negligence per se doctrine in Connecticut

2016"In cases involving the doctrine of negligence per se ... the defendant ordinarily may avoid liability upon proof of a valid excuse or justification." Gore v. People's Savings Bank, 235 Conn. 360 , 376, 665 A.2d 1341 (1995), quoting 2 Restatement (Second), Torts § 288A (1965).

2016"In cases involving the doctrine of negligence per se ... the defendant ordinarily may avoid liability upon proof of a valid excuse or justification." Gore v. People's Savings Bank, 235 Conn. 360 , 376, 665 A.2d 1341 (1995), quoting 2 Restatement (Second), Torts § 288A (1965).

1996Because the federal statutes do not provide a basis for a private cause of action it would be anomalous to say that they could be used to set a negligence per se standard, see Frederick L. v. Thomas 578 F.2d 513 , 417 (CA 3, 1978) and in light of the specific federal case law to this effect for a state court to so hold might raise the possibility of a violation of the Supremacy Clause of the federal constitution.

1996As said in Frederick L. v. Thomas, 578 F.2d 513 , 517 (CA 3, 1978): "(m)ost formulations of the standards for implying a private cause of action center on the presence or absence of a legislative intent to impose civil liability.

1995Thereafter, on July 24,1995, the court decided, sua sponte, to consider this case en banc and ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs limited to the following issue: “In light of cases such as Chambers v. Lowe, 117 Conn. 624 , 169 A. 912 (1933), Ziskin v. Confietto, 137 Conn. 629 , 79 A.2d 816 (1951), and Panaroni v. Johnson, 158 Conn. 92 , 256 A.2d 246 (1969), does General Statutes (Rev. to 1985) § 47a-8 provide for liability of a landlord based upon the doctrine of negligence per se, irrespective of and as distinguished from whether it provides for such liability based on the doctr

1995Thereafter, on July 24,1995, the court decided, sua sponte, to consider this case en banc and ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs limited to the following issue: “In light of cases such as Chambers v. Lowe, 117 Conn. 624 , 169 A. 912 (1933), Ziskin v. Confietto, 137 Conn. 629 , 79 A.2d 816 (1951), and Panaroni v. Johnson, 158 Conn. 92 , 256 A.2d 246 (1969), does General Statutes (Rev. to 1985) § 47a-8 provide for liability of a landlord based upon the doctrine of negligence per se, irrespective of and as distinguished from whether it provides for such liability based on the doctr

1996Pa. 1989), Bagley v. Controlled Environment Corp, 503 A.2d 823 (NH, 1986), Connecticut Light Power v. Knight, 3 CSCR 600 (1988), cf Sanford St.

1996The comment goes on to note that the latter doctrine is discussed in § 286-288C and § 874A "serves to supplement" those sections not alter them "and to indicate the potential effect on other torts of legislative provisions proscribing or requiring certain conduct." Several cases also recognize the distinction between the two theories of recovery but differ on the effect that a determination that no private cause of action can be based on environmental acts should have on whether or not standards set forth in the statutes or administrative regulations issued pursuant to these statutes should be

1996And I suppose the point is that to permit a negligence per se rule adopting administrative regulations is tantamount to saying there is a private cause of action under the statute Sanford Street Local, supra 768 F. Supp. at p. 1224 .

1996And I suppose the point is that to permit a negligence per se rule adopting administrative regulations is tantamount to saying there is a private cause of action under the statute, Sanford Street Local, supra 768 F. Supp. at p. 1224 .

1995CT Page 2510-OO (Emphasis added.) Initially, this statute was interpreted as imposing a negligence per se standard of care upon the operator. "[A] failure to have a motor vehicle provided with brakes adequate safely to control its movement or to maintain them at all times in good working order is negligence per se, whether or not the defect is due to any negligence on the part of the owner or operator." Smith v. Finkel, 130 Conn. 354 , 359 , 34 A.2d 209 (1943).

1995CT Page 2510-OO (Emphasis added.) Initially, this statute was interpreted as imposing a negligence per se standard of care upon the operator. "[A] failure to have a motor vehicle provided with brakes adequate safely to control its movement or to maintain them at all times in good working order is negligence per se, whether or not the defect is due to any negligence on the part of the owner or operator." Smith v. Finkel, 130 Conn. 354 , 359 , 34 A.2d 209 (1943).

2014Considine v. Waterbury, supra, 279 Conn. 867 -68. 7 For example, Storace’s opinion was based in part on the State Building Code, Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 29-252-ld, whose scope is defined as: “[T]he construction, alteration, movement, enlargement, replacement, repair, equipment, use and occupancy, location, maintenance, removal and demolition of every building or structure or any appurtenances connected or attached to such buildings or structures.” 8 The plaintiff also claims that the court erroneously required that expert testimony be based on “objective standards” due to a “misguided” r

2001Similarly, in Wendland, supra, a remand "for further proceedings according to law" did not foreclose revisiting the amount of damages where the prior reversible error had lain in a negligence per se instruction.

2000For common law cause of action requisites see Nolin v. Morelli , 154 Conn. 432 , 434 , 226 A.2d 383 (1967).

2000For common law cause of action requisites see Nolin v. Morelli , 154 Conn. 432 , 434 , 226 A.2d 383 (1967).

1998The doctrine of negligence per se does not apply." "Issues of negligence are ordinarily not susceptible of summary adjudication but should be resolved by trial in the ordinary manner." Fogarty v. Rashaw, 193 Conn. 442 , 446 .

1998The doctrine of negligence per se does not apply." "Issues of negligence are ordinarily not susceptible of summary adjudication but should be resolved by trial in the ordinary manner." Fogarty v. Rashaw, 193 Conn. 442 , 446 .

1997No word within a statute is to be rendered mere surplusage. . . ." (Citations omitted.) Westport Taxi Service, Inc. v. Westport Transit District, 235 Conn. 1 , 40 , 664 A.2d 719 (1995).

1997No word within a statute is to be rendered mere surplusage. . . ." (Citations omitted.) Westport Taxi Service, Inc. v. Westport Transit District, 235 Conn. 1 , 40 , 664 A.2d 719 (1995).

1996SIXTH AND SEVENTH COUNTS Insofar as these counts base a private cause of action on our environmental statutes, Superior Court cases that have considered whether a cause of action can be based on our Water Pollution Control Act have ruled that such a cause of action cannot be maintained, Oink Inc., et al v. Arm Street Limited Partnership, et al., 12 Conn. L.

1995In cases involving the doctrine of negligence per se, however, the defendant ordinarily may avoid liability upon proof of a valid excuse or justification. 2 Restatement (Second), Torts § 288A (1965); 16 see also Sanderson v. Steve Snyder Enterprises, Inc., 196 Conn. 134, 150 , 491 A.2d 389 (1985).

1995In cases involving the doctrine of negligence per se, however, the defendant ordinarily may avoid liability upon proof of a valid excuse or justification. 2 Restatement (Second), Torts § 288A (1965); 16 see also Sanderson v. Steve Snyder Enterprises, Inc., 196 Conn. 134, 150 , 491 A.2d 389 (1985).

1995Thereafter, on July 24,1995, the court decided, sua sponte, to consider this case en banc and ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs limited to the following issue: “In light of cases such as Chambers v. Lowe, 117 Conn. 624 , 169 A. 912 (1933), Ziskin v. Confietto, 137 Conn. 629 , 79 A.2d 816 (1951), and Panaroni v. Johnson, 158 Conn. 92 , 256 A.2d 246 (1969), does General Statutes (Rev. to 1985) § 47a-8 provide for liability of a landlord based upon the doctrine of negligence per se, irrespective of and as distinguished from whether it provides for such liability based on the doctr

1995Thereafter, on July 24,1995, the court decided, sua sponte, to consider this case en banc and ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs limited to the following issue: “In light of cases such as Chambers v. Lowe, 117 Conn. 624 , 169 A. 912 (1933), Ziskin v. Confietto, 137 Conn. 629 , 79 A.2d 816 (1951), and Panaroni v. Johnson, 158 Conn. 92 , 256 A.2d 246 (1969), does General Statutes (Rev. to 1985) § 47a-8 provide for liability of a landlord based upon the doctrine of negligence per se, irrespective of and as distinguished from whether it provides for such liability based on the doctr

1995Thereafter, on July 24,1995, the court decided, sua sponte, to consider this case en banc and ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs limited to the following issue: “In light of cases such as Chambers v. Lowe, 117 Conn. 624 , 169 A. 912 (1933), Ziskin v. Confietto, 137 Conn. 629 , 79 A.2d 816 (1951), and Panaroni v. Johnson, 158 Conn. 92 , 256 A.2d 246 (1969), does General Statutes (Rev. to 1985) § 47a-8 provide for liability of a landlord based upon the doctrine of negligence per se, irrespective of and as distinguished from whether it provides for such liability based on the doctr

1995Thereafter, on July 24,1995, the court decided, sua sponte, to consider this case en banc and ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs limited to the following issue: “In light of cases such as Chambers v. Lowe, 117 Conn. 624 , 169 A. 912 (1933), Ziskin v. Confietto, 137 Conn. 629 , 79 A.2d 816 (1951), and Panaroni v. Johnson, 158 Conn. 92 , 256 A.2d 246 (1969), does General Statutes (Rev. to 1985) § 47a-8 provide for liability of a landlord based upon the doctrine of negligence per se, irrespective of and as distinguished from whether it provides for such liability based on the doctr

1994In Staudinger v. Barrett , 208 Conn. 94 , 103 (1988), the Supreme Court did not apply the negligence per se standard because of a failure of proof that a similar pursuit policy had in fact been adopted by the police department pursuant to § 14-283a (b) C.G.S.