reasonable probability error in Colorado

2025Id. ¶ 66 When a defendant objects to the trial court’s ruling on a jury instruction, we review for nonconstitutional harmless error and will affirm if “there is not a reasonable probability that the error contributed to the defendant’s conviction.” People v. Garcia, 28 P.3d 340, 344 (Colo. 2001) (quoting Salcedo v. People, 999 P.2d 833, 841 (Colo. 2000)).

2025However, if the jury was adequately instructed on the law, we review for an abuse of discretion a court’s decision to give a particular instruction, and we “will not disturb the ruling unless it is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair.” People v. Trujillo, 2018 COA 12, ¶ 11 . ¶ 23 When a defendant objects to the court’s ruling, we review for nonconstitutional harmless error and affirm if “there is not a reasonable probability that the error contributed to the defendant’s conviction.” People v. Garcia, 28 P.3d 340, 344 (Colo. 2011) (quoting Salcedo v. People, 999 P.2d 833, 841 (Colo. 2

2026But a court doesn’t err by rejecting a theory of defense instruction if it is “argumentative or merely highlights specific pieces of evidence.” People v. Omwanda, 2014 COA 128, ¶ 41 . ¶ 16 “When a defendant objects to the trial court’s ruling on a jury instruction, we review for nonconstitutional harmless error and will thus affirm if ‘there is not a reasonable probability that the error contributed to the defendant’s conviction.’” Trujillo, ¶ 12 (quoting People v. Garcia, 28 P.3d 340, 344 (Colo. 2001)); see also People v. Joosten, 2018 COA 115, ¶ 40 (“A court’s improper rejection of a theory

2025However, if the jury was adequately instructed on the law, we review for an abuse of discretion a court’s decision to give a particular instruction, and we “will not disturb the ruling unless it is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair.” People v. Trujillo, 2018 COA 12, ¶ 11 . ¶ 23 When a defendant objects to the court’s ruling, we review for nonconstitutional harmless error and affirm if “there is not a reasonable probability that the error contributed to the defendant’s conviction.” People v. Garcia, 28 P.3d 340, 344 (Colo. 2011) (quoting Salcedo v. People, 999 P.2d 833, 841 (Colo. 2

2020“Put differently, [a defendant] is entitled to reversal if 20 there is ‘a reasonable probability that the error contributed to [his] conviction.’” Yusem v. People, 210 P.3d 458, 469 (Colo. 2009) (quoting People v. Garcia, 28 P.3d 340, 344 (Colo. 2001)); People v. Zapata, 2016 COA 75M , ¶ 38, aff’d, 2018 CO 82 . ¶ 50 The only issue at trial was whether Rojas obtained the food stamps by deception.

2016Thus, a defendant is only “entitled to rever *501 sal if there is ‘a reasonable probability that the error contributed to the defendant’s conviction.’” Yus ero, 210 P.3d at 469 (citation omitted). ¶ 67 There was no such reasonable probability here, especially considering that some of the sex toys and pornography were properly admitted, and the prosecutor did not argue — and in fact explicitly . disclaimed— that the jury should use the sex toys and pornography as propensity evidence.

2025Hagos v. People , 2012 CO 63, ¶ 11, 288 P.3d 116, 119 ("In other words, we reverse if 'there is a reasonable possibility that the [error] might have contributed to the conviction.'") (alteration in original) (quoting Chapman v. California , 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). 23 ¶53 Here, assuming without deciding that the nonconstitutional harmless error standard applies as the People contend, we conclude that there is a reasonable probability that the error contributed to Schnorenberg's convictions. ¶54 As noted above, Schnorenberg's primary defense at trial was that he did not disclose certain informa

2025Hagos v. People , 2012 CO 63, ¶ 11, 288 P.3d 116, 119 ("In other words, we reverse if 'there is a reasonable possibility that the [error] might have contributed to the conviction.'") (alteration in original) (quoting Chapman v. California , 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). 23 ¶53 Here, assuming without deciding that the nonconstitutional harmless error standard applies as the People contend, we conclude that there is a reasonable probability that the error contributed to Schnorenberg's convictions. ¶54 As noted above, Schnorenberg's primary defense at trial was that he did not disclose certain informa

2008Error is harmless "if there is not a reasonable probability that the error contributed to the defendant's conviction." Crider v. People, 186 P.3d 39, 45 (Colo.2008) (citations omitted); see also People v. Miller, 113 P.3d 743, 754 (Colo.2005).

2008Error is harmless "if there is not a reasonable probability that the error contributed to the defendant's conviction." Crider v. People, 186 P.3d 39, 45 (Colo.2008) (citations omitted); see also People v. Miller, 113 P.3d 743, 754 (Colo.2005).

2026See id. ¶ 16 A permissive inference “allows, but does not require, the trier of fact to infer” something.

2009See, eg., Yusem v. People, 210 P.3d 458, 469-70 (Colo.2009); Crider v. People, 186 P.3d 39, 42 (Colo.2008); Raile v. People, 148 P.3d 126, 134 (Colo.2006); Mata-Medina v. People, 71 P.3d 973, 980 (Colo.2003); Grant v. People, 48 P.3d 543, 554 (Colo.2002); People v. Garcia, 28 P.3d 340, 344 (Colo.2001).

2025Hagos v. People , 2012 CO 63 , ¶ 11 , 288 P.3d 116, 119 ( "In other words, we reverse if 'there is a reasonable possibility that the [error] might have contributed to the conviction.' " ) ( alteration in original ) ( quoting Chapman v. California , 386 U.S. 18, 24 ( 1967 ) ) . ¶53 Here, assuming without deciding that the nonconstitutional harmless error standard applies as the People contend, we conclude that there is a reasonable probability that the error contributed to Schnorenberg's convictions. ¶54 As noted above, Schnorenberg's primary defense at trial was that he did not disclose certai

2025Hagos v. People , 2012 CO 63, ¶ 11, 288 P.3d 116, 119 ("In other words, we reverse if 'there is a reasonable possibility that the [error] might have contributed to the conviction.'") (alteration in original) (quoting Chapman v. California , 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). 23 ¶53 Here, assuming without deciding that the nonconstitutional harmless error standard applies as the People contend, we conclude that there is a reasonable probability that the error contributed to Schnorenberg's convictions. ¶54 As noted above, Schnorenberg's primary defense at trial was that he did not disclose certain informa

2014The defendant must "establish a reasonable probability that the error contributed to the verdict." Krutsinger v. People, 219 P.3d 1054, 1063 (Colo.2009); see also People v. Quintana, 665 P.2d 605, 612 (Colo.1983) ("[The appropriate question is whether the error substantially influenced the verdict or affected the fairness of the trial proceedings."). . 128 In the specific situation that confronts us, the court in Novotny made clear that the mere loss of a peremptory challenge, standing alone, is insufficient to require reversal..

2014Krutsinger v. People, 219 P.3d 1054, 1063 (Colo.2009); see Hagos v. People, 2012 CO 63, 112 , 288 P.3d 116 ; see also Teulin v. People, 715 P.2d 838, 342 (Colo.1986) (The defendant must show that the error "substantially influenced the verdict or affected the fairness of the trial proceedings.").

2008Error is harmless "if there is not a reasonable probability that the error contributed to the defendant's conviction." Crider v. People, 186 P.3d 39, 45 (Colo.2008) (citations omitted); see also People v. Miller, 113 P.3d 743, 754 (Colo.2005).

2008Error is harmless "if there is not a reasonable probability that the error contributed to the defendant's conviction." Crider v. People, 186 P.3d 39, 45 (Colo.2008) (citations omitted); see also People v. Miller, 113 P.3d 743, 754 (Colo.2005).

2025Id. ¶ 29 We review a preserved claim of prosecutorial misconduct for an abuse of discretion, People v. Monroe, 2018 COA 110, ¶ 11 , aff’d, 2020 CO 67 , and “will only reverse if there is a reasonable probability that the error contributed to the defendant’s conviction.” Id.

2025Id. ¶ 29 We review a preserved claim of prosecutorial misconduct for an abuse of discretion, People v. Monroe, 2018 COA 110, ¶ 11 , aff’d, 2020 CO 67 , and “will only reverse if there is a reasonable probability that the error contributed to the defendant’s conviction.” Id.

2026But a court doesn’t err by rejecting a theory of defense instruction if it is “argumentative or merely highlights specific pieces of evidence.” People v. Omwanda, 2014 COA 128, ¶ 41 . ¶ 16 “When a defendant objects to the trial court’s ruling on a jury instruction, we review for nonconstitutional harmless error and will thus affirm if ‘there is not a reasonable probability that the error contributed to the defendant’s conviction.’” Trujillo, ¶ 12 (quoting People v. Garcia, 28 P.3d 340, 344 (Colo. 2001)); see also People v. Joosten, 2018 COA 115, ¶ 40 (“A court’s improper rejection of a theory

2026See id.

2026But a court doesn’t err by rejecting a theory of defense instruction if it is “argumentative or merely highlights specific pieces of evidence.” People v. Omwanda, 2014 COA 128, ¶ 41 . ¶ 16 “When a defendant objects to the trial court’s ruling on a jury instruction, we review for nonconstitutional harmless error and will thus affirm if ‘there is not a reasonable probability that the error contributed to the defendant’s conviction.’” Trujillo, ¶ 12 (quoting People v. Garcia, 28 P.3d 340, 344 (Colo. 2001)); see also People v. Joosten, 2018 COA 115, ¶ 40 (“A court’s improper rejection of a theory

2026See People v. Sifuentes, 2017 COA 48M , ¶ 20 (“Some objective evidence must corroborate the defendant’s testimony that he would have made a different decision about the plea if he had been properly advised.”). ¶ 45 Disparities between the actual sentence the defendant faced and the sentence he could have received if his counsel had been effective “are an important factor in the reasonable-probability inquiry where a defendant claims he would have accepted a plea but for his counsel’s error.” Baker v. United States, 109 F.4th 187 , 22 197 (3d Cir. 2024); cf. People v. Carmichael, 206 P.3d 800,

2026See A.W., 982 P.2d at 852 ; Aguilar, ¶ 9.

2026See People v. Sifuentes, 2017 COA 48M , ¶ 20 (“Some objective evidence must corroborate the defendant’s testimony that he would have made a different decision about the plea if he had been properly advised.”). ¶ 45 Disparities between the actual sentence the defendant faced and the sentence he could have received if his counsel had been effective “are an important factor in the reasonable-probability inquiry where a defendant claims he would have accepted a plea but for his counsel’s error.” Baker v. United States, 109 F.4th 187 , 22 197 (3d Cir. 2024); cf. People v. Carmichael, 206 P.3d 800,

2025However, if the jury was adequately instructed on the law, we review for an abuse of discretion a court’s decision to give a particular instruction, and we “will not disturb the ruling unless it is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair.” People v. Trujillo, 2018 COA 12, ¶ 11 . ¶ 23 When a defendant objects to the court’s ruling, we review for nonconstitutional harmless error and affirm if “there is not a reasonable probability that the error contributed to the defendant’s conviction.” People v. Garcia, 28 P.3d 340, 344 (Colo. 2011) (quoting Salcedo v. People, 999 P.2d 833, 841 (Colo. 2

2025However, if the jury was adequately instructed on the law, we review for an abuse of discretion a court’s decision to give a particular instruction, and we “will not disturb the ruling unless it is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair.” People v. Trujillo, 2018 COA 12, ¶ 11 . ¶ 23 When a defendant objects to the court’s ruling, we review for nonconstitutional harmless error and affirm if “there is not a reasonable probability that the error contributed to the defendant’s conviction.” People v. Garcia, 28 P.3d 340, 344 (Colo. 2011) (quoting Salcedo v. People, 999 P.2d 833, 841 (Colo. 2

2025However, if the jury was adequately instructed on the law, we review for an abuse of discretion a court’s decision to give a particular instruction, and we “will not disturb the ruling unless it is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair.” People v. Trujillo, 2018 COA 12, ¶ 11 . ¶ 23 When a defendant objects to the court’s ruling, we review for nonconstitutional harmless error and affirm if “there is not a reasonable probability that the error contributed to the defendant’s conviction.” People v. Garcia, 28 P.3d 340, 344 (Colo. 2011) (quoting Salcedo v. People, 999 P.2d 833, 841 (Colo. 2

2025Thus, the response did not 44 expand the bases on which the jury could find guilt, as Dearing alleges; it limited the bases, and therefore it “inure[d] to [Dearing’s] benefit.” People v. Lopez, 2015 COA 45, ¶ 46 (instruction that required jury to consider additional factors when such factors were irrelevant effectively added an element to the offense and therefore any error benefitted the defendant and was harmless). ¶ 97 And there is no reasonable probability that, under the court’s narrower definition, the jury found that the exterior landing was an “occupied structure.” See People v. Snelli

2024Espinoza , 712 P.2d at 478 (finding no plain error where t he court erroneous ly defined “knowingly” because the mental state was not conteste d at trial); People v. Geyer , 942 P.2d 1297, 1301 (Colo. App. 1996) (finding the court’s instructions on “unlawful entry” did not constitute plain error because the defendant did not contest that he was not authorized to enter the unit ). ¶ 31 Therefore, based on the above, we also conclude that any alleged error was not substantial because the record reveals that there is not a reasonable probability that the error contri buted to Clark’s conviction.