above-quoted rule in Nebraska

1999Trustees, 69 Ohio St.2d 241 , 431 N.E.2d 672 (1982) (where plaintiff's case was dismissed without considering constitutionality of ordinance where in prior litigation on validity of ordinance only defense of nonconforming uses had been raised.) The complicated fact situations in all of these cases makes it difficult to use them as models to demonstrate the correct analysis of the facts in this case for application of the above-quoted rule.

1999The Dakota Title court cited Henry v. Farmer City State Bank, 808 F.2d 1228 (7th Cir. 1986) (where state court’s foreclosure proceeding was held to be res judicata to claim of racketeering based on fraud and forgery), and Island v. Board, 69 Ohio St. 2d 241 , 431 N.E.2d 672 (1982) (where plaintiff’s case was dismissed without considering constitutionality of ordinance where in prior litigation on validity of ordinance only defense of nonconforming uses had been raised.) The complicated fact situations in all of these cases make it difficult to use them as models to demonstrate the correct anal

2007Cold Storage's amended answer to the second amended complaint simply admits certain allegations and "denies all of the other allegations contained in the Second Amended Complaint." While we have found no specific authority holding that noncompliance with the 120-day requirement for the filing of a construction lien is an affirmative defense which is waived if not specifically pled, we so hold for the reasons set forth above. *790 Additionally, such conclusion is analogous to the holding of Big Crow v. City of Rushville, 266 Neb. 750 , 669 N.W.2d 63 (2003), that noncompliance with Neb.

2007Cold Storage's amended answer to the second amended complaint simply admits certain allegations and "denies all of the other allegations contained in the Second Amended Complaint." While we have found no specific authority holding that noncompliance with the 120-day requirement for the filing of a construction lien is an affirmative defense which is waived if not specifically pled, we so hold for the reasons set forth above. *790 Additionally, such conclusion is analogous to the holding of Big Crow v. City of Rushville, 266 Neb. 750 , 669 N.W.2d 63 (2003), that noncompliance with Neb.

1999In Gibson-Voss v. Voss, 4 Neb.

1999The Dakota Title court cited Henry v. Farmer City State Bank, 808 F.2d 1228 (7th Cir. 1986) (where state court’s foreclosure proceeding was held to be res judicata to claim of racketeering based on fraud and forgery), and Island v. Board, 69 Ohio St. 2d 241 , 431 N.E.2d 672 (1982) (where plaintiff’s case was dismissed without considering constitutionality of ordinance where in prior litigation on validity of ordinance only defense of nonconforming uses had been raised.) The complicated fact situations in all of these cases make it difficult to use them as models to demonstrate the correct anal

1999App. 187 , 492 N.W.2d 50 (1992), this court actually considered the factors recognized in the above-quoted rule, albeit in slightly different words, and this court included only two-thirds of the personal injury recovery in the marital estate in recognition of the injured wife’s personal suffering.

1959Co., 142 Neb. 811, 8 , N. W. 2d 179, which is one of the cases directly disapproved in the court’s opinion here; As late as Johnson v. Radio Station WOW, on rehearing, 144 Neb. 432 , 14 N. W. 2d 666 , in a supplemental, opinion we held: “The character of a cause of action is determined by the allegations of fact contained in the petition, unaffected by the conclusions of the pleader. * * * The prayer of the petition asks for general equitable relief and is not, therefore, so restrictive as to preclude the holding that constructive fraud exists.” The above-quoted rule is a clear rule advising a

1958However, it has been cited as authority for the above-quoted rule in Bartlett v. State, 115 Neb. 148 , 211 N. W. 994 .) “The credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence are for the jury to determine in a criminal case in which the evidence presents an issue of fact as to the guilt or innocence of the accused and the conclusion of the jury may not be disturbed by this court unless it is clearly wrong.” Sedlacek v. State, 166 Neb. 736 , 90 N. W. 2d 340 .

1958However, it has been cited as authority for the above-quoted rule in Bartlett v. State, 115 Neb. 148 , 211 N. W. 994 .) “The credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence are for the jury to determine in a criminal case in which the evidence presents an issue of fact as to the guilt or innocence of the accused and the conclusion of the jury may not be disturbed by this court unless it is clearly wrong.” Sedlacek v. State, 166 Neb. 736 , 90 N. W. 2d 340 .

1958However, it has been cited as authority for the above-quoted rule in Bartlett v. State, 115 Neb. 148 , 211 N. W. 994 .) “The credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence are for the jury to determine in a criminal case in which the evidence presents an issue of fact as to the guilt or innocence of the accused and the conclusion of the jury may not be disturbed by this court unless it is clearly wrong.” Sedlacek v. State, 166 Neb. 736 , 90 N. W. 2d 340 .

1958However, it has been cited as authority for the above-quoted rule in Bartlett v. State, 115 Neb. 148 , 211 N. W. 994 .) “The credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence are for the jury to determine in a criminal case in which the evidence presents an issue of fact as to the guilt or innocence of the accused and the conclusion of the jury may not be disturbed by this court unless it is clearly wrong.” Sedlacek v. State, 166 Neb. 736 , 90 N. W. 2d 340 .