negligence per se instruction in New Mexico

2015See Archibeque v. Homrich, 1975-NMSC-066 , ¶ 16, 88 N.M. 12 527, 543 P.2d 820 (providing a negligence per se analysis).

2015See Archibeque v. Homrich, 1975-NMSC-066 , ¶ 16, 88 N.M. 527 , 543 P.2d 820 (providing a negligence per se analysis).

2023See id.; Apodaca, 2003-NMCA-085, ¶ 43 (concluding that the first two prongs of the negligence per se test are not met where the regulation in question was not applicable to the alleged wrongdoer).

2015The County does not directly address 18 the negligence per se claim; however, it maintains that Mrs. Paez could see the train, 19 failed to perceive it in time, and, therefore, proximately caused the collision herself. 25 1 The County generally reminds us that in order to recover damages, Plaintiffs must 2 prove that an act or omission by the County was a proximate cause. 3 {30} In order to determine whether a party was negligent per se, New Mexico courts 4 employ the following four-part test: (1) a statute “prescribes certain actions or defines 5 a standard of conduct, either explicitly or im

2015See Hernandez v. Brooks, 1980-NMCA-056 , ¶ 5, 95 N.M. 670 , 625 P.2d 16 1187 (“In New Mexico, one who violates a statute . . . is guilty of negligence per se, 17 if the statute . . . was enacted for the benefit of the class of persons to which the 18 injured person belongs.”). 27 1 CONCLUSION 2 {33} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the summary judgment rulings of the 3 district court. 4 {34} IT IS SO ORDERED. 5 _________________________________ 6 J.

2015See Hernandez v. Brooks, 1980-NMCA-056 , ¶ 5, 95 N.M. 670 , 625 P.2d 1187 (“In New Mexico, one who violates a statute ... is guilty of negligence per se, if the statute . . . was enacted for the benefit of the class of persons to which the injured person belongs.”).

2006We, therefore, conclude that the UBC lacks the requisite level of specificity to justify the submission of a negligence per se instruction to .the jury. {15} Lastly, we note that Plaintiffs argument would bring the UBC in direct conflict with New Mexico’s established standard of ordinary care, requiring Defendant, as a landlord, to “maintain the common areas of his property in a reasonably safe condition.” Calkins v. Cox Estates, 110 N.M. 59, 64 , 792 P.2d 36, 41 (1990); see NMSA 1978, § 47-8-20(A)(3) (1999) (requiring landlords to maintain common areas in a “reasonably safe condition”); Rule

2006We, therefore, conclude that the UBC lacks the requisite level of specificity to justify the submission of a negligence per se instruction to .the jury. {15} Lastly, we note that Plaintiffs argument would bring the UBC in direct conflict with New Mexico’s established standard of ordinary care, requiring Defendant, as a landlord, to “maintain the common areas of his property in a reasonably safe condition.” Calkins v. Cox Estates, 110 N.M. 59, 64 , 792 P.2d 36, 41 (1990); see NMSA 1978, § 47-8-20(A)(3) (1999) (requiring landlords to maintain common areas in a “reasonably safe condition”); Rule

2023See Heath, 2008-NMSC-017, ¶ 7 (applying a four-part test to determine whether a negligence per se instruction is appropriate: “(1) [t]here must be a statute which prescribes certain actions or defines a standard of conduct, either explicitly or implicitly, (2) the defendant must violate the statute, (3) the plaintiff must be in the class of persons sought to be protected by the statute, and (4) the harm or injury to the plaintiff must generally be of the type the [L]egislature through the statute sought to prevent” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

2013Moreover, our Supreme Court has enunciated a four-part test for determining whether a negligence per se instruction is appropriate in a given case: “(1) There must be a statute which prescribes certain actions or defines a standard of conduct, either explicitly or implicitly, (2) the defendant must violate the statute, (3) the plaintiff must be in the class of persons sought to be protected by the statute, and (4) the harm or injury to the plaintiff must generally be of the type the [Ljogislaturc through the statute sought to prevent.” Heath v. La Mariana Apartments, 2008-NMSC-017, ¶ 7 , 143 N

2025As a result, Section 65-3-9 does not impose a specific standard of conduct that would support a negligence per se claim against Jeff. {11} Section 30-8-4, the littering statute, also does not support a claim for negligence per se because the harm to Plaintiffs was not “of the type the Legislature through the statute sought to prevent.” See Thompson, 2012-NMCA-014, ¶ 32 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted).

2021See Valdez v. Cillessen & Son, Inc., 1987- NMSC-015, ¶¶ 2, 7, 10-13, 105 N.M. 575 , 734 P.2d 1258 (affirming the grant of summary judgment on a negligence per se claim predicated on alleged violations of OSHA and NMOHSA).

2021See Valdez v. Cillessen & Son, Inc., 1987- NMSC-015, ¶¶ 2, 7, 10-13, 105 N.M. 575 , 734 P.2d 1258 (affirming the grant of summary judgment on a negligence per se claim predicated on alleged violations of OSHA and NMOHSA).

2008Thus, when a statute imposes a specific requirement, there is an absolute duty to comply with that requirement, and “ ‘no inquiry is to be made whether the defendant acted as a reasonably prudent man, or was in the exercise of ordinary care.’ ” Id. (quoting Swoboda v. Brown, 129 Ohio St. 512 , 196 N.E. 274, 278 (1935)). {9} However, “‘where duties are undefined, or defined only in abstract or general terms,’ ” leaving it to the jury to evaluate the factual circumstances of the particular case to determine whether the defendant acted reasonably, then a negligence per se instruction is not warra

2008See Abeita, 1997-NMCA-097, ¶¶ 23-25 , 124 N.M. 97 , 946 P.2d 1108 (noting that regulations requiring electric lines to be maintained so as to reduce hazards to life “as far as practicable” and provide “adequate clearance” were indistinguishable from a standard of reasonable care, and thus would not justify a negligence per se instruction unless other provisions in the same regulations supplied further specificity). {10} Plaintiff contends that various provisions of the 1997 UBC, when read together, establish a sufficiently specific standard to support an instruction on negligence per se in thi

2008Barron Rice, Inc., 77 N.M. 717, 722-23 , 427 P.2d 240, 244-45 (1967) (trial court erred in refusing to give a negligence per se instruction based on violation of plumbing-gas code); Anderson v. Welsh, 86 N.M. 767, 773 , 527 P.2d 1079, 1085 (Ct.App.1974) (negligence per se instruction based on violation of the UBC); see also Alderman’s Inc. v. Shanks, 536 N.W.2d 4, 10-11 (Minn.1995) (negligence per se instruction based on violation of the Uniform Fire Code).

2008Barron Rice, Inc., 77 N.M. 717, 722-23 , 427 P.2d 240, 244-45 (1967) (trial court erred in refusing to give a negligence per se instruction based on violation of plumbing-gas code); Anderson v. Welsh, 86 N.M. 767, 773 , 527 P.2d 1079, 1085 (Ct.App.1974) (negligence per se instruction based on violation of the UBC); see also Alderman’s Inc. v. Shanks, 536 N.W.2d 4, 10-11 (Minn.1995) (negligence per se instruction based on violation of the Uniform Fire Code).

2008See McNeil Pharm. v. Hawkins, 686 A.2d 567, 579 (D.C.1996) (“[A] statute or regulation offered to establish a standard for negligence per se purposes must not merely repeat the common law duty of reasonable care, but must set forth specific guidelines to govern behavior.” (Quoted authority omitted.)) Short v. Spring Creek Ranch, Inc., 731 P.2d 1195, 1198 (Wyo.1987) (“The thrust of the negligence per se rule is that a legislative or administrative rule fixes a standard for all members of the community which does not require a specific interpretation by the jury, and thus certainty is promoted.”

2008Id. (quoting Swoboda, 196 N.E. at 278 ); see also Watkins v. Hartsock, 245 Kan. 756 , 783 P.2d 1293, 1297 (1989) (“The distinction between ‘negligence’ and ‘negligence per se’ is the means and method of ascertainment, in that the former must be found by a factfinder from the evidence, while the latter results from violation of the specific requirement of law or ordinance; and the only fact for the determination of the factfinder is the commission or omission of the specific act inhibited or required.” (Quoted authority omitted.)) The task for any court, then, is one of statutory construction t

2008Id. (quoting Swoboda, 196 N.E. at 278 ); see also Watkins v. Hartsock, 245 Kan. 756 , 783 P.2d 1293, 1297 (1989) (“The distinction between ‘negligence’ and ‘negligence per se’ is the means and method of ascertainment, in that the former must be found by a factfinder from the evidence, while the latter results from violation of the specific requirement of law or ordinance; and the only fact for the determination of the factfinder is the commission or omission of the specific act inhibited or required.” (Quoted authority omitted.)) The task for any court, then, is one of statutory construction t

2008Barron Rice, Inc., 77 N.M. 717, 722-23 , 427 P.2d 240, 244-45 (1967) (trial court erred in refusing to give a negligence per se instruction based on violation of plumbing-gas code); Anderson v. Welsh, 86 N.M. 767, 773 , 527 P.2d 1079, 1085 (Ct.App.1974) (negligence per se instruction based on violation of the UBC); see also Alderman’s Inc. v. Shanks, 536 N.W.2d 4, 10-11 (Minn.1995) (negligence per se instruction based on violation of the Uniform Fire Code).

2008Thus, when a statute imposes a specific requirement, there is an absolute duty to comply with that requirement, and “ ‘no inquiry is to be made whether the defendant acted as a reasonably prudent man, or was in the exercise of ordinary care.’ ” Id. (quoting Swoboda v. Brown, 129 Ohio St. 512 , 196 N.E. 274, 278 (1935)). {9} However, “‘where duties are undefined, or defined only in abstract or general terms,’ ” leaving it to the jury to evaluate the factual circumstances of the particular case to determine whether the defendant acted reasonably, then a negligence per se instruction is not warra

2008Thus, when a statute imposes a specific requirement, there is an absolute duty to comply with that requirement, and “ ‘no inquiry is to be made whether the defendant acted as a reasonably prudent man, or was in the exercise of ordinary care.’ ” Id. (quoting Swoboda v. Brown, 129 Ohio St. 512 , 196 N.E. 274, 278 (1935)). {9} However, “‘where duties are undefined, or defined only in abstract or general terms,’ ” leaving it to the jury to evaluate the factual circumstances of the particular case to determine whether the defendant acted reasonably, then a negligence per se instruction is not warra

2008See Gourdi v. Berkelo, 1996-NMSC-076, ¶ 8 , 122 N.M. 675 , 930 P.2d 812 (“[A] landlord is bound by the standard of ordinary care, and must, prior to leasing the premises, remedy such dangerous conditions as an inspection conducted with ordinary care would reveal.” (Citation omitted.)). {19} In the absence of something more specific in terms of a required course of conduct for property owners, the term “dangerous to life” is too broad and lacks the requisite focus to form the basis for a negligence per se instruction.

2008See Gourdi v. Berkelo, 1996-NMSC-076, ¶ 8 , 122 N.M. 675 , 930 P.2d 812 (“[A] landlord is bound by the standard of ordinary care, and must, prior to leasing the premises, remedy such dangerous conditions as an inspection conducted with ordinary care would reveal.” (Citation omitted.)). {19} In the absence of something more specific in terms of a required course of conduct for property owners, the term “dangerous to life” is too broad and lacks the requisite focus to form the basis for a negligence per se instruction.

2008Barron Rice, Inc., 77 N.M. 717, 722-23 , 427 P.2d 240, 244-45 (1967) (trial court erred in refusing to give a negligence per se instruction based on violation of plumbing-gas code); Anderson v. Welsh, 86 N.M. 767, 773 , 527 P.2d 1079, 1085 (Ct.App.1974) (negligence per se instruction based on violation of the UBC); see also Alderman’s Inc. v. Shanks, 536 N.W.2d 4, 10-11 (Minn.1995) (negligence per se instruction based on violation of the Uniform Fire Code).

2008Barron Rice, Inc., 77 N.M. 717, 722-23 , 427 P.2d 240, 244-45 (1967) (trial court erred in refusing to give a negligence per se instruction based on violation of plumbing-gas code); Anderson v. Welsh, 86 N.M. 767, 773 , 527 P.2d 1079, 1085 (Ct.App.1974) (negligence per se instruction based on violation of the UBC); see also Alderman’s Inc. v. Shanks, 536 N.W.2d 4, 10-11 (Minn.1995) (negligence per se instruction based on violation of the Uniform Fire Code).

2008See McNeil Pharm. v. Hawkins, 686 A.2d 567, 579 (D.C.1996) (“[A] statute or regulation offered to establish a standard for negligence per se purposes must not merely repeat the common law duty of reasonable care, but must set forth specific guidelines to govern behavior.” (Quoted authority omitted.)) Short v. Spring Creek Ranch, Inc., 731 P.2d 1195, 1198 (Wyo.1987) (“The thrust of the negligence per se rule is that a legislative or administrative rule fixes a standard for all members of the community which does not require a specific interpretation by the jury, and thus certainty is promoted.”

2006We disagree, and hold that the trial court correctly ruled that the 1997 UBC provisions, relied on by Plaintiff, did not set out a sufficiently specific duty to warrant submission of a negligence per se instruction to the jury. {6} “A directed verdict is appropriate only when there are no true issues of fact to be presented to a jury.” Sunwest Bank of Clovis v. Garrett, 113 N.M. 112, 115 , 823 P.2d 912, 915 (1992).

2006We disagree, and hold that the trial court correctly ruled that the 1997 UBC provisions, relied on by Plaintiff, did not set out a sufficiently specific duty to warrant submission of a negligence per se instruction to the jury. {6} “A directed verdict is appropriate only when there are no true issues of fact to be presented to a jury.” Sunwest Bank of Clovis v. Garrett, 113 N.M. 112, 115 , 823 P.2d 912, 915 (1992).

2006See Apodaca v. AAA Gas Co., 2003-NMCA-085, ¶ 43 , 134 N.M. 77 , 73 P.3d 215 ; see also Acosta v. City of Santa Fe, 2000-NMCA-092 , ¶ 16, 129 N.M. 632 , 11 P.3d 596 (noting that interpreting an ordinance to determine existence of legal duty is a question of law). {7} In determining whether a negligence per se instruction is appropriate, we apply the following four-part test adopted by our Supreme Court in Archibeque v. Homrich, 88 N.M. 527, 532 , 543 P.2d 820, 825 (1975): (1) [Tjhere must be a statute which prescribes certain actions or defines a standard of conduct, either explicitly or implic

2006See Apodaca v. AAA Gas Co., 2003-NMCA-085, ¶ 43 , 134 N.M. 77 , 73 P.3d 215 ; see also Acosta v. City of Santa Fe, 2000-NMCA-092 , ¶ 16, 129 N.M. 632 , 11 P.3d 596 (noting that interpreting an ordinance to determine existence of legal duty is a question of law). {7} In determining whether a negligence per se instruction is appropriate, we apply the following four-part test adopted by our Supreme Court in Archibeque v. Homrich, 88 N.M. 527, 532 , 543 P.2d 820, 825 (1975): (1) [Tjhere must be a statute which prescribes certain actions or defines a standard of conduct, either explicitly or implic

1997Accord Eisenhuth v. Moneyhon, 161 Ohio St. 367 , 119 N.E.2d 440 , 444 (1954); Board of Comm’rs v. Klepinger, 149 Ind.App. 377 , 273 N.E.2d 109, 112 (1971); see, e.g., Dahle v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 725 P.2d 1069, 1073 (Alaska 1986) (“In order for a provision to be the basis of a negligence per se instruction, it must set forth a specific standard of conduct beyond that defined in a common law duty.”); Griffith v. Valley of the Sun Recovery & Adjustment Bureau, 126 Ariz. 227 , 613 P.2d 1283, 1285 (App.1980) (“[Njegligence per se applies when there has been a violation of a specific requiremen

1997Accord Eisenhuth v. Moneyhon, 161 Ohio St. 367 , 119 N.E.2d 440 , 444 (1954); Board of Comm’rs v. Klepinger, 149 Ind.App. 377 , 273 N.E.2d 109, 112 (1971); see, e.g., Dahle v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 725 P.2d 1069, 1073 (Alaska 1986) (“In order for a provision to be the basis of a negligence per se instruction, it must set forth a specific standard of conduct beyond that defined in a common law duty.”); Griffith v. Valley of the Sun Recovery & Adjustment Bureau, 126 Ariz. 227 , 613 P.2d 1283, 1285 (App.1980) (“[Njegligence per se applies when there has been a violation of a specific requiremen

1997Accord Eisenhuth v. Moneyhon, 161 Ohio St. 367 , 119 N.E.2d 440 , 444 (1954); Board of Comm’rs v. Klepinger, 149 Ind.App. 377 , 273 N.E.2d 109, 112 (1971); see, e.g., Dahle v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 725 P.2d 1069, 1073 (Alaska 1986) (“In order for a provision to be the basis of a negligence per se instruction, it must set forth a specific standard of conduct beyond that defined in a common law duty.”); Griffith v. Valley of the Sun Recovery & Adjustment Bureau, 126 Ariz. 227 , 613 P.2d 1283, 1285 (App.1980) (“[Njegligence per se applies when there has been a violation of a specific requiremen

1997Accord Eisenhuth v. Moneyhon, 161 Ohio St. 367 , 119 N.E.2d 440 , 444 (1954); Board of Comm’rs v. Klepinger, 149 Ind.App. 377 , 273 N.E.2d 109, 112 (1971); see, e.g., Dahle v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 725 P.2d 1069, 1073 (Alaska 1986) (“In order for a provision to be the basis of a negligence per se instruction, it must set forth a specific standard of conduct beyond that defined in a common law duty.”); Griffith v. Valley of the Sun Recovery & Adjustment Bureau, 126 Ariz. 227 , 613 P.2d 1283, 1285 (App.1980) (“[Njegligence per se applies when there has been a violation of a specific requiremen

1997Accord Eisenhuth v. Moneyhon, 161 Ohio St. 367 , 119 N.E.2d 440 , 444 (1954); Board of Comm’rs v. Klepinger, 149 Ind.App. 377 , 273 N.E.2d 109, 112 (1971); see, e.g., Dahle v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 725 P.2d 1069, 1073 (Alaska 1986) (“In order for a provision to be the basis of a negligence per se instruction, it must set forth a specific standard of conduct beyond that defined in a common law duty.”); Griffith v. Valley of the Sun Recovery & Adjustment Bureau, 126 Ariz. 227 , 613 P.2d 1283, 1285 (App.1980) (“[Njegligence per se applies when there has been a violation of a specific requiremen

1997Accord Eisenhuth v. Moneyhon, 161 Ohio St. 367 , 119 N.E.2d 440 , 444 (1954); Board of Comm’rs v. Klepinger, 149 Ind.App. 377 , 273 N.E.2d 109, 112 (1971); see, e.g., Dahle v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 725 P.2d 1069, 1073 (Alaska 1986) (“In order for a provision to be the basis of a negligence per se instruction, it must set forth a specific standard of conduct beyond that defined in a common law duty.”); Griffith v. Valley of the Sun Recovery & Adjustment Bureau, 126 Ariz. 227 , 613 P.2d 1283, 1285 (App.1980) (“[Njegligence per se applies when there has been a violation of a specific requiremen

1997Accord Eisenhuth v. Moneyhon, 161 Ohio St. 367 , 119 N.E.2d 440 , 444 (1954); Board of Comm’rs v. Klepinger, 149 Ind.App. 377 , 273 N.E.2d 109, 112 (1971); see, e.g., Dahle v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 725 P.2d 1069, 1073 (Alaska 1986) (“In order for a provision to be the basis of a negligence per se instruction, it must set forth a specific standard of conduct beyond that defined in a common law duty.”); Griffith v. Valley of the Sun Recovery & Adjustment Bureau, 126 Ariz. 227 , 613 P.2d 1283, 1285 (App.1980) (“[Njegligence per se applies when there has been a violation of a specific requiremen

1997Accord Eisenhuth v. Moneyhon, 161 Ohio St. 367 , 119 N.E.2d 440 , 444 (1954); Board of Comm'rs v. Klepinger, 149 Ind.App. 377 , 273 N.E.2d 109, 112 (1971); see, e.g., Dahle v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 725 P.2d 1069, 1073 (Alaska 1986) ("In order for a provision to be the basis of a negligence per se instruction, it must set forth a specific standard of conduct beyond that defined in a common law duty."); Griffith v. Valley of the Sun Recovery & Adjustment Bureau, 126 Ariz. 227 , 613 P.2d 1283, 1285 (App.1980) ("[N]egligence per se applies when there has been a violation of a specific requiremen

1997Accord Eisenhuth v. Moneyhon, 161 Ohio St. 367 , 119 N.E.2d 440 , 444 (1954); Board of Comm’rs v. Klepinger, 149 Ind.App. 377 , 273 N.E.2d 109, 112 (1971); see, e.g., Dahle v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 725 P.2d 1069, 1073 (Alaska 1986) (“In order for a provision to be the basis of a negligence per se instruction, it must set forth a specific standard of conduct beyond that defined in a common law duty.”); Griffith v. Valley of the Sun Recovery & Adjustment Bureau, 126 Ariz. 227 , 613 P.2d 1283, 1285 (App.1980) (“[Njegligence per se applies when there has been a violation of a specific requiremen

1997Accord Eisenhuth v. Moneyhon, 161 Ohio St. 367 , 119 N.E.2d 440 , 444 (1954); Board of Comm’rs v. Klepinger, 149 Ind.App. 377 , 273 N.E.2d 109, 112 (1971); see, e.g., Dahle v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 725 P.2d 1069, 1073 (Alaska 1986) (“In order for a provision to be the basis of a negligence per se instruction, it must set forth a specific standard of conduct beyond that defined in a common law duty.”); Griffith v. Valley of the Sun Recovery & Adjustment Bureau, 126 Ariz. 227 , 613 P.2d 1283, 1285 (App.1980) (“[Njegligence per se applies when there has been a violation of a specific requiremen