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8 Oklahoma opinions name it 2 courts 1994–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oklahoma courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Busby v. Quail Creek Golf & Country Clubgreen2 sentences2019Busby v. Quail Creek Golf & Country Club , 1994 OK 63 , ¶¶ 6, 19, 885 P.2d 1326 . ("If ... there are criminal or regulatory *177 statutes which delineate the defendant's conduct, courts may adopt the conduct required by the statutes as that which would be expected of a reasonably prudent person - providing courts believe the statutorily required conduct is appropriate for establishing civil liability." (Emphasis added) ). ¶ 10 We find the trial court erred in submitting the negligence per se instruction with respect to 27A O.S. § 2-6-105 because it has no application to the facts and issues at 2019Busby v. Quail Creek Golf & Country Club , 1994 OK 63 , ¶¶ 6, 19, 885 P.2d 1326 . ("If ... there are criminal or regulatory *177 statutes which delineate the defendant's conduct, courts may adopt the conduct required by the statutes as that which would be expected of a reasonably prudent person - providing courts believe the statutorily required conduct is appropriate for establishing civil liability." (Emphasis added) ). ¶ 10 We find the trial court erred in submitting the negligence per se instruction with respect to 27A O.S. § 2-6-105 because it has no application to the facts and issues at | 1 | 3 |
Howard v. Zimmer, Inc.green2 sentences2019Howard v. Zimmer, Inc. , 2013 OK 17 , ¶ 13, 299 P.3d 463 . 2019Howard v. Zimmer, Inc. , 2013 OK 17 , ¶ 13, 299 P.3d 463 . | 1 | 3 |
Smith v. Barkergreen2 sentences2019Smith v. Baker , 2017 OK CIV APP 69, ¶29, 419 P.3d 327, 333. ¶12 We must next consider whether submitting the jury instuction, though improper, requires reversal. 2019Smith v. Barker , 2017 OK CIV APP 69 , ¶ 29, 419 P.3d 327 , 333. ¶ 12 We must next consider whether submitting the jury instuction, though improper, requires reversal. | 1 | 2 |
Jones v. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co.green2 sentences2013Natural Gas Co., 1994 OK 89 , 894 P.2d 415 (holding that the question of negligence per se under 63 0.$.1981 § 142.1 et seq., The Underground Facilities Damage Prevention Act, was a question of fact for the jury); Busby v. Quail Creek Golf and Country Club, 1994 OK 63 , 885 P.2d 1326 (determining that violation of 37 O.S. 1991 § 241 could satisfy the negligence per se factors but that under proper facts a jury could find the violation excusable); Hamilton v. Allen, 1993 OK 46 , 852 P.2d 697 (finding driver of vehicle was negligent per se under 47 0.8. 11-701(a)(1) and (2) for failing to stop, 2013Natural Gas Co., 1994 OK 89 , 894 P.2d 415 (holding that the question of negligence per se under 63 0.$.1981 § 142.1 et seq., The Underground Facilities Damage Prevention Act, was a question of fact for the jury); Busby v. Quail Creek Golf and Country Club, 1994 OK 63 , 885 P.2d 1326 (determining that violation of 37 O.S. 1991 § 241 could satisfy the negligence per se factors but that under proper facts a jury could find the violation excusable); Hamilton v. Allen, 1993 OK 46 , 852 P.2d 697 (finding driver of vehicle was negligent per se under 47 0.8. 11-701(a)(1) and (2) for failing to stop, | 1 | 2 |
Wade Ex Rel. Wade v. Reimergreen2 sentences2017See Wade v. Reimer , 1961 OK 44 , ¶ 5, 359 P.2d 1071 (involving a statute requiring that a vehicle be operated at a careful and prudent speed not greater nor less than is reasonable and proper). ¶ 30 We have reviewed all five of Plaintiff's requested negligence per se instructions and find that four of them do not properly support the giving of a negligence per se instruction, because the statutory duties imposed upon the operator of a vehicle are undefined or defined only in abstract general terms. ¶ 31 We therefore find that the court's refusal to give the proposed negligence per se instruct 2017See Wade v. Reimer , 1961 OK 44 , ¶ 5, 359 P.2d 1071 (involving a statute requiring that a vehicle be operated at a careful and prudent speed not greater nor less than is reasonable and proper). ¶ 30 We have reviewed all five of Plaintiff's requested negligence per se instructions and find that four of them do not properly support the giving of a negligence per se instruction, because the statutory duties imposed upon the operator of a vehicle are undefined or defined only in abstract general terms. ¶ 31 We therefore find that the court's refusal to give the proposed negligence per se instruct | 1 | 1 |
Athey v. Binghamgreen2 sentences2013Natural Gas Co., 1994 OK 89 , 894 P.2d 415 (holding that the question of negligence per se under 63 0.$.1981 § 142.1 et seq., The Underground Facilities Damage Prevention Act, was a question of fact for the jury); Busby v. Quail Creek Golf and Country Club, 1994 OK 63 , 885 P.2d 1326 (determining that violation of 37 O.S. 1991 § 241 could satisfy the negligence per se factors but that under proper facts a jury could find the violation excusable); Hamilton v. Allen, 1993 OK 46 , 852 P.2d 697 (finding driver of vehicle was negligent per se under 47 0.8. 11-701(a)(1) and (2) for failing to stop, 2013Natural Gas Co., 1994 OK 89 , 894 P.2d 415 (holding that the question of negligence per se under 63 0.$.1981 § 142.1 et seq., The Underground Facilities Damage Prevention Act, was a question of fact for the jury); Busby v. Quail Creek Golf and Country Club, 1994 OK 63 , 885 P.2d 1326 (determining that violation of 37 O.S. 1991 § 241 could satisfy the negligence per se factors but that under proper facts a jury could find the violation excusable); Hamilton v. Allen, 1993 OK 46 , 852 P.2d 697 (finding driver of vehicle was negligent per se under 47 0.8. 11-701(a)(1) and (2) for failing to stop, | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oklahoma. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hamid v. Sew Original
green
2 sentences2019Hamid v. Sew Original , 1982 OK 46 , 645 P.2d 496 . ¶ 27 In conclusion, we hold the verdict was tainted by the improper negligence per se instruction. 2019Hamid v. Sew Original , 1982 OK 46 , 645 P.2d 496 . ¶ 27 In conclusion, we hold the verdict was tainted by the improper negligence per se instruction. | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Smicklas v. Spitz
green
2 sentences2022Instead, citing Smicklas v. Spitz , 1992 OK 145 846 P.2d 362 12 O.S. 2011 , § 578 A. Instruction No. 19, Negligence Per Se ¶18 With respect to Instruction No. 19, the negligence per se instruction, counsel for the Farrises stated on the record before the instructions were given to the jury: "We also believe that the negligence, per se, instruction should be submitted as we had provided it, with the specific references to the statutes that have been involved here -- that are being followed here. 2022Instead, citing Smicklas v. Spitz , 1992 OK 145 846 P.2d 362 12 O.S. 2011 , § 578 A. Instruction No. 19, Negligence Per Se ¶18 With respect to Instruction No. 19, the negligence per se instruction, counsel for the Farrises stated on the record before the instructions were given to the jury: "We also believe that the negligence, per se, instruction should be submitted as we had provided it, with the specific references to the statutes that have been involved here -- that are being followed here. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Bane v. Anderson, Bryant & Co.
green
2 sentences2022Here, Instruction No. 19 fairly instructed the jury as to the negligence per se claim by providing the definition of the term and a specific reference to the law that the Masqueliers allegedly violated. ¶22 Next, the Farrises contend that the negligence per se instruction should have also included a citation to statutes, 60 O.S. § 60 82 O.S. § 105.5 Sellars v. McCullough , 1989 OK 155 784 P.2d 1060 Bane v. Anderson, Bryant & Co. , 1989 OK 140 786 P.2d 1230 Id . at ¶ 24, 786 P.2d at 1236 . ¶23 After all the evidence was received at trial in the underlying matter, the trial court determined that 2022Here, Instruction No. 19 fairly instructed the jury as to the negligence per se claim by providing the definition of the term and a specific reference to the law that the Masqueliers allegedly violated. ¶22 Next, the Farrises contend that the negligence per se instruction should have also included a citation to statutes, 60 O.S. § 60 82 O.S. § 105.5 Sellars v. McCullough , 1989 OK 155 784 P.2d 1060 Bane v. Anderson, Bryant & Co. , 1989 OK 140 786 P.2d 1230 Id . at ¶ 24, 786 P.2d at 1236 . ¶23 After all the evidence was received at trial in the underlying matter, the trial court determined that | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Sellars v. McCullough
green
2 sentences2022Here, Instruction No. 19 fairly instructed the jury as to the negligence per se claim by providing the definition of the term and a specific reference to the law that the Masqueliers allegedly violated. ¶22 Next, the Farrises contend that the negligence per se instruction should have also included a citation to statutes, 60 O.S. § 60 82 O.S. § 105.5 Sellars v. McCullough , 1989 OK 155 784 P.2d 1060 Bane v. Anderson, Bryant & Co. , 1989 OK 140 786 P.2d 1230 Id . at ¶ 24, 786 P.2d at 1236 . ¶23 After all the evidence was received at trial in the underlying matter, the trial court determined that 2022Here, Instruction No. 19 fairly instructed the jury as to the negligence per se claim by providing the definition of the term and a specific reference to the law that the Masqueliers allegedly violated. ¶22 Next, the Farrises contend that the negligence per se instruction should have also included a citation to statutes, 60 O.S. § 60 82 O.S. § 105.5 Sellars v. McCullough , 1989 OK 155 784 P.2d 1060 Bane v. Anderson, Bryant & Co. , 1989 OK 140 786 P.2d 1230 Id . at ¶ 24, 786 P.2d at 1236 . ¶23 After all the evidence was received at trial in the underlying matter, the trial court determined that | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Hamilton v. Allen
green
2 sentences2013Natural Gas Co., 1994 OK 89 , 894 P.2d 415 (holding that the question of negligence per se under 63 0.$.1981 § 142.1 et seq., The Underground Facilities Damage Prevention Act, was a question of fact for the jury); Busby v. Quail Creek Golf and Country Club, 1994 OK 63 , 885 P.2d 1326 (determining that violation of 37 O.S. 1991 § 241 could satisfy the negligence per se factors but that under proper facts a jury could find the violation excusable); Hamilton v. Allen, 1993 OK 46 , 852 P.2d 697 (finding driver of vehicle was negligent per se under 47 0.8. 11-701(a)(1) and (2) for failing to stop, 2013Natural Gas Co., 1994 OK 89 , 894 P.2d 415 (holding that the question of negligence per se under 63 0.$.1981 § 142.1 et seq., The Underground Facilities Damage Prevention Act, was a question of fact for the jury); Busby v. Quail Creek Golf and Country Club, 1994 OK 63 , 885 P.2d 1326 (determining that violation of 37 O.S. 1991 § 241 could satisfy the negligence per se factors but that under proper facts a jury could find the violation excusable); Hamilton v. Allen, 1993 OK 46 , 852 P.2d 697 (finding driver of vehicle was negligent per se under 47 0.8. 11-701(a)(1) and (2) for failing to stop, | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Bausch v. Stryker Corp.
green
1 sentence2013When faced with arguments similar to those championed by the dissent as to the purpose of the Medical Devices Act, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals relied on the Sixth Circuit's rejection of such an argument in this very case. 41 In Bausch v. Stryker Corp., 630 F.3d 546 (7th Cir.2010), the appellate court stated in pertinent part: Like the Sixth Circuit in Howard, we do not see a sound legal basis for defendants' proposal to distinguish between general requirements and "concrete, device-specific" requirements.... [Fljlederal law is clear: for manufacturers of Class III medical devices, the | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Rotramel v. Public Service Company
green
2 sentences2013Woodis, 1985 OK 62, ¶ 16 , 704 P.2d 488 , 486 (citing Rotramel v. Public Service Co., 1975 OK 91, ¶ 5 , 546 P.2d 1015, 1017 ). 2013Woodis, 1985 OK 62, ¶ 16 , 704 P.2d 488 , 486 (citing Rotramel v. Public Service Co., 1975 OK 91, ¶ 5 , 546 P.2d 1015, 1017 ). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Woodis v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co.
green
2 sentences2013Therefore, I must respectfully dissent from today's decision. 1 3 The Defendant correctly points out that this Court has never allowed a negligence per se claim to go forward solely on an alleged violation of a federal regulation 2 That's because this Court's negligence per se case law has developed primarily around violations of Oklahoma state statutes and municipal ordinances. 3 The Plaintiff relies on Covel v. Rodriguez, 2012 OK 5 , 272 P.3d 705 , and Woodis v. Oklahoma Gas and Electric Co., 1985 OK 62 , 704 P.2d 483 , to support his position that this Court has allowed negli-genee per se c 2013Therefore, I must respectfully dissent from today's decision. 1 3 The Defendant correctly points out that this Court has never allowed a negligence per se claim to go forward solely on an alleged violation of a federal regulation 2 That's because this Court's negligence per se case law has developed primarily around violations of Oklahoma state statutes and municipal ordinances. 3 The Plaintiff relies on Covel v. Rodriguez, 2012 OK 5 , 272 P.3d 705 , and Woodis v. Oklahoma Gas and Electric Co., 1985 OK 62 , 704 P.2d 483 , to support his position that this Court has allowed negli-genee per se c | 1 | 2013–2013 |
COVEL v. Rodriguez
green
2 sentences2013Therefore, I must respectfully dissent from today's decision. 1 3 The Defendant correctly points out that this Court has never allowed a negligence per se claim to go forward solely on an alleged violation of a federal regulation 2 That's because this Court's negligence per se case law has developed primarily around violations of Oklahoma state statutes and municipal ordinances. 3 The Plaintiff relies on Covel v. Rodriguez, 2012 OK 5 , 272 P.3d 705 , and Woodis v. Oklahoma Gas and Electric Co., 1985 OK 62 , 704 P.2d 483 , to support his position that this Court has allowed negli-genee per se c 2013Therefore, I must respectfully dissent from today's decision. 1 3 The Defendant correctly points out that this Court has never allowed a negligence per se claim to go forward solely on an alleged violation of a federal regulation 2 That's because this Court's negligence per se case law has developed primarily around violations of Oklahoma state statutes and municipal ordinances. 3 The Plaintiff relies on Covel v. Rodriguez, 2012 OK 5 , 272 P.3d 705 , and Woodis v. Oklahoma Gas and Electric Co., 1985 OK 62 , 704 P.2d 483 , to support his position that this Court has allowed negli-genee per se c | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Brannigan v. Raybuck
green
1 sentence1994Brannigan v. Raybuck, see note 15, 667 P.2d at 217 , supra. However, when evidence of an excuse is presented, an appropriate instruction should be given in lieu of the standard negligence per se instruction. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.