reasonable probability error in District of Columbia

2007The result of a proceeding can be rendered unreliable, and hence the proceeding itself unfair, even if the errors of counsel cannot be shown by a preponderance of the evidence to have determined the outcome." Id. at 693-94 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 ; see also United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83 , 124 S.Ct. 2333 , 159 L.Ed.2d 157 (2004) ("The reasonable-probability standard is not the same as, and should not be confused with, a requirement that a defendant prove by a preponderance of the evidence that but for error things would have been different.") (citation omitted).

2007The result of a proceeding can be rendered unreliable, and hence the proceeding itself unfair, even if the errors of counsel cannot be shown by a preponderance of the evidence to have determined the outcome." Id. at 693-94 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 ; see also United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83 , 124 S.Ct. 2333 , 159 L.Ed.2d 157 (2004) ("The reasonable-probability standard is not the same as, and should not be confused with, a requirement that a defendant prove by a preponderance of the evidence that but for error things would have been different.") (citation omitted).

2018In order to prevail when bringing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant must show that “his trial attorney's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that there is a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the trial to his prejudice.” Simpson v. United States, 576 A.2d 1336, 1337 (D.C. 1990) (see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984)).

2018In order to prevail when bringing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant must show that "his trial attorney's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that there is a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the trial to his prejudice." Simpson v. United States , 576 A.2d 1336 , 1337 (D.C. 1990) ( see Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 , 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) ).

2008Therefore, although the DEA chemist did not appear at the trial, we are not persuaded under the particular circumstances here that there was “a reasonable probability that the violation of the Confrontation Clause here had a prejudicial effect on the outcome of his trial.” 4 Thomas, supra, 914 A.2d at 21 (citation omitted).

2007Thomas, 914 A.2d at 21 (citations omitted).

2018In order to prevail when bringing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant must show that "his trial attorney's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that there is a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the trial to his prejudice." Simpson v. United States , 576 A.2d 1336 , 1337 (D.C. 1990) ( see Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 , 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) ).

2018In order to prevail when bringing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant must show that "his trial attorney's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that there is a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the trial to his prejudice." Simpson v. United States , 576 A.2d 1336 , 1337 (D.C. 1990) ( see Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 , 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) ).

2014Even assuming, without deciding, that Mr. Thompkins can show that the trial court’s error “affected his substantial rights” because there is “a reasonable probability that the error had a prejudicial effect on the outcome of his trial,” Green v. United States, 948 A.2d 554, 560 (D.C. 2008), we are satisfied on this record that he cannot satisfy his burden to show that *423 the error “resulted in a clear miscarriage of justice,” or that it seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of his trial.

2013The court appears to have mistakenly borrowed the pleading requirement of “specific, non-conclusory facts” from § 22-4135(c), which governs motions “to vacate the conviction or to grant a new trial on grounds of actual innocence based on new evidence,” § 22-4135(a), and assessed Mr. Mitchell’s request against that requirement, as opposed to using the “reasonable probability” standard of § 22-4133(d). 11 Rather than deciding ourselves whether Mr. Mitchell showed a “reasonable probability,” we remand his application for DNA testing to the trial court to give it an opportunity to parse alternativ

2013The court appears to have mistakenly borrowed the pleading requirement of “specific, non-conclusory facts” from § 22-4135(c), which governs motions “to vacate the conviction or to grant a new trial on grounds of actual innocence based on new evidence,” § 22-4135(a), and assessed Mr. Mitchell’s request against that requirement, as opposed to using the “reasonable probability” standard of § 22-4133(d). 11 Rather than deciding ourselves whether Mr. Mitchell showed a “reasonable probability,” we remand his application for DNA testing to the trial court to give it an opportunity to parse alternativ

2008See United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 81-82 , 124 S.Ct. 2333 , 159 L.Ed.2d 157 (2004) (“In cases where the burden of demonstrating prejudice (or materiality) is on the defendant seeking relief, we have invoked a standard with similarities to the Kotteakos [v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 , 66 S.Ct. 1239 , 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946)] formulation in requiring the showing of a reasonable probability that, but for [the error claimed], the result of the proceeding would have been different.” (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2008See United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 81-82 , 124 S.Ct. 2333 , 159 L.Ed.2d 157 (2004) (“In cases where the burden of demonstrating prejudice (or materiality) is on the defendant seeking relief, we have invoked a standard with similarities to the Kotteakos [v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 , 66 S.Ct. 1239 , 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946)] formulation in requiring the showing of a reasonable probability that, but for [the error claimed], the result of the proceeding would have been different.” (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2006The Second Circuit has held that where (as in the present case) a supervening decision alters settled law, the Olano conditions for finding reversible plain error still must be met, but with "one crucial distinction: the burden of persuasion as to prejudice (or, more precisely, lack of prejudice) is borne by the government, and not the defendant.” United States v. Viola, 35 F.3d 37, 42 (2d Cir.1994).