above-quoted rule in Wisconsin

2022However, that awareness does not allow this court to overlook the record or not consider controlling authorities. 12 In addition, as already noted, in the presence of the jury the circuit court itself “move[d]” to “strike” the pertinent testimony of E.F. 18 No. 2021AP1732-CR result, the circuit court failed to properly instruct the jury about E.F.’s pertinent testimony as the directive was not “given in clear and certain terms.” Peters, 70 Wis. 2d at 32 . ¶35 Next, the circuit court concluded that the jury likely did not interpret E.F.’s testimony as referring to a prior criminal conviction ag

2005The court declared: "If the motion on its face alleges facts which would entitle the defendant to relief, the circuit court has no discretion and must hold an evidentiary hearing." 201 Wis. 2d at 310 .

2005The court declared: "If the motion on its face alleges facts which would entitle the defendant to relief, the circuit court has no discretion and must hold an evidentiary hearing." 201 Wis. 2d at 310 .

1982The court of appeals, relying on State v. Schulz, 102 Wis. 2d 423 , 307 N.W.2d 151 (1981), concluded that the jury could have been misled as to who had the burden of persuasion on the element of intent.

1982The court of appeals, relying on State v. Schulz, 102 Wis. 2d 423 , 307 N.W.2d 151 (1981), concluded that the jury could have been misled as to who had the burden of persuasion on the element of intent. [1] The determinative question in the case before us is whether the trial court's instruction to the jury on intoxication, together with all other instructions, viewed in their entirety, made it clear that the burden of persuasion on the issue of intent remained on the state.

1982The court of appeals, relying on State v. Schulz, 102 Wis. 2d 423 , 307 N.W.2d 151 (1981), concluded that the jury could have been misled as to who had the burden of persuasion on the element of intent.

1982The court of appeals, relying on State v. Schulz, 102 Wis. 2d 423 , 307 N.W.2d 151 (1981), concluded that the jury could have been misled as to who had the burden of persuasion on the element of intent. [1] The determinative question in the case before us is whether the trial court's instruction to the jury on intoxication, together with all other instructions, viewed in their entirety, made it clear that the burden of persuasion on the issue of intent remained on the state.

1963We deem apposite this statement made in Losching v. Fischer (1941), 237 Wis. 193, 196 , 295 N. W. 712 : “To say that confusion may arise in the minds of the witnesses to the accident and that contradictory statements may be made, is only to acknowledge human frailties, and the lack of mathematical certainty in matters where the truth depends on human observation and recollection.

1963We deem apposite this statement made in Losching v. Fischer (1941), 237 Wis. 193, 196 , 295 N. W. 712 : “To say that confusion may arise in the minds of the witnesses to the accident and that contradictory statements may be made, is only to acknowledge human frailties, and the lack of mathematical certainty in matters where the truth depends on human observation and recollection.

1960If thereby the intention is plain, or the major probabilities are on the side of a particular intent, for the purpose of so reading the will as to express it, words may be given a very broad or very restrictive meaning, going to the very limit of the boundaries of reason, or may be transposed or rejected, or words not seen, may be read in place which are there by reasonable or necessary inference, or may *229 be transposed or supplied, and thus the language be moulded to express, so jar as can reasonably be done, the testator’s intention.” (Emphasis supplied.) The decision of this court in Est

1960If thereby the intention is plain, or the major probabilities are on the side of a particular intent, for the purpose of so reading the will as to express it, words may be given a very broad or very restrictive meaning, going to the very limit of the boundaries of reason, or may be transposed or rejected, or words not seen, may be read in place which are there by reasonable or necessary inference, or may *229 be transposed or supplied, and thus the language be moulded to express, so jar as can reasonably be done, the testator’s intention.” (Emphasis supplied.) The decision of this court in Est

1959With ordinary players, as the evidence shows in this case, this frequently takes place.” In support of his contention, that defendant was guilty of negligence as a matter of law in failing to shout “fore” before striking the ball, the plaintiff quotes the following statement from Getz v. Freed (1954), 377 Pa. 480, 483 , 105 Atl. (2d) 102, 103: “It is the duty of every player to give timely and adequate warning — usually by the word ‘fore’ — of a shot which he is about to make and which he has reasonable grounds to bd-lieve may strike another player, caddy, or spectator, either on the same hole

1956R. 9, 48, as follows: “A will jointly executed by two testators or one of two separate wills, containing reciprocal provisions and provisions for the benefit of third persons effective upon the death of the surviving testator, which is a fruition of a contract between the testators, cannot be revoked to the detriment of the third persons by the survivor after the death of the other testator and the acceptance of benefits derived from the will of the other which conformed to the contract, without committing a breach of contract, at least not from the viewpoint of a court of equity.” Cases holdi

1956R. 9, 48, as follows: “A will jointly executed by two testators or one of two separate wills, containing reciprocal provisions and provisions for the benefit of third persons effective upon the death of the surviving testator, which is a fruition of a contract between the testators, cannot be revoked to the detriment of the third persons by the survivor after the death of the other testator and the acceptance of benefits derived from the will of the other which conformed to the contract, without committing a breach of contract, at least not from the viewpoint of a court of equity.” Cases holdi

1956In Touchett v. E Z Paintr Corp. (1953), 263 Wis. 626, 630 , 58 N. W. (2d) 448 , 59 N. W. (2d) 433 , this court had before it a cause of action for reformation of contract, and in its opinion stated (p. 630) : “There is a further rule of law that the court will not insert a provision in a contract which was omitted with the consent of the parties asking for reformation, although such consent was given in reliance on an oral promise of the other party that the omission would not make any difference.” We consider the above-quoted principle to be equally applicable to the facts in the instant case

1956R. 9, 48, as follows: “A will jointly executed by two testators or one of two separate wills, containing reciprocal provisions and provisions for the benefit of third persons effective upon the death of the surviving testator, which is a fruition of a contract between the testators, cannot be revoked to the detriment of the third persons by the survivor after the death of the other testator and the acceptance of benefits derived from the will of the other which conformed to the contract, without committing a breach of contract, at least not from the viewpoint of a court of equity.” Cases holdi

1956R. 9, 48, as follows: “A will jointly executed by two testators or one of two separate wills, containing reciprocal provisions and provisions for the benefit of third persons effective upon the death of the surviving testator, which is a fruition of a contract between the testators, cannot be revoked to the detriment of the third persons by the survivor after the death of the other testator and the acceptance of benefits derived from the will of the other which conformed to the contract, without committing a breach of contract, at least not from the viewpoint of a court of equity.” Cases holdi

1956R. 9, 48, as follows: “A will jointly executed by two testators or one of two separate wills, containing reciprocal provisions and provisions for the benefit of third persons effective upon the death of the surviving testator, which is a fruition of a contract between the testators, cannot be revoked to the detriment of the third persons by the survivor after the death of the other testator and the acceptance of benefits derived from the will of the other which conformed to the contract, without committing a breach of contract, at least not from the viewpoint of a court of equity.” Cases holdi

1956R. 9, 48, as follows: “A will jointly executed by two testators or one of two separate wills, containing reciprocal provisions and provisions for the benefit of third persons effective upon the death of the surviving testator, which is a fruition of a contract between the testators, cannot be revoked to the detriment of the third persons by the survivor after the death of the other testator and the acceptance of benefits derived from the will of the other which conformed to the contract, without committing a breach of contract, at least not from the viewpoint of a court of equity.” Cases holdi

1956R. 9, 48, as follows: “A will jointly executed by two testators or one of two separate wills, containing reciprocal provisions and provisions for the benefit of third persons effective upon the death of the surviving testator, which is a fruition of a contract between the testators, cannot be revoked to the detriment of the third persons by the survivor after the death of the other testator and the acceptance of benefits derived from the will of the other which conformed to the contract, without committing a breach of contract, at least not from the viewpoint of a court of equity.” Cases holdi

1956R. 9, 48, as follows: “A will jointly executed by two testators or one of two separate wills, containing reciprocal provisions and provisions for the benefit of third persons effective upon the death of the surviving testator, which is a fruition of a contract between the testators, cannot be revoked to the detriment of the third persons by the survivor after the death of the other testator and the acceptance of benefits derived from the will of the other which conformed to the contract, without committing a breach of contract, at least not from the viewpoint of a court of equity.” Cases holdi

1956In Touchett v. E Z Paintr Corp. (1953), 263 Wis. 626, 630 , 58 N. W. (2d) 448 , 59 N. W. (2d) 433 , this court had before it a cause of action for reformation of contract, and in its opinion stated (p. 630) : “There is a further rule of law that the court will not insert a provision in a contract which was omitted with the consent of the parties asking for reformation, although such consent was given in reliance on an oral promise of the other party that the omission would not make any difference.” We consider the above-quoted principle to be equally applicable to the facts in the instant case

1956In Touchett v. E Z Paintr Corp. (1953), 263 Wis. 626, 630 , 58 N. W. (2d) 448 , 59 N. W. (2d) 433 , this court had before it a cause of action for reformation of contract, and in its opinion stated (p. 630) : “There is a further rule of law that the court will not insert a provision in a contract which was omitted with the consent of the parties asking for reformation, although such consent was given in reliance on an oral promise of the other party that the omission would not make any difference.” We consider the above-quoted principle to be equally applicable to the facts in the instant case

1956Co. (1908), 134 Wis. 603, 607 , 115 N. W. 383 , as follows: “The rule contended for, that particularization followed by a general expression will ordinarily be restricted to the former, is based on the fact in human experience that usually the minds of parties are addressed specially to the particularization, and that the generalities, though broad enough to comprehend other fields if they stood alone, are used in contemplation of that upon which the minds of the parties are centered.” We consider that it would be an unreasonable interpretation of the provisions of paragraph 4 of the employmen

1956Co. (1908), 134 Wis. 603, 607 , 115 N. W. 383 , as follows: “The rule contended for, that particularization followed by a general expression will ordinarily be restricted to the former, is based on the fact in human experience that usually the minds of parties are addressed specially to the particularization, and that the generalities, though broad enough to comprehend other fields if they stood alone, are used in contemplation of that upon which the minds of the parties are centered.” We consider that it would be an unreasonable interpretation of the provisions of paragraph 4 of the employmen

1956R. 9, 48, as follows: “A will jointly executed by two testators or one of two separate wills, containing reciprocal provisions and provisions for the benefit of third persons effective upon the death of the surviving testator, which is a fruition of a contract between the testators, cannot be revoked to the detriment of the third persons by the survivor after the death of the other testator and the acceptance of benefits derived from the will of the other which conformed to the contract, without committing a breach of contract, at least not from the viewpoint of a court of equity.” Cases holdi

1956R. 9, 48, as follows: “A will jointly executed by two testators or one of two separate wills, containing reciprocal provisions and provisions for the benefit of third persons effective upon the death of the surviving testator, which is a fruition of a contract between the testators, cannot be revoked to the detriment of the third persons by the survivor after the death of the other testator and the acceptance of benefits derived from the will of the other which conformed to the contract, without committing a breach of contract, at least not from the viewpoint of a court of equity.” Cases holdi

1956R. 9, 48, as follows: “A will jointly executed by two testators or one of two separate wills, containing reciprocal provisions and provisions for the benefit of third persons effective upon the death of the surviving testator, which is a fruition of a contract between the testators, cannot be revoked to the detriment of the third persons by the survivor after the death of the other testator and the acceptance of benefits derived from the will of the other which conformed to the contract, without committing a breach of contract, at least not from the viewpoint of a court of equity.” Cases holdi

1956R. 9, 48, as follows: “A will jointly executed by two testators or one of two separate wills, containing reciprocal provisions and provisions for the benefit of third persons effective upon the death of the surviving testator, which is a fruition of a contract between the testators, cannot be revoked to the detriment of the third persons by the survivor after the death of the other testator and the acceptance of benefits derived from the will of the other which conformed to the contract, without committing a breach of contract, at least not from the viewpoint of a court of equity.” Cases holdi

1939Consequently, the inhibition prescribed by that statute is within and rendered inapplicable by the above-quoted clause, “except as herein otherwise provided,” and there is no restriction upon the “full power” conferred by sec. 1 of ch. 249, Laws of 1895, upon the county court of Lincoln county “to grant adjournments and continuances, and take, and have, all necessary proceedings concerning or relating thereto as provided by law.” In Snyder v. Malone, 124 Wis. 114 , 102 N. W. 354 , it was contended that the power of the municipal court of Rock county to order an adjournment in an action, which

1939Consequently, the inhibition prescribed by that statute is within and rendered inapplicable by the above-quoted clause, “except as herein otherwise provided,” and there is no restriction upon the “full power” conferred by sec. 1 of ch. 249, Laws of 1895, upon the county court of Lincoln county “to grant adjournments and continuances, and take, and have, all necessary proceedings concerning or relating thereto as provided by law.” In Snyder v. Malone, 124 Wis. 114 , 102 N. W. 354 , it was contended that the power of the municipal court of Rock county to order an adjournment in an action, which