above-quoted rule in Oklahoma

2017However, the RISCs do not contain any terms regarding dispute resolution and, thus, the dispute resolution clause in the Purchase Agreement is not inconsistent or in conflict with any terms in the RISC. ¶12 By contrast, in Arizon Structures Worldwide, LLC v. Global Blue Technologies-Cameron, LLC , 481 S.W.3d 542 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015), the two documents in question executed by the buyers and sellers "contained contradictory and mutually exclusive provisions" regarding dispute resolution.

2017However, the RISCs do not contain any terms regarding dispute resolution and,, thus, the dispute resolution clause in the Purchase Agreement is not inconsistent or in conflict with any terms in the RISC. ¶ 12 By contrast, in Arizon Structures Worldwide, LLC v. Global Blue Technologies-Cameron, LLC, 481 S.W.3d 542 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015), the two documents in question executed by the buyers and sellers “contained contradictory and mutually exclusive provisions” regarding dispute resolution.

1985Bias v. State , supra. However, based on the above-quoted test enunciated in Cook v. City of Price, Carbon County, Utah , supra, there may be circumstances in which the selection of attorneys by the district court for this mandatory duty is so arbitrary and purposeful and shown to be so unfair that this requirement could be shown to be unconstitutional as applied.

1976Additionally, Appellee belatedly injects this issue for the first time on rehearing and is thereby proscribed by the above-quoted rule in Pointer, supra ; and, Brown, supra .

1976Additionally, Appellee belatedly injects this issue for the first time on rehearing and is thereby proscribed by the above-quoted rule in Pointer, supra; and, Brown, supra. We therefore conclude the petition for rehearing is without merit and deny same.

1976Additionally, Appellee belatedly injects this issue for the first time on rehearing and is thereby proscribed by the above-quoted rule in Pointer, supra ; and, Brown, supra .

1976Additionally, Appellee belatedly injects this issue for the first time on rehearing and is thereby proscribed by the above-quoted rule in Pointer, supra; and, Brown, supra. We therefore conclude the petition for rehearing is without merit and deny same.

1963In Hales v. Henry Black, Ltd., Inc., Okl., 264 P.2d 355 , we held: “For the purposes of a motion by plaintiff for directed verdict it must be assumed that defendant’s evidence is *314 true, and the trial court should not direct a verdict where it is necessary to weigh the evidence to determine where the preponderance lies; to do so constitutes reversible error.” In view of the above described pro1 and con evidence on the issue of whether or not, at the time of the fire loss, plaintiffs had ever apprised defendant of a decision, or desire, on their part to assume the role of “insured” in the su

1962As we have determined that the question of whether the accident was proximately caused by negligence on the part of the defendant, concurring with negligence on the part of the driver of the third car, was a fundamental issue in the case (as well as whether the accident was caused solely by defendant’s negligence), we are not impressed by defendant’s claim that the above-quoted instruction, requested by plaintiff, was incomplete or improper, because it did not define the negligence referred to therein as that “which proximately caused the accident.” In Kelly v. Employers Casualty Co., 202 Okl.

1962As we have determined that the question of whether the accident was proximately caused by negligence on the part of the defendant, concurring with negligence on the part of the driver of the third car, was a fundamental issue in the case (as well as whether the accident was caused solely by defendant’s negligence), we are not impressed by defendant’s claim that the above-quoted instruction, requested by plaintiff, was incomplete or improper, because it did not define the negligence referred to therein as that “which proximately caused the accident.” In Kelly v. Employers Casualty Co., 202 Okl.

1961There, this court said: “Since the trial of the instant case this court in other cases has construed and applied § 93, supra, as effective and operative to bar an action for recovery of real property held under a void tax deed, if after the recordation of the deed there has been a continuous possession of the real property under the deed for a period of five years.” Defendant contends that, under Douglas v. Mounce, Okl., 303 P.2d 430 , the above-quoted rule does not apply to minerals that have been severed from the surface, after issuance of the resale tax deed and prior to the running, or exp

1960Andrews v. Moery, 205 Okl. 635 , 240 P.2d 447 ; Ruther v. Tyra, 207 Okl. 112 , 247 P.2d 964 ; Tuck v. Buller, Okl., 311 P.2d 212 , 66 A.L.R.2d 1043 .

1960Andrews v. Moery, 205 Okl. 635 , 240 P.2d 447 ; Ruther v. Tyra, 207 Okl. 112 , 247 P.2d 964 ; Tuck v. Buller, Okl., 311 P.2d 212 , 66 A.L.R.2d 1043 .

1960Andrews v. Moery, 205 Okl. 635 , 240 P.2d 447 ; Ruther v. Tyra, 207 Okl. 112 , 247 P.2d 964 ; Tuck v. Buller, Okl., 311 P.2d 212 , 66 A.L.R.2d 1043 .

1960Andrews v. Moery, 205 Okl. 635 , 240 P.2d 447 ; Ruther v. Tyra, 207 Okl. 112 , 247 P.2d 964 ; Tuck v. Buller, Okl., 311 P.2d 212 , 66 A.L.R.2d 1043 .

1960Washita Valley Grain Co. v. Mc-Elroy, Okl., 262 P.2d 133 , opinion of patrolman that plaintiff was not negligent; Wade v. Wolf, Okl., 312 P.2d 493 , testimony of patrolman that he found no improper action on part of defendant, and Maben v. Lee, Okl., 260 P.2d 1064, 1065 , opinion of patrolman that collision was caused by defendant.

1960Washita Valley Grain Co. v. Mc-Elroy, Okl., 262 P.2d 133 , opinion of patrolman that plaintiff was not negligent; Wade v. Wolf, Okl., 312 P.2d 493 , testimony of patrolman that he found no improper action on part of defendant, and Maben v. Lee, Okl., 260 P.2d 1064, 1065 , opinion of patrolman that collision was caused by defendant.

1960Washita Valley Grain Co. v. Mc-Elroy, Okl., 262 P.2d 133 , opinion of patrolman that plaintiff was not negligent; Wade v. Wolf, Okl., 312 P.2d 493 , testimony of patrolman that he found no improper action on part of defendant, and Maben v. Lee, Okl., 260 P.2d 1064, 1065 , opinion of patrolman that collision was caused by defendant.

1960Andrews v. Moery, 205 Okl. 635 , 240 P.2d 447 ; Ruther v. Tyra, 207 Okl. 112 , 247 P.2d 964 ; Tuck v. Buller, Okl., 311 P.2d 212 , 66 A.L.R.2d 1043 .

1960Andrews v. Moery, 205 Okl. 635 , 240 P.2d 447 ; Ruther v. Tyra, 207 Okl. 112 , 247 P.2d 964 ; Tuck v. Buller, Okl., 311 P.2d 212 , 66 A.L.R.2d 1043 .

1957The rule whose application both parties’ arguments concern, without specifically mentioning it, was set forth in the second paragraph of the syllabus in Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Fortinberry Co., 201 Okl. 537 , 207 P.2d 301, 302 , as follows: “In addition to the powers expressly given by statute to an officer or board, he or it has, by implication, such additional powers as are necessary for the due and efficient exercise of the powers expressly granted, or such as may be fairly implied from the statute granting the express powers.” In order to determine whether, under the proper application

1957The rule whose application both parties’ arguments concern, without specifically mentioning it, was set forth in the second paragraph of the syllabus in Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Fortinberry Co., 201 Okl. 537 , 207 P.2d 301, 302 , as follows: “In addition to the powers expressly given by statute to an officer or board, he or it has, by implication, such additional powers as are necessary for the due and efficient exercise of the powers expressly granted, or such as may be fairly implied from the statute granting the express powers.” In order to determine whether, under the proper application

1952The above-quoted rule of the Hester case and the Reynolds case was followed in the more recent decision in Noble v. Kahn, 206 Okla. 13 , 240 P. 2d 757 .

1952The above-quoted rule of the Hester case and the Reynolds case was followed in the more recent decision in Noble v. Kahn, 206 Okla. 13 , 240 P. 2d 757 .

1952In the case of Myers v. Myers, 130 Okla. 184 , 266 P. 452 , this court stated as an established rule that: “Where undue influence is one of the grounds for the setting aside of a will and a person assists in the preparation of same and is present at the time of its execution and is a beneficiary under the will, and other beneficiaries are excluded from the presence of the testator and a confidential and fiduciary relationship exists, the presumption of undue influence arises which calls for a careful scrutiny by the court, and the burden is upon the proponent to show the absence of undue influ

1952In the case of Myers v. Myers, 130 Okla. 184 , 266 P. 452 , this court stated as an established rule that: “Where undue influence is one of the grounds for the setting aside of a will and a person assists in the preparation of same and is present at the time of its execution and is a beneficiary under the will, and other beneficiaries are excluded from the presence of the testator and a confidential and fiduciary relationship exists, the presumption of undue influence arises which calls for a careful scrutiny by the court, and the burden is upon the proponent to show the absence of undue influ

1952In the Lillie case, supra, it is stated: “As stated in Re Estate of Llewellyn, 296 Pa. 74 , 145 A. 810, 813 , 66 A.L.R. *143 222; ‘The active part which gives rise to the presumption must go to the substance of the testamentary act, not to some mere formal matter.

1952In the Lillie case, supra, it is stated: “As stated in Re Estate of Llewellyn, 296 Pa. 74 , 145 A. 810, 813 , 66 A.L.R. *143 222; ‘The active part which gives rise to the presumption must go to the substance of the testamentary act, not to some mere formal matter.

1947The above-quoted rule is discussed by us in various cases, among which are: Roetzel v. Rusch, 172 Okla. 465 , 45 P. 2d 518 ; Rocher v. Williams et al., 183 Okla. 221 , 80 P. 2d 649 ; Johnson v. Whelan et al., 186 Okla. 511 , 98 P. 2d 1103 ; Lamm et al. v. Hardigree et al., 188 Okla. 378 , 109 P. 2d 225 ; Kelly v. Choate et al., 192 Okla. 397 , 136 P. 2d 885 ; Piquet v. Piquet, 196 Okla. 419 , 165 P. 2d 622 .

1947The above-quoted rule is discussed by us in various cases, among which are: Roetzel v. Rusch, 172 Okla. 465 , 45 P. 2d 518 ; Rocher v. Williams et al., 183 Okla. 221 , 80 P. 2d 649 ; Johnson v. Whelan et al., 186 Okla. 511 , 98 P. 2d 1103 ; Lamm et al. v. Hardigree et al., 188 Okla. 378 , 109 P. 2d 225 ; Kelly v. Choate et al., 192 Okla. 397 , 136 P. 2d 885 ; Piquet v. Piquet, 196 Okla. 419 , 165 P. 2d 622 .

1947The above-quoted rule is discussed by us in various cases, among which are: Roetzel v. Rusch, 172 Okla. 465 , 45 P. 2d 518 ; Rocher v. Williams et al., 183 Okla. 221 , 80 P. 2d 649 ; Johnson v. Whelan et al., 186 Okla. 511 , 98 P. 2d 1103 ; Lamm et al. v. Hardigree et al., 188 Okla. 378 , 109 P. 2d 225 ; Kelly v. Choate et al., 192 Okla. 397 , 136 P. 2d 885 ; Piquet v. Piquet, 196 Okla. 419 , 165 P. 2d 622 .

1947The above-quoted rule is discussed by us in various cases, among which are: Roetzel v. Rusch, 172 Okla. 465 , 45 P. 2d 518 ; Rocher v. Williams et al., 183 Okla. 221 , 80 P. 2d 649 ; Johnson v. Whelan et al., 186 Okla. 511 , 98 P. 2d 1103 ; Lamm et al. v. Hardigree et al., 188 Okla. 378 , 109 P. 2d 225 ; Kelly v. Choate et al., 192 Okla. 397 , 136 P. 2d 885 ; Piquet v. Piquet, 196 Okla. 419 , 165 P. 2d 622 .

1947The above-quoted rule is discussed by us in various cases, among which are: Roetzel v. Rusch, 172 Okla. 465 , 45 P. 2d 518 ; Rocher v. Williams et al., 183 Okla. 221 , 80 P. 2d 649 ; Johnson v. Whelan et al., 186 Okla. 511 , 98 P. 2d 1103 ; Lamm et al. v. Hardigree et al., 188 Okla. 378 , 109 P. 2d 225 ; Kelly v. Choate et al., 192 Okla. 397 , 136 P. 2d 885 ; Piquet v. Piquet, 196 Okla. 419 , 165 P. 2d 622 .

1947The above-quoted rule is discussed by us in various cases, among which are: Roetzel v. Rusch, 172 Okla. 465 , 45 P. 2d 518 ; Rocher v. Williams et al., 183 Okla. 221 , 80 P. 2d 649 ; Johnson v. Whelan et al., 186 Okla. 511 , 98 P. 2d 1103 ; Lamm et al. v. Hardigree et al., 188 Okla. 378 , 109 P. 2d 225 ; Kelly v. Choate et al., 192 Okla. 397 , 136 P. 2d 885 ; Piquet v. Piquet, 196 Okla. 419 , 165 P. 2d 622 .

1947The above-quoted rule is discussed by us in various cases, among which are: Roetzel v. Rusch, 172 Okla. 465 , 45 P. 2d 518 ; Rocher v. Williams et al., 183 Okla. 221 , 80 P. 2d 649 ; Johnson v. Whelan et al., 186 Okla. 511 , 98 P. 2d 1103 ; Lamm et al. v. Hardigree et al., 188 Okla. 378 , 109 P. 2d 225 ; Kelly v. Choate et al., 192 Okla. 397 , 136 P. 2d 885 ; Piquet v. Piquet, 196 Okla. 419 , 165 P. 2d 622 .

1947The above-quoted rule is discussed by us in various cases, among which are: Roetzel v. Rusch, 172 Okla. 465 , 45 P. 2d 518 ; Rocher v. Williams et al., 183 Okla. 221 , 80 P. 2d 649 ; Johnson v. Whelan et al., 186 Okla. 511 , 98 P. 2d 1103 ; Lamm et al. v. Hardigree et al., 188 Okla. 378 , 109 P. 2d 225 ; Kelly v. Choate et al., 192 Okla. 397 , 136 P. 2d 885 ; Piquet v. Piquet, 196 Okla. 419 , 165 P. 2d 622 .

1947The above-quoted rule is discussed by us in various cases, among which are: Roetzel v. Rusch, 172 Okla. 465 , 45 P. 2d 518 ; Rocher v. Williams et al., 183 Okla. 221 , 80 P. 2d 649 ; Johnson v. Whelan et al., 186 Okla. 511 , 98 P. 2d 1103 ; Lamm et al. v. Hardigree et al., 188 Okla. 378 , 109 P. 2d 225 ; Kelly v. Choate et al., 192 Okla. 397 , 136 P. 2d 885 ; Piquet v. Piquet, 196 Okla. 419 , 165 P. 2d 622 .

1947The above-quoted rule is discussed by us in various cases, among which are: Roetzel v. Rusch, 172 Okla. 465 , 45 P. 2d 518 ; Rocher v. Williams et al., 183 Okla. 221 , 80 P. 2d 649 ; Johnson v. Whelan et al., 186 Okla. 511 , 98 P. 2d 1103 ; Lamm et al. v. Hardigree et al., 188 Okla. 378 , 109 P. 2d 225 ; Kelly v. Choate et al., 192 Okla. 397 , 136 P. 2d 885 ; Piquet v. Piquet, 196 Okla. 419 , 165 P. 2d 622 .

1947The above-quoted rule is discussed by us in various cases, among which are: Roetzel v. Rusch, 172 Okla. 465 , 45 P. 2d 518 ; Rocher v. Williams et al., 183 Okla. 221 , 80 P. 2d 649 ; Johnson v. Whelan et al., 186 Okla. 511 , 98 P. 2d 1103 ; Lamm et al. v. Hardigree et al., 188 Okla. 378 , 109 P. 2d 225 ; Kelly v. Choate et al., 192 Okla. 397 , 136 P. 2d 885 ; Piquet v. Piquet, 196 Okla. 419 , 165 P. 2d 622 .

1947The above-quoted rule is discussed by us in various cases, among which are: Roetzel v. Rusch, 172 Okla. 465 , 45 P. 2d 518 ; Rocher v. Williams et al., 183 Okla. 221 , 80 P. 2d 649 ; Johnson v. Whelan et al., 186 Okla. 511 , 98 P. 2d 1103 ; Lamm et al. v. Hardigree et al., 188 Okla. 378 , 109 P. 2d 225 ; Kelly v. Choate et al., 192 Okla. 397 , 136 P. 2d 885 ; Piquet v. Piquet, 196 Okla. 419 , 165 P. 2d 622 .

1945A past consideration, it is said, is some act or forbearance in time past by which a man has benefited without thereby incurring any legal liability; if afterward, whether from good feeling or from interested motives, he makes a promise to the person by whose act or forbearance he has benefited, and that promise is made on no other consideration than the past benefit, it is gratuitous and cannot be enforced; it is based on motive and not on consideration. . . .” ■ The above-quoted rule was approved and applied by this court in Eatmon v. Penland, 119 Okla. 180 , 249 P. 387 , and Reconstruction

1945A past consideration, it is said, is some act or forbearance in time past by which a man has benefited without thereby incurring any legal liability; if afterward, whether from good feeling or from interested motives, he makes a promise to the person by whose act or forbearance he has benefited, and that promise is made on no other consideration than the past benefit, it is gratuitous and cannot be enforced; it is based on motive and not on consideration. . . .” ■ The above-quoted rule was approved and applied by this court in Eatmon v. Penland, 119 Okla. 180 , 249 P. 387 , and Reconstruction

1945A past consideration, it is said, is some act or forbearance in time past by which a man has benefited without thereby incurring any legal liability; if afterward, whether from good feeling or from interested motives, he makes a promise to the person by whose act or forbearance he has benefited, and that promise is made on no other consideration than the past benefit, it is gratuitous and cannot be enforced; it is based on motive and not on consideration. . . .” ■ The above-quoted rule was approved and applied by this court in Eatmon v. Penland, 119 Okla. 180 , 249 P. 387 , and Reconstruction

1945A past consideration, it is said, is some act or forbearance in time past by which a man has benefited without thereby incurring any legal liability; if afterward, whether from good feeling or from interested motives, he makes a promise to the person by whose act or forbearance he has benefited, and that promise is made on no other consideration than the past benefit, it is gratuitous and cannot be enforced; it is based on motive and not on consideration. . . .” ■ The above-quoted rule was approved and applied by this court in Eatmon v. Penland, 119 Okla. 180 , 249 P. 387 , and Reconstruction

1943Co. v. Boggess, 147 Okla. 39 , 294 P. 186 , wherein the above-quoted rule appears a8l paragraph 1 of the syllabus.

1943Co. v. Boggess, 147 Okla. 39 , 294 P. 186 , wherein the above-quoted rule appears a8l paragraph 1 of the syllabus.

1942City of Shawnee v. Cheek, 41 Okla. 227 , 137 P. 724 .

1942City of Shawnee v. Cheek, 41 Okla. 227 , 137 P. 724 .

1940Co. v. Eakins, 141 Okla. 256 , 284 P. 866 , to *528 which this court expressly declined to apply the above-quoted rule.

1940The plaintiff relies almost entirely upon the case of Mid-Continent Life Insurance Co. v. Harrison, 175 Okla. 543 , 53 P. 2d 266 , to sustain her contention that the proof required in the above-quoted clause in the policies was a condition subsequent, and therefore entitled her to maintain the action.

1940The plaintiff relies almost entirely upon the case of Mid-Continent Life Insurance Co. v. Harrison, 175 Okla. 543 , 53 P. 2d 266 , to sustain her contention that the proof required in the above-quoted clause in the policies was a condition subsequent, and therefore entitled her to maintain the action.