27 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1985–2023 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Strickland v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2015The reasonable probability standard 62 requires only “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. 2015The reasonable probability standard 62 requires only “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. | 3 | 8 |
City of San Antonio v. Velagreen2 sentences2018City of San Antonio v. Vela, 762 S.W.2d 314, 321 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1988, writ denied). 2007City of San Antonio v. Vela , 762 S.W.2d 314, 321 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988, writ denied); Armellini Exp. | 2 | 3 |
N.N. v. Institute for Rehabilitation & Researchgreen2 sentences2015N.N. v. Inst. for Rehab. & Research, 234 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.). 2. 2015N.N. v. Inst. for Rehab. & Research, 234 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.). 2. | 2 | 2 |
Routier v. Stategreen2 sentences2014See Routier v. State, 273 S.W.3d 241 , 259 n. 76 (Tex.Crim. 2014See Routier v. State , 273 S.W.3d 241 , 259 n.76 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2 |
Ex Parte Gonzalesgreen1 sentence2022Ex parte Buck, 418 S.W.3d 96 , 110 n.11 (Tex.Crim.App. 2013)(citing Gonzales, Ex Parte, 204 S.W.3d 391, 394 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006))(“A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”); see also Bouchillon v. Collins, 907 F.2d 589, 595 (5th Cir. 1990)(“sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome” is “a lower burden of proof than the preponderance standard”). | 1 | 1 |
Terry Allen Bouchillon v. James A. Collins, Director Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Divisiongreen1 sentence2022Ex parte Buck, 418 S.W.3d 96 , 110 n.11 (Tex.Crim.App. 2013)(citing Gonzales, Ex Parte, 204 S.W.3d 391, 394 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006))(“A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”); see also Bouchillon v. Collins, 907 F.2d 589, 595 (5th Cir. 1990)(“sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome” is “a lower burden of proof than the preponderance standard”). | 1 | 1 |
Rivera v. Stategreen1 sentence2019See id. | 1 | 1 |
Martinez v. Ryangreen1 sentence2017Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (noting that the test for prejudice requires a showing that there is a reasonable probability, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would.have been different); see also Martinez, 566 U.S. at 14, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (holding that a prisoner may establish cause for a default for an ineffective assistance claim when the prisoner can establish that appointed counsel on the initial-review collateral proceeding was ineffective under the standards of Strickland v. Washington.). | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Taylorgreen2 sentences2015E.g., Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 , 404–06 (2000) (O’Connor, J., for the Court) (state court improperly applied “preponderance of evidence” standard to defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel); United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74 , 83 n.9 (2004) (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433-34 (1995)) (“The reasonable-probability standard is not the same as, and should not be confused with, a requirement that a defendant prove by a preponderance of the evidence that but for error things would have been different”); Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 175 (1986) (to sh 2015See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (“The result of a proceeding can be rendered unreliable, and hence the proceeding itself unfair, even if the errors of counsel cannot be shown by a preponderance of the evidence to have determined the outcome.”); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 , 405–06 (2000) (explaining that a preponderance of the evidence standard would be “opposed to our clearly established precedent ... that the prisoner need only demonstrate a reasonable probability that ... the result of the proceeding would have been different” (quotation omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
Youngblood v. West Virginiagreen1 sentence2015E.g., Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 , 404–06 (2000) (O’Connor, J., for the Court) (state court improperly applied “preponderance of evidence” standard to defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel); United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74 , 83 n.9 (2004) (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433-34 (1995)) (“The reasonable-probability standard is not the same as, and should not be confused with, a requirement that a defendant prove by a preponderance of the evidence that but for error things would have been different”); Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 175 (1986) (to sh | 1 | 1 |
Hagos v. Peoplegreen1 sentence2015Vt. 2001) (“the ‘reasonable probability’ standard is lower than the preponderance standard”); Hagos v. People, 288 P.3d 116, 120 (Colo. 2012) (“The word ‘probability’ [in “reasonable probability”] does not require a defendant to show that the deficient performance more likely than not altered the outcome of the case.”). 7 than the one the statute imposes – that the defendant need show only a reasonable probability that, if presented with the DNA testing results, at least one juror would have harbored a reasonable doubt about his guilt. | 1 | 1 |
Kyles v. Whitleygreen1 sentence2015E.g., Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 , 404–06 (2000) (O’Connor, J., for the Court) (state court improperly applied “preponderance of evidence” standard to defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel); United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74 , 83 n.9 (2004) (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433-34 (1995)) (“The reasonable-probability standard is not the same as, and should not be confused with, a requirement that a defendant prove by a preponderance of the evidence that but for error things would have been different”); Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 175 (1986) (to sh | 1 | 1 |
Purdy v. Zeldesgreen1 sentence2015E.g., Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 , 404–06 (2000) (O’Connor, J., for the Court) (state court improperly applied “preponderance of evidence” standard to defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel); United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74 , 83 n.9 (2004) (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433-34 (1995)) (“The reasonable-probability standard is not the same as, and should not be confused with, a requirement that a defendant prove by a preponderance of the evidence that but for error things would have been different”); Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 175 (1986) (to sh | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Elizondogreen1 sentence2015See Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
George Lindstadt v. John P. Keane, Superintendentgreen1 sentence2015E.g., Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 , 404–06 (2000) (O’Connor, J., for the Court) (state court improperly applied “preponderance of evidence” standard to defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel); United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74 , 83 n.9 (2004) (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433-34 (1995)) (“The reasonable-probability standard is not the same as, and should not be confused with, a requirement that a defendant prove by a preponderance of the evidence that but for error things would have been different”); Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 175 (1986) (to sh | 1 | 1 |
Nix v. Whitesidegreen1 sentence2015E.g., Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 , 404–06 (2000) (O’Connor, J., for the Court) (state court improperly applied “preponderance of evidence” standard to defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel); United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74 , 83 n.9 (2004) (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433-34 (1995)) (“The reasonable-probability standard is not the same as, and should not be confused with, a requirement that a defendant prove by a preponderance of the evidence that but for error things would have been different”); Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 175 (1986) (to sh | 1 | 1 |
Crosstex NGL Pipeline, L.P. v. Reins Road Farms-1, Ltd.green1 sentence2013Farms-1, Ltd., 404 S.W.3d 754, 760-61 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2013, no pet. h.) (citing Denbury, 363 S.W.3d at 202 n. 28). 26 Even if Denbury should apply here, TransCanada contends, it has done all that is required under the reasonable probability test established in that case to show that it is a common carrier. | 1 | 1 |
Fisher v. Coastal Transport Co.green2 sentences1999See Fisher v. Coastal Transport Co., 149 Tex. 224 , 230 S.W.2d 522, 523 (1950). 1999See Fisher v. Coastal Transport Co., 149 Tex. 224 , 230 S.W.2d 522, 523 (1950). | 1 | 1 |
Hughett v. Dwyregreen1 sentence1992Hughett v. Dwyre, 624 S.W.2d 401, 405 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Texas Utilities Electric Co.
green
2 sentences2023Id. at 654–55. 2021Id. at 654–55. | 4 | 2006–2023 |
United States v. Dominguez Benitez
green
2 sentences2015E.g., Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 , 404–06 (2000) (O’Connor, J., for the Court) (state court improperly applied “preponderance of evidence” standard to defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel); United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74 , 83 n.9 (2004) (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433-34 (1995)) (“The reasonable-probability standard is not the same as, and should not be confused with, a requirement that a defendant prove by a preponderance of the evidence that but for error things would have been different”); Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 175 (1986) (to sh 2015“The reasonable-probability standard is not the same as, and should not be confused with, a requirement that a defendant prove by a preponderance of the evidence that but for error things would have been different.” United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74 , 82 n. 9, 124 S.Ct. 2333 , 159 L.Ed.2d 157 (2004); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (“The result of a proceeding can be rendered unreliable, and hence, the proceeding itself unfair, even if the errors of counsel cannot be shown by a preponderance of the evidence to have determined the outcome.”). | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Kutzner v. State
green
2 sentences2014In addressing the former version of the Chapter 64 provision providing a right of appeal, this Court explained that the Legislature intended to “‘give convicted people full access to the courts’ and to ‘provide a check on individual courts’ decisions.’” Kutzner, 75 S.W.3d at 433-35 . 2014In addressing the former version of the Chapter 64 provision providing a right of appeal, this Court explained that the Legislature intended to "'give convicted people full access to the courts' and to 'provide a check on individual courts' decisions.'" Kutzner , 75 S.W.3d at 433-35 . | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Lopez v. State
green
1 sentence2022See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 ; Lopez, 343 S.W.3d at 142 . 8 Carter’s first two claims, that his defense counsel introduced harmful evidence and she introduced that evidence for no valid purpose, have failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel. 2. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
PNS Stores, Inc. v. Munguia
green
1 sentence2016PNS Store, Inc. v. Munguia, supra. To meet the reasonable probability rule, as required to support an award for future mental anguish, a plaintiff must (1) present evidence that in reasonable probability, he will suffer damages in the future and (2) prove the probable reasonable amount of the future damages. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Katy Springs & Manufacturing, Inc. v. Favalora
green
1 sentence2016Katy Springs & Manufacturing, Inc. v. Favalora, supra. Furthermore, a plaintiff can recover only for injuries caused by the event made the basis of the suit. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Brady v. Maryland
green
1 sentence2015E.g., Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 , 404–06 (2000) (O’Connor, J., for the Court) (state court improperly applied “preponderance of evidence” standard to defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel); United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74 , 83 n.9 (2004) (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433-34 (1995)) (“The reasonable-probability standard is not the same as, and should not be confused with, a requirement that a defendant prove by a preponderance of the evidence that but for error things would have been different”); Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 175 (1986) (to sh | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Rosenboom MacHine & Tool, Inc. v. MacHala
green
1 sentence2003Rosenboom , 995 S.W.2d at 828 ; Vela , 762 S.W.2d at 321 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
United States v. Bagley
green
2 sentences1992Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 , 105 S.Ct. at 3383 . 1992Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 , 105 S.Ct. at 3383 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.