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5 Vermont opinions name it 1 courts 2013–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Vermont courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Williams v. Taylorgreen2 sentences2013See Strickland , 466 U.S. at 694 (“The result of a proceeding can be rendered unreliable, and hence the proceeding itself unfair, even if the errors of counsel cannot be shown by a preponderance of the evidence to have determined the outcome.”); see also Williams v. Taylor , 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000) (explaining that a preponderance of the evidence standard would be “opposed to our clearly established precedent . . . that the prisoner need only demonstrate a reasonable probability that . . . the result of the proceeding would have been different” (quotation omitted)). ¶ 11. 2013See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (“The result of a proceeding can be rendered unreliable, and hence the proceeding itself unfair, even if the errors of counsel cannot be shown by a preponderance of the evidence to have determined the outcome.”); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000) (explaining that a preponderance of the evidence standard would be “opposed to our clearly established precedent . . . that the prisoner need only demonstrate a reasonable probability that . . . the result of the proceeding would have been different” (quotation omitted)). ¶ 11. | 2 | 2 |
Strickland v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2013See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (“The result of a proceeding can be rendered unreliable, and hence the proceeding itself unfair, even if the errors of counsel cannot be shown by a preponderance of the evidence to have determined the outcome.”); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000) (explaining that a preponderance of the evidence standard would be “opposed to our clearly established precedent . . . that the prisoner need only demonstrate a reasonable probability that . . . the result of the proceeding would have been different” (quotation omitted)). ¶ 11. 2013Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 . | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Marcusgreen2 sentences2018In other words, to find plain error, "there must be a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the trial." United States v. Marcus , 560 U.S. 258 , 262, 130 S.Ct. 2159 , 176 L.Ed.2d 1012 (2010) (emphasis added). 2018In other words, to find plain error, "there must be a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the trial." United States v. Marcus , 560 U.S. 258 , 262, 130 S.Ct. 2159 , 176 L.Ed.2d 1012 (2010) (emphasis added). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Wrightgreen2 sentences2016We concluded that the petitioner had failed to do so, given that the “evidence on both threats was inextricably intertwined” and “the victim often described both threats within the same statement.” Id.; see also United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258 , 262-63 7 (2010) (rejecting plain-error standard that would set aside conviction based on any possibility of different verdict and holding that for prejudice component of plain-error standard to be satisfied, “there must be a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the trial” (emphasis added)); cf. State v. Wright, 154 Vt. 51 2016We concluded that the petitioner had failed to do so, given that the “evidence on both threats was inextricably intertwined” and “the victim often described both threats within the same statement.” Id.; see also United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258 , 262-63 7 (2010) (rejecting plain-error standard that would set aside conviction based on any possibility of different verdict and holding that for prejudice component of plain-error standard to be satisfied, “there must be a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the trial” (emphasis added)); cf. State v. Wright, 154 Vt. 51 | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Vermont. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Jeffrey M. Ray
green
1 sentence2023As we have often repeated, “we find plain error only in rare and extraordinary circumstances.” State v. Ray, 2019 VT 51, ¶ 6 , 210 Vt. 496 , 216 A.3d 1274 (quotation omitted). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Prior
green
2 sentences2016Similarly, in State v. Prior, where the trial court instructed the jury that the defendant could be found guilty of violating a relief-from-abuse order by “following or stalking” the victim but gave no specific unanimity instruction, we found no plain error because the defendant’s consistent position throughout his trial was that he neither stalked nor followed the victim. 2007 VT 1, ¶ 5 , 181 Vt. 564 , 917 A.2d 466 (mem.) We concluded that where “evidence relating to alternative theories under which a jury could convict is intertwined throughout the trial and defendant’s defense did not disti 2016Similarly, in State v. Prior, where the trial court instructed the jury that the defendant could be found guilty of violating a relief-from-abuse order by “following or stalking” the victim but gave no specific unanimity instruction, we found no plain error because the defendant’s consistent position throughout his trial was that he neither stalked nor followed the victim. 2007 VT 1, ¶ 5 , 181 Vt. 564 , 917 A.2d 466 (mem.) We concluded that where “evidence relating to alternative theories under which a jury could convict is intertwined throughout the trial and defendant’s defense did not disti | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.