reasonable probability standard in Tennessee

2016The reasonable probability standard “requires a „substantial,‟ not just „conceivable,‟ likelihood of a different result.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 189 (2011).

2014The reasonable probability standard “requires a ‘substantial,’ not just ‘conceivable,’ likelihood of a different result.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1403 (2011).

2016In evaluating whether a petitioner satisfied the prejudice prong, a court must ask “whether counsel‟s deficient performance renders the result of the trial unreliable or the proceeding fundamentally unfair.” Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 ).

2014In evaluating whether the petitioner satisfied the prejudice prong, a court must ask “whether counsel’s deficient performance renders the result of the trial unreliable or the proceeding fundamentally unfair.” Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 ).

2008The Appellant, relying upon Johnson v. Hardin, 926 S.W.2d 236, 242 (Tenn.1996), asserts that the trial court’s instruction “amounts to an undue intrusion into the exclusive province of the jury.” He adds that “there is a reasonable probability that the instruction coerced a finding by the jury that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances because to find otheiwise would require the jury to ignore the emotional victim impact evidence presented by the State.” The Appellant’s reliance upon Johnson is misplaced because in Johnson our supreme court addressed the issue o

2007The Appellant, relying upon Johnson v. Hardin, 926 S.W.2d 236, 242 (Tenn. 1996), asserts that the trial court’s instruction “amounts to an undue intrusion into the exclusive province of the jury.” He adds that “there is a reasonable probability that the instruction coerced a finding by the jury that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances because to find otherwise would require the jury to ignore the emotional victim impact evidence presented by the State.” The Appellant’s reliance upon Johnson is misplaced because in Johnson -45- our supreme court addressed the i

2014As our supreme court has explained, “‘the trial court should postulate whatever realistically possible test results would be most favorable to [the petitioner] in determining whether he has established’ the reasonable probability requirement.” 343 S.W.3d at 51 (quoting State v. Peterson, 836 A.2d 821, 827 (N.J.

2012To this end, courts “‘should postulate whatever realistically possible test results would be most favorable to [the] defendant in determining whether he has established’ the reasonable probability requirement under that jurisdiction’s DNA testing statute.” Id. (quoting Peterson, 836 A.2d at 827 ).

2016In evaluating whether a petitioner satisfied the prejudice prong, a court must ask “whether counsel‟s deficient performance renders the result of the trial unreliable or the proceeding fundamentally unfair.” Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 ).

1999See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 692, 694 (1984)(petitioner must shown a reasonable probability that his defense was prejudiced in order to receive relief).

2006The defendant contends that “there is a reasonable probability that the instruction coerced a finding by the jury that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances because to find otherwise would require the jury to ignore the emotional victim impact evidence presented by the State.” The instruction provided to the jury in the present case was recommended by our supreme court in Nesbit, 978 S.W.2d at 892 , and was discussed and approved by our supreme court in Reid, 91 S.W.3d at 283 .

2006The instruction provided to the jury in the present case was recommended by our supreme court in State v. Nesbit, 978 S.W.2d 872, 892 (Tenn. 1998), and was discussed and approved by our supreme court in State v. Reid, 91 S.W.3d 247, 282-83 (Tenn. 2002).

2006The defendant contends that “there is a reasonable probability that the instruction coerced a finding by the jury that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances because to find otherwise would require the jury to ignore the emotional victim impact evidence presented by the State.” The instruction provided to the jury in the present case was recommended by our supreme court in Nesbit, 978 S.W.2d at 892 , and was discussed and approved by our supreme court in Reid, 91 S.W.3d at 283 .

2006The instruction provided to the jury in the present case was recommended by our supreme court in State v. Nesbit, 978 S.W.2d 872, 892 (Tenn. 1998), and was discussed and approved by our supreme court in State v. Reid, 91 S.W.3d 247, 282-83 (Tenn. 2002).

2025State v. Edgin, 902 S.W.2d 387, 390 (Tenn. 1995) (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995)) (explaining what reasonable probability is in the context of the materiality standard for Brady material).

2025State v. Edgin, 902 S.W.2d 387, 390 (Tenn. 1995) (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995)) (explaining what reasonable probability is in the context of the materiality standard for Brady material).

2013The reasonable probability standard “requires a ‘substantial,’ not just ‘conceivable,’ likelihood of a different result.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1403 (2011) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 791 (2011)).

2011In keeping with the reasonable probability standard, it is still helpful to consider the factors applicable when determining whether the violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt on direct appeal. -10- On direct appeal, when faced with a Momon violation, reviewing courts should consider “(1) the importance of the defendant’s testimony to the defense case; (2) the cumulative nature of the testimony; (3) the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the defendant on material points; [and] (4) the overall strength of the prosecution’s case.” Id. at 168; accord State v.

2010See id.; see also Overton, 874 S.W.2d 6, 11 (Tenn. 1994) (“To establish actual prejudice, the defendant must demonstrate that ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’”), cf. State v. Allen, 69 S.W.3d 181, 189 (Tenn. 2002) (articulating a traditional test for harmless constitutional error in omitting jury instruction on lesser included offense and indicating that the conviction will be reversed on direct appeal unless the reviewing court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not

2010In United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867 , 102 S.Ct. 3440, 3446 (1982), relied upon by Justice Boyle, the Supreme Court addressed the showing required by a defendant attempting to demonstrate a violation of compulsory process after the government deports possible defense witnesses who have not been previously interviewed by defense counsel.

2010In United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867 , 102 S.Ct. 3440, 3446 (1982), relied upon by Justice Boyle, the Supreme Court addressed the showing required by a defendant attempting to demonstrate a violation of compulsory process after the government deports possible defense witnesses who have not been previously interviewed by defense counsel.

2010See id.; see also Overton, 874 S.W.2d 6, 11 (Tenn. 1994) (“To establish actual prejudice, the defendant must demonstrate that ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’”), cf. State v. Allen, 69 S.W.3d 181, 189 (Tenn. 2002) (articulating a traditional test for harmless constitutional error in omitting jury instruction on lesser included offense and indicating that the conviction will be reversed on direct appeal unless the reviewing court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not

2006The Petitioner strenuously asserts that the results of testing need not only be considered individually, but also collectively, in order to obtain what the Petitioner refers to as “redundant results.” In Alley I, this Court stated that “[a] ‘reasonable probability’ of a different result exists when the evidence at issue, in this case potentially favorable DNA results, undermines confidence in the outcome of the prosecution.” Sedley Alley, 2004 WL 1196095 , at *9; see also State v. Workman, 111 S.W.3d 10, 18 (Tenn. Crim.

2006See also State v. Reid, 164 S.W.3d 286, 336-37 (Tenn. 2005) (Appendix); Cole, 155 S.W.3d at 914 (approving Nesbit victim impact instruction).

2006See also State v. Reid, 164 S.W.3d 286, 336-37 (Tenn. 2005) (Appendix); Cole, 155 S.W.3d at 914 (approving Nesbit victim impact instruction).