negligence per se instruction in District of Columbia

2009See McNeil, supra, 686 A.2d at 579 (stating that a statute offered as the foundation for a negligence per se claim “must set forth specific guidelines to govern behavior.”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

2009See McNeil, supra, 686 A.2d at 579 (stating that a statute offered as the foundation for a negligence per se claim “must set forth specific guidelines to govern behavior.”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

2001See McNeil Pharmaceutical v. Hawkins, 686 A.2d 567, 579 (D.C.1996); Joy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 303 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 10 , 999 F.2d 549, 558 (1993). “[A] statute or regulation offered to establish a standard for negligence per se purposes must not merely repeat the common law duty of reasonable care, but must set forth ‘specific guidelines to govern behavior.’ ” McNeil Pharmaceutical, 686 A.2d at 579 (quoting Joy, 303 U.S.App.D.C. at 10 , 999 F.2d at 558 ); see also Thoma v. Kettler, 632 A.2d 725 , 728-29 n. 8 (D.C.1993) (stating negligence per se instruction improper because generalit

1993See District of Columbia v. Mitchell, 533 A.2d 629, 639 (D.C.1987). [9] Appellees could not contend otherwise because, as M.A.P. v. Ryan, supra note 5 , explains, prior to the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970 (effective February 1, 1971), this court was an intermediate appellate court whose judgments were subject to review by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upon petition for allowance of an appeal.

2014See, e.g., Clark, 708 A.2d at 636 (suicide prevention plan for juvenile detention facility); Morgan v. District of Columbia, 468 A.2d 1306, 1317-18 (D.C.1983) (en banc) (police department general orders).

2014“To prevail on a negligence per se theory, the plaintiff may, in certain circumstances and under specified conditions[,] rely on a statute or regulation as proof of the applicable standard of care.” Clark v. District of Columbia, 708 A.2d 632, 636 (D.C.1997) (internal quotations and alteration omitted).

2014See, e.g., Clark, 708 A.2d at 636 (suicide prevention plan for juvenile detention facility); Morgan v. District of Columbia, 468 A.2d 1306, 1317-18 (D.C.1983) (en banc) (police department general orders).

2001See McNeil Pharmaceutical v. Hawkins, 686 A.2d 567, 579 (D.C.1996); Joy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 303 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 10 , 999 F.2d 549, 558 (1993). “[A] statute or regulation offered to establish a standard for negligence per se purposes must not merely repeat the common law duty of reasonable care, but must set forth ‘specific guidelines to govern behavior.’ ” McNeil Pharmaceutical, 686 A.2d at 579 (quoting Joy, 303 U.S.App.D.C. at 10 , 999 F.2d at 558 ); see also Thoma v. Kettler, 632 A.2d 725 , 728-29 n. 8 (D.C.1993) (stating negligence per se instruction improper because generalit

2001See McNeil Pharmaceutical v. Hawkins, 686 A.2d 567, 579 (D.C.1996); Joy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 303 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 10 , 999 F.2d 549, 558 (1993). “[A] statute or regulation offered to establish a standard for negligence per se purposes must not merely repeat the common law duty of reasonable care, but must set forth ‘specific guidelines to govern behavior.’ ” McNeil Pharmaceutical, 686 A.2d at 579 (quoting Joy, 303 U.S.App.D.C. at 10 , 999 F.2d at 558 ); see also Thoma v. Kettler, 632 A.2d 725 , 728-29 n. 8 (D.C.1993) (stating negligence per se instruction improper because generalit

2001See McNeil Pharmaceutical v. Hawkins, 686 A.2d 567, 579 (D.C.1996); Joy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 303 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 10 , 999 F.2d 549, 558 (1993). “[A] statute or regulation offered to establish a standard for negligence per se purposes must not merely repeat the common law duty of reasonable care, but must set forth ‘specific guidelines to govern behavior.’ ” McNeil Pharmaceutical, 686 A.2d at 579 (quoting Joy, 303 U.S.App.D.C. at 10 , 999 F.2d at 558 ); see also Thoma v. Kettler, 632 A.2d 725 , 728-29 n. 8 (D.C.1993) (stating negligence per se instruction improper because generalit

2001When reviewing jury instructions, “we must look at the instructions as a whole in assessing whether they constituted prejudicial error.” Hunt v. United States, 729 A.2d 322 (D.C.1999) (quoting Murchison v. United States, 486 A.2d 77, 82 (D.C.1984) (internal quotations omitted)). 3 We are comfortable after reviewing the jury instructions in this case that the appellant suffered no prejudicial error.

1993Co., 395 A.2d 63 , 71 n. 9 (D.C.1978), we purported to leave open the question "whether and, if so, under what circumstances, a person other than a wage earner might be an intended beneficiary of [District of Columbia workplace] safety regulations, compare Kurtz, [supra], with Bowman v. Redding & Co., 145 U.S.App.D.C. [294], 302, 449 F.2d [956], 964 [(1971)].” As we recognized elsewhere in the opinion, however, Martin, 395 A.2d at 68 , the Bowman decision is not binding on us under M.A.P. v. Ryan, supra note 5 , whereas Kurtz is. .Still another reason why a negligence per se instruction would

1993Co., 395 A.2d 63 , 71 n. 9 (D.C.1978), we purported to leave open the question "whether and, if so, under what circumstances, a person other than a wage earner might be an intended beneficiary of [District of Columbia workplace] safety regulations, compare Kurtz , [ supra ], with Bowman v. Redding & Co., 145 U.S.App.D.C. [294], 302, 449 F.2d [956], 964 [ (1971) ]." As we recognized elsewhere in the opinion, however, Martin, 395 A.2d at 68 , the Bowman decision is not binding on us under M.A.P. v. Ryan, supra note 5 , whereas Kurtz is. [8] Still another reason why a negligence per se instructio

1978Judge Youngdahl announced one exception to his formulation (with which we need not deal here). “[T]he Court is in agreement with those jurisdictions which hold minor automobile drivers and motorcycle riders to the adult standard of care and the negligence per se rule . . .” Herrell v. Pimsler, supra at 1172.

1978This exception has been justified on the ground that a minor who drives a car or motorcycle “engages in an activity which is normally undertaken only by adults, and for which adult qualifications are required.” Prichard v. Veterans Cab Co., 63 Cal.2d 727, 732 , 47 Cal.Rptr. 904, 907 , 408 P.2d 360, 363 (1965). 5 .

1978This exception has been justified on the ground that a minor who drives a car or motorcycle “engages in an activity which is normally undertaken only by adults, and for which adult qualifications are required.” Prichard v. Veterans Cab Co., 63 Cal.2d 727, 732 , 47 Cal.Rptr. 904, 907 , 408 P.2d 360, 363 (1965). 5 .

1978See Whetzel v. Jess Fisher Management Co., 108 U.S.App.D.C. 385 , 388-90, 282 F.2d 943, 946-48 (1960); Peigh v. Baltimore & O.