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15 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1902–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Williams v. Hajosygreen2 sentences2025(Emphasis supplied.) Appellants seemingly recognize that there were no records attached to Nurse Camper’s affidavits, but they assert that this “omission . . . is not an automatic preclusion of the affidavit in a summary judgment analysis if the certified records are part of the record and before the court.” While Appellants are correct that the above-quoted requirement from OCGA § 9-11-56 (e) “has been relaxed somewhat for the practical purpose of avoiding duplication by allowing clear identification of records already on file,” Williams v. Hajosy, 210 Ga. App. 637, 638 (2) ( 436 SE2d 716 ) ( 2025(Emphasis supplied.) Appellants seemingly recognize that there were no records attached to Nurse Camper’s affidavits, but they assert that this “omission . . . is not an automatic preclusion of the affidavit in a summary judgment analysis if the certified records are part of the record and before the court.” While Appellants are correct that the above-quoted requirement from OCGA § 9-11-56 (e) “has been relaxed somewhat for the practical purpose of avoiding duplication by allowing clear identification of records already on file,” Williams v. Hajosy, 210 Ga. App. 637, 638 (2) ( 436 SE2d 716 ) ( | 1 | 1 |
Watkins v. Stategreen2 sentences1996The above-quoted instruction is an accurate statement of the law, Watkins v. State, 207 Ga. App. 766, 773 (5) ( 430 SE2d 105 ), and in no way confuses the subject of liability as a conspirator with the distinct theory of liability as an aider and abettor. 1996The above-quoted instruction is an accurate statement of the law, Watkins v. State, 207 Ga. App. 766, 773 (5) ( 430 SE2d 105 ), and in no way confuses the subject of liability as a conspirator with the distinct theory of liability as an aider and abettor. | 1 | 1 |
Drane v. Stategreen2 sentences1996See Drane v. State, 265 Ga. 255, 257 (4), 258, n. 4 ( 455 SE2d 27 ). 1996See Drane v. State, 265 Ga. 255, 257 (4), 258, n. 4 ( 455 SE2d 27 ). | 1 | 1 |
Walker v. Stategreen2 sentences1992The indictment alleged that appellant had violated OCGA § 16-11-106 (b) in that he “did . . . unlawfully possess a knife having a blade of three or more inches in length. . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) The trial court instructed the jury that a violation of OCGA § 16-11-106 (b) occurs when one “has on or within arm’s reach of his person a knife having a blade of three or more inches in length. . . .’’(Emphasis supplied.) Through his reliance upon Walker v. State, 146 Ga. App. 237, 244 (2) ( 246 SE2d 206 ) (1978), appellant apparently urges on appeal that the above-quoted instruction, in its empha 1992The indictment alleged that appellant had violated OCGA § 16-11-106 (b) in that he “did . . . unlawfully possess a knife having a blade of three or more inches in length. . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) The trial court instructed the jury that a violation of OCGA § 16-11-106 (b) occurs when one “has on or within arm’s reach of his person a knife having a blade of three or more inches in length. . . .’’(Emphasis supplied.) Through his reliance upon Walker v. State, 146 Ga. App. 237, 244 (2) ( 246 SE2d 206 ) (1978), appellant apparently urges on appeal that the above-quoted instruction, in its empha | 1 | 1 |
Atlantic Coast Line Railroad v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co.green2 sentences1960Co. v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 120 Ga. 268, 281 ( 48 S. E. 15 , 1 Ann. 1960Co. v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 120 Ga. 268, 281 ( 48 S. E. 15 , 1 Ann. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Dennard v. Freeport Minerals Co.
green
1 sentence2000But, as shown in Dennard , the above-quoted clause indicates “clear assent to the assignability and delegability of all the contract terms.” Id. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
O'Kelly v. Southland Life Insurance
green
1 sentence1999O'Kelly, supra at 458 , 305 S.E.2d 873 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Dennis v. Grimes
green
2 sentences1993In Dennis v. Grimes, 216 Ga. 671 ( 118 SE2d 923 ) (1961), relied upon by the majority, the Supreme Court held that the absence of the accused from the court due to his incarceration did not absolve the accused of compliance with the above-quoted requirement of presence in the courtroom because, the court reasoned, "he was represented by counsel who could have done this for him." Id. at 673 . 1993In Dennis v. Grimes, 216 Ga. 671 ( 118 SE2d 923 ) (1961), relied upon by the majority, the Supreme Court held that the absence of the accused from the court due to his incarceration did not absolve the accused of compliance with the above-quoted requirement of presence in the courtroom because, the court reasoned, "he was represented by counsel who could have done this for him." Id. at 673 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Burns v. Horkan
green
2 sentences1938In that case it was further laid down that ‘The refusal to dismiss as to a defendant may be ground of exception by him, because, if ruled as he desired, the case would have been finally disposed of as to him; aliter as to a complainant who pursues two or more, and a dismissal is had as to one.’ We therefore have no alternative, except to dismiss these writs of error.” In the later case of Burns v. Horkan, 126 Ga. 161 (2) ( 54 S. E. 946 ), Mr. Justice Cobb, again speaking for the court, applied the above-quoted doctrine of McGaughey v. Latham . 1938In that case it was further laid down that ‘The refusal to dismiss as to a defendant may be ground of exception by him, because, if ruled as he desired, the case would have been finally disposed of as to him; aliter as to a complainant who pursues two or more, and a dismissal is had as to one.’ We therefore have no alternative, except to dismiss these writs of error.” In the later case of Burns v. Horkan, 126 Ga. 161 (2) ( 54 S. E. 946 ), Mr. Justice Cobb, again speaking for the court, applied the above-quoted doctrine of McGaughey v. Latham . | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Board of Commissioners v. Mayor
green
2 sentences1938The cases of Board of Commissioners of Sumter County v. Americus, 141 Ga. 542 ( 81 S. E. 435 ); City of Macon v. Road Commissioners of Bibb County, 150 Ga. 116 ( 102 S. E. 867 ), cited by the defendants, involved local statutes enacted since adoption of the constitution of 1877 containing the above-quoted clause, and consequently are not pertinent to the question now under consideration. 1938The cases of Board of Commissioners of Sumter County v. Americus, 141 Ga. 542 ( 81 S. E. 435 ); City of Macon v. Road Commissioners of Bibb County, 150 Ga. 116 ( 102 S. E. 867 ), cited by the defendants, involved local statutes enacted since adoption of the constitution of 1877 containing the above-quoted clause, and consequently are not pertinent to the question now under consideration. | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Brantley v. Atwood
neutral
1 sentence1938The cases of Board of Commissioners of Sumter County v. Americus, 141 Ga. 542 ( 81 S. E. 435 ); City of Macon v. Road Commissioners of Bibb County, 150 Ga. 116 ( 102 S. E. 867 ), cited by the defendants, involved local statutes enacted since adoption of the constitution of 1877 containing the above-quoted clause, and consequently are not pertinent to the question now under consideration. | 1 | 1938–1938 |
City of Macon v. Road Commissioners
neutral
1 sentence1938The cases of Board of Commissioners of Sumter County v. Americus, 141 Ga. 542 ( 81 S. E. 435 ); City of Macon v. Road Commissioners of Bibb County, 150 Ga. 116 ( 102 S. E. 867 ), cited by the defendants, involved local statutes enacted since adoption of the constitution of 1877 containing the above-quoted clause, and consequently are not pertinent to the question now under consideration. | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Keener v. Headrick
neutral
1 sentence1938In Crow v. Whitworth, 170 Ga. 242 (3-6) ( 152 S. E. 445 ), it was held that a somewhat similar charge was not cause for reversal. | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Crow v. Whitworth
neutral
1 sentence1938In Crow v. Whitworth, 170 Ga. 242 (3-6) ( 152 S. E. 445 ), it was held that a somewhat similar charge was not cause for reversal. | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Steel v. Payne
neutral
1 sentence1936Steel v. Payne, 42 Ga. 207 ; Rosser v. Harris, 48 Ga. 512 ; Petty v. Kennon, 49 Ga. 468 ; Baxley Hardware Co. v. Morris, 165 Ga. 359 (8) ( 140 S. E. 869 ). | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Rosser v. Harris
neutral
1 sentence1936Steel v. Payne, 42 Ga. 207 ; Rosser v. Harris, 48 Ga. 512 ; Petty v. Kennon, 49 Ga. 468 ; Baxley Hardware Co. v. Morris, 165 Ga. 359 (8) ( 140 S. E. 869 ). | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Petty v. Kennon
green
1 sentence1936Steel v. Payne, 42 Ga. 207 ; Rosser v. Harris, 48 Ga. 512 ; Petty v. Kennon, 49 Ga. 468 ; Baxley Hardware Co. v. Morris, 165 Ga. 359 (8) ( 140 S. E. 869 ). | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Farmers Bank v. Johnson, King & Co.
green
2 sentences1936Farmers Battle of Nashville v. Johnson, 134 Ga. 486 ( 68 S. E. 85 , 30 L. 1936Farmers Battle of Nashville v. Johnson, 134 Ga. 486 ( 68 S. E. 85 , 30 L. | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Baxley Hardware Co. v. Morris
green
2 sentences1936Steel v. Payne, 42 Ga. 207 ; Rosser v. Harris, 48 Ga. 512 ; Petty v. Kennon, 49 Ga. 468 ; Baxley Hardware Co. v. Morris, 165 Ga. 359 (8) ( 140 S. E. 869 ). 1936Steel v. Payne, 42 Ga. 207 ; Rosser v. Harris, 48 Ga. 512 ; Petty v. Kennon, 49 Ga. 468 ; Baxley Hardware Co. v. Morris, 165 Ga. 359 (8) ( 140 S. E. 869 ). | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Black v. Maddox
green
2 sentences1931Black v. Maddox, 104 Ga. 157 ( 30 S. E. 723 ) ; Walker v. Edmundson, 111 Ga. 454 ( 36 S. E. 800 ). 1931Black v. Maddox, 104 Ga. 157 ( 30 S. E. 723 ) ; Walker v. Edmundson, 111 Ga. 454 ( 36 S. E. 800 ). | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Walker v. Edmundson
green
2 sentences1931Black v. Maddox, 104 Ga. 157 ( 30 S. E. 723 ) ; Walker v. Edmundson, 111 Ga. 454 ( 36 S. E. 800 ). 1931Black v. Maddox, 104 Ga. 157 ( 30 S. E. 723 ) ; Walker v. Edmundson, 111 Ga. 454 ( 36 S. E. 800 ). | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Central of Georgia Railway Co. v. Chicago Portrait Co.
green
1 sentence1907Co. v. Chicago Portrait Co., 122 Ga. 11 (1), it was held that “where a petition can be construed either as a suit in contract or as an action for a breach of duty arising out of the contract, the latter construction will be adopted.” No objection hav ing been made to plaintiff’s petition, the evidence adduced in support thereof will also justify a construction in accordance with the above-quoted rule. | 1 | 1907–1907 |
Sutton v. Howard
neutral
1 sentence1902We are clearly of. opinion that the above-quoted clause of the contract does not provide for the payment of liquidated damages, but for the payment of a penalty. “ The intention of the parties is mainly to be considered in determining whether an agreement is a penalty or liquidated damages.” Sutton v. Howard, 33 Ga. 536 . “ The only inquiry as to intention is whether or not the parties intended the sum to be accepted as compensation.” 1 Sedg. | 1 | 1902–1902 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.