17 Kentucky opinions name it 2 courts 1953–2026 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kentucky courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Young v. Carrangreen2 sentences2025We begin the discussion with the statutory or negligence per se claims, which are premised upon Kentucky Revised Statutes (“KRS”) 177.106 and 179.240. a) Negligence Per Se A negligence per se claim “is merely a negligence claim with a statutory standard of care substituted for the common law standard of care.” Lewis v. B&R Corp., 56 S.W.3d 432, 438 (Ky. App. 2001) (citation omitted); see also Young v. Carran, 289 S.W.3d 586, 588-89 (Ky. App. 2008) (citation omitted). 2019As noted above, that statute provides, “A person injured by the violation of any statute may recover from the offender such damages as he sustained by reason of the violation, although a penalty or forfeiture is imposed for such violation.” KRS 446.070 codifies the doctrine of negligence per se and allows an injured party to recover “for a violation of a statutory standard of care if the statute in question provides no inclusive civil remedy and if the party is within the class of persons the statute is intended to protect.” Young v. Carran, 289 S.W.3d 586, 589 (Ky. App. 2008). | 2 | 2 |
Lewis v. B & R CORPORATIONgreen2 sentences2025We begin the discussion with the statutory or negligence per se claims, which are premised upon Kentucky Revised Statutes (“KRS”) 177.106 and 179.240. a) Negligence Per Se A negligence per se claim “is merely a negligence claim with a statutory standard of care substituted for the common law standard of care.” Lewis v. B&R Corp., 56 S.W.3d 432, 438 (Ky. App. 2001) (citation omitted); see also Young v. Carran, 289 S.W.3d 586, 588-89 (Ky. App. 2008) (citation omitted). 2021A negligence per se claim is merely a negligence claim with a statutory standard of care substituted for the common law standard of care.” Lewis v. B & R Corp., 56 S.W.3d 432, 438 (Ky. App. 2001) (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Hargis v. Baizegreen2 sentences2024Hargis v. Baize, 168 S.W.3d 36, 40 (Ky. 2005). -19- The negligence per se claim fails as a matter of law as Xhale’s failure to ensure Sims’ licensure would not have prevented an unwanted touching. 2021And, to prevail upon a negligence per se claim, a “violation [of the statute] must have been a substantial factor in causing the result.” McCarty v. Covol Fuels No. 2, LLC, 476 S.W.3d 224, 228 (Ky. 2015) (quoting Hargis v. Baize, 168 S.W.3d 36, 46 (Ky. 2005)). | 2 | 2 |
Howard v. Prudential Insurance Co. of Americagreen1 sentence2026Howard v. Prudential Insurance Company of America, 248 F.Supp. 3d 862, 867 (W.D. | 1 | 1 |
St. Luke Hospital, Inc. v. Straubgreen2 sentences2025Straub, 354 S.W.3d at 534 (Negligence per se is a legal doctrine whereby a statutory standard of care is substituted for the common law standard of care.). 2025Id. | 1 | 1 |
Wright v. House of Imports, Inc.green1 sentence2025Setting aside the issue of whether the tenants’ expenditures qualify as repair costs, the court correctly determined that their negligence per se claim failed as a matter of law. -9- The statutory authority for a negligence per se action arises under KRS 446.070, which states that “[a] person injured by the violation of any statute may recover from the offender such damages as he sustained by reason of the violation, although a penalty or forfeiture is imposed for such violation.” The effect of a negligence per se claim is to replace the common law standard of care with a statutory standard, W | 1 | 1 |
Grzyb v. Evansgreen1 sentence2025However, “[w]here the statute both declares the unlawful act and specifies the civil remedy available to the aggrieved party, the aggrieved party is limited to the remedy provided by the statute.” Waugh, 584 S.W.3d at 753 (quoting Grzyb v. Evans, 700 S.W.2d 399, 401 (Ky. 1985)). | 1 | 1 |
Nancy J. McCarty v. Covol Fuels No. 2, LLC a Utah Corporationgreen1 sentence2021And, to prevail upon a negligence per se claim, a “violation [of the statute] must have been a substantial factor in causing the result.” McCarty v. Covol Fuels No. 2, LLC, 476 S.W.3d 224, 228 (Ky. 2015) (quoting Hargis v. Baize, 168 S.W.3d 36, 46 (Ky. 2005)). | 1 | 1 |
Eades v. Stephensgreen1 sentence2018It, too, was purely 5 302 S.W.2d 117, 120 (Ky. 1957). 6 399 S.W.2d 491, 493 (Ky. 1966). based upon an argument of law pertaining to the applicability of KOSHA regulations with which the LLC admittedly did not comply. | 1 | 1 |
Flynn v. Songergreen1 sentence2018It, too, was purely 5 302 S.W.2d 117, 120 (Ky. 1957). 6 399 S.W.2d 491, 493 (Ky. 1966). based upon an argument of law pertaining to the applicability of KOSHA regulations with which the LLC admittedly did not comply. | 1 | 1 |
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Thompsongreen2 sentences2012See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575, 578 (Ky.2000) (describing the relevancy of expert testimony to a particular fact in issue as one of “fit”). 2012See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575, 578 (Ky.2000) (describing the relevancy of expert testimony to a particular fact in issue as one of “fit”). | 1 | 1 |
Chalothorn v. Meadegreen2 sentences2009See 15 S.W.3d at 393 . 2009See 15 S.W.3d at 393 . | 1 | 1 |
Hilen v. Haysgreen2 sentences2009See 673 S.W.2d 713, 720 (Ky.1984). 2009See 673 S.W.2d 713, 720 (Ky.1984). | 1 | 1 |
Britton v. Wootengreen1 sentence2001Under common law premises liability, the owner of a premises to which the public is invited has a general duty to exercise ordinary care to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition and warn invitees of dangers that are latent, unknown or not obvious. 15 Similarly, statutes, ordinances, regulations and building codes may create a duty subject to liability as negligence per se. 16 A negligence per se claim “is merely a negligence claim with a statutory standard of care substituted for the common law standard of care.” 17 While it is unquestioned that violations of statutes constitute neg | 1 | 1 |
ATHERTON CONDO APARTMENT-OWNERS ASS'N BD OF DIRECTORS v. Blume Dev. Co.green2 sentences1994See Atherton Condominium, Apartment-Owners Association Board of Directors v. Blume Development Company, 115 Wash.2d 506 , 799 P.2d 250 (1990).” KRS 446.070 elevates proof of violation of statutory standards to the status of negligence per se, by stating: “A person injured by the violation of any statute may recover from the offender such damages as he sustained by reason of the violation, although a penalty or forfeiture is imposed for such violation.” The interrelationship between the statutory standard and KRS 446.070 is illustrated by Grayson Fraternal Order of Eagles v. Claywell, Ky., 736 1994See Atherton Condominium, Apartment-Owners Association Board of Directors v. Blume Development Company, 115 Wash.2d 506 , 799 P.2d 250 (1990).” KRS 446.070 elevates proof of violation of statutory standards to the status of negligence per se, by stating: “A person injured by the violation of any statute may recover from the offender such damages as he sustained by reason of the violation, although a penalty or forfeiture is imposed for such violation.” The interrelationship between the statutory standard and KRS 446.070 is illustrated by Grayson Fraternal Order of Eagles v. Claywell, Ky., 736 | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kentucky. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Laws v. Harter
red
2 sentences2009VENTERS, Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I concur with the sound reasoning and scholarly analysis expressed by Special Justice Mando in our rejection of the negligence per se rule of Laws v. Harter, 534 S.W.2d 449 (Ky.1975), and adoption of the res ipsa loquitor approach to medical negligence issues arising from surgical objects left in a patient. 2009VENTERS, JUSTICE, CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART: I concur with the sound reasoning and scholarly analysis expressed by Special Justice Mando in our rejection of the negligence per se rule of Laws v. Harter, 534 S.W.2d 449 (Ky. 1975), and adoption of the res ipso loquitor approach to medical negligence issues arising from surgical objects left in a patient. | 2 | 2009–2009 |
Peak v. Barlow Homes, Inc.
green
1 sentence2025In Peak v. Barlow Homes, Inc., a passenger in one vehicle was killed when it collided with another vehicle turning left into a service entrance created by an adjoining landowner. 765 S.W.2d at 578 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Hughes v. Boston Scientific Corp.
green
1 sentence2020Further, Hughes “conclude[d] that invoking the negligence per se doctrine to support a negligence claim that is otherwise parallel to federal requirements is not expressly preempted.” Id. at 772 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Real Estate Marketing, Inc. v. Franz
green
1 sentence2011Having concluded that a warranty claim was not viable without privity of contract, the Court turned to the negligence per se claim and found that in Kentucky “tort recovery is contingent upon damage from a destructive occurrence as contrasted with economic loss related solely to the diminution in value ...” Id. at 926 (citing Dealers Transport Co., Inc. v. Battery Distributing Co., 402 S.W.2d 441 (Ky.1966), which had adopted Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Dealers Transport Co. v. Battery Distributing Co.
green
1 sentence2011Having concluded that a warranty claim was not viable without privity of contract, the Court turned to the negligence per se claim and found that in Kentucky “tort recovery is contingent upon damage from a destructive occurrence as contrasted with economic loss related solely to the diminution in value ...” Id. at 926 (citing Dealers Transport Co., Inc. v. Battery Distributing Co., 402 S.W.2d 441 (Ky.1966), which had adopted Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Grayson Fraternal Order of Eagles, Aerie No. 3738, Inc. v. Claywell
red
1 sentence1994See Atherton Condominium, Apartment-Owners Association Board of Directors v. Blume Development Company, 115 Wash.2d 506 , 799 P.2d 250 (1990).” KRS 446.070 elevates proof of violation of statutory standards to the status of negligence per se, by stating: “A person injured by the violation of any statute may recover from the offender such damages as he sustained by reason of the violation, although a penalty or forfeiture is imposed for such violation.” The interrelationship between the statutory standard and KRS 446.070 is illustrated by Grayson Fraternal Order of Eagles v. Claywell, Ky., 736 | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Pryor's Administrator v. Otter
green
1 sentence1953Pryor’s Adm’r v. Otter, 268 Ky, 602, 105 S.W.2d 564 . ’ There are certain exceptions to the rule .which are not involved in this case.- The problem here is; whether- the violation of an ordinance may ever be explained or, excused to such an extent as to avoid the application of the negligence per se rule. | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.