above-quoted standard in Mississippi

1986The U.S. Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the Adams standard in Wainwright v. Witt , in which Justice Rehnquist wrote: We therefore take this opportunity to clarify our decision in Witherspoon, and to reaffirm the above-quoted standard from Adams as the proper standard for determining when a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment. 469 U.S. at ___ , 105 S.Ct. at 582 , 83 L.Ed.2d at 851 .

1986The U.S. Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the Adams standard in Wainwright v. Witt , in which Justice Rehnquist wrote: We therefore take this opportunity to clarify our decision in Witherspoon, and to reaffirm the above-quoted standard from Adams as the proper standard for determining when a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment. 469 U.S. at ___ , 105 S.Ct. at 582 , 83 L.Ed.2d at 851 .

2016Nevertheless, the trial court in the instant case properly instructed the jury on every element of the charged offense and also gave the above-quoted instruction from Fortune defining the'word “willfully.” See Moore v. State, 676 So.2d 244, 246 (Miss.1996) (quoting Ousley v. State, 164 Miss. 451 , 122 So. 731, 732 (1929)) (“This Court has stated that ‘it is inconceivable that an act willfully done is not also knowingly done.’ Stated differently, ‘willfully’ means ‘knowingly.’ Moreover, ‘wil[l]ful’ means nothing more than doing an act intentionally.”).

2016The trial court’s determination that Isaac had failed to prove facts to show he did not commit arson was a finding of fact, so the Court affords it great deference on appeal. “‘A circuit court judge sitting without a jury is accorded the same deference with regard to his findings as a chancellor,’ and his findings are safe on appeal where they are supported by substantial, credible, and reasonable evidence.” City of Jackson v. Perry, 764 So.2d 373, 376 (¶ 9) (Miss.2000) (quoting Puckett v. Stuckey, 633 So.2d 978, 982 (Miss.1993)); see also Hymes v. State, 121 So.3d 938, 943-44 (¶ 18) (Miss.Ct.

2016The trial court’s determination that Isaac had failed to prove facts to show he did not commit arson was a finding of fact, so the Court affords it great deference on appeal. “‘A circuit court judge sitting without a jury is accorded the same deference with regard to his findings as a chancellor,’ and his findings are safe on appeal where they are supported by substantial, credible, and reasonable evidence.” City of Jackson v. Perry, 764 So.2d 373, 376 (¶ 9) (Miss.2000) (quoting Puckett v. Stuckey, 633 So.2d 978, 982 (Miss.1993)); see also Hymes v. State, 121 So.3d 938, 943-44 (¶ 18) (Miss.Ct.

2016The trial court’s determination that Isaac had failed to prove facts to show he did not commit arson was a finding of fact, so the Court affords it great deference on appeal. “‘A circuit court judge sitting without a jury is accorded the same deference with regard to his findings as a chancellor,’ and his findings are safe on appeal where they are supported by substantial, credible, and reasonable evidence.” City of Jackson v. Perry, 764 So.2d 373, 376 (¶ 9) (Miss.2000) (quoting Puckett v. Stuckey, 633 So.2d 978, 982 (Miss.1993)); see also Hymes v. State, 121 So.3d 938, 943-44 (¶ 18) (Miss.Ct.

2016The Court will not disturb the findings of a trial judge unless the Court determines the findings “are manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous or an erroneous legal standard was applied.” Perry, 764 So.2d at 376 (citing Bell v. City of Bay St.

2016Nevertheless, the trial court in the instant case properly instructed the jury on every element of the charged offense and also gave the above-quoted instruction from Fortune defining the'word “willfully.” See Moore v. State, 676 So.2d 244, 246 (Miss.1996) (quoting Ousley v. State, 164 Miss. 451 , 122 So. 731, 732 (1929)) (“This Court has stated that ‘it is inconceivable that an act willfully done is not also knowingly done.’ Stated differently, ‘willfully’ means ‘knowingly.’ Moreover, ‘wil[l]ful’ means nothing more than doing an act intentionally.”).

1986Additionally, this Court recently commented on the Adams standard in saying, "Although the United States Supreme Court has refined the Witherspoon decision in Adams , the issue remains the ability of the prospective juror to follow the instructions and the jurors oath." Gray v. State, 472 So.2d 409, 421 (Miss. 1985).