d 326 , 327 (1956) (holding that there is no distinction between violation of a statute and violation of a municipal traffic ordinance in applying the doctrine of negligence per se).

2005See Keeton v. Fayette County , 558 So.2d 884 , 887 (Ala. 1989) (stating that violation of a statute or an ordinance may be negligence per se); Simpson v. Glenn , 264 Ala. 519 , 521 , 88 So.2d 326 , 327 (1956) (holding that there is no distinction between violation of a statute and violation of a municipal traffic ordinance in applying the doctrine of negligence per se).

1997See 57A Am.Jur.2d Negligence § 727 (1989) (stating that "[t]he negligence per se doctrine does not depend on the grant of a private right of action by the legislature."); see generally Alabama Power Co. v. Dunaway, 502 So.2d 726 (Ala.1987); Fox v. Bartholf, 374 So.2d 294 (Ala.1979) (cases applying the doctrine of negligence per se).

1923Co. v. Lee, 92 Ala. 262 , 9 South. 230 , where the holding was that the so-called negligence per se rule applies, to travelers on foot or in a vehicle, only where the traveler approached the railroad track under ordinary circumstances and conditions, and therefore does not apply where there are exceptional circumstances (deemed sufficient) and where the failure was not the proximate cause of the injury.