reasonable probability error in California

2026(See People v. Vance (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 706 , 717 [under prejudice standard for state law errors, defendant bears burden of persuasion on issue of prejudice], citing People v. Penunuri (2018) 5 Cal.5th 126, 169 .8) As set forth below, it is not reasonably probable that it affected 8 Errors in applying state evidentiary law are subject to the prejudice test enunciated in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson), which requires a defendant to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the trial, except in rare cases in which the error prevented a de

2026(See People v. Vance (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 706 , 717 [under prejudice standard for state law errors, defendant bears burden of persuasion on issue of prejudice], citing People v. Penunuri (2018) 5 Cal.5th 126, 169 .8) As set forth below, it is not reasonably probable that it affected 8 Errors in applying state evidentiary law are subject to the prejudice test enunciated in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson), which requires a defendant to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the trial, except in rare cases in which the error prevented a de

2025(Id. at p. 195.) In determining whether there is a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome, we undertake “an examination of the entire record.” (People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 165 .) And, it cannot “be said that an erroneous failure to instruct on a lesser included offense is necessarily prejudicial, on the premise that if the evidence was substantial enough to warrant lesser offense instructions in the first place, it must have been strong enough to affect the outcome had the instructions not been omitted.” (Id. at p. 177.) Instead, our harmless “review focuses

2025(See Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 165, 169 [failure to instruct on lesser included offense is error of California law alone and therefore subject to state standards of reversibility].) Under this standard, the failure to instruct on a lesser included offense “is not subject to reversal unless an examination of the entire record establishes a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome.” (Breverman, at p. 165.) In applying this standard, we focus “not on what a reasonable jury could do, but 14 what such a jury is likely to have done in the absence of the error under consid

2025When an involuntary confession is admitted at trial, prejudice from the error is generally viewed under the reasonable probability test embodied in article VI, section 13 of the California Constitution (see People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 , 9 836), unless its exclusion is mandated under the federal Constitution, in which case the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of harmless error under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 , 24 is applicable.

2024Nonetheless, any error was harmless, whether evaluated under the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 , applicable to federal constitutional error, or under the reasonable probability standard in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 , applicable to state law statutory error.

2025(See Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 165, 169 [failure to instruct on lesser included offense is error of California law alone and therefore subject to state standards of reversibility].) Under this standard, the failure to instruct on a lesser included offense “is not subject to reversal unless an examination of the entire record establishes a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome.” (Breverman, at p. 165.) In applying this standard, we focus “not on what a reasonable jury could do, but 14 what such a jury is likely to have done in the absence of the error under consid

2025We review a trial court’s failure to instruct on a lesser included offense for prejudice under the Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818 , harmless error standard. ( Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 867–868; see People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237 , 260.) Such an error “does not require reversal ‘unless an examination of the entire record establishes a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome.’ ” (People v. Wyatt (2012) 55 Cal.4th 694, 698 ; People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 955 .) Accordingly, a trial court’s failure to instruct on a lesser included offense is harmless if

2024(See People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838 , 896–899 [erroneous voluntary intoxication instruction concerning aider and abettor liability did not violate due process and thus the question was whether it was reasonably probable the error affected the verdict adversely to the defendant]; People v. Pearson (2012) 53 Cal.4th 306, 325 (Pearson) [failure to instruct on voluntary intoxication in relation to the specific intent to torture reviewable for prejudice under the reasonable probability test]; People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 187 [assumed erroneous voluntary intoxication

2024(See Pearson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 325, fn. 9 [“The failure to give a fully inclusive pinpoint instruction on voluntary intoxication did not, contrary to defendant’s contention, deprive him of his federal fair trial right or unconstitutionally lessen the prosecutor’s burden of proof”].) As our Supreme Court held in Mendoza, when an instructional error precludes the jury from considering evidence of voluntary intoxication in deciding whether the prosecution met 28 its burden to establish a necessary mental state, “[a]ny error would have the effect of excluding defense evidence and is thus su

2024(See People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838 , 896–899 [erroneous voluntary intoxication instruction concerning aider and abettor liability did not violate due process and thus the question was whether it was reasonably probable the error affected the verdict adversely to the defendant]; People v. Pearson (2012) 53 Cal.4th 306, 325 (Pearson) [failure to instruct on voluntary intoxication in relation to the specific intent to torture reviewable for prejudice under the reasonable probability test]; People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 187 [assumed erroneous voluntary intoxication

2024(See Pearson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 325, fn. 9 [“The failure to give a fully inclusive pinpoint instruction on voluntary intoxication did not, contrary to defendant’s contention, deprive him of his federal fair trial right or unconstitutionally lessen the prosecutor’s burden of proof”].) As our Supreme Court held in Mendoza, when an instructional error precludes the jury from considering evidence of voluntary intoxication in deciding whether the prosecution met 28 its burden to establish a necessary mental state, “[a]ny error would have the effect of excluding defense evidence and is thus su

2024(See People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838 , 896–899 [erroneous voluntary intoxication instruction concerning aider and abettor liability did not violate due process and thus the question was whether it was reasonably probable the error affected the verdict adversely to the defendant]; People v. Pearson (2012) 53 Cal.4th 306, 325 (Pearson) [failure to instruct on voluntary intoxication in relation to the specific intent to torture reviewable for prejudice under the reasonable probability test]; People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 187 [assumed erroneous voluntary intoxication

2021(People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 187 ; People v. Mendoza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1114, 1134-1135 .) Under the circumstances, we reverse only if we find a reasonable probability the error affected the verdict adversely to Schmidt.

2020(People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 366-367 ; Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 697 .) Even if 7 we were to assume, without deciding, that a claim-of-right defense was supported by the evidence and defense counsel was deficient in failing to request such a pinpoint instruction and focusing on the defense in closing argument, we cannot conclude defendant has established a reasonable probability such an instruction and a related discussion in closing argument would have affected the verdict.

2008Seizing upon part of the Strickland formulation—"a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome" ( Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694 )—petitioner contends that the reasonable probability requirement can be satisfied by something less than showing a different, more favorable result.

2021(See People v. Trujeque (2015) 61 Cal.4th 227, 280 [“Evidence Code section 352 claim . . . is reviewed under the reasonable probability standard for prejudice”]; People v. Marks (2003) 31 Cal.4th 197, 226-227 [“the application of ordinary rules of evidence like Evidence Code section 352 does not implicate the federal Constitution, and thus we review allegations of error under the ‘reasonable probability’ standard of Watson”]; People v. Felix (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 177 , 187 [“We review evidentiary errors for prejudice by determining whether it was reasonably probable that a jury would have retu

2016(People v. Marks (2003) 31 Cal.4th 197, 226-227 [we review error in admitting evidence under ordinary rules of evidence like Evidence Code section 352 under the reasonable probability standard of People v. 13 Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 ].) As we have explained, the evidence supporting the conviction is strong.

2024(See People v. Ledesma, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 705 .) “[T]o be entitled to relief on appeal from an alleged abuse of discretion, it must clearly appear the resulting injury is sufficiently grave to manifest a miscarriage of justice.” (In re Richard E. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 349, 354 ; In re K.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 566 , 606; accord, People v. Johnson (2022) 12 Cal.5th 544 , 605–606.) The miscarriage of justice requirement permits “reversal only if the reviewing court finds 22. it reasonably probable the result would have been more favorable to the appealing party but for the error.” (In re Celin

2023(See People v. Hernandez (2011) 51 Cal.4th 733, 746 [“This requirement that the defendant demonstrate actual prejudice is consistent with the defendant’s burden under Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at page 837 , to establish a reasonable probability that error affected the trial’s result.”].) A comparison of the two jury instructions supports our conclusion.

2025We review a trial court’s failure to instruct on a lesser included offense for prejudice under the Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818 , harmless error standard. ( Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 867–868; see People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237 , 260.) Such an error “does not require reversal ‘unless an examination of the entire record establishes a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome.’ ” (People v. Wyatt (2012) 55 Cal.4th 694, 698 ; People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 955 .) Accordingly, a trial court’s failure to instruct on a lesser included offense is harmless if

2025(Brown, at pp. 154-155; People v. White (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 161, 168 .) The failure to instruct on a lesser-included offense requires reversal in a noncapital case only if “an examination of the entire record establishes a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome.” (People v. Wyatt (2012) 55 Cal.4th 694, 698 .) Even if we assume for purposes of argument that the trial court should have given a lesser-included instruction on assault, there is no reasonable probability that a jury would have convicted defendant solely of assault (rather than resisting an executive officer) be

2021(People v. Debose (2014) 59 Cal.4th 177 , 205–206 [“ ‘error of instruction on an inapplicable legal theory is reviewed under the reasonable probability standard’ ” of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 ].) In arguing otherwise, appellant relies on People v. Vasquez (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1176 , but his reliance is misplaced.

2019To the extent the court erred in instructing on a theory unsupported by the evidence, the error is one of state law, “subject to the reasonable probability standard of harmless error under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 , 836–837 [(Watson)].” (People v. Whisenhunt (2008) 44 Cal.4th 174, 214 ; see also People v. Debose (2014) 59 Cal.4th 177 , 205–206 [error of instructing on inapplicable theory subject to Watson review] (Debose).) On the other hand, “[i]nstructional error regarding the elements of the offense 9 Even if there had been evidence of a primary target, the kill zone theory req

2026(See People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 47 [applying Watson standard to evidentiary error]; People v. Trujeque (2015) 61 Cal.4th 227, 280 [section 352 error “is reviewed under the reasonable probability standard for prejudice” of Watson].) “A ‘reasonable probability’ ‘does not mean more likely than not, but merely a reasonable 25 chance, more than an abstract possibility.’” (People v. Hardy (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 312 , 329-330.) We conclude there was a reasonable chance the jury would not have convicted Tzul of first degree murder or even second degree murder absent the error.

2026(See People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 47 [applying Watson standard to evidentiary error]; People v. Trujeque (2015) 61 Cal.4th 227, 280 [section 352 error “is reviewed under the reasonable probability standard for prejudice” of Watson].) “A ‘reasonable probability’ ‘does not mean more likely than not, but merely a reasonable 25 chance, more than an abstract possibility.’” (People v. Hardy (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 312 , 329-330.) We conclude there was a reasonable chance the jury would not have convicted Tzul of first degree murder or even second degree murder absent the error.

2021Under that scenario, [appellant] could have been found not guilty of the section 69 violation, but still guilt of the lesser crime of assault.” (Brown, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 154 .) We also conclude that the error in failing to instruct on simple assault was prejudicial. “‘“[T]he failure to instruct sua sponte on a lesser included offense in a noncapital case is, at most, an error of California law alone, and is thus subject only to state standards of reversibility.” [Citation.] Under the state standard, “such misdirection of the jury is not subject to reversal unless an examination of t

2021Under that scenario, [appellant] could have been found not guilty of the section 69 violation, but still guilt of the lesser crime of assault.” (Brown, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 154 .) We also conclude that the error in failing to instruct on simple assault was prejudicial. “‘“[T]he failure to instruct sua sponte on a lesser included offense in a noncapital case is, at most, an error of California law alone, and is thus subject only to state standards of reversibility.” [Citation.] Under the state standard, “such misdirection of the jury is not subject to reversal unless an examination of t

2015Any Error Was Harmless When a trial court “misapplies Evidence Code section 352 to exclude defense evidence . . . the applicable standard of prejudice is that for state law error, as set forth in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 .” (People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 611 .) Thus, the court will “reverse only if it also finds a reasonable probability the error affected the verdict adversely to defendant. [Citations.]” (People v. Humphrey (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1089 ; see also People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1102-1103 .) We find no such prejudice here.

2013Thus, “[i]f the trial court misstepped, ‘[t]he trial court’s ruling was an error of law merely; there was no refusal to allow [defendant] to present a defense, but only a rejection of some evidence concerning the defense.’ [Citation.] Accordingly, the proper standard of review is that announced in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 , 836 . . . .” (People v. Fudge, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 1103.) Under the Watson standard, the court must reverse only if it also finds a reasonable probability the error affected the verdict adversely to defendant.

2021A trial court’s failure to instruct sua sponte on a lesser included offense “is not subject to reversal unless an examination of the entire record establishes a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome.” (Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 165 ; see People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 .)17 “ ‘The question is not what a jury could have done, but what a jury would likely have done if properly instructed.’ ” (People v. Larsen (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 810, 831 .) In making this determination, we may consider the relative strengths and weaknesses of the evidence supporting th

2021(People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 559 [“an instruction on voluntary intoxication . . . is a form of pinpoint instruction that the trial court is not required to give in the absence of a request”]; People v. Saille (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1119 .) “Instructional error that limits the jury’s consideration of voluntary intoxication evidence ‘is thus subject to the usual standard for state law error [under which] “the court must reverse only if it also finds a reasonable probability the error 31 affected the verdict adversely to defendant.”’” (People v. Mendoza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1114, 1134-11

2025(See Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 165, 169 [failure to instruct on lesser included offense is error of California law alone and therefore subject to state standards of reversibility].) Under this standard, the failure to instruct on a lesser included offense “is not subject to reversal unless an examination of the entire record establishes a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome.” (Breverman, at p. 165.) In applying this standard, we focus “not on what a reasonable jury could do, but 14 what such a jury is likely to have done in the absence of the error under consid

2023We raise the issue ourselves to forestall the need to address it on habeas (People v. Williams, supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1126 ), having afforded the parties an opportunity to submit supplemental briefing. 15 California law alone and therefore subject to state standards of reversibility].) Under this standard, the failure to instruct on a lesser included offense “is not subject to reversal unless an examination of the entire record establishes a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome.” (Breverman, at p. 165.) In applying this standard, we focus “not on what a reasonable j

2023When the reviewing court applying state law finds an erroneous exclusion of defense evidence, the usual standard of review for state law error applies: the court must reverse only if it also finds a reasonable probability the error affected the verdict adversely to defendant.” (Humphrey, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1089 .) The court did not exclude evidence regarding autism spectrum disorder.

2016The court concluded that “[a]ny error would have the effect of excluding defense evidence and is thus subject to the usual standard for state law error: ‘the court must reverse only if it also finds a reasonable probability the error affected the verdict adversely to defendant.’ ” (Ibid., quoting People v. Humphrey (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1089 .) We find this 8 The Attorney General does not argue that the instruction should not have been given on the ground that defendant’s belief in the need for self-defense was purely delusional.

2025We review a trial court’s failure to instruct on a lesser included offense for prejudice under the Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818 , harmless error standard. ( Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 867–868; see People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237 , 260.) Such an error “does not require reversal ‘unless an examination of the entire record establishes a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome.’ ” (People v. Wyatt (2012) 55 Cal.4th 694, 698 ; People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 955 .) Accordingly, a trial court’s failure to instruct on a lesser included offense is harmless if

2024A trial court’s failure to instruct on a lesser included offense is harmless if the defendant “cannot demonstrate a reasonable probability that the jury would have—without the error—reached a different result.” (People v. Gonzalez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 186, 191 .) We review a trial court’s failure to instruct on a lesser included offense for prejudice under the People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 harmless error standard. ( Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 867– 868; see People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237 , 260.) Such an error “does not require reversal ‘unless an examination of the entire re

2025We review a trial court’s failure to instruct on a lesser included offense for prejudice under the Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818 , harmless error standard. ( Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 867–868; see People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237 , 260.) Such an error “does not require reversal ‘unless an examination of the entire record establishes a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome.’ ” (People v. Wyatt (2012) 55 Cal.4th 694, 698 ; People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 955 .) Accordingly, a trial court’s failure to instruct on a lesser included offense is harmless if

2024A trial court’s failure to instruct on a lesser included offense is harmless if the defendant “cannot demonstrate a reasonable probability that the jury would have—without the error—reached a different result.” (People v. Gonzalez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 186, 191 .) We review a trial court’s failure to instruct on a lesser included offense for prejudice under the People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 harmless error standard. ( Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 867– 868; see People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237 , 260.) Such an error “does not require reversal ‘unless an examination of the entire re

2019To the extent the court erred in instructing on a theory unsupported by the evidence, the error is one of state law, “subject to the reasonable probability standard of harmless error under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 , 836–837 [(Watson)].” (People v. Whisenhunt (2008) 44 Cal.4th 174, 214 ; see also People v. Debose (2014) 59 Cal.4th 177 , 205–206 [error of instructing on inapplicable theory subject to Watson review] (Debose).) On the other hand, “[i]nstructional error regarding the elements of the offense 9 Even if there had been evidence of a primary target, the kill zone theory req

2019To the extent the court erred in instructing on a theory unsupported by the evidence, the error is one of state law, “subject to the reasonable probability standard of harmless error under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 , 836–837 [(Watson)].” (People v. Whisenhunt (2008) 44 Cal.4th 174, 214 ; see also People v. Debose (2014) 59 Cal.4th 177 , 205–206 [error of instructing on inapplicable theory subject to Watson review] (Debose).) On the other hand, “[i]nstructional error regarding the elements of the offense 9 Even if there had been evidence of a primary target, the kill zone theory req

2025(People v. Jandres (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 340, 357 ; see also People v. Nguyen (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1120 .) Considering the number of children who accused Garcia and the similarity of their allegations, it is not reasonably probable that Niece L.’s statement affected the verdict.

2025(People v. Jandres (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 340, 357 ; see also People v. Nguyen (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1120 .) Considering the number of children who accused Garcia and the similarity of their allegations, it is not reasonably probable that Niece L.’s statement affected the verdict.

2024(See People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838 , 896–899 [erroneous voluntary intoxication instruction concerning aider and abettor liability did not violate due process and thus the question was whether it was reasonably probable the error affected the verdict adversely to the defendant]; People v. Pearson (2012) 53 Cal.4th 306, 325 (Pearson) [failure to instruct on voluntary intoxication in relation to the specific intent to torture reviewable for prejudice under the reasonable probability test]; People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 187 [assumed erroneous voluntary intoxication

2021(People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 172-178 .) In this regard, we “consider whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the trial court’s instructions caused the jury to misapply the law in violation of the Constitution.” (Mitchell, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 579 ; Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62 , 72 & fn. 4.) As such, an instructional error requires reversal only where “an examination of the entire record establishes a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome.” (Breverman, at p. 165, citing Watson, at p. 836, and Cal. Const., art.

2016“Instructional error regarding the elements of the offense requires reversal of the judgment unless the reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict.” (People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172, 1201 [ 91 Cal.Rptr.3d 106 , 203 P.3d 425 ]; see Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , 87 S.Ct. 824 ].) On the other hand, to the extent the court erred in instructing on a theory unsupported by the evidence, the error is one of state law, “subject to the reasonable probability standard of harmless error under People v. Watson

2016“Instructional error regarding the elements of the offense requires reversal of the judgment unless the reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict.” (People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172, 1201 [ 91 Cal.Rptr.3d 106 , 203 P.3d 425 ]; see Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , 87 S.Ct. 824 ].) On the other hand, to the extent the court erred in instructing on a theory unsupported by the evidence, the error is one of state law, “subject to the reasonable probability standard of harmless error under People v. Watson

2024“To obtain relief, [] a defendant who has established that the trial court erred in denying Pitchess discovery must also demonstrate a reasonable probability of a different outcome had the evidence been disclosed.” (Gaines, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 182 .) “The reasonable-probability standard of prejudice [courts] have applied in Pitchess cases is the same standard [courts] have applied generally to claims that the prosecution improperly withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of a defendant’s right to due process” under Brady.

2024(Gaines, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 181 ; see also id. at p. 183 [“The reasonable-probability standard of prejudice we have applied in Pitchess cases is the same standard we have applied 16 As noted ante (pt.